A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This appeal concerns the conviction of C. Kamalakkannan for offences under Sections 120B, 468 and 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, alleging that he prepared a postal cover used to transmit a forged MBBS marksheet. The trial court convicted the appellant primarily on the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert and certain co-accused testimony; the appellate courts affirmed. On special leave, the Supreme Court reviewed whether opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert requires corroboration and, critically, whether the prosecution proved the original postal cover (primary evidence) before placing reliance on the expert’s conclusions.
Applying the principles in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. and a cautious approach to handwriting identification under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Court held there is no absolute rule requiring corroboration of handwriting expert evidence but emphasized probe, reason and corroboration where appropriate. The prosecution failed to produce or exhibit the original postal cover; the handwriting expert did not identify the cover in court as the very document examined; and the absence of the primary document rendered the expert’s report evidentially redundant. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, quashed convictions and acquitted the appellant.
Keywords: postal cover; forged marksheet; handwriting expert; corroboration; primary evidence; Section 45 Evidence Act.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title — C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Inspector of Police C.B.C.I.D., Chennai.
ii) Case Number — Criminal Appeal No. 1056 of 2025.
iii) Judgement Date — 03 March 2025.
iv) Court — Supreme Court of India.
v) Quorum — Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.
vi) Author — Mehta, J.
vii) Citation — [2025] 3 S.C.R. 629 : 2025 INSC 309.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved — Sections 120B, 468, 471 and 109 IPC; Section 45 Evidence Act, 1872; provisions relating to primary and secondary evidence under the Indian Evidence Act.
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case — None; decision follows and applies precedent in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. rather than overruling it.
x) Related Law Subjects — Criminal law; Evidence law; Forensic jurisprudence; Procedural law (proof and admissibility of documents).
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case arises from an FIR registered in 1996 after discovery that an MBBS admission mark-sheet produced by Kumari Amudha was forged: her true score was 767/1200 whereas the produced document claimed 1120/1200. Investigation led to charge-sheeting of several accused, including the present appellant, on allegations that he prepared the postal cover used to transmit the forged marksheet. The trial court convicted the appellant; the Principal Sessions Judge affirmed with reduced fines; the Madras High Court dismissed revision.
Before the Supreme Court the central evidentiary dispute narrowed to two interrelated questions:
(1) what weight may be accorded to handwriting expert opinion under Section 45 and whether such opinion requires corroboration; and
(2) whether the prosecution proved the original postal cover (primary evidence), without which reliance on the expert’s conclusion about the handwriting would be legally untenable.
The prosecution relied heavily on the evidence of the handwriting expert (PW-18) and an expert report (Exhibit A-31), while the defence emphasised absence of primary evidence, non-exhibition of the reasoning sheet prepared during examination, and the scientifically imperfect nature of handwriting identification. The Supreme Court, while reaffirming Murari Lal’s cautionary but non-dogmatic approach to expert handwriting evidence, scrutinised the chain of proof and exhibited materiality. The Court concluded that absent proof and exhibition of the original postal cover the handwriting opinion could not sustain conviction.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The prosecution case is that a forged MBBS marksheet was used for admission; police investigation traced the forged document’s transmission to a postal cover allegedly bearing the appellant’s handwriting. The charge-sheet alleged concerted criminality under Sections 120B, 468 and 471 IPC. At trial the prosecution produced a photocopy of the implicated postal cover and tendered the handwriting expert’s report. The handwriting expert (PW-18) examined several items (Exhibits A-2, A-14, A-15 and a postal cover) and prepared a report (Exhibit A-31).
However, the original postal cover that allegedly bore the appellant’s handwriting was not produced or exhibited in court; the appellant objected to exhibiting a copy and the trial court recorded non-exhibition. The expert’s oral testimony did not specifically identify the postal cover produced in court as the identical document he had examined and reasoned upon. A co-accused’s deposition and other witnesses were before the trial court, but the trial judge primarily relied on the expert opinion to attribute authorship of the postal cover to the appellant.
The appellate courts affirmed conviction and fines were adjusted. On revision the High Court rejected the appellant’s challenge, and the matter reached the Supreme Court by special leave. The defence pointed out fatal lapses: failure to lead primary documentary evidence, non-production of the expert’s reasoning sheet while testifying, and overreliance on an opinion from an imperfect forensic science.
The prosecution contended secondary evidence (photostat) was admissible where the original could not be traced and maintained that the expert’s report and testimony sufficed to prove handwriting identity.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must invariably be corroborated before being acted upon?
ii. Whether a photostat copy of a postal cover can be treated as admissible secondary evidence in absence of the original and suffice to prove authorship by the accused?
iii. Whether non-exhibition of the original document renders expert opinion on handwriting without evidentiary value?
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the prosecution’s case rests solely on the handwriting expert and that the original postal cover the primary piece of evidence was never produced or exhibited; hence the trial court’s reliance on the expert was unjustified. They further argued that the handwriting expert’s reasoning sheet prepared during scientific examination was not brought on record during testimony and so the report lacks procedural proof and is inadmissible.
