A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1842 of 2025 (judgment dated 07 April 2025) where the Supreme Court considered whether allegations in an FIR (registered 14.12.2015) amounted to offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC and whether the accused-appellant should have been discharged under Section 227 CrPC. The complainant alleged that while matrimonial proceedings with her husband were pending (2014), she entered into a relationship with the appellant — then an ACJM and later a retired judicial officer — who promised marriage once her divorce was finalised, provided financial support (rented accommodation, school fees, bank transfers) and introduced an advocate who handled her litigation; after divorce the appellant allegedly avoided her and threatened to harm her son. The prosecution relied on the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement, witness statements (security guard and driver), CFSL/CDR material and a charge-sheet filed after CID investigation. The appellant argued the relationship was consensual, the complainant knew he was separated, no fraudulent inducement was made and promises to marry cannot be equated to a false fact vitiating consent. The Court analysed precedent on consent, misconception of fact and false promise to marry, notably Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Uday v. State of Karnataka, found inconsistencies in the complainant’s narrative, and concluded that even accepting allegations at face value the physical relationship was most probably consensual and not procured by a false promise to marry; further, material for offences under Sections 417/506 IPC was inadequate. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order refusing discharge and terminated proceedings at the stage of charge.

Keywords: consent; misconception of fact; false promise to marry; Section 227 CrPC; Sections 376(2)(f), 417, 506 IPC; inconsistency in testimony; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from an FIR dated 14.12.2015 where the complainant alleged a prolonged intimate relationship with the appellant that began in 2014 during her matrimonial litigation. The appellant, a serving ACJM at the time and subsequently a retired judicial officer, allegedly promised to marry the complainant after her divorce and undertook responsibilities — housing, school admissions and regular monetary support for the complainant and her son — thereby procuring sexual relations on the false pretext of marriage. When the complainant’s divorce concluded she claims the appellant withdrew, ignored calls and threatened harm to her son via his security guard. After CID investigation and a charge-sheet (30.04.2020) the appellant applied for discharge under Section 227 CrPC, which was refused by the Sessions Judge and the High Court (Calcutta) dismissed the revision. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the material, taken at face value, could sustain offences under Sections 376(2)(f) (rape by promise to marry), 417 (cheating) and 506 (criminal intimidation), and whether the matter required trial or termination at charge stage. The impugned orders were challenged on the canvas of consent jurisprudence and the threshold for discharge.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant had matrimonial disputes with her then-husband. During that pendency in 2014 she allegedly met the appellant (then ACJM). The appellant allegedly informed her he was separated from his wife, promised marriage upon her divorce, kept her in rented accommodation at Tamluk, paid for her son’s admission into Tamralipta Public School, and transferred money to her bank account for expenses. She claims the appellant introduced an advocate and that physical relations occurred repeatedly on the assurance of marriage. After her divorce was finalised the appellant purportedly avoided her, stopped answering calls, and directed his security guard to prevent contact, allegedly threatening harm to her son. Anticipatory bail was granted to the appellant on 13.01.2016. CID investigation led to a charge-sheet (30.04.2020). The Sessions Court refused discharge (04.01.2024) and the High Court dismissed revision (23.02.2024). The prosecution relied on the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement, witness evidence (guard/driver), CFSL and CDR analysis linking mobile devices to the appellant. The defence emphasised consent, the complainant’s knowledge of appellant’s separated status, absence of fraudulent inducement, and argued the promise to marry could not be equated to a false factual inducement vitiating consent.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose an offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC (rape by promise to marry) where the prosecutrix knew the accused was in a subsisting but separated marriage?
ii. Whether the elements of cheating under Section 417 IPC (dishonest inducement) are made out by the alleged promise and financial assistance?
iii. Whether the allegations and claimed threats satisfy Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation?
iv. Whether the case should be terminated at the stage of discharge under Section 227 CrPC or proceed to trial?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The relationship was consensual and prolonged; the complainant was an adult who knowingly entered the relationship while aware the appellant was separated—hence no misconception of fact vitiating consent.
ii. A promise to marry which is unenforceable or non-factual cannot constitute the false pretext envisaged under Section 376(2)(f).
iii. Ingredients of cheating (dishonesty, inducement) under Section 417 IPC are absent — the complainant received substantial support but that does not equate to fraudulent inducement.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. CID affidavit and witness testimony disclose material showing the appellant used his office to gain trust and promised marriage to exploit vulnerability; CFSL/CDR evidence links communications and devices to the appellant. The State argued prima facie material exists for offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 417, 506 and 120B IPC and that the appellant must face trial.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 376(2)(f) IPC — rape where sexual intercourse is committed by a man who, by deceit or false promise of marriage, causes a woman to have sexual intercourse.
ii. Section 417 IPC — cheating by dishonest inducement. filecite
iii. Section 506 IPC — criminal intimidation by threats of injury to person or reputation.
iv. Section 227 CrPC — power of Sessions Judge to discharge accused where no case made out.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court, after weighing the pleadings and material, directed itself to established tests for consent and misconception of fact and relevant precedents — particularly Pramod Suryabhan Pawar and Uday v. State of Karnataka — which require that a false promise be given in bad faith and bear immediate nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse. The Court recorded the complainant’s admission that she knew the appellant was separated and had actively chosen to continue the relationship while receiving support. The bench found it improbable that the physical relationship arose only because of an assurance to marry. The Court observed inconsistencies — notably the complainant’s different accounts regarding introduction to the appellant and the role of Advocate Gopal Chandra Dass (the charge-sheet indicating the advocate was known to the complainant independently) — casting doubt on the narrative of inducement. The CFSL/CDR material and witness statements were evaluated but were not found to conclusively establish dishonest intent or threats amounting to Section 506; a bare allegation of threat without corroborative detail fails to meet the criminal intimidation threshold. The Court emphasised that at discharge stage a mini-trial is impermissible; yet the Court may, in exceptional cases where the material on record shows the prosecution case is inherently improbable or an abuse of process, terminate proceedings. Given the totality — consensual pattern of association, knowledge of appellant’s marital status, inconsistencies and lack of cogent evidence of dishonest promise or real threats — the Court concluded the relationship was most likely consensual and not procured by fraudulent promise. Finding a risk of abuse of process and prolonged litigation over a 2014 episode, the Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal, terminating proceedings at charge stage.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive reasoning is that a mere promise to marry, without proof of a false promise given in bad faith and immediate nexus to the sexual act, does not vitiate consent; where the prosecutrix knew the accused’s circumstances and voluntarily sustained the relationship, and where material lacks proof of dishonest inducement or credible threats, the ingredients of Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC are not made out even at the prima facie stage — warranting discharge and termination of proceedings as an abuse of process.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court cautioned against the growing tendency to convert failed relationships into criminal prosecutions and underscored that courts must guard against litigation that would be mala fide or an abuse of process; the bench reiterated that each case is fact-sensitive and tests on consent demand careful factual appraisal rather than mechanical invocation of promise-to-marry jurisprudence.

