A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Chinubhai Haridas v. The State of Bombay (1959) stands as a landmark judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India interpreting the liability of an occupier under Sections 36(3) and 36(4) of the Indian Factories Act, 1948. The case involves a tragic industrial accident where five workers lost their lives after entering a pit filled with toxic fumes without any breathing apparatus or safety measures. The central question before the Court was whether the appellant, as an occupier of the factory, could be held liable for “permitting” such entry into a hazardous confined space, and whether there was a breach of absolute statutory obligations under the Act. The Supreme Court interpreted the expression “be permitted to enter” not as an absolute liability but as contingent on either express or implied permission, and held that each case must be assessed based on factual context. It clarified that although the worker is primarily prohibited from entering confined spaces under Section 36(3), the occupier may be liable if implied permission or failure to prevent entry is established. Further, the Court confirmed that Section 36(4) imposes an absolute duty on the occupier to ensure that appropriate safety equipment is available in the factory and periodically tested. The judgment is a crucial precedent in industrial safety jurisprudence and delineates the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability under statutory welfare provisions. It strikes a balance between holding employers accountable and not extending liability to the point of absurdity, especially in cases of reckless or unauthorized conduct by employees.

Keywords: Indian Factories Act, 1948; confined space; occupier liability; private entry; Section 36; factory safety laws; implied permission; statutory duty; industrial accident; criminal liability.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Chinubhai Haridas v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date
4th September 1959

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice Syed Jafar Imam

vi) Author
Justice K. N. Wanchoo

vii) Citation
(1959) SCR Supl. (2) 654

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 36(3) and 36(4) of the Factories Act, 1948

• Section 97 and Section 101 of the Factories Act, 1948

ix) Judgments Overruled
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Labour Law, Criminal Law, Industrial Safety Law, Welfare Legislation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal emerged from a tragic incident at the Gopal Mills Co. Ltd., Broach, where five workers died after entering a pit that contained dangerous fumes. The pit, part of a purification plant, was not intended for human entry under normal working conditions. It had been securely covered, and its operation was controlled through surface gadgets. When the machinery inside the pit malfunctioned, a worker entered without necessary precautions and died. Subsequently, four others followed and also perished. The factory did not possess or keep ready any breathing or reviving apparatus, belts, or ropes for emergencies.

The trial court acquitted the occupier (appellant) on the grounds that there was no express or implied permission to the workers to enter the pit, and hence no liability under Section 36(3). It also held that Section 36(4) did not apply since permission under subsection (3) was not established. However, the Bombay High Court reversed this interpretation, holding the occupier liable for implied permission and breach of safety obligations. The appeal to the Supreme Court questioned the interpretation and application of these subsections and raised critical points about the scope of liability for workplace safety lapses.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Chinubhai Haridas, was the occupier of Gopal Mills Company Ltd., where an enclosed pit containing dangerous fumes existed as part of a purification system. On 4th July 1955, the machinery in this pit developed a fault. In response, a worker, Melia Dadla, entered the pit without any breathing apparatus or safety rope and succumbed to the poisonous atmosphere. Four other workers — Fakirji Dhanjishaw, Maganlal Gordhandas, Chunilal Bochar, and Chhotalal Nathubhai — also entered the pit, similarly unprotected, and died from gas exposure.

Investigations revealed that the factory lacked basic safety equipment like breathing masks, reviving apparatus, and safety belts. These were not stored near the pit nor elsewhere in the factory. The occupier was prosecuted under Sections 36(3) and 36(4) of the Factories Act, 1948. The appellant argued that there was no permission, direct or indirect, given to workers to enter the pit. The trial court accepted this defence and acquitted the occupier.

However, the High Court of Bombay, upon appeal by the State, held that failure to prevent entry implied permission and hence the appellant was liable. It also ruled that safety apparatus should have been available at all times near the pit. The matter escalated to the Supreme Court via special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the term “be permitted to enter” under Section 36(3) implies an absolute obligation on the occupier to prevent any worker’s entry into confined spaces.

ii) Whether an occupier is criminally liable under Section 36(4) for failure to keep safety equipment near a hazardous confined space at all times, regardless of whether entry was authorized.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Appellant submitted that Section 36(3) does not impose an absolute liability on the occupier to prevent entry into the confined space. They argued that the section places the primary obligation on workers themselves not to enter unless safety conditions are fulfilled. They referred to Section 97 of the Act which penalizes workers for contravening provisions imposed upon them and highlighted that the trial court had rightly relied upon this when acquitting the appellant. 

