A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This judgment concerns the conviction of C. Kamalakkannan under Sections 120B, 468, 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for his alleged role in preparing a postal cover that purportedly carried a forged marksheet. The trial court convicted on the basis of expert handwriting evidence and other material; the appellate courts affirmed. Before this Court the central contest was evidentiary: whether opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert may be acted upon without substantial corroboration and whether a photocopy/secondary evidence of a postal cover can stand when the original is not produced.

Applying the principles in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. the Court reiterated that there is no inflexible rule requiring corroboration of a handwriting expert’s opinion but that courts must proceed with caution given the imperfect nature of handwriting identification. Crucially, the prosecution failed to exhibit or prove the original postal cover; the expert himself did not identify the particular cover received for examination. Non-production of the primary document rendered the expert’s opinion ineffective in law. The convictions were therefore quashed and the appellant acquitted.

Keywords: postal cover; forged marksheet; handwriting expert; corroboration; secondary evidence.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal flows from convictions for conspiring to produce and use a forged marksheet and sending it by post. The prosecution’s theory was that a forged marksheet showing higher marks than the accused student actually obtained was transmitted in a postal cover prepared by the appellant. The trial court convicted largely on handwriting expert evidence opining that the postal cover bore the appellant’s handwriting; the appellate court and the High Court affirmed the conviction and penalties were imposed.

On special leave, the appellant raised fundamental evidential challenges: the original postal cover was never produced or exhibited during prosecution evidence; only secondary material was relied upon; and the handwriting expert’s reasoning-sheet and the chain of custody were not properly proved. The Supreme Court was asked to test whether an expert’s opinion unsupported by primary documentary proof could sustain conviction, and whether established jurisprudence permitting acceptance of handwriting-expert opinion without rigid requirement of corroboration remained applicable.

The factual matrix involves forgery of an academic document used for admission, the ensuing criminal investigation, and the weight given by trial courts to opinion-evidence when primary evidence is absent. This Court undertook a careful examination of the expert’s testimony, the trial record’s treatment of the disputed cover, and the binding guidance of Murari Lal v. State of M.P. on the admissibility and scrutiny of handwriting opinion. The appeal forced a focused legal articulation about the interplay between Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the fundamental evidentiary requirement to produce primary documents where available.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On investigation following detection of a fabricated marksheet submitted by one Kumari Amudha for MBBS admission, it emerged that while the student had in fact secured 767/1200, the marksheet submitted showed 1120/1200. An FIR (Crime No. 2172 of 1996) led to charge-sheets implicating several persons, including the appellant, who was alleged to have prepared the postal cover in which the forged marksheet had been sent. At the trial the prosecution exhibited various documents and examined witnesses including a handwriting expert (PW-18).

The trial court found the appellant guilty principally because the handwriting expert’s report (Exhibit A-31) opined that the postal cover bore the appellant’s handwriting. The court’s record however also notes that the original postal cover was not on the record; only a copy/photostat was available and objection was raised to its exhibition. The expert stated that he received certain exhibits (A-2, A-14, A-15 and a postal cover) for examination, yet did not expressly identify the postal cover in court as the same item that allegedly contained the forged marksheet.

On appeal, the appellant argued that absence of the original document and lack of proof of the expert’s reasoning-sheet, together with the imperfect nature of handwriting science, precluded safe reliance on the expert report. The prosecution argued that secondary evidence was admissible where the original could not be produced and that the evidence of other witnesses supported the overall story. Lower courts, however, either found the absence of the original to be immaterial or considered the secondary proof adequate, leading to affirmed convictions until the present challenge.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert requires substantive corroboration before a court may act upon it?
ii. Whether a photocopy/secondary evidence of a postal cover may be admitted and relied upon where the original document is not produced?
iii. Whether failure to exhibit the original disputed postal cover vitiates the evidentiary value of the handwriting expert’s opinion linked to that cover?
iv. Whether the expert’s failure to identify the specific postal cover he examined affects admissibility and weight of his opinion?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the conviction rested almost entirely on handwriting expert evidence and that the trial Court erred in accepting the expert report when the original postal cover was never produced or exhibited. It was urged that the reasoning-sheet used by the expert during comparison was not placed on record and thus the report was not properly proved. Learned counsel emphasized that handwriting opinion is not infallible and must be tested by corroboration and strict proof of the primary document, especially where an accused’s liberty is at stake. Reliance on testimony of co-accused or interested witnesses to shore up the expert opinion was said to be impermissible without proper corroboration. The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to meet its fundamental burden to produce the original postal cover and to establish chain of custody and identity of the item actually examined by the expert.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State’s counsel maintained that expert evidence is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and that there is no absolute rule demanding corroboration in each case. It was argued that secondary evidence (photocopy) could be used where the original could not be traced and that the trial court properly evaluated the entirety of evidence. The respondent contended that the handwriting expert’s report and testimony furnished sufficient bases for the conclusion that the appellant had prepared the postal cover. The State urged that the courts below correctly applied the law and that mere non-exhibition of the original did not automatically negate the expert opinion.

