A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009 is a leading Indian judgment on territorial jurisdiction in internet-based passing off and infringement disputes. The Division Bench, speaking through Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar, examined whether a Delhi court could assume jurisdiction merely because a defendant’s website was accessible in Delhi. The plaintiff was based in Singapore. The defendants were based in Hyderabad. Neither party was located within Delhi. The plaintiff alleged passing off through the defendants’ use of “Banyan Tree Retreat” and a banyan tree device on a website. The Court rejected the broad proposition that mere accessibility of a website confers jurisdiction. It held that the plaintiff must show purposeful availment, specific targeting, a real or intended commercial transaction with forum users, and resulting injury within the forum. It overruled Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del) to that extent. It also held that a solitary trap transaction cannot create jurisdiction.

Keywords: Territorial Jurisdiction, Passing Off, Internet Jurisdiction, Purposeful Availment, Specific Targeting, Section 20 CPC, Trap Transactions, Website Accessibility.

B) CASE DETAILS

The judgment cause title is Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr. The case number is CS (OS) No. 894/2008. The judgment date is 23 November 2009. The court is the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. The matter was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Hon’ble Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar. The judgment was authored by Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar. The plaintiff was Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited. The defendants were A. Murali Krishna Reddy and another. The plaintiff was represented by Mr. Praveen Anand with Mr. Sagar Chandra, Advocate. The uploaded judgment does not record appearances for the defendants in the opening cause-title portion. Therefore, no counsel name for the defendants can safely be supplied.

The citation may be written as Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009. The principal legal provisions involved were Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The judgment also mentioned the absence of a general Indian long-arm statute for internet-based jurisdiction. No judgment was overruled entirely. However, the proposition in Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del) that mere website accessibility in Delhi was sufficient for jurisdiction was expressly held not to be good law. The case relates to Intellectual Property Law, Trade Mark Law, Passing Off, Civil Procedure, Private International Law, Cyber Law, and Internet Jurisdiction.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case emerged from a legal problem created by internet commerce. A plaintiff may find that a defendant’s website is visible everywhere. Yet the defendant may not reside or carry on business in the forum where the suit is filed. The question then becomes difficult. Should every court where the website is visible get jurisdiction. Or should jurisdiction require something more concrete. Banyan Tree answered this question for Indian passing off and infringement actions. The case is especially important because the plaintiff was not located in Delhi. The defendants were also not located in Delhi. Therefore, ordinary jurisdiction under Section 20(a) and Section 20(b) CPC was unavailable. The plaintiff had to rely on Section 20(c) CPC. It had to show that a part of the cause of action arose in Delhi.

The dispute concerned the mark “Banyan Tree”. The plaintiff was a Singapore company engaged in hospitality. It claimed use of the word mark “Banyan Tree” and a banyan tree device since 1994. It also maintained websites such as www.banyantree.com and www.banyantreespa.com since 1996. The defendants were from Hyderabad. They allegedly used “Banyan Tree Retreat” for a project advertised on www.makprojects.com/banyantree. The plaintiff alleged dishonest adoption and passing off. It stated that the defendants were attempting to ride on its goodwill. It further argued that the defendants’ website was accessible in Delhi and had interactive features. The learned Single Judge referred jurisdictional questions to a Division Bench. The reference was necessary because existing Indian case law had not clearly settled internet jurisdiction.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited, was a company with its registered office in Singapore. It claimed to be part of a hospitality group. It adopted and used the word mark “Banyan Tree” and a banyan tree device from 1994. According to the plaintiff, continuous and extensive use gave the mark secondary meaning and distinctiveness. It asserted that the mark had become associated with the plaintiff and its group. It had no registered trade mark in India at the relevant time. Its registration application was stated to be pending. Since 2002, it claimed collaboration with the Oberoi Group for operating spas across India. In October 2007, it learnt that the defendants had started a project called “Banyan Tree Retreat”.

