A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This judgment examines the complex legal battle between hereditary worshippers (Guravs) and trustees of the Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, Alandi. The appellants, being hereditary pujaris, claimed declaratory relief recognizing their hereditary service rights and sought injunctions against interference from the trustees. The respondents argued the appellants were merely appointed servants without any hereditary claim, and further asserted that even if any such hereditary rights existed, they stood extinguished by limitation. The case deeply analyzed the applicability of Article 120 versus Article 124 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and the interpretation of Section 23 of the Limitation Act concerning continuing wrongs. The Supreme Court of India ultimately held that Article 120, with its six-year limitation period, applied, not Article 124, and that Section 23 could not save the appellants from limitation. This judgment remains a cornerstone precedent on limitation law, hereditary rights under Hindu religious endowments, and the nuanced application of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Keywords: Hereditary worshippers, Limitation Act 1908, Article 120, Article 124, Section 23, continuing wrong, ouster, religious endowment, Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Balkrishna Savalram Pujari & Others v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeals Nos. 220 to 223 of 1953.

iii) Judgement Date:
March 26, 1959.

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India.

v) Quorum:
P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, and K. Subba Rao, JJ.

vi) Author:
Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar.

vii) Citation:
[1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 476.

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Indian Limitation Act, 1908: Articles 120, 124, Section 23.

• Specific Relief Act, 1877: Section 9.

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 92.

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case:
None.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Civil Law, Hindu Religious Endowments Law, Limitation Law, Trust Law.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute originated from long-standing differences between hereditary pujaris of the Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, Alandi, and the trustees managing the temple affairs. The appellants, known as Guravs, historically performed puja and related rituals in the temple. They traced their rights back to grants and arrangements made during the Peshwa regime and subsequent administration by the East India Company. However, administrative changes post-1852 led to the establishment of a trustee system to govern temple affairs, culminating in significant tension regarding the Guravs’ hereditary claims.

The trustees’ actions in dismissing eleven Guravs in 1911 on charges of misconduct led to the initiation of multiple litigations, starting with Suit No. 485 of 1911. This series of legal proceedings spanned over four decades, repeatedly revisiting the nature and extent of the Guravs’ rights. The case reached its final stage before the Supreme Court after traversing through the trial court, the Bombay High Court, and an unsuccessful attempt before the Privy Council.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Sansthan of Dnyaneshwar Maharaj holds immense religious significance in Maharashtra. The Guravs historically managed puja and received offerings. After the establishment of the trustee system in 1852, tensions escalated over control and service rights.

In 1911, trustees dismissed eleven Guravs citing gross misconduct. When remaining Guravs refused to submit to trustee conditions, trustees replaced them with Brahmin priests, denying the Guravs any further role. This led the Guravs to file Suit No. 485 of 1911, asserting ownership rights over the shrine. Both trial and appellate courts rejected their ownership claim but left open the question of their hereditary service rights.

Subsequently, the Guravs forcibly took over the temple in 1922, prompting the trustees to file a possession suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Trustees succeeded, reclaiming possession. The Guravs then filed multiple suits seeking declarations of hereditary rights, injunctions against trustee interference, and accounting for offerings.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Guravs on merit but was reversed by the High Court solely on limitation grounds, ultimately leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Applicability of Limitation Act:
Whether Article 124 or Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 governed the suit.

ii) Continuing Wrong:
Whether Section 23 of the Limitation Act applied due to alleged continuing wrong by the trustees.

iii) Nature of Hereditary Rights:
Whether Guravs were hereditary worshippers entitled to legal protection against trustee interference.

iv) Effect of Prior Litigation:
Whether prior judgments created estoppel or res judicata against Guravs.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The appellants argued their rights constituted possession of a hereditary office under Article 124, which prescribes a 12-year limitation period starting from adverse possession by defendants.

They contended trustees had ousted them only temporarily by appointing Brahmin servants but never themselves exercised the hereditary office, hence adverse possession never began.

They argued the trustees’ wrongful denial of hereditary rights amounted to a continuing wrong, invoking Section 23 to save limitation.

They cited Kunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, (1904) ILR 28 Bom 567, claiming the relief sought was essentially possession of an office, thus falling under Article 124.

