A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Ashutosh Pathak v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., SLP (Criminal) No.10852/2024 Supreme Court (Dulia & Amanullah, JJ.), 04 Feb 2025. The petition challenged two interlocutory orders of the Trial Court:

(i) partial allowance of a Section 311, CrPC application that summoned Vinay Kumar Pathak (V) but did not summon Kanak Lata Singh (K); and

(ii) the closure of the defence’s opportunity to examine V after the defence failed to have him present when last opportunity was granted.

The High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482, CrPC and this Court in turn refused special leave. The core legal questions were (a) the ambit and exercise of the court’s discretionary power under Section 311, CrPC when prosecution witness names appear in the prosecution list but are sought to be summoned later by the defence; and (b) whether the Trial Court misapplied principles of criminal procedure by closing the opportunity to examine a witness who had been arrayed as a prosecution witness but not examined by the State.

The Court applied settled authorities (including Satbir Singh, Ratanlal, Vijay Kumar, Zahira Habibullah Sheikh, Umar Mohammad and Harendra Rai) to hold that:

(i) Section 311 is a wide but cautious discretionary power to be employed only for the ends of justice;

(ii) summoning a person at the belated stage is not automatic and must be justified, bearing in mind delay, prejudice and previous directions for expedition;

(iii) the defence was given adequate opportunities and bore the primary onus to ensure presence of its witness; and

(iv) successive and dilatory applications under Section 311 constituted an abuse of process. The High Court order was affirmed and special leave refused.

Keywords: Section 311 CrPC; summoning witnesses; closure of defence evidence; dilatory tactics; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS 

i) Judgement Cause Title: Ashutosh Pathak v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr..
ii) Case Number: SLP (Criminal) No.10852 of 2024.
iii) Judgement Date: 04 February 2025.
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India (Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia & Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.).
v) Quorum: Two-Judge Bench.
vi) Author: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J..
vii) Citation: [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1831 : 2025 INSC 534.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 311, CrPC; Section 313, CrPC; relevant provisions of IPC (Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506) and Dowry Prohibition Act (Sections 3, 4).
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None.
x) Related Law Subjects: Criminal Procedure; Criminal Evidence; Criminal Law; Judicial Discretion & Case Management.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arises from matrimonial-criminal proceedings registered on 30.04.2018 under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act following allegations of dowry demand and physical and mental cruelty. After investigation and chargesheet, prosecution listed 16 witnesses including Vinay Kumar Pathak (V) and Kanak Lata Singh (K). The prosecution however led only three witnesses at trial. Following closure of prosecution evidence and recording of accused statements under Section 313, CrPC (01.05.2023), the accused sought to summon V and K under Section 311, CrPC by application dated 19.09.2023.

The Trial Court partly allowed the application and summoned V (order dated 18.05.2024), directed him to be present on 30.05.2024 for defence evidence; record for that date is not before the Court. On 05.06.2024 V attended but defence sought adjournment citing counsel’s illness; the court granted a last opportunity and imposed cost of Rs.1,000/-. On 06.06.2024 V did not appear and Trial Court closed opportunity to examine him. The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s Section 482 petition (order dated 03.07.2024). The Supreme Court considered whether the lower courts misapplied Section 311 and whether closure of omission to examine V was unlawful in light of procedural fairness and the prosecution’s initial witness list.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Marriage took place on 16.02.2014. Complaint alleges continuous dowry demand (Rs.10 lakhs and 5 biswa land), physical assault on 28.04.2018, confinement and threats including threat to burn. FIR registered 30.04.2018 at P.S. Mahila Thana Gauriganj. Chargesheet filed 10.10.2018 and supplementary chargesheet 04.11.2018 listing 16 witnesses including V and K. Prosecution finally produced PW1–PW3; many formally listed witnesses did not enter the box. Defence statements under Section 313 recorded 01.05.2023. Petitioner first filed a Section 311 application earlier which was dismissed on 25.08.2023 and matter posted for defence evidence on 10.09.2023.