The defendants were located in Hyderabad. Defendant No. 1 was the promoter of Defendant No. 2. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ word mark and device were deceptively similar to its mark and device. It alleged dishonest adoption. It also alleged an attempt to encash upon the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation. The defendants advertised their project through www.makprojects.com/banyantree. The plaintiff filed a passing off suit for injunction. In the plaint, it claimed Delhi jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC. It pleaded that the defendants solicited business in Delhi through the impugned mark. It stated that the website was accessible in Delhi. It further stated that the website was not passive because it gave contact information and sought feedback through an interactive webpage. The plaintiff also relied on one alleged instance of a brochure being sent to a Delhi resident for sale of property.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

The Division Bench reframed three issues. First, in a passing off action or infringement action where the plaintiff is not carrying on business within the court’s jurisdiction, the Court had to decide when a universally accessible website gives jurisdiction to the forum court. Second, where the defendant is sued because its website is accessible in the forum state, the Court had to decide the plaintiff’s prima facie burden for establishing jurisdiction. Third, the Court had to decide whether such prima facie jurisdiction could be established through trap orders or trap transactions. These questions were foundational. They determined when internet visibility becomes a part of cause of action under Section 20(c) CPC.

The issues were framed against a specific procedural background. The plaintiff did not sue for trade mark infringement while carrying on business in Delhi. Had that been the case, Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 might have assisted it. That provision, like Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, is a limited long-arm provision. It allows certain plaintiffs to sue where they carry on business. But the present action was a passing off action. Neither side resided or carried on business in Delhi. Therefore, the Court had to interpret Section 20(c) CPC in the internet context. The central legal question was whether online accessibility, interactivity, targeting, commercial transaction, and harm could together create jurisdiction.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendants’ website gave Delhi jurisdiction. The plaintiff relied on three factors. These were the nature of the website, the intention of the host to market its product in Delhi, and the effect of the defendants’ action in Delhi. The plaintiff argued that websites could be passive, interactive, or active. It suggested that even a passive website could become “passive plus” if the defendant did not block access to Delhi viewers. The plaintiff also argued for purposeful avoidance. According to this argument, unless the website owner placed filters or blocked viewers outside its own territory, viewers elsewhere should be treated as targeted. This argument tried to shift the burden to the website owner.

The plaintiff also argued that interactivity mattered. Since the defendants’ website sought feedback and inputs, it could not be treated as a merely passive online brochure. The plaintiff submitted that the defendants’ services were offered to customers in Delhi because of the ubiquity, universality, and utility of the internet. The plaintiff also relied on the alleged brochure sent to a Delhi resident. It argued that this showed solicitation or commercial reach into Delhi. To support its case, the plaintiff cited several Indian and foreign decisions. It urged the Court to adopt an expansive jurisdictional approach. That approach would protect trade mark owners from evasive online wrongdoers. It would also prevent defendants from escaping liability merely by operating outside Delhi while targeting Delhi consumers through the internet.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The uploaded judgment mainly records the plaintiff’s submissions in detail because the matter arose on a reference about jurisdiction. Still, the defendants’ jurisdictional position can be understood from the questions and the Court’s analysis. The defendants resisted Delhi jurisdiction. Their broad position was that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were located in Delhi. The defendants were based in Hyderabad. The plaintiff was based in Singapore. Mere access to a website from Delhi could not create jurisdiction under Section 20(c) CPC. Otherwise, every website would expose its owner to suits in every Indian court. That would be unfair, uncertain, and commercially oppressive. The defendants’ position therefore aligned with the principle that jurisdiction requires a real connection.

The respondent-side reasoning found support in the Court’s final holding. The Court rejected mere accessibility. It also rejected mere interactivity. It treated those features as insufficient unless combined with targeting and commercial activity. This reasoning protects defendants from being sued anywhere merely because the internet is borderless. It also reflects fairness in civil procedure. Jurisdiction should not arise through random, accidental, or fortuitous contact. The forum must have a legally meaningful connection to the defendant’s conduct. The Court’s acceptance of purposeful availment over purposeful avoidance substantially favoured this disciplined approach. The defendant may show avoidance later. But the initial burden remains on the plaintiff.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 20 CPC was the principal provision. It provides that a suit may be instituted where the defendant resides, carries on business, personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises. In this case, Section 20(a)and Section 20(b) did not apply because the defendants were not in Delhi. The plaintiff therefore invoked Section 20(c). The Court had to decide whether website accessibility and interactivity created part of the cause of action in Delhi. The phrase “cause of action” became decisive. It means a bundle of essential facts that the plaintiff must prove. The Court held that mere online visibility is not an essential fact sufficient for jurisdiction. Something more is required. That “something more” is targeting, commercial transaction, and injury within the forum.

Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was discussed because it gives a special jurisdictional advantage to plaintiffs in infringement suits. It allows a plaintiff to sue where it resides or carries on business. The Court described it as a limited long-arm provision. But it was not helpful here because the suit was for passing off and the plaintiff was not carrying on business in Delhi. Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 was mentioned by analogy. It similarly allows a copyright plaintiff to sue where it resides or carries on business. These provisions showed that Parliament can create special jurisdiction where it wishes. In the absence of such benefit, the plaintiff had to satisfy ordinary civil procedure under Section 20 CPC.

The Information Technology Act was mentioned in the referred questions. However, the decision did not rest on a substantive provision of that Act. The case was decided through Section 20 CPC and common law jurisdictional principles. The Court considered international principles such as minimum contacts, purposeful availment, Zippo sliding scale, Calder effects test, targeting, and real and substantial connection. These were not Indian statutes. They were comparative tools. The Court used them to shape Indian law in a field where the CPC had to be applied to internet conduct. This method is doctrinally sound. It respects Indian statutory text while learning from jurisdictions that faced similar problems earlier.

I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE

The Court analysed several United States decisions. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 340 (1945)introduced the idea of minimum contacts and fairness. It required purposeful direction of activities towards the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) developed purposeful availment. It held that random or fortuitous contacts are insufficient. The defendant must create a substantial connection with the forum. Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) cautioned that mere placement of goods into the stream of commerce is not enough. These cases supplied the fairness foundation for internet jurisdiction.

The Court then examined internet-specific decisions. Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) represented an early expansive approach. A website and toll-free number were held enough to show purposeful availment. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) took a narrower view. It held that merely creating a website accessible everywhere is not an act purposefully directed to the forum. CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) found purposeful availment because the defendant deliberately transmitted software through the plaintiff’s system. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002) treated website interaction with residents and actual business as relevant. These cases helped the Court distinguish passive presence from deliberate commercial connection.

The Court analysed Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). That case created the famous sliding scale test. Websites may be passive, interactive, or integral to business. Jurisdiction becomes stronger when a website conducts commercial activity with forum residents. The Delhi High Court accepted the usefulness of this test but did not apply it mechanically. It noted difficulties in measuring interactivity. Many websites are interactive today. Therefore, the Court shifted attention to the nature of the activity and whether it results in commercial transactions with forum users.

The Court also considered the Calder effects test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). That case allowed jurisdiction where tortious conduct was expressly aimed at the forum and the brunt of harm was suffered there. The Court referred to the French Yahoo! litigation where harmful online content accessible in France attracted French jurisdiction. It also discussed the difficulty of applying the effects test to trade mark cases. Corporations do not suffer harm in the same geographic manner as individuals. Therefore, in trade mark and passing off cases, effects must be coupled with specific targeting. The Delhi High Court adopted this tighter version.

The Court reviewed Toys “R” Us v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003). That case warned that operating a commercially interactive website should not subject a defendant to jurisdiction everywhere in the world. There must be evidence of purposeful availment by direct targeting, knowing interaction with forum residents, or other related contacts. The Delhi High Court found this approach persuasive. It also referred to scholars like Thomas Schultz and Michael Geist. Their writings supported targeting as a middle path. Targeting is more than mere effects. It is less than physical presence. This helped the Court craft a balanced Indian rule.

The Court examined common law decisions from Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 used the real and substantial connection test. Patrick Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., 2006 FC 1395 refused Canadian jurisdiction where the defendant’s Canadian connection was weak. 1-800 Flowers Inc. v. Phonenames, [2002] FSR 12 CA held that website accessibility in the United Kingdom did not by itself amount to trade mark use there. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56 was discussed as an Australian defamation case involving a long-arm rule. These authorities showed that mature legal systems rejected universal jurisdiction based on mere internet access.