The appellant further relied on Section 101, which provides that an occupier shall not be liable if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or despite due diligence. They contended that the appellant had no prior knowledge of the incident and no express or implied permission had been given. Hence, prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving negligence or connivance.

The appellant also challenged the High Court’s view that failure to prevent entry amounts to implied permission. They cautioned against expanding the interpretation of “permitted to enter” to such an extent as to create unreasonable and absolute liability, which contradicts the legislative intent of balancing duties between employers and employees under welfare statutes like the Factories Act, 1948.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the appellant, as occupier, was bound by statutory duties under Sections 36(3) and 36(4) to ensure that no worker enters such hazardous spaces without proper safety measures. The State argued that the failure to prevent workers from entering must be construed as implied permission, particularly in the absence of supervisory control or warning systems.

The High Court had rightly ruled that “permitted to enter” under Section 36(3) includes acquiescence, inaction, and failure to prevent. They contended that occupiers cannot escape liability by simply denying express permission while allowing unsafe conditions to persist.

On Section 36(4), the respondent argued that breathing and reviving apparatus must be “kept ready for instant use” and that this implies proximity to the hazardous area. The absence of any such equipment in the factory amounted to a flagrant breach of an absolute obligation, making the appellant criminally liable regardless of whether he authorized the entry.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 36(3), Factories Act, 1948 – Prohibits any person from entering confined spaces unless safety procedures (like breathing apparatus or written certification) are complied with.
ii) Section 36(4), Factories Act, 1948 – Mandates the factory to keep breathing and reviving apparatus ready and ensure periodic training of workers.
iii) Section 97, Factories Act – Provides for penalizing workers for contraventions and shields employers if the worker is at fault.
iv) Section 101, Factories Act – Provides a defence to occupiers if they prove absence of knowledge, consent, or connivance, and demonstrate due diligence.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the words “be permitted to enter” under Section 36(3) do not impose an absolute liability on the occupier. Liability cannot be inferred solely from the worker’s presence in the hazardous area. The Court emphasized that each case must be assessed on its facts to determine whether permission was express or implied.

ii) On Section 36(4), the Court held that while the apparatus need not be kept beside the pit at all times, it must be always available in the factory and subject to periodic inspection and readiness. The Court confirmed that this obligation is absolute, regardless of whether someone enters the pit or not.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that welfare legislations like the Factories Act must balance accountability without imposing unrealistic burdens on employers, especially in cases of unforeseeable or unauthorized acts by workers.

c. GUIDELINES

• Liability under Section 36(3) depends on the facts indicating permission, not merely the act of entry.

• The burden of proof to establish employer’s failure lies on the prosecution.

• Apparatus under Section 36(4) must be permanently available, but not necessarily near the pit unless someone is about to enter.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chinubhai Haridas v. State of Bombay sets a measured precedent in interpreting liability under industrial safety laws. The judgment prevents the imposition of absolute criminal liability on occupiers for every accident, especially where worker conduct is spontaneous or unauthorized. At the same time, the Court upheld the non-negotiable duty to maintain safety equipment and train personnel, reinforcing the welfare objectives of the Factories Act.

The ruling offers clarity on the scope of “implied permission”, the standards of reasonable diligence, and the shared responsibilities between workers and management. It remains a cornerstone precedent in occupational safety jurisprudence and continues to guide Indian courts in interpreting employer liability in hazardous workplace environments.

K) REFERENCES

1. Factories Act, 1948, §36(3), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1491970/

2. Factories Act, 1948, §101, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7745/

3. Chinubhai Haridas v. The State of Bombay

4. Chinubhai Haridas v. The State of Bombay, (1959) SCR Supl. (2) 654

5. Amjad Khan v. State, 1952 SCR 567