A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

CMJ Foundation & Ors. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors., decided on 13 February 2025, examines three principal questions:

(1) whether the appointment of the Chancellor of Chandra Mohan Jha University (CMJ University) complied with Section 14(1) of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009;

(2) whether the State’s dissolution order dated 31 March 2014 complied with Section 48 of the Act and this Court’s direction of 13 September 2013; and

(3) whether the Division Bench’s remand to the Single Judge for re-examination on merits was justified.

The Supreme Court held that the sponsor’s appointment of the Chancellor without the Visitor’s approval was conditional and therefore non est void ab initio because the appointment under s.14(1) is expressly “subject to the approval of the Visitor”; no deeming fiction of approval exists absent statutory enactment. The Court further held that the State complied with the procedural mandate of s.48 (notice, show-cause, examination of replies, reminder and a speaking order) before the dissolution; the dissolution order of 31.03.2014 was therefore affirmed on the facts.

Finally, the Court found the Division Bench’s remand to the Single Judge to be unnecessary and legally flawed because the appellate court had already examined and decided the core controversy on merits; the remand was set aside. Key precedents on “subject to” construction, deeming provisions and administrative fairness were applied.

Keywords: Chancellor; Visitor; Section 14(1); Section 48; Dissolution; Deemed approval; Legal fiction; Natural justice; Wednesbury unreasonableness; Remand.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The CMJ University was statutory created by the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009 and sponsored by Chandra Mohan Jha Foundation. The Sponsor appointed Shri Chander Mohan Jha as Chancellor on 29 July 2009 but did not obtain explicit approval from the Visitor (the Governor of Meghalaya) as mandated by s.14(1). Repeated requests for approval were sent (letters of 3 Aug 2009, reminders in Nov–Dec 2009 and a letter of 1 Apr 2010 claiming “deemed approval” if no response were received), yet no formal approval followed.

The Visitor, upon later enquiry, issued directions (letter dated 30 Apr 2013) identifying serious anomalies irregular Ph.D. awards, off-campus centres, non-submission of annual reports, misleading advertisements, potential contraventions of UGC regulations and recommended dissolution. This Court (in SLP disposed 13 Sep 2013) directed the State to pass a speaking order under s.48 after notice and hearing. The State issued show-cause notices (12 Nov 2013 and 24 Jan 2014), considered replies, issued reminders, and on 31 Mar 2014 dissolved the University under s.48(2) on grounds of persistent mismanagement.

The Single Judge quashed that dissolution in 2015 on procedural fairness grounds; subsequent appellate permutations culminated in the present appeals. The Supreme Court analyzed statutory text, precedents on “subject to” and deeming provisions, procedural compliance under s.48, and appellate remand principles.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Sponsor incorporated CMJ University by the 2009 Act and immediately appointed a Chancellor without Visitor approval. The UGC recognised the University as a State Private University (UGC letter 25 Nov 2010). Between 2010–2013 the University conducted admissions (notably high Ph.D. enrollments and awards), ran off-campus/distance programs, and purportedly awarded large numbers of degrees despite limited Ph.D. faculty facts the Visitor characterized as “extraordinary” and indicative of abuse of power.

The Visitor’s 30 Apr 2013 letter set out specific directions (recall degrees, fresh proposal for Chancellor, frame Ph.D. rules per UGC 2009 regulations, stop admissions until compliance). The Visitor’s subsequent recommendations (12 Jun 2013) asked the State to consider dissolution for mismanagement, maladministration, indiscipline and failure to meet objectives. Acting under this Court’s 13 Sep 2013 directions, the State served show-cause notices, evaluated replies (appellants’ replies dated 25 Nov 2013 and 4 Feb 2014), issued reminders, then passed the dissolution order on 31 Mar 2014.

The appellants challenged procedure and sought a deemed approval theory for the Chancellor’s appointment; the High Court and this Court traversed multiple interlocutory and appellate steps thereafter.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Was the appointment of the Chancellor valid in absence of Visitor approval as required by s.14(1)?

2. Did the State follow the procedural mandate of s.48 (notice → directions to management → reasonable opportunity → speaking order) before dissolving the University on 31.03.2014?