The Court analysed Indian precedents. Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)had held that accessibility of a website from Delhi was enough to invoke jurisdiction. The Division Bench rejected that proposition. It expressly stated that Casio was not good law to that extent. India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, 2007 (35) PTC 177 (Del) was treated as closer to the correct position. It recognised that mere accessibility is not enough and considered interactivity, subscription, targeting, and India-focused services. The Division Bench refined the law further by requiring purposeful availment, targeting, commercial transaction, and injury.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio decidendi is that mere accessibility of a website in the forum state does not confer territorial jurisdiction. Even a website that is interactive will not automatically confer jurisdiction. The plaintiff must show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum court’s jurisdiction. This means that the defendant’s website activity must be directed at the forum with an intention to conclude a commercial transaction with users there. The plaintiff must also show that this specific targeting caused injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum. The Court therefore applied the effects test together with the sliding scale test. Accessibility, interactivity, targeting, commercial transaction, and injury must be read together.

For Section 20(c) CPC, the plaintiff must plead and produce material to show that a part of cause of action arose in the forum through internet activity. The website may be called passive plus or interactive. Labels do not decide jurisdiction. The plaintiff must show specific targeting of forum viewers for commercial transactions. It must also show that some commercial transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a user located in the forum. This transaction must result in harm to the plaintiff in the forum. The Court therefore rejected abstract jurisdiction based on internet universality. It insisted on concrete facts.

The ratio on trap transactions is equally important. A solitary trap transaction cannot establish purposeful availment. It is not a real instance of the defendant choosing the forum. It may be engineered by the plaintiff. Therefore, it cannot alone create jurisdiction. If the plaintiff relies on a series of trap transactions, they must be obtained by fair means. The plaintiff must plead them unambiguously. It must place supporting material before the Court. Even then, the Court must examine whether the transactions genuinely show targeting and commercial dealing. This prevents plaintiffs from manufacturing jurisdiction through artificial purchases.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court’s discussion on comparative law contains persuasive observations. It explained that the internet is not legally borderless in an absolute sense. States may regulate web-based activity when a sufficient connection exists. Yet the Court also warned against unlimited jurisdiction. If accessibility alone were enough, every website owner could be sued anywhere. That would be unfair and commercially chaotic. This reasoning has broad relevance beyond trade mark law. It applies to online contracts, e-commerce, defamation, consumer disputes, and platform disputes. Courts must identify a principled connection between forum, defendant conduct, and plaintiff injury.

Another important observation concerns purposeful avoidance. The plaintiff argued that defendants should be treated as targeting Delhi unless they blocked Delhi users. The Court rejected this burden-shifting. It held that the plaintiff must first prove purposeful availment. The defendant’s efforts to avoid a forum may become relevant later. But avoidance cannot replace the plaintiff’s initial burden. This is a valuable procedural safeguard. It prevents plaintiffs from saying that every unblocked jurisdiction was targeted. Such a rule would punish ordinary internet publication. The Court therefore preserved fairness and predictability.

c. GUIDELINES

The Court framed practical criteria for internet jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must show more than accessibility. A website visible in Delhi is not enough. Second, the plaintiff must show more than interactivity. A feedback form, contact page, or brochure download is not enough by itself. Third, the defendant must have specifically targeted viewers in the forum. Targeting may be inferred from language, currency, advertising, services, shipping, subscriptions, forum-specific content, or actual dealings. Fourth, the defendant’s online conduct must be linked to commercial transactions with forum users. Fifth, the plaintiff must show injury to its business, goodwill, or reputation within the forum. Sixth, the plaintiff must plead these facts clearly and support them with prima facie material.

The guidelines on trap transactions are stricter. Trap orders may be useful evidence in trade mark and passing off disputes. However, courts scrutinise them carefully. The plaintiff must act fairly. Written evidence is preferable. Ambiguity must be avoided. The defendant should have a fair chance to investigate. A single trap transaction is insufficient for jurisdiction because it does not show purposeful availment. A series of trap transactions may be considered only if obtained fairly and supported by proper pleadings. The Court drew from cases such as California Fig Syrup Company v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd., (1897) 14 RPC 564, Carr & Sons v. Crisp & Co. Ltd., (1902) 19 RPC 497, C.C. Wakefield & Co. Ltd. v. Purser, (1934) 51 RPC 167, and Showerings Ltd. v. Fern Vale Brewery Coy Ltd., [1958] RPC 484.

d. DISSENTING OPINION

There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was delivered by Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar for the Division Bench. The Bench answered the referred questions and sent the matter back to the learned Single Judge. The Single Judge was directed to determine, on the facts of the suit, whether the plaintiff had prima facie shown Delhi jurisdiction in light of the law laid down. The Division Bench did not finally decide the suit. It decided the legal standards governing jurisdiction. The matter was listed before the Single Judge on 7 December 2009.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is a cornerstone of Indian internet jurisdiction law. It refused two extremes. It rejected the extreme plaintiff-friendly rule that mere website accessibility is enough. It also rejected the idea that internet wrongs cannot be controlled unless the defendant is physically present. The Court created a middle path. It required purposeful availment and specific targeting. This approach protects both trade mark owners and defendants. It gives plaintiffs a remedy where real forum-directed online conduct exists. It protects defendants from arbitrary suits in distant courts where their website is merely visible.