Defense stressed the imperfect nature of handwriting comparison and urged that uncorroborated expert opinion should not ground conviction. They maintained the conviction cannot stand where the chain of custody and primary proof of the questioned document are absent.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Respondent submitted that the prosecution had proceeded correctly by tendering secondary evidence (photostat) when the original could not be traced, and that the handwriting expert’s report and testimony constituted admissible and reliable evidence. The State contended that the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence including co-accused testimony and documentary exhibits tendered as secondary evidence supported the finding that the postal cover bore the appellant’s handwriting. The respondent urged that Murari Lal does not create a bar against acting upon expert handwriting opinion, and that the trial court applied the evidence sensibly.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Section 45, Evidence Act, 1872 — relevance of opinion of persons specially skilled in questions as to identity of handwriting.
ii. Provisions on primary and secondary evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — requirements for proving documents and conditions when secondary evidence may be admitted.
iii. Sections 120B, 468, 471 and 109 IPC — criminal conspiracy, forgery and using forged document.
I) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court granted leave and examined the material facts and law. The Court reaffirmed the principles in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. that there is no inflexible rule disallowing reliance on handwriting expert opinion absent corroboration; instead the court must proceed with caution, probe the reasons given by the expert, and consider all other relevant evidence. Applying that principle, the Court found two fatal lapses in the prosecution case.
First, the original postal cover the primary document alleged to contain the appellant’s handwriting was not produced or exhibited in evidence; non-production leads to the inference that the document was never proved as required by law and cannot be used as the foundation for conviction.
Second, the handwriting expert (PW-18) did not identify the postal cover produced in court as the same document he examined; he stated he had received various exhibits and a postal cover but did not connect the examined item to the document on record. Given these defects, the evidentiary value of the expert’s report (Exhibit A-31) was rendered redundant.
The Court therefore held that the prosecution failed to prove the essential fact that the postal cover existed in evidence and that its handwriting belonged to the appellant. The convictions recorded by the Trial Court, affirmed by the Sessions Court and the High Court, could not stand judicial scrutiny. The appeal was allowed, prior judgments were quashed and the appellant was acquitted.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The ratio is two-fold:
(i) while expert opinion under Section 45 is relevant and need not be mechanically rejected for lack of corroboration, the court must carefully probe the reasons for the expert’s opinion, and accept it only when convincing;
(ii) primary documentary proof is indispensable where the existence and identity of a questioned document is in issue non-exhibition of the original document means the document was not proved as required, and any expert opinion relying on an unproved document becomes legally valueless.
Put succinctly, expert handwriting evidence may convict only when anchored to properly proved, exhibited and identified primary material and when the expert’s reasons satisfy judicial scrutiny.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed (following Murari Lal) that handwriting identification is an imperfect science and commands caution; experts are not accomplices and should not be treated with initial suspicion, yet their opinions must be tested by the soundness of reasons given. The Court reiterated that there can be no rigid rule insisting on corroboration in every case but stressed the practical need for corroboration in many fact patterns. The obiter emphasizes that procedural safeguards exhibition, chain-of-custody, identification in court and production of underlying reasoning strengthen admissibility and weight of expert testimony.
c. GUIDELINES
i. Exhibit and Prove Originals: Always produce and exhibit the original questioned document wherever possible; absence invites inference of non-proof.
ii. Link Expert to Exhibit: The handwriting expert must, on oath, identify the exact document he examined and produce or explain his reasoning sheet and steps undertaken during examination.
iii. Probe Expert Reasons: Courts must probe the reasons and basis of the expert’s opinion; acceptance depends on cogency, method and supporting facts, not on expert status alone.
iv. Use Corroboration Where Needed: When handwriting science is not decisive, seek corroboration by other evidence — e.g., contemporaneous admissions, custody trail, witnesses linking the document to the accused.
v. Secondary Evidence as Exception: Secondary evidence (photocopies) may be used only when the original is shown to be unavailable for permissible reasons and the legal preconditions for secondary proof are satisfied. Failure to satisfy those preconditions weakens the prosecution’s case.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The decision responsibly balances trust in scientific opinion with the procedural rigour required for documentary proof. The Court neither denigrates handwriting experts nor permits convictions founded on unproved documents. The jurisprudential lesson is procedural: prosecution must secure and exhibit the primary document and ensure the expert’s testimony links to the exhibited item; failing this, conviction based chiefly on an expert’s opinion becomes unsafe.
Practically, investigating agencies and prosecutors must preserve physical exhibits, document chain of custody and produce the expert’s underlying working notes in court to avoid evidentiary gaps. For courts, the ruling reiterates Murari Lal’s methodology no hard rule of corroboration but an insistence on careful judicial scrutiny of expert reasons and surrounding evidence.
Academically, the case underlines that forensic disciplines with inherent uncertainty require procedural buttressing; forensic opinions translate into conviction only when anchored to admissible, exhibited material and transparent expert reasoning. The acquittal here does not sanctify forgery or obstruct accountability; it enforces evidentiary integrity so convictions rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt, not on opinion untethered to primary evidence.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704 (also reported [1980] 2 SCR 249).
ii. C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 629 : 2025 INSC 309 (Supreme Court, 03 March 2025).
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120B, 468, 471, 109.
ii. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 45 (opinion of expert) and provisions on primary and secondary evidence.