H) JUDGEMENT

This Court examined the scope of reliance that may be placed on handwriting-expert evidence through the prism of Murari Lal v. State of M.P. The ratio in Murari Lal was reproduced: there is no invariable rule that a handwriting expert’s opinion must be rejected unless substantially corroborated; rather courts must proceed with caution, probe the reasons given by the expert, and weigh all other relevant evidence. Applying those principles, the Court closely inspected the trial record and discovered critical lacunae: the prosecution had failed to produce or exhibit the original postal cover said to contain the forged marksheet.

The trial Court itself noted the non-availability of the original and recorded objection to exhibiting the copy. The handwriting expert’s testimony further failed to identify the particular postal cover on record as the same item he examined. Given these defects, the Court held that the primary document was never proved as required by law. Once the postal cover (the very subject-matter of the expert comparison) was not proved, the expert’s opinion about its handwriting became legally redundant because the opinion lacked the foundational predicate the identity of the questioned exhibit necessary for it to have probative force.

The Court therefore concluded that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish that the accused had prepared the cover in his handwriting, and that convictions founded on that missing link could not stand. The appeal was allowed, impugned judgments were quashed and the appellant was acquitted.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle is twofold. First, while expert handwriting opinion is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and need not invariably be disregarded for want of corroboration, courts must scrutinize the reasons underpinning the expert’s conclusion and evaluate all other evidence before accepting such opinion. Second, primary documentary proof is indispensable: if the original document (here, the postal cover) is not produced and identified in evidence, secondary evidence cannot supply the fundamental identity required to give probative content to an expert’s comparative opinion. The combination of these principles led to the conclusion that an expert opinion devoid of the primary document it seeks to characterise cannot sustain conviction.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court reiterated the cautionary posture a tribunal must adopt toward handwriting science because it is not infallible. The judgment observed that while experts are not to be treated with undue suspicion, their opinion is to be tested against stated reasons and supporting facts. The judgment also commented on the procedural requirement that a handwriting expert should identify exhibits actually received and produce his working notes or reasoning-sheet when necessary to justify the opinion; omission weakens the evidentiary weight.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. When acting upon handwriting expert evidence the court must probe the basis and reasons for the expert’s conclusion and test those reasons against other material on record.
ii. The original document which is the subject matter of examination must ordinarily be produced and exhibited; non-production attracts adverse inference and undermines the foundation of comparative expert opinion.
iii. Where the original cannot be traced, prosecution must satisfactorily explain non-production and justify admissibility of secondary evidence under statutory provisions; bare reliance on a photocopy is insufficient if identity is contested.
iv. An expert should be called to identify the actual exhibits he examined and to produce his reasoning-sheet or working notes where such documents are material to explain the process of comparison.
v. Acceptance of handwriting opinion without corroboration is permissible in appropriate cases, but the court must adopt a cautious, fact-sensitive approach and may require corroboration of varying degree depending on the quality of reasons and surrounding evidence.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment is an instructive application of Murari Lal and an important reminder that admissibility and weight are distinct questions: admissible expert opinion may still be deprived of probative weight if the foundational documentary item is not proved. The decision affirms that Section 45 imports relevance for expert testimony but does not relieve the prosecution of the elementary obligation to produce the original instrument which forms the subject of expertise.

For practitioners, the ruling underscores meticulous proof of chain of custody, exhibition of originals, and preservation of the expert’s reasoning materials. The judgment balances acceptance of scientific assistance to the court with procedural safeguards that protect accused persons from convictions based on opinions untethered to primary evidence. In cases of forgery and document-related offences the Court’s insistence on proving the questioned document is a robust safeguard of fair trial standards and evidentiary rigour.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704 (referred and followed).

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120B, 468, 471, 109.
ii. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 45.
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.