The petitioner filed a subsequent Section 311 application on 19.09.2023 seeking summons for V and K. Trial Court allowed summons only for V (order 18.05.2024). V was made available on 05.06.2024 but defence sought adjournment for counsel’s ill-health; court allowed a last opportunity (cost Rs.1,000) and listed matter 06.06.2024; V absent on that date and opportunity closed by Trial Court. Petitioner moved High Court under Section 482 (A482 No.5718/2024) which was dismissed; petitioner sought SLP which the Supreme Court dismissed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a court, in exercising Section 311, CrPC, is obliged to summon every person whose name appears in the prosecution witness list merely because defence later seeks their summons?
ii. Whether closure of opportunity to examine a summoned witness was disproportionate when the witness had been listed as a prosecution witness though not produced by the State?
iii. Whether successive and belated Section 311 applications (after recording of Section 313 answers) can be permitted where earlier directions had been issued to expedite trial?
iv. Whether defence’s failure to ensure the presence of its summoned witness absolves the trial court from closing the opportunity?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Learned counsel argued that both V and K were on the prosecution witness list and referenced in complainant’s examination-in-chief; hence, once the Trial Court granted Section 311 relief in part, the prosecution ought to have examined them in the first instance and not leave the burden to defence.
ii. It was submitted that closing the right to examine V was a fundamental error because the witness was formally connected to prosecution and would have material testimony favouring defence.
iii. Counsel urged that the inquisitorial/curial power under Section 311 was misunderstood and that denying K and closing V meant miscarriage of justice and breach of the obligation to elicit essential evidence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Respondent (informant) relied on the High Court order and contended the petitioner was adopting dilatory tactics, filing successive Section 311 applications after Section 313 statements and after Prosecution evidence had closed; earlier directions (25.07.2022) required expedition.
ii. It was contended the Trial Court permitted defence to examine V from defence side; V was present on 05.06.2024 but defence sought adjournment; on 06.06.2024 V was absent — thus the onus lay on defence to ensure presence; closure was lawful.
iii. The State aligned with this position and argued prejudice to prosecution, risk of trial delay and that K had no material to warrant summons.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court reviewed the scope of Section 311, CrPC and reiterates the trilogy of constraints: wide discretionary power, obligation to invoke it only to prevent failure of justice, and to exercise it with caution and reasons. Reliance was placed on prior jurisprudence including Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P., Zahira Habibullah Sheikh, State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, Umar Mohammad, Manju Devi, Swapan Kumar Chatterjee and Harendra Rai all recognizing Section 311 as potent but circumscribed. The Court analysed factual chronology: prosecution produced only three witnesses despite listing sixteen; Section 313 statements recorded 01.05.2023; petitioner filed multiple Section 311 applications first dismissed (25.08.2023) and the second filed 19.09.2023; High Court had earlier directed expedition (25.07.2022).

The Trial Court summoned V as independent witness for defence and scheduled dates; there is no record of what occurred on 30.05.2024; on 05.06.2024 V attended but defence sought adjournment due to counsel illness adjournment granted with cost and last opportunity; V absent on 06.06.2024 and Trial Court closed the opportunity. The Court emphasised that once summoned as defence witness the primary obligation to produce and examine V lay upon defence; the mere appearance of a name in the prosecution list does not vest a continuing obligation on the State to examine that person at belated stages. The Court found no illegality in refusal to summon K as no material suggested her evidence would be essential.

The Court held that successive applications and adjournments, when coupled with earlier judicial directions to expedite the trial, constituted dilatory conduct and abuse of process; exercise of discretion to close the opportunity was therefore justified. The High Court’s Section 482 dismissal was affirmed and special leave refused.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The dispositive legal principle: Section 311, CrPC confers wide but controlled discretion to summon or recall witnesses only when their evidence is essential to the just decision; courts must balance ends of justice against delay, prejudice and abuse. A name on the prosecution list does not create perpetual prosecutorial duty to examine that person if the prosecution has closed its case; when the defence seeks to summon such a person at defence-stage, the defence bears the onus to secure his presence and examine him.

Repeated, belated Section 311 applications after Section 313 statements and in the backdrop of previous directions to expedite the trial are susceptible to being treated as dilatory and may be refused. Judicial exercise of Section 311 must be reasoned, cautious and cognisant of trial-conclusion imperatives.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed by way of guidance that recall or summoning at belated stages may be permitted where tangible reasons show why justice would suffer without such evidence; mere aspiration that the evidence might assist defence is insufficient. Courts should take into account the chronology of events, prior opportunities, the reason for delay, presence or absence of material that demonstrates essentiality of such evidence, and possible prejudice to witnesses or to the opposing party. The Court reiterated previous admonitions that Section 311 should not be used as a tool to prolong trials.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Section 311 to be invoked only when evidence appears essential to just decision; reasons must be recorded.
ii. Delay and prior directions for expedition are material belated applications post-Section 313 draw strict scrutiny.
iii. Names on prosecution list do not create automatic prosecutorial duty to examine at later stages; if defence seeks such persons, defence must ensure their presence.
iv. Trial courts should impose reasonable conditions (costs, last opportunity) when adjournments are sought at late stages.
v. Successive Section 311 petitions without persuasive fresh material may be rejected as abuse of process.
vi. Courts should weigh prejudice to witnesses, inconvenience, and public interest in timely trials.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces disciplined judicial management of criminal trials and curbs tactical delays through repeated Section 311 applications. It clarifies that procedural labels (a person being in the prosecution list) do not immunise parties from the obligations of trial management once prosecution evidence is closed. For practitioners, the decision underscores the need to advance concrete grounds demonstrating essentiality, explain delay, and ensure logistical arrangements for witness production when relief under Section 311 is sought during defence-stage. The case affirms that courts will not countenance procedural manoeuvres designed to protract trials and will exercise Section 311 conservatively to protect fair and expeditious adjudication.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Ashutosh Pathak v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., SLP (Crim.) No.10852/2024, Supreme Court, Judgment dated 04 Feb 2025 (reported [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1831 : 2025 INSC 534).

2. Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2023) — SCC OnLine SC 1086. (cited in judgment).

3. Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340. (as cited in judgment).

4. Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P., (2011) 8 SCC 136.

5. Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374.

6. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402.

7. Umar Mohammad v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 14 SCC 711.

8. Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203.

9. Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328.

10. Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1023.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 311, Section 313.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506.

3. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Sections 3 & 4.