c. GUIDELINES 

• At Section 227 stage, courts should assess whether the prosecution’s allegations, even taken at face value, could reasonably establish each ingredient of the charged offences.

• Where the record demonstrates material inconsistencies or inherent improbabilities and absence of elements like dishonest intent or credible threats, courts may exercise discretion to terminate to prevent abuse of process.

• Promise to marry must be shown to be false at the time it was made and of direct relevance to the complainant’s consent.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision underscores a careful, fact-sensitive application of consent jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces that not every broken promise or post-relationship complaint will sustain criminal charges; consent must be evaluated in context and dishonest intent to induce must be established with supportive material. The bench balanced victims’ protection with safeguards against frivolous or vindictive criminalisation of consensual adult relationships. While the decision may raise concerns about access to justice where power asymmetries exist, the Court’s analysis signals that allegations of misuse of position or threats must be supported by reliable evidence — mere transactions of support and subsequent withdrawal do not ipso facto transform relationships into offences under Section 376(2)(f) or Section 417. Practitioners should note the Court’s willingness to quash proceedings at discharge where continuation would be oppressive and the prosecution case demonstrably weak. The judgment is a pragmatic reaffirmation that the criminal law’s extreme remedy must be reserved for demonstrable exploitation, not for all dissolved intimacies.

K) REFERENCES 

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1842 of 2025 (S.C. Apr. 7, 2025).

2. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608. (referred in judgment).

3. Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46. (referred in judgment).

4. Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2024) SCC Online SC 3375. (referred in judgment).

5. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh, (2023) SCC Online SC 379. (procedural citation re discharge stage).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 376(2)(f), 415, 417, 506, 120B.

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 164 (statement), 227 (discharge), 402 r/w 482 (High Court revision).