A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. examined the ambit of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to quashing of criminal proceedings founded on allegations of rape on a false promise of marriage. The complainant, a previously married woman with a child, accused the appellant of repeatedly engaging in sexual intercourse with her under the pretext of marriage. She further alleged unnatural sex, threats, and abuse. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s plea for quashing under Section 482 CrPC, leading to the present appeal.

The Supreme Court, after scrutinising the factual matrix and legal precedents, found no material evidence suggesting coercion, threat, or inducement under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), or 506 IPC. The Court emphasized that consent under Section 90 IPC cannot be said to be vitiated merely by the promise of marriage unless such promise was false from the inception. It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) to underline that consensual relationships later turning sour cannot invoke the criminal machinery of the State. Observing that the prosecution bore traits of mala fide intent and that continuation of trial would amount to abuse of process, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings in the interest of justice.

This decision reinforces the caution against criminalizing failed relationships and reiterates the judicial responsibility to prevent misuse of laws meant to protect women. It highlights that every breach of promise cannot be construed as rape and reflects the balance courts must maintain between safeguarding women and protecting individuals from vexatious prosecutions.

Keywords: Quashing of criminal case, false promise of marriage, consensual sexual relationship, Section 90 IPC, misuse of criminal law, inducement, coercion, abuse of process of law, Section 482 CrPC.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case stems from allegations by a woman, previously married and a mother of a minor child, who accused the appellant, a young agricultural student, of having coerced her into sexual relations under a false assurance of marriage. The complaint registered at Karad Taluka Police Station accused the appellant under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504, and 506 of the IPC. The complainant asserted that despite her initial resistance, she was compelled into physical intimacy on repeated assurances of marriage, which ultimately did not materialize due to opposition from the appellant’s family.

The appellant, however, contested these claims, asserting that the relationship was consensual and initiated voluntarily by the complainant. He also filed counter-complaints alleging harassment and threats by the complainant, which revealed the possibility of mala fides. The case thus raised a crucial legal issue: whether criminal prosecution based on such allegations could sustain or whether it amounted to an abuse of process.

The High Court of Bombay dismissed the appellant’s plea under Section 482 CrPC, refusing to quash the proceedings, holding that allegations disclosed cognizable offences warranting trial. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court, which was tasked with examining whether the continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellant was justified in law.

This case lies at the intersection of criminal law and gender justice, revisiting the delicate boundary between genuine complaints of sexual exploitation and misuse of penal provisions. The Supreme Court’s approach reflects its consistent stance in distinguishing false promises from breaches of consensual relationships, ensuring that criminal law is not weaponized in personal disputes.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant, who had obtained a Khulanama divorce from her ex-husband in December 2022 and lived with her four-year-old son, became acquainted with the appellant, who resided as a tenant in the neighborhood. Their friendship developed into a romantic relationship. The complainant alleged that in July 2022, the appellant entered her house at night and engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her wishes, promising marriage after her divorce. Thereafter, multiple instances of intercourse occurred, allegedly without her free consent but based on the assurance of marriage. She also accused him of borrowing money, misusing her car, and committing unnatural sex at a lodge in January 2023.

The relationship soured when the appellant distanced himself and moved to his native village in Ahmednagar. In July 2023, the complainant visited his family, where she claimed to have been abused and assaulted by his relatives when they refused to solemnize the marriage due to religious differences. The FIR was lodged on 31 July 2023, nearly 13 months after the alleged initiation of sexual relations.

The appellant refuted the allegations, claiming that the complainant had pursued him, frequently visited his college, and even harassed him. His father lodged a complaint alleging threats by the complainant to implicate him in false rape charges. The Additional Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail, noting that the prosecutrix was a mature woman capable of consenting and that the long-standing consensual relationship contradicted the rape allegations.