3. Can inaction by the Visitor be construed as deemed approval absent a statutory deeming provision?

4. Was the Division Bench justified in remanding the matter to the Single Judge after upholding the procedure adopted by the State?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants argued that the Sponsor validly appointed the Chancellor under s.14(1) and that prior approval was unnecessary or, alternatively, that a reasonable delay by the Visitor converted silence into deemed approval (letter 1 Apr 2010). Reliance was placed on s.26 (acts not invalid merely by reason of vacancy or defect) to protect university actions; they contended the State did not issue the corrective directions mandated by s.48(2) before dissolution and thus violated natural justice. The appellants urged that their detailed replies to show-cause notices were adequate and that dissolution was arbitrary, harming invested infrastructure and students.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State maintained the Visitor’s approval was never given and the statutory text “subject to the approval” means conditional approval; therefore the Chancellor’s appointment was void. The State contended it complied fully with the Court’s 13 Sep 2013 direction: it issued show-cause notices, considered replies, sent reminders, and passed a speaking dissolution order on 31 Mar 2014 under s.48(2) because deficiencies persisted. The State rejected deemed approval as unsustainable absent legislative enactment and relied on precedents that only legislature can create legal fictions.

H) JUDGMENT 

The Court answered each issue in turn. First, on s.14(1) it construed “subject to the approval of the Visitor” as conditional upon approval; precedent (K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty and V. Balasubramaniam) supports reading “subject to” as conditional. Approval requires positive adjudicatory action; silence cannot be treated as assent absent a statutory deeming clause. The appellants’ letter attempting to create deemed approval was legally ineffective. Consequently, the Chancellor’s appointment was invalid and non est in law.

Second, on s.48, the Court reviewed the Visitor’s recommendations, the two show-cause notices (12 Nov 2013 and 24 Jan 2014), the appellants’ replies (25 Nov 2013 and 4 Feb 2014), the State’s reminder (3 Jun 2013), and the dissolution order (31 Mar 2014). The Court found that the State afforded opportunities to show cause, examined replies, and issued a reasoned order dissolving the University for continuing mismanagement, contraventions of UGC standards and failure to comply with directions. The dissolution therefore complied with s.48(2)–(3) and this Court’s earlier 13 Sep 2013 mandate. The dissolution was affirmed.

Third, on remand, the Court reiterated appellate restraint: remand is not a routine device where the appellate court has fully considered evidence and law. Relying on Nadekerappa v. Pillamma and Wednesbury principles, the Court held the Division Bench’s remand was unnecessary and legally flawed; the State’s appeal on that limited point was allowed and remand set aside.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative legal proposition: where statute conditions an act “subject to the approval” of a specified authority, the act is conditional and cannot be validated by silence; absent a legislative deeming provision, courts cannot create legal fictions of deemed approval. Administrative dissolution under a statute that provides for show-cause → directions → failure to comply → winding up will be valid if the authority issues directives, affords opportunity, and records reasons in a speaking order; mere procedural labels cannot substitute for substantive consideration, but on the facts the State satisfied these requirements.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that s.26 (non-invalidity for vacancies) has limited application and cannot validate initial non-compliance with express statutory preconditions. The Court also emphasized legislative primacy in creating deeming provisions. Finally, it reiterated appellate courts’ duty to decide merits where possible rather than remand.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Statutory text controls: “subject to” construed as conditional upon; always require affirmative approval when statute demands.

• Deeming clauses: only legislature may create legal fictions; litigants cannot manufacture them by correspondence.

• Dissolution under s.48: State must issue show-cause, give reasonable time and directions for rectification, examine replies, and pass a speaking order before winding up.

• Remand practice: appellate courts should avoid remand where merits can be conclusively disposed; remand is exceptional.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision balances two protectable public interests: statutory fidelity (protecting rule-based governance of universities) and protection of students/public interest by validating appropriate executive action where statutory safeguards were observed. The judgment underlines that institutional legitimacy of universities requires strict compliance with statutory appointment mechanisms (Visitor’s approval as a condition precedent). On administrative law, the ruling confirms that a state’s power to wind up educational institutions is exercisable when statutory procedures are satisfied notice, opportunity, directions and a reasoned order and courts will respect reasoned executive judgments addressing systemic mismanagement.

The Court’s refusal to allow a judicially invented deemed approval protects legislative supremacy and avoids ad hoc solutions that would undermine statutory architecture. Lastly, the restraint against unnecessary remand strengthens appellate responsibility to decide controversies on merits. The decision will be instructive for regulation of private universities, requiring sponsors and State authorities to observe statutory preconditions and procedural fairness in supervisory interventions.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty & Sons & Co. v. State of Madras, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 179 (construction of “subject to”).

2. V. Balasubramaniam v. Tamilnadu Housing Board, (1987) 4 SCC 738 (conditional meaning of “subject to”).

3. Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1169 (deeming provisions and legal fiction).

4. Nadekerappa v. Pillamma, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 387 (remand principles).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009 — Sections 13, 14(1), 14(2), 26, 41, 45, 46, 48, 52.

2. University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (referenced for degree-granting/UGC regulatory context).