A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeals concern the validity of the Chancellor’s appointment at Chandra Mohan Jha University and the legality of the State Government’s dissolution order dated 31 March 2014 under Section 48 of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009.

The core legal findings are:

(i) the appointment of the Chancellor by the Sponsor was subject to the approval of the Visitor (the Governor) and, because such approval was never granted, the appointment was invalid and non-est ab initio;

(ii) the State complied with the directions of this Court (order dated 13 September 2013), issued show-cause notices, considered replies and passed a speaking order under Section 48(2) dissolving the University the dissolution was therefore lawful; and

(iii) the Division Bench’s remand of the matter to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration was legally unnecessary and was set aside by this Court.

The judgment reiterates that a statutory “subject to approval” requirement is conditional and cannot be converted into a deemed approval absent a legislative deeming provision; it also emphasizes the limited role of courts in substituting their view for Wednesbury-unreasonable executive decisions once procedure and reason are satisfied.

Keywords: Sections 14(1), 48 of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009; Chancellor appointment; Visitor approval; Deeming provision; Dissolution of university; Wednesbury principle; natural justice; speaking order; mismanagement / irregularities.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The CMJ University was established by the Meghalaya legislature (CMJ University Act, 2009). The Sponsor appointed Shri Chander Mohan Jha as Chancellor on 29 July 2009 but did so without the recorded approval of the Visitor (the Governor). Multiple communications and reminders to the Visitor followed; a letter of 1 April 2010 sought to treat the Visitor’s silence as deemed approval if no response issued by a cutoff date a contention later repudiated by courts.

The Visitor (Governor) issued directions in April 2013 citing grave irregularities, and later recommended consideration of dissolution on grounds including large-scale Ph.D. enrolments/awards inconsistent with faculty strength, off-campus centres, improper B.Ed. awards, failure to submit annual accounts and alleged misapplication of the Endowment Fund. This Court (13 Sept. 2013) directed the State to proceed under Section 48 after notice and opportunity.

The State issued show-cause notices (12 Nov. 2013, 24 Jan. 2014); after considering replies it passed a speaking dissolution order dated 31 March 2014. The Single Judge quashed the dissolution in July 2015 on procedural fairness grounds; the Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s order but remanded for merits consideration the remand was later held to be unnecessary by the Supreme Court which affirmed dissolution but set aside the remand direction.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Foundation behind CMJ University registered in 2004 and secured a State Act in 2009 to create the University. The Sponsor appointed a Chancellor immediately but did not obtain formal approval from the Governor/Visitor despite reminders (3 Aug 2009; reminders on 17 Nov and 9 Dec 2009). On 1 April 2010 the Sponsor wrote that absence of reply by 25 April 2010 would be treated as deemed approval the Visitor never formally approved.

UGC recognized the university in Nov 2010 as a State private university for its main campus. In 2013 the Visitor, after examining records, found serious anomalies: mass Ph.D. awards/enrolments disproportionate to faculty, offshore/off-campus centres, unapproved B.Ed. programmes, failure to furnish annual reports/accounts, premature withdrawal of endowment funds, and misleading public statements. The Visitor issued directions (30 Apr 2013) requiring compliance; the State later issued show-cause notices and, after unsatisfactory replies, dissolved the university (31 Mar 2014).

The Single Judge quashed the dissolution; the Division Bench invalidated the Single Judge order but remanded; the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the Foundation’s appeal and allowed the State’s appeal only to the extent of setting aside remand.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the Chancellor’s appointment — made subject to the Visitor’s approval but without recorded approval — was valid?

2. Whether the dissolution order dated 31 March 2014 complied with Section 48 and this Court’s 13 Sept. 2013 directions (notice, hearing, speaking order)?

3. Whether the Division Bench was justified in remanding the matter to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration after upholding State’s procedure?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants contended that the Sponsor validly appointed the Chancellor under Section 14(1) and that prior recorded approval was not a precondition; silence of the Visitor after multiple requests (and the 1 April 2010 letter) amounted to deemed approval, reliance being placed on precedents where “subject to approval” did not invalidate appointments pending express disapproval.

They relied on Section 26 to argue that acts/decisions of university authorities should not be voided for defects in constitution or vacancy. The appellants further urged that Section 48(2)–(3) procedure was not followed: the show-cause notices were said to be vague and the State ignored offers of rectification and hence the dissolution was arbitrary.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State emphasized that Section 14(1) makes the Chancellor’s appointment conditional upon Visitor approval; absent approval the appointment is legally ineffective. The State rejected the deemed approval theory stressing that a deeming fiction requires express statutory language.

