A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz & Ors. v. Government of Karnataka & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025 (02 Jan 2025). The appellants were owners of residential plots acquired under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 for the Bengaluru–Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project. A Preliminary Notification was issued on 29.01.2003, possession was taken (2005) but awards were not made for many years. In April 2019 the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) framed awards after relying on an Advocate-General’s opinion and judicial precedents, postponing the effective date for determining market value to a later year (2011) to mitigate injustice caused by delay.

Project proponents challenged the 2019 awards and the High Court (Single Judge) quashed the awards for want of jurisdiction in shifting the notification date; the Division Bench treated the appellants’ appeal as premature.

This Court (B.R. Gavai, J.):

(i) held that SLAO had no power to unilaterally shift the date of preliminary notification,

(ii) accepted that exceptional judicial exercise (under Article 142/226/32) can shift the date but only by the Court,

(iii) found appellants had been deprived of property without prompt compensation contrary to Article 300-A,

(iv) set aside the Division Bench order as premature and allowed the Writ Petition of appellants insofar as their claim to shift the date was concerned,

(v) directed the SLAO to pass fresh awards reckoning market value as on 22.04.2019 and to allow appellants all statutory benefits. 

Keywords: Article 300-A; Right to property; Land Acquisition; KIAD Act; preliminary notification; shifting date; compensation; delay; Article 142.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from large-scale land acquisition for the Bengaluru–Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP). A Framework Agreement (1997) envisaged massive transfers to project proponent NICE. Following administrative steps, KIADB issued a Preliminary Notification on 29.01.2003 and later final notifications; possession of various plots was taken in 2005. Despite possession, awards were not made for many years. Multiple litigations followed: land-owners challenged notifications (2010s), High Court refused to quash at that time but reserved remedies; representations seeking rehabilitation were directed to be considered; contempt proceedings were initiated for non-compliance of judicial directions.

In April 2019 the SLAO (acting on an Advocate-General’s opinion and KIADB instructions) made awards but postponed the effective date for market valuation (notably considering 2011 guideline values). Project proponents challenged the awards; the High Court (Single Judge) quashed the 2019 awards as the SLAO lacked jurisdiction to shift the notification date, directing fresh awards. A Division Bench said appellants’ appeal was premature. The Supreme Court entertained SLP and examined whether non-payment/delay required judicially shifting the valuation date and whether SLAO could do so. The Court balanced landowners’ constitutional right under Article 300-A against public interest and prior precedents, culminating in directions to determine compensation based on market value as on 22.04.2019 and to award statutory benefits.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

From 1995–1997 appellants acquired residential plots in Gottigere (Bengaluru). 1997 FWA between Karnataka and NICE contemplated acquisition of >20,000 acres for BMICP. KIADB was asked to make lands available; on 29.01.2003 KIADB issued preliminary notifications under s.28(1) KIAD Act. Final notifications were issued in July 2003; possession was taken (22.11.2005) and handed to NICE/NECE. Despite possession the SLAO did not promptly pass awards. Writ petitions (2009–2011) by landowners were dismissed but with liberty for rehabilitation remedies; representations in 2016 followed.

Contempt petitions were filed for non-compliance. During contempt proceedings SLAO passed awards on 22.04.2019 relying on an Advocate-General opinion to postpone the preliminary notification date (to 2011) and use guideline values; award amount aggregate approx. Rs. 3.26 crore for specified acreage. Project proponents challenged that shifting; High Court (Single Judge) quashed the award (18.04.2022) holding SLAO lacked jurisdiction to shift date; Division Bench dismissed appellants’ intra-court appeal as premature. Appellants approached the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a Special Land Acquisition Officer or the State/KIADB can unilaterally shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification for determining market value of land?
ii. Whether exceptional delay in payment of compensation justifies judicially shifting the valuation date so as to accord adequate compensation?
iii. Whether the appellants were deprived of their constitutional right under Article 300-A by inordinate delay and denial of prompt compensation?
iv. What relief is appropriate where (i) awards were quashed for jurisdictional infirmity but (ii) delay caused injustice to landowners?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. SLAO’s 2019 decision to refuse shifting and to stick to notification date was challenged: appellants contended the Single Judge’s refusal to shift the date left their grievance live and the Division Bench wrongly held the appeal premature. They sought judicial shifting to the date of award (or closest to award) because delay of >21 years made notification-date valuation manifestly inadequate. Relied on Ram Chand and Tukaram Kana Joshi as exceptional precedents permitting date shift to prevent injustice. Also prayed that compensation be determined under 2013 RFCTLARR Act principles (mutatis mutandis via s.30 KIAD Act).

