A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This landmark judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service & Another v. The State of Bombay clarified a pivotal issue under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, regarding the termination of conciliation proceedings. The core question revolved around whether an employer, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, could dismiss a workman without prior permission of the appropriate authority under Section 33(1) of the Act. The appellants, who had dismissed a workman during conciliation proceedings, were prosecuted under Section 31(1) of the Act for violating Section 33(1).
The Court held that the pendency of conciliation proceedings does not expire automatically after 14 days, as contemplated under Section 12(6), but only terminates as per Section 20(2), i.e., when the report of the Conciliation Officer is received by the appropriate Government. Thus, any punitive action taken during such pendency without express permission contravenes the law.
This decision reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with procedural mandates under industrial law and provided necessary judicial clarity to employers, employees, and legal practitioners regarding industrial adjudication timelines.
Keywords: Industrial Disputes Act, Conciliation Proceedings, Section 33 Violation, Section 20 Interpretation, Workman Dismissal, Labour Law, Supreme Court, 1959 Judgment
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title: Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service & Another v. The State of Bombay
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1957
iii) Judgement Date: 21st April, 1959
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice Syed Jafer Imam
vi) Author: Justice J. L. Kapur
vii) Citation: [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 734
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
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Section 33(1) and Section 31(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
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Section 12(6) and Section 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
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Labour Law
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Industrial Disputes
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Employment Law
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Criminal Law (Industrial Offences)
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case unfolded during the early evolution of India’s industrial jurisprudence, particularly involving employers’ obligations during industrial dispute resolution. The dispute involved the Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service, a private transport service in Bombay, and its managerial authority. A key issue arose when the employer dismissed a workman, Louis Pereira, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings—a process intended to mediate industrial disputes and avoid escalation into strikes or lockouts.
The Bombay High Court convicted the appellants under Section 31(1) for violating Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellants argued that the 14-day period specified in Section 12(6) for conciliation should be the defining limit for ‘pendency’, and beyond this, the proceedings could not legally continue. The Supreme Court was thus called to determine whether proceedings actually continued beyond 14 days in the absence of a submitted report, and what the legal implications of such pendency were.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service faced an industrial dispute raised by a workers’ union in 1951, with the Conciliation Officer commencing proceedings formally on January 17, 1952. These discussions, negotiations, and hearings continued into June 1952, with the employer and the union both admitting failure of negotiations on June 2, 1952, and May 9, 1952, respectively.
Meanwhile, during this pendency, on March 18, 1952, the management dismissed one of its conductors—Louis Pereira—without seeking prior approval or express permission from the authority handling the dispute. This led to a complaint by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, prosecuting five individuals including the two appellants.
The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted all accused, holding that conciliation proceedings must terminate after 14 days, as per Section 12(6). The State appealed, and the Bombay High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the appellants. Hence, this appeal by special leave came before the Supreme Court.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act terminate automatically after 14 days under Section 12(6).
ii. Whether the dismissal of a workman during such proceedings, without approval, violates Section 33(1).
iii. Whether proceedings are deemed pending until the Government receives the Conciliation Officer’s report under Section 20(2)(b).
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for the appellants submitted that Section 12(6) mandates the Conciliation Officer to submit a report within 14 days from the date of commencement of conciliation. Thus, they argued that any continuation beyond that period was unauthorised and illegal.
They further contended that once the 14-day period had lapsed without a formal report, the conciliation proceedings must be deemed terminated, rendering any action taken thereafter, including the dismissal of Pereira, as falling outside the ‘pendency’ clause under Section 33(1).
Relying on strict construction of penal provisions, they claimed that continuing proceedings without legal basis violates the employers’ rights and should not attract penal consequences. They also attempted to rely on the precedent in Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I.L.R. 1947 All. 155, to suggest that the limitation period under the statute was to be strictly followed.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for the State of Bombay submitted that the Industrial Disputes Act, in Section 20(2)(b), clearly outlines that conciliation proceedings conclude only when the report is received by the appropriate Government, not merely when 14 days pass from the start of proceedings.
They emphasized that Section 12(6) only imposes a duty on the Officer to act expediently but does not curtail the pendency of proceedings. Thus, any action taken before the receipt of the Conciliation Officer’s report remains within the statutory definition of ‘pendency’.
They further invoked Workers of the Industry Colliery, Dhanbad v. Management of the Industry Colliery, [1953] S.C.R. 428, and Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New Beerbhoom Coal Co. Ltd., [1952] L.A.C. 219, where the apex Court held that pendency continues until the Government receives the report, reinforcing the constitutional intent of fair adjudication before punitive measures.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Section 12(6) – Requires Conciliation Officer to submit a report within 14 days.
ii. Section 20(2)(b) – States that proceedings conclude when the report is received by the Government.
iii. Section 33(1) – Bars employers from changing service conditions or dismissing employees during pending proceedings.
iv. Section 31(1) – Penal provision for violating Section 33.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Supreme Court held that conciliation proceedings do not conclude automatically after 14 days, and the pendency continues until the report is received by the appropriate Government under Section 20(2)(b).
Thus, the dismissal of Louis Pereira occurred during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, and the employer was legally bound to obtain permission under Section 33(1). Failure to do so made them liable under Section 31(1).
The interpretation aimed to protect workmen from employer retaliation during industrial disputes and upheld the legislative intention behind the Industrial Disputes Act.
b. OBITER DICTA
i. Even if the Conciliation Officer failed to adhere to the statutory deadline, the legal consequence is not the termination of proceedings but an internal administrative lapse. This does not excuse the employer from compliance with Section 33.
c. GUIDELINES
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Conciliation proceedings must be interpreted in line with Section 20, not merely Section 12(6).
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Employers must avoid punitive actions during such pendency unless permitted under law.
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The submission of a report and its receipt by the Government are distinct and important.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment in this case has long-standing implications for Indian labour jurisprudence. It provides a protective umbrella for workmen during delicate stages of dispute resolution and prevents coercive employer actions. The ruling established a critical judicial precedent clarifying that procedural compliance cannot be diluted by statutory time-limits when substantive rights of workmen are at stake.
It also reaffirmed the constitutional and legislative objectives behind the Industrial Disputes Act—ensuring fair negotiation and industrial harmony. The decision is a cornerstone in balancing industrial relations and procedural legality.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
[1] Workers of the Industry Colliery, Dhanbad v. Management of the Industry Colliery, [1953] S.C.R. 428
[2] Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New Beerbhoom Coal Co. Ltd., [1952] L.A.C. 219
[3] Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I.L.R. 1947 All. 155
b. Important Statutes Referred
[1] Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – [Sections 12(6), 20(2)(b), 31(1), 33(1)]
[2] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (old reference framework in procedural context)