The appellant sought quashing under Section 482 CrPC before the Bombay High Court, but the petition was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, disclose the commission of offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504, and 506 IPC.
ii. Whether consent given by the complainant was vitiated by a false promise of marriage under Section 90 IPC.
iii. Whether the prosecution was an abuse of process and liable to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
iv. Whether the prolonged consensual relationship negates the inference of rape under false promise of marriage.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the appellant argued that the relationship was consensual and mutual, involving a mature woman who was fully aware of the consequences of her actions. The allegations of coercion and false promise were improbable, particularly given the complainant’s continued association with the appellant over more than a year.

ii. It was contended that the FIR was lodged with a considerable delay of 13 months, undermining its credibility. The delay, coupled with the complainant’s sustained companionship, visiting lodges, and lending money and her car, pointed towards voluntary participation rather than victimization.

iii. The appellant relied upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp 1 SCC 335), arguing that the case fell squarely within the categories warranting quashing, especially where allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, or actuated by mala fides.

iv. The appellant further cited Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023 SCC OnLine SC 89), stressing that not every breach of promise constitutes rape and that only where the promise was false from the inception could an offence under Section 376 IPC be made out.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the complainant and the State argued that the allegations disclosed a prima facie case of rape under false promise of marriage. It was submitted that the complainant had consistently resisted sexual advances and only yielded due to the repeated assurance of marriage.

ii. They asserted that consent obtained on such misrepresentation falls within Section 90 IPC, thereby constituting rape under Section 375 IPC.

iii. It was further argued that quashing at the threshold would deny the complainant the opportunity of trial and examination of evidence, which ought to be considered during trial rather than at the pre-trial stage.

iv. The respondents emphasized that the chargesheet had already been filed, demonstrating sufficient material for prosecution, and hence the High Court was justified in refusing to quash proceedings.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 376 IPC – Punishment for rape.
ii. Section 376(2)(n) IPC – Punishment for repeated commission of rape on the same woman.
iii. Section 377 IPC (since omitted but applicable for unnatural offences at the relevant time).
iv. Section 504 IPC – Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.
v. Section 506 IPC – Criminal intimidation.
vi. Section 90 IPC – Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.
vii. Section 482 CrPC – Inherent powers of the High Court to quash proceedings to prevent abuse of process of law.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court held that the continuation of prosecution against the appellant would be unjustified. It noted that the complainant’s conduct of maintaining a long-term relationship, visiting lodges, lending money, and continuing intimacy belied her allegations of coercion or inducement. Her consent could not be said to be under misconception as defined under Section 90 IPC. The Court reiterated that not every breach of promise amounts to false promise; only when such promise is false from inception can it vitiate consent.

The Court relied on Bhajan Lal to emphasize that the case fell under categories where criminal proceedings should be quashed to prevent abuse of process. Observing that the complainant’s prosecution reflected mala fide motives and disgruntled emotions, the Court quashed the FIR and chargesheet, discharging the appellant.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio decidendi of this judgment lies in the principle that consensual sexual relations between adults, even if induced by a promise of marriage, cannot constitute rape unless it is proved that the promise was false from inception. Mere breach of promise, without evidence of deception or lack of intent to marry ab initio, does not vitiate consent under Section 90 IPC.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that misuse of rape laws by treating every failed relationship as sexual exploitation burdens the judicial system and maligns the identity of the accused. It stressed the need for caution and restraint in prosecuting such cases, as they may often be borne out of personal vendetta rather than genuine grievance.

c. GUIDELINES

• Courts must carefully distinguish between breach of promise and false promise of marriage.

• Consent of mature individuals in sustained relationships should not be lightly disregarded.

• Delay in lodging FIR must be scrutinized closely in cases involving false promise of marriage.

• High Courts must exercise Section 482 CrPC powers to prevent misuse of criminal law in personal disputes.

• Criminal law should not be invoked to settle scores in broken relationships.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment reinforces the settled jurisprudence that criminal law must not be used as a weapon in matters arising from failed relationships. The Supreme Court rightly emphasized that sexual relations sustained over a prolonged period between consenting adults cannot be retrospectively converted into allegations of rape on breach of promise of marriage. By quashing the proceedings, the Court protected the appellant from an unnecessary trial and prevented misuse of criminal machinery.

The ruling aligns with earlier precedents and underscores the responsibility of courts to filter vexatious prosecutions. It also highlights the importance of protecting both women’s rights and men’s liberty, balancing gender justice with due process. The judgment sends a clear message that while genuine cases of sexual exploitation must be punished, the law cannot be misapplied to settle personal disputes or pressurize individuals into marriage.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
ii. Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504, 506, 90.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482.