The ruling is particularly strong because it understands the nature of online presence. Almost every website is accessible everywhere. Many websites are interactive in some way. If those features alone created jurisdiction, the rule would become unworkable. A hotel in Hyderabad, a shop in Jaipur, or a consultant in Kochi could be sued anywhere merely because a website form is visible there. The Court avoided that absurd result. It looked for commercial intention and actual connection. That approach respects the logic of Section 20 CPC. A cause of action must be based on meaningful facts, not technological possibility.

The judgment also strengthens procedural fairness. Jurisdiction is not a technical nuisance. It protects defendants from being dragged to inconvenient forums without adequate connection. It also protects judicial discipline. Courts should not assume power merely because harm is alleged. The plaintiff must show that the forum is connected to the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. This is why the Court adopted the combined Zippo-Calder-targeting approach. It made internet jurisdiction fact-sensitive. It avoided rigid categories and encouraged practical inquiry.

The treatment of Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del) is also significant. The Court expressly overruled it to the extent it held that accessibility alone was sufficient. This restored balance in Delhi trade mark litigation. Delhi is a major commercial court forum. Without this correction, many plaintiffs could file suits in Delhi despite weak connections. The ruling therefore prevented forum shopping. It also aligned Indian law with comparative global standards.

The case remains relevant even after later developments in digital commerce. Websites now use targeted advertisements, location-based services, app downloads, payment gateways, delivery networks, and algorithmic marketing. The Banyan Tree test remains useful because it focuses on targeting and commercial transaction. Modern plaintiffs can show jurisdiction through geo-targeted ads, delivery to forum users, forum-specific pricing, user analytics, subscription records, or actual sales. Modern defendants can resist jurisdiction by showing absence of targeting, absence of transactions, or only passive visibility.

The judgment also offers a careful approach to trap transactions. Trap orders are often necessary in passing off cases. Wrongdoing may be difficult to prove otherwise. Yet trap transactions can be misused to manufacture jurisdiction. The Court therefore required fairness and substance. A plaintiff cannot create jurisdiction by sending its own agent to trigger a transaction that would not otherwise occur. This protects defendants from artificial litigation strategies. It also preserves the credibility of investigative evidence.

The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium supports remedies for online passing off. Yet the maxim must operate with forum discipline. Banyan Tree achieves that balance. It says that where a defendant truly targets the forum and causes harm there, the court may act. Where the defendant merely hosts a globally accessible website, the court should not assume jurisdiction. This is a mature and principled rule. It remains one of the most cited Indian authorities on online jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009.
2. Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del).
3. India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, 2007 (35) PTC 177 (Del).
4. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
5. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
6. Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
7. Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
8. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
9. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
10. Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
11. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
12. Toys “R” Us v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003).
13. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077.
14. Patrick Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., 2006 FC 1395.
15. 1-800 Flowers Inc. v. Phonenames, [2002] FSR 12 CA.
16. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56.
17. California Fig Syrup Company v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd., (1897) 14 RPC 564.
18. Carr & Sons v. Crisp & Co. Ltd., (1902) 19 RPC 497.
19. C.C. Wakefield & Co. Ltd. v. Purser, (1934) 51 RPC 167.
20. Showerings Ltd. v. Fern Vale Brewery Coy Ltd., [1958] RPC 484.
21. Marie Claire Album SA v. Hartstone Hosiery Ltd., [1993] FSR 693.
22. Hilti AG v. Ucan Development Ltd., [1963] 7 RPC 160.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 20.
2. Trade Marks Act, 1999: Section 134(2).
3. Copyright Act, 1957: Section 62(2).
4. Information Technology Act, 2000, referred in the jurisdictional questions.