A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Bakshish Singh v. The State of Punjab, reported in [1958] S.C.R. 409, addresses significant legal questions surrounding the evidentiary value and procedural integrity of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The appellant was initially acquitted by the Sessions Court, which found discrepancies and external influence in the dying declaration. The High Court reversed this judgment, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court. The apex court upheld the High Court’s verdict and emphasized that in Punjab, recording a statement in Urdu while it was spoken in Punjabi does not vitiate its authenticity, considering the historical usage of Urdu in police and judicial processes. The judgment also dealt with the discretion of the prosecutor under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, in not producing a witness allegedly won over. The court discussed the parameters of admissibility of transferred testimony under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. This case sets precedents on evidentiary practices in criminal trials and provides interpretative clarity on testimonial admissibility, prosecutorial discretion, and linguistic fidelity in recording judicial statements.

Keywords: Dying Declaration, Indian Evidence Act, Section 32(1), Prosecutorial Discretion, Linguistic Discrepancies, Section 33, Section 114, Criminal Law, Punjab, Supreme Court.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: Bakshish Singh v. The State of Punjab
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 205 of 1956
iii) Judgment Date: 17th September 1957
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Hon’ble Justices B.P. Sinha, P. Govinda Menon, and J.L. Kapur
vi) Author: Justice J.L. Kapur
vii) Citation: [1958] S.C.R. 409
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 32(1), 33, and 114
ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None
x) Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Law of Evidence

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case emerges from an appeal against a Punjab High Court judgment that reversed an acquittal by the Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar. The appellant, Bakshish Singh, was charged with murder under Sections 302/34 of the IPC. The focal legal issue centered on the reliability of the deceased’s dying declaration, which the Sessions Court had dismissed based on allegations of coaching and discrepancies in language translation. The High Court overturned this finding, accepting the declaration as credible. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the High Court rightly assessed the declaration’s authenticity and whether the procedural standards for admissibility of dying declarations and transferred testimony had been correctly followed. The case unfolds within a matrix of linguistic practices, evidentiary jurisprudence, and judicial discretion in criminal adjudication, offering layered insights into procedural standards across Indian criminal courts.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On the evening of August 1, 1954, Bachhinder Singh, son of Bhagwan Singh from the village of Kairon, was shot outside his house and later succumbed to his injuries. His younger brother, Narvel Singh, aged 13, was present during the incident. After being injured, Bachhinder was taken home, and then moved to V.J. Hospital, Amritsar, via the railway station. Bhagwan Singh attempted to file a police report at the nearby Police Post in Kairon, but the officer was unavailable. They later reached the hospital, where Dr. Kanwal Kishore and Dr. Mahavir Sud examined Bachhinder and certified him fit for a statement.

Head Constable Maya Ram Sharma recorded Bachhinder’s dying declaration (Exhibit P-H) in Urdu. This statement became the foundation for the First Information Report (FIR) lodged at Police Station Sarhali. The deceased was operated on, but he died the next afternoon. The prosecution based its case on the dying declaration, the testimony of Narvel Singh, and an alleged extra-judicial confession, which was eventually disregarded by the courts. The Sessions Court doubted the integrity of the dying declaration, suspecting it had been coached or influenced, and acquitted the accused. The High Court reversed this acquittal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a dying declaration recorded in Urdu while the deceased spoke in Punjabi affects its reliability and admissibility under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

ii. Whether the presence of relatives during the recording of the declaration undermines its authenticity.

iii. Whether Head Constable Maya Ram’s process of recording was valid and untainted.

iv. Whether the failure to produce Sucha Singh, an alleged eyewitness, affected the prosecution’s case under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

v. Whether the transferred testimony of Dr. Mahavir Sud under Section 33 was rightly accepted.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Bakshish Singh contended that the dying declaration was not voluntary. They argued that Bhagwan Singh and Narvel Singh were present when the declaration was recorded, and that it might have been coached. They submitted that this declaration was a collaborative product and not the deceased’s own words.

ii. The language discrepancy—the deceased spoke Punjabi while the statement was recorded in Urdu—was emphasized as a critical flaw.

iii. They argued that the declaration was excessively long, resembling an FIR more than a dying declaration, and thereby inherently suspicious.

iv. The admissibility of Dr. Mahavir Sud’s statement under Section 33 was challenged, citing procedural deficiencies in establishing his unavailability.

v. The prosecution’s non-production of Sucha Singh, an eyewitness named in the declaration, was urged as a material suppression of evidence, invoking adverse inference under Section 114.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the State of Punjab maintained that dying declarations are admissible under Section 32(1) and that linguistic translation into Urdu does not compromise its substantive content, especially given Punjabi-Urdu practices in Punjab’s legal system.

ii. They asserted that Dr. Mahavir Sud, a neutral and credible doctor, oversaw the process and ensured voluntariness, ruling out any influence.

iii. They defended the non-examination of Sucha Singh, explaining that he had been won over and could have undermined the case, thus his exclusion fell within prosecutorial discretion.

iv. They validated the transfer of Dr. Sud’s statement under Section 33, arguing that diligent efforts had been made to trace him, but his whereabouts remained unknown, justifying reliance on prior testimony.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Permits dying declarations as exceptions to hearsay, provided they relate to the cause of death.

ii. Section 33, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Admits prior recorded testimony where the witness cannot be produced without undue delay.

iii. Section 114, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Permits courts to draw adverse inferences when a material witness is withheld without justification.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that recording a dying declaration in Urdu in Punjab, while the declarant speaks Punjabi, does not vitiate the declaration. Urdu was historically used in police and judicial contexts and remains acceptable.

ii. It affirmed that the presence of family members prior to the declaration does not necessarily imply interference, especially when disinterested medical personnel supervise the process.

iii. The declaration was found authentic and voluntary, supported by the testimony of Dr. Mahavir Sud, whose statement was properly transferred under Section 33.

iv. Non-production of Sucha Singh did not lead to adverse inference. The Court emphasized prosecutorial discretion and held that no rule mandates examination of every named witness.

v. The judgment underscored the need for rules regulating dying declarations in Punjab, as exist in other states, to avoid ambiguity and inconsistency.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court observed the lack of uniform standards in recording dying declarations and recommended that High Courts should frame procedural rules to guide police and magistrates.

ii. The Court criticized excessively detailed declarations resembling FIRs, noting such documents may lose evidentiary purity and suggested adherence to relevance and brevity.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Dying declarations should avoid irrelevant details unless necessary for coherence.

• Declarations should stick to events surrounding the cause of death.

• High Courts should frame standardized rules to govern the process of recording.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred:

i. Abdul Mohammad v. Attorney General of Palestine, AIR 1945 PC 42 [1]
ii. Stephen Senaratne v. The King, AIR 1936 PC 289 [2]
iii. Habeeb Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad, (1954) SCR 475 [3]

b. Important Statutes Referred:

i. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32(1) [4], Section 33 [5], Section 114 [6]
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302 and 34