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Project proponents and State: contended delay was not attributable to them (many steps and correspondence, deposit of compensation by project proponents with KIADB), and shifting the date is permissible only in rare exceptional circumstances—citing Barangore Jute Factory and other precedents. SLAO lacked power to shift; High Court remedies (fresh award) appropriate. Any extra liability due to delay should fall on State/KIADB rather than project proponents. Appellants’ claims were premature and remedies under award proceedings not exhausted.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court granted special leave, heard extensive authorities and facts, and proceeded in two steps: (a) correctness of quashing the SLAO award; (b) whether appellants deserve shifting-of-date relief.

(1) On quashing the 2019 awards: The Court agreed with the High Court that SLAO lacked jurisdiction to shift the preliminary notification date. Authorities relied upon by SLAO involved extraordinary exercise of Court’s inherent jurisdiction (Article 142/226/32). Administrative officers cannot themselves effect such jurisdictional modification. Accordingly, the impugned award was rightly quashed.

(2) On appellants’ entitlement: The Court found appellants had been deprived of possession and compensation for over two decades through no fault of theirs but owing to administrative lethargy. Article 300-A imposes constitutional protection — deprivation must be accompanied by adequate compensation in accordance with law. The Court noted settled jurisprudence (e.g., Ram Chand, Gauri Shankar Gaur, Haji Saeed Khan, Tukaram Kana Joshi) where courts in exceptional facts shifted the relevant date to secure substantial justice to land losers when delay caused unfairness and quashing of acquisition would cause disproportionate public injury. The Court held shifting power to a later date is exceptional and available to superior courts, not to SLAOs or the State unilaterally. Given the facts (long delay, deprivation without compensation, public project realities), in exercise of Article 142 the Court directed SLAO to pass fresh awards taking market value as on 22.04.2019 the date of the earlier award and to allow statutory benefits available under the 1894 LA Act. Parties retain rights to challenge the fresh awards. The Court underlined the principle that money today ≠ money decades ago and emphasized promptitude in disbursal is critical.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

(i) SLAOs or administrative officers do not possess authority to shift the statutory valuation date fixed by the acquisition statute; only courts (extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 32/226/142) can effect such remedial shifting in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) Where delay in awarding/ disbursing compensation is inordinate and attributable to State/authorities, courts may, to do complete and substantial justice and to prevent violation of Article 300-A, exercise inherent jurisdiction to direct a later date for valuation or award other equitable reliefs.

(iii) Equitable relief must balance individual deprivation and public interest; quashing acquisition may be inappropriate where land is already used for public purpose compensatory moulded relief is preferable.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court reiterated that right to property though no longer a fundamental right remains a protected constitutional right under Article 300-A and is treated as a human right in the welfare State context. The State’s duty extends to proactive facilitation of compensation; depositing or assigning liability may not absolve State of its constitutional duty to ensure prompt payment. The judgement emphasizes time-value of money and condemns administrative lethargy in acquisition processes.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Administrative officers cannot unilaterally postpone the statutory date of preliminary notification for valuation.
ii. Inordinate delay attributable to State entitles courts to fashion equitable remedies — including shifting date — but only when exercised by courts in exceptional facts.
iii. Where acquisition land is already used for public purpose, courts should avoid quashing notifications if that would cause public injury; instead mold relief to compensate landowners adequately.
iv. Prompt disbursal of determined compensation is mandatory; the State must not abdicate by shifting responsibility to third parties.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court took a balanced, remedial stance: it upheld the rule of law constraint that administrative officers cannot modify the statutory compass for valuation, yet recognized that prolonged administrative inaction that deprives citizens of property without prompt compensation can and should be remedied by the Court exercising its extraordinary powers. By directing fresh awards reckoning market value as on 22.04.2019 and granting statutory benefits the Court sought to restore fairness without disturbing a major public project consistent with precedents (Ram Chand, Barangore, Haji Saeed Khan, Tukaram Kana Joshi).

The judgment is significant for land-acquisition practice:

it reinforces (a) state accountability for timely awards/disbursement;

(b) strict limits on administrative attempts to engineer valuation dates;

(c) continued availability of court-crafted equitable relief where delay causes real deprivation.

For practitioners, the decision clarifies procedural forums and remedies: affected landowners can press for date-shift relief before superior courts where delay is not their fault; acquiring authorities must prioritize disbursal and avoid attempting unilateral corrective measures beyond statutory power.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred 

i. Ram Chand & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1993 INSC 315.
ii. Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors., 2012 INSC 503.
iii. Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 47.
iv. Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P., (1994) 1 SCC 92.
v. Haji Saeed Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2001) 9 SCC 513.
vi. K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. Special Deputy Collector, Karimnagar (1988) 4 SCC 163.
vii. Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., 2020 INSC 23.
viii. Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram & Ors., 2024 INSC 709.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India, Article 300-A.
ii. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (referred provisions; e.g., s.11 / Section 4/6 aspects).
iii. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (s.28, s.30).
iv. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (referenced for principles).