It maintained that the 13 Sept. 2013 direction of the Supreme Court was complied with: show-cause notices were issued, replies considered, and a speaking dissolution order passed under Section 48(2) due to continued irregularities and mismanagement. The State argued the Division Bench’s remand was unnecessary once procedure was validated and that courts should not re-open an administrative decision unless Wednesbury-unreasonable.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court answered Issue I against the appellants: “subject to the approval” in Section 14(1) was interpreted as conditional upon approval; precedent (K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty and V. Balasubramaniam) was applied to hold that absent Visitor approval the Chancellor’s appointment was non-est and void ab initio. The Court rejected the deemed approval attempt holding that judicial creation of a deeming fiction is impermissible and only legislature may create such legal fictions; Sant Lal Gupta and related authorities were relied upon.

On Issue II the Court held the State complied with the mandate of 13 Sept. 2013 show-cause notices were issued (12 Nov 2013; 24 Jan 2014), replies were considered and a reasoned speaking order dissolving the University dated 31 Mar 2014 was passed pursuant to Section 48(2) because replies failed satisfactorily to explain the irregularities (off-campus centres, B.Ed. approvals, mass Ph.D. awards, endowment fund withdrawal, failure to file accounts).

The Court concluded that appellants were afforded adequate opportunity to show cause and to rectify; the dissolution thus survived Wednesbury and natural-justice scrutiny.

On Issue III the Court found remand by the Division Bench to the Single Judge to be legally unwarranted: once the Division Bench had validated the State’s procedural exercise and addressed merits, sending the matter back to the Single Judge for merits amounted to an empty formality; accordingly the remand was set aside and the State’s appeal limited to that point was allowed. The Supreme Court dismissed the Foundation’s appeal and allowed the State’s appeal to the extent of quashing the remand order; no costs were awarded.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive ratio comprises two pillars:

(1) statutory conditionality where a statute makes an appointment “subject to approval” that approval is a precondition; absence of approval renders the act ineffective; and

(2) procedural compliance a dissolution under Section 48 after court directions must be preceded by notice, opportunity to be heard and a speaking order; where those procedural requisites are satisfied and reasons recorded addressing substantive mismanagement, judicial interference is limited.

The Court anchored both rules in settled precedent and statutory text.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court emphasized (obiter) that large-scale academic irregularities (mass Ph.D. awards, off-campus centres, awarding regulated degrees without statutory regulator approval) seriously jeopardize academic standards and student careers, and that State oversight under private-university statutes must be robust. The Court reiterated caution against judicial creation of deeming provisions. It also observed that Section 26 cannot cure an initial invalidity arising from failure to obtain mandatory prior approval.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. “Subject to approval” clauses in university statutes are to be treated as conditional; Sponsors must secure express approval of Visitor/Governor before conferring powers that depend on that office.

2. Executive action under statutes like Section 48 must produce a speaking order explaining factual basis and reasons, after notice and opportunity; mere perfunctory compliance will not suffice.

3. Courts will not create deeming rules by interpretation; legislative intervention is required to validate any fiction.

4. Where procedure and reason are present, judicial review is constrained: interference is warranted only if decision is Wednesbury-unreasonable or violative of natural justice.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reinforces statutory formalism where approval conditions are concerned and underscores the separation between judicial interpretation and legislative creation of legal fictions. For regulators and university sponsors the ruling is a cautionary precedent: governance must strictly respect statutory appointment routes and regulatory approvals; failure to do so carries the risk that institutional acts (admissions, degrees) may be held void.

Administrations exercising dissolution powers must ensure meticulous notice, opportunity, evidentiary examination and a reasoned speaking order steps that are decisive in Wednesbury and natural-justice analysis. The judgment balances institutional autonomy with accountability, and signals judicial deference once statutory procedure and reason are satisfied, while protecting students and academic standards from regulatory breaches.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred 

1. CMJ Foundation & Ors. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1020 : 2025 INSC 211.

2. K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty & Sons & Co. v. State of Madras, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 179.

3. V. Balasubramaniam & Ors. v. Tamilnadu Housing Board & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 738.

4. Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1169.

5. Vijay S. Sathaye v. Indian Airlines Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC 253.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009 (provisions Sections 13, 14, 26, 41, 45, 46, 48, 52).

2. University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Section 22 — degree-granting power; UGC regulations referenced).