A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd & Anr., 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73 — The Supreme Court clarified the true scope and working of Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Ord. II r.2 CPC) in the context of a plaintiff who first sued for a permanent injunction to protect possession and thereafter instituted a second suit seeking specific performance and cancellation of a later-registered sale deed. The appellant (purchaser of the property) relied on Ord. II r.2 to contend that the second suit was barred because all available reliefs should have been included in the first suit; trial court and first appellate court rejected the second plaint, but the High Court restored it.

The Supreme Court held that Ord. II r.2 bars a second suit only when the plaintiff, at the time of instituting the first suit, was entitled to and able to obtain the relief later claimed and deliberately omitted it (or failed to obtain leave under r.2(3)). Where a subsequent discrete event here the quashing of a Government Order that had prevented registration occurs after the first suit, a new cause of action may arise and Ord. II r.2 will not operate as a bar. The Court emphasized substance over form in identifying cause(s) of action, the need to read plaints as a whole before rejecting under Order VII r.11(d), and that the defence under Ord. II r.2(3) is a technical one which must be satisfactorily proved by producing earlier pleadings. On the facts, the quashing of the GO and the timing of the affected rights created a fresh cause of action permitting the second suit; the High Court’s restoration of the plaint was upheld and both suits were directed to be tried together.

Keywords: Order II Rule 2 CPC; cause of action; multiplicity of suits; specific performance; permanent injunction; rejection of plaint; Order VII r.11(d); Government Order; quashing; essential averments.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The dispute arises from an agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007 under which respondent no.1 (purchaser Chemplast) paid the entire consideration and was put in possession of one acre at Thiyagavalli, Cuddalore; an irrevocable power of attorney and registration of the agreement followed. Attempts to register the sale deed were repeatedly refused by the registrar because of an earlier Government Order (GO) of 08.08.1986 and a TNEB notification reserving lands for a thermal power project; those measures effectively prevented registration, and led to writ proceedings and a public interest litigation which eventually quashed the GO.

During these events the plaintiff faced alleged interference and threat of dispossession and sued initially for permanent injunction (first suit). Only after the registrar’s refusal and the High Court quashing the GO did the plaintiff file the second suit seeking specific performance, cancellation of a sale deed executed in favour of the appellant (registered on 24.01.2008) and injunction. The appellant successfully moved to reject the second plaint under Order VII r.11(d) relying on Ord. II r.2 (multiplicity/splitting of claims), and lower courts dismissed the second suit; the High Court restored it and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The factual matrix, dates of instruments and the sequence agreement (2007), attempted registration, registrar’s refusal, writs, quashing of GO (05.03.2008), discovery of appellant’s registered deed, and suits form the crucible for the legal question whether Ord. II r.2 bars the second suit.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

M/s Chemplast (respondent no.1) executed an agreement for sale with Mrs Senthamizh Selvi (respondent no.2) on 24.01.2007, paid Rs.1,50,000, obtained possession, and secured an irrevocable power of attorney (26.03.2007) and registration of the agreement (07.09.2007). The vendor later purported to revoke the power of attorney (02.11.2007) and sent a demand draft (06.02.2008) which purchaser returned (08.02.2008); purchaser served notice (09.02.2008) demanding performance. Registration attempts were consistently refused (including 14.12.2007), prompting Writ Petition No. 1783 of 2008.

A public interest writ challenged the blanket reservation GO (W.P. No.11453/2007), and on 05.03.2008 the Madras High Court quashed the GO and directed registration authorities to accept valid documents. Meanwhile, alleged interference with the purchaser’s possession by respondent no.2 and the appellant commenced in February 2008, prompting the first suit (O.S. No.28/2008) for permanent injunction filed 16.02.2008. The purchaser later discovered a sale deed dated 24.01.2008 executed in favour of the appellant; thereupon the purchaser filed second suit (O.S. No.122/2008) for specific performance, cancellation of that sale deed, and injunction.

The trial court (and first appellate court) rejected the second plaint as barred by Ord. II r.2, but the High Court restored it. The central contention: whether reliefs in the second suit were available and omitted at the time of the first suit, or whether a subsequent event (quashing the GO) generated a new cause of action.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i. Whether Order II Rule 2 CPC bars the institution of the second suit where the first suit sought only permanent injunction?
ii. Does the quashing of the GO by the High Court after the first suit give rise to a new cause of action permitting specific performance in a later suit?
iii. When is rejection of a plaint under Order VII r.11(d) permissible in the light of Ord. II r.2 — must the plaint be read as a whole?
iv. What is the correct test for identity of cause of action for Ord. II r.2 purposes — form or substance; same evidence test?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant contended that the first-suit pleadings (revocation of POA, return of demand draft, admitted knowledge of competing sale) showed the purchaser had cause and knowledge to pursue specific performance and cancellation in the first suit, and that omission to seek those reliefs amounted to deliberate relinquishment attracting Ord. II r.2(2)/(3); the appellant relied on precedents (e.g. Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari Venkata Radharani and other authorities) to urge that where the plaintiff had the relief available, he cannot split remedies and later sue on the same cause. The appellant stressed that the appellant was impleaded in the first suit and therefore the purchaser was aware of the competing claim before filing the injunction suit.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Counsel for respondent-purchaser submitted that the two suits sprang from different causes of action: the first addressed imminent dispossession (urgent protective relief) while the second sought substantive enforcement of contractual rights and cancellation of a subsequently discovered registered deed, which became viable only after the High Court quashed the GO. The respondent relied on the principle that when a relief becomes available only after a subsequent event, a subsequent suit is not barred; the respondent also noted that r.2’s exceptions (leave) were preserved and that there was no deliberate relinquishment.

H) JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s restoration of the second plaint. The Court expounded the true import of Ord. II r.2: it prevents multiplicity of suits but must be applied on substance whether the new suit is founded on a cause of action distinct in fact from the earlier suit. The Court summarised leading tests:

(i) whether the same set of operative facts would need proof in both suits;

(ii) whether the remedy was available to plaintiff at the time of the first suit; and

(iii) whether the plaintiff deliberately omitted to sue for available reliefs without seeking leave.

The bench stressed that Ord. II r.2(3) is a technical bar and defendants who rely on it must establish identity of causes and deliberate omission by producing the earlier plaint. On facts, the Court held:

(a) the GO prevented registration and thus effectively deprived the purchaser of the available remedy of specific performance at the time of the first suit;

(b) the quashing of the GO by the High Court (05.03.2008) constituted a subsequent event that crystallized rights and produced a fresh cause of action enabling specific performance and cancellation claims;

(c) factual averments in the first plaint did not conclusively demonstrate that the purchaser could have sought those substantive remedies earlier; and

(d) the trial court’s rejection was therefore unsustainable.

The Court directed that both suits be tried together on merits and in accordance with law within the stipulated period. The decision carefully reconciled prior authorities and emphasised reading plaints as a whole before rejecting under Order VII r.11(d).

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

Ord. II r.2 bars subsequent suits only where the plaintiff at the time of filing the first suit was entitled to and able to obtain the relief later sought and deliberately omitted it (without leave). Where a subsequent event (here judicial quashing of a GO that had prevented relief) occurs and makes the relief available, a new cause of action arises and Ord. II r.2 does not preclude a later suit. The identity-of-cause test is substantive: if different facts or different evidence are necessary, causes differ. The technical nature of the defence requires the earlier plaint to be produced and the bar to be satisfactorily established.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed obiter that plaintiffs who file urgent protective suits for injunction while reserving rights to sue later should not be penalised where the urgency legitimately prevented earlier comprehensive relief and where subsequent events change legal availability; it reiterated the need to balance prevention of multiplicity against denial of substantive justice. The Court also commented on reading pleadings in entirety and avoiding reductive parsing when assessing Ord. II r.2 pleas.

c. GUIDELINES

• Read the plaints as a whole before rejecting under Order VII r.11(d); isolate paragraphs only with caution.

• In determining Ord. II r.2: ask (i) was the relief available when first suit filed? (ii) do the two suits rely on substantially identical operative facts and evidence? (iii) did plaintiff deliberately omit relief without leave?

• Defendant relying on the bar must produce earlier plaint and prove identity and omission — technical pleas cannot be presumed.

• Subsequent events (e.g., judicial quashing of executive orders) that alter availablity of remedies create fresh causes of action.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment provides a balanced, pragmatic application of Ord. II r.2: protecting defendants from vexatious multiplicity while ensuring plaintiffs are not unjustly deprived of remedies that were impossible to pursue at the time of an initial urgent suit. Practitioners must focus on:

(i) framing precise cause-of-action averments,

(ii) noting the availability of remedies at each point,

(iii) producing earlier plaints when relying on or defending against Ord. II r.2 pleas, and

(iv) invoking leave under r.2(3) where reliefs might be split by design.

The Court’s insistence on substance over form and its guidance on reading pleadings as a whole will curb mechanical rejections of plaints and encourage courts to examine whether subsequent events legitimately give rise to new causes. On the facts, restoration was correct: the GO’s existence and later quashing were decisive in creating a fresh enforceable right to specific performance and cancellation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd & Anr., 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73 (Supreme Court, 2025).

2. Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810.

3. Mohammad Khalil Khan & Ors. v. Mahbub Ali Mian & Ors., AIR 1949 PC 78.

4. Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari Venkata Radharani, (2020) 14 SCC 110.

5. Rathnavati v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223.

6. Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan, (2015) 11 SCC 12.
   (Additional authorities cited in the judgment: Sucha Singh Sodhi v. Baldev Raj Walia, Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports, and others as listed in the judgment.)

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order II Rule 2; Order VII Rule 11(d); Section 151.

2. Registration Act (relevant provisions governing registration and legal effect).