A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court in Baburao Shantaram More v. The Bombay Housing Board and Another, 1954 SCR 572, upheld the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and Section 3-A of the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948, as amended in 1951. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of these provisions under Article 14 of the Constitution, alleging discrimination between tenants of the Bombay Housing Board and tenants of cooperative housing societies. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the classification was reasonable, having a direct nexus with the objective of housing regulation. The Court highlighted the public welfare function of the Housing Board and the absence of profit motive, distinguishing it from private and cooperative entities. It reiterated that a classification based on intelligible differentia and rational nexus does not violate Article 14. The decision reinforced the principle that differential treatment is permissible under Article 14 when justified by public interest and legislative intent.

Keywords: Article 14, Housing Board, Equal Protection, Rent Control, Bombay Rent Act, Cooperative Housing

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Baburao Shantaram More v. The Bombay Housing Board and Another

ii) Case Number
Original Jurisdiction Petition No. 271 of 1952 and Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 108 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date
December 18, 1953

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Patanjali Sastri C.J., S. R. Das, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, and Jagannadhadas JJ.

vi) Author
Justice S. R. Das

vii) Citation
1954 SCR 572

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Article 14, Constitution of India

• Article 32, Constitution of India

• Section 4, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947

• Section 3-A, Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 (inserted by Bombay Act XI of 1951)

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Housing and Property Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case emerged from a property dispute concerning tenancy and rent regulation within premises vested in the Bombay Housing Board, a statutory authority formed under Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948. The Board had taken over a wartime housing facility and revised rents to recover reconditioning costs. The petitioner challenged this rent revision and eviction, claiming statutory protection under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, which governed tenancy rights and rent control. The litigation journey included proceedings before the Small Causes Court, the Bombay High Court, and finally, a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution. The core issue was whether the statutory exemption provided to public housing authorities under rent control legislation violated the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner occupied two rooms in Barrack No. T-93 in Sion Dharavi Camp, Greater Bombay, constructed by the Government of India during WWII for military purposes. The Government of Bombay later acquired the camp and transferred its administration to the Bombay Provincial Housing Board, eventually vesting ownership to the Bombay Housing Board after its statutory formation under Act LXIX of 1948. The petitioner and other occupants had no formal title but were allowed to stay under a temporary arrangement with rent fixed initially at ₹14/month. After reconditioning, the revised rent increased to ₹56.50/month. The petitioner refused to pay this revised rent, leading the Board to serve an eviction notice and later initiate legal proceedings. The petitioner claimed protection under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, while the Board asserted exemption under Section 4 of the Act. The Bombay High Court upheld the Board’s rights, citing retrospective validation through Section 3-A introduced by the 1951 amendment. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, claiming violation of Article 14.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether Section 3-A of the Bombay Housing Board Act (as amended in 1951) is unconstitutional under Article 14?
ii. Whether Section 4 of the Bombay Rent Control Act discriminates against tenants of public housing bodies like the Bombay Housing Board?
iii. Whether such exemption amounts to arbitrary classification lacking reasonable nexus with the object of the Act?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the exclusion of tenants of the Bombay Housing Board from rent control protection under Section 4 and Section 3-A created arbitrary discrimination violating Article 14. They argued that cooperative housing societies, although functionally similar to the Board, did not receive such exemption. Thus, tenants in similar circumstances were treated unequally without a rational basis. Further, they claimed the retrospective operation of Section 3-A unfairly curtailed the accrued rights of tenants, violating due process principles under Article 14. They contended that the legislative intent to exclude tenants from statutory protection simply based on ownership by a statutory board lacked intelligible differentia and was not rationally connected to the public interest or housing objectives of the State.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Bombay Housing Board functioned under government direction and lacked profit motive, thereby distinguishing it from private and cooperative housing providers. The exemption under Section 4 and 3-A was aimed at empowering the Board to recover investments and manage properties effectively. They emphasized the public welfare nature of the Board’s functions, highlighting its housing schemes and subsidized development initiatives, aligning with governmental obligations to solve housing shortages. They argued that tenants of the Board and private landlords were not similarly situated, making the classification legitimate under Article 14. The provision ensured operational autonomy and financial sustainability for public housing agencies.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Equality before law and equal protection of the laws.
ii. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Remedies for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
**iii. Section 4, Bombay Rent Act, 1947 – Excludes application to properties of Government or local authorities.
**iv. Section 3-A, Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 (as amended by Bombay Act XI of 1951) – Exempts properties vested in the Board from Bombay Rent Act, both retrospectively and prospectively.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Supreme Court upheld that Section 3-A of the Bombay Housing Board Act and Section 4 of the Bombay Rent Act did not violate Article 14, as the classification between public housing tenants and private tenants was reasonable and based on intelligible differentia. The Board’s non-commercial, welfare-oriented nature, and its role in solving housing crises, formed a rational basis for the exclusion. The Court observed that public authorities managing housing did not possess the same incentives as private landlords to evict tenants or hike rents, thus not necessitating similar tenant protections.

b. OBITER DICTA 
i. The Court made a passing observation that cooperative societies, though similar in housing objectives, were not on par with public statutory authorities due to their profit potential and lack of governmental control. The absence of formal tenancy agreements further differentiated their occupants from statutory board tenants.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Statutory exemptions from general laws can be justified under Article 14 when aimed at public interest.

• Government-controlled bodies without profit motives can be treated separately from private landlords.

• Differentiation must rest on rational nexus and intelligible differentia, which the Board’s statutory functions satisfied.

• Retrospective legislation is constitutionally valid if it does not infringe fundamental rights and is justified by public policy.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Court’s reasoning reaffirms that equality under Article 14 is not absolute equality, but equality among similarly situated persons. The Bombay Housing Board, acting under legislative mandate and serving public purpose, qualified for differentiated treatment. The Court’s approach resonates with earlier jurisprudence including Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41, where state action aimed at public welfare was upheld despite discriminatory consequences. The decision also fortifies the doctrine that government instrumentalities deserve operational freedom when engaged in social upliftment, as long as classification is reasonable. This judgment continues to hold value in present-day housing law and public interest litigation, particularly in justifying targeted legislative interventions for urban housing challenges.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41
ii. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318
iii. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Constitution of India – Article 14
ii. Constitution of India – Article 32
iii. Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 4
iv. Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 – Section 3-A (as amended in 1951)