They also emphasized that prior dismissals in 1911 involved misconduct charges, but trustees could not extinguish hereditary rights merely through dismissal.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The respondents argued that Guravs had lost their hereditary rights after their dismissal in 1911 and forcible dispossession in 1922.

They asserted that Article 120 applied because the suit sought declaratory and injunction relief, not direct possession of an office.

They emphasized that trustees never themselves occupied the office but managed appointments as per their powers.

They relied upon the earlier Bombay High Court judgment in Thathachariar v. Singarachariar, AIR 1928 Mad 377, where trustees exercising administrative powers did not amount to adverse possessors of an office.

They contended the ouster in 1922 was complete and final, triggering the limitation clock; hence, filing the suit beyond six years made it time-barred.

They further argued that Section 23 did not apply since ouster was a completed wrong, not a continuing one.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Indian Limitation Act, 1908

• Article 120: Six years’ limitation for suits not covered elsewhere, from when right to sue accrues.

• Article 124: Twelve years’ limitation for possession of hereditary office, from when defendant takes possession adversely.

• Section 23: Continuing wrongs provision allowing fresh limitation for every moment injury continues.

ii) Specific Relief Act, 1877

• Section 9: Possession suits against forcible dispossession.

iii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Section 92: Provision for public trusts’ suits involving management disputes.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i)

The Court held that Article 124 did not apply as it governs disputes between rival hereditary claimants, not disputes between hereditary claimants and trustees exercising administrative authority.

The trustees were not performing hereditary duties themselves nor claiming such rights; thus, no adverse possession of hereditary office existed under Article 124.

The appropriate provision was Article 120, applicable to declaratory suits seeking enforcement of rights, subject to six-year limitation.

The Court held that cause of action accrued at latest upon the 1922 dispossession decree under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, suits filed subsequently were time-barred.

The Court rejected invocation of Section 23, clarifying that completed ouster injuries do not constitute continuing wrongs. Continued dispossession was an effect of completed injury, not fresh injury.

The Court endorsed earlier reasoning from Jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee Lall Johurry, (1911) 15 CWN 882, Thathachariar v. Singarachariar, AIR 1928 Mad 377, and Jhalandar Thakur v. Jharula Das, ILR 42 Cal 244.

b. OBITER DICTA

i)

The Court emphasized that Limitation Act provisions may produce inequitable results but must be applied strictly as per statutory text, regardless of apparent unfairness.

The Court noted that Guravs succeeded in proving hereditary rights but suffered due to procedural delay.

c. GUIDELINES

i)

• Trustees administering temple affairs without claiming hereditary office do not incur adverse possession under Article 124.

• Section 23 of Limitation Act applies only to continuing wrongs where the wrongful act itself perpetuates injury, not where injury results from a completed ouster.

• Declaratory suits concerning hereditary rights, when not directly claiming possession, attract Article 120 limitation.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case remains a leading authority in India on the scope of continuing wrongs under limitation law. It delineates a clear distinction between disputes over hereditary offices versus management disputes with trustees. The judgment underscores that legal rights, even if valid, can lapse solely due to limitation rules. While sympathetic to the Guravs’ situation, the Court faithfully applied statutory text, highlighting the harsh reality that delay often extinguishes substantive rights in civil law. The judgment also serves as a guiding precedent for religious endowment disputes and will continue to influence litigation concerning Hindu religious institutions’ hereditary rights.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Kunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, (1904) ILR 28 Bom 567.
ii) Jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee Lall Johurry, (1911) 15 CWN 882.
iii) Thathachariar v. Singarachariar, AIR 1928 Mad 377.
iv) Annasami v. Adivarachari, ILR 1941 Mad 275.
v) Jhalandar Thakur v. Jharula Das, ILR 42 Cal 244.
vi) Maharani Rajroop Kaer v. Syed Abdul Hossein, (1880) LR 7 IA 240.
vii) Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, (1933) LR 60 IA 313.
viii) Choudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadev Asram Prasad Saki Bahadur, ILR 19 Pat 208.
ix) Khair Mohammad Khan v. Mst. Jannat, ILR 22 Lah 22.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
ii) Specific Relief Act, 1877.
iii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.