A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4359 of 2024, decided 2 January 2025, examines whether a proclamation under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter Cr.P.C.) loses all legal consequences if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the underlying offence, and whether prosecution under section 174A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC) can proceed once the section 82 proclamation is extinguished. The Supreme Court held that section 174A IPC constitutes an independent substantive offence: although proceedings under section 174A can only be initiated after a proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C. has been published, they may continue even if the section 82 status is later nullified by subsequent developments (for example, acquittal in the original trial).

However, the Court recognized judicial discretion: where the accused is acquitted of the underlying offence and the reasons warrant it, a court may close 174A proceedings in view of changed circumstances. On the facts, since the appellant was acquitted in the main proceedings and the disputed monetary claim had been satisfied, the Court quashed the High Court judgment, set aside the proclaimed offender order, and ordered closure of all criminal proceedings (including the FIR under section 174A IPC). The judgment balances the independence of the penal provision in section 174A with pragmatic considerations of fairness and utility where the original cause for the proclamation ceases to exist.

Keywords: Proclaimed offender, section 82 Cr.P.C., section 174A IPC, non-appearance, acquittal, prosecution continuity.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal challenges a High Court order refusing to quash a 2010 complaint, its summoning order, and a proclaimed offender order dated 28 November 2016 issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhiwani. The underlying dispute arose from a supply/contract matter connected to an NHAI highway contract and cheques given as security and payment. The prosecution alleged cheques were encashed improperly, prompting a complaint in June 2010 and summons in August 2010. Non-appearance led to issuance of a written proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C. and eventual declaration of the appellant as a proclaimed offender.

Subsequently, parallel developments culminated in the appellant’s arrest under the PO order in December 2022 and bail; an FIR under section 174A IPC was registered. Meanwhile the appellant was acquitted in the principal proceedings under section 138 NI Act (the Court records that the money was paid as arranged). The High Court refused quashing under s.482 Cr.P.C., relying on precedent that a person declared proclaimed offender could not maintain such a petition and that validity of proclamation should be raised before the issuing court.

On special leave the Supreme Court confronted two discrete legal questions:

(1) does proclaimed offender status subsist if the accused is later acquitted of the same offence;

(2) is the existence of an extant section 82 proclamation necessary for continuing or initiating prosecution under section 174A IPC?

The Court situated section 82 within Chapter VI (process to compel appearance) and contrasted procedural aims of that provision with the penal character and object of section 174A, added to the IPC in the 2005 amendment to create penal consequences for evading a court proclamation. The factual matrix old dispute (2010), payment set-off/compromise and eventual acquittal shaped the Court’s exercise of discretion after resolving the statutory interplay.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant operated an enterprise awarded an NHAI contract for highway work. Respondent no. 2 (a supplier) alleged defective stone supply and received cheques as security. The NHAI terminated the appellant’s contract in January 2009 and encashed bank guarantees. A cheque for ₹10,00,000 was encashed on 16 October 2009 and another cheque drawn on the bank guarantee account encashed on 30 November 2009. A complaint was filed on 8 June 2010 (Complaint No. 151 of 2010) alleging misuse/unclaimed cheque; summons issued 17 August 2010. The matter moved jurisdictionally and the appellant failed to appear; a direction to issue a proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C. was made on 15 October 2016 and a PO Order declaring the appellant a proclaimed offender was passed on 28 November 2016.

The appellant’s co-director challenged similar orders unsuccessfully. The appellant was arrested under the PO order on 19 December 2022 and released on bail same day; an FIR under s.174A IPC (FIR No. 200 dated 17 December 2023) was registered. Thereafter the appellant secured acquittal in the main s.138 NI Act proceedings; records and bail order recorded a compromise/settlement (payment schedule and partial payments). The High Court had dismissed the quashing petition on 2 June 2023; the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether proclaimed offender status under section 82 Cr.P.C. can subsist if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the same offence?
ii. Whether the subsistence of the section 82 Cr.P.C. proclamation is necessary for authorities to proceed or continue against the accused under section 174A IPC?
iii. Whether courts may, in exercise of discretion, close section 174A proceedings once the principal offence is extinguished by acquittal or compromise?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the proclaimed offender order had become otiose once the appellant was acquitted in the main proceedings; continuance of criminal consequence served no public interest where the monetary dispute had been settled.
ii. It was argued that prosecutorial consequence flowing from non-appearance should not be permitted to bite indefinitely once the underlying cause for compelling attendance ceased.
iii. The appellant urged quashing of the complaint, summons and proclamation, and closure of FIR under s.174A IPC as proceedings had become academic and oppressive.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that declaration as proclaimed offender is a creature of procedure and its validity must be contested before the court which issued it; the High Court was correct in refusing quashing under s.482 Cr.P.C..
ii. It was contended that section 174A IPC is a substantive penal provision and needs independent adjudication; acquittal in the original offence does not automatically neutralize liability under s.174A.
iii. The Respondent emphasised public interest in penal deterrence for evading judicial process and adherence to statutory process.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court parsed statutory text and precedent. It observed that section 82 Cr.P.C. is located in Chapter VI—Process to Compel Appearance—and exists to secure presence of an accused where a warrant cannot be executed. The Court reviewed authorities on absconding (Kartarey v. State of U.P., Jayendra Thakur, Vimlaben Patel, Raghubir Singh, Rahman, Matru) establishing that absconding may be relevant but is not conclusive of guilt and that s.82 proceedings are procedural devices.

Turning to section 174A IPC (inserted by the 2005 amendment) the Court emphasised its penal object: it punishes failure to appear as required by a section 82 proclamation and prescribes higher punishment where a declaration under section 82(4) has been made. The Court concluded that:

(i) prosecution under s.174A can only be initiated after issuance of a section 82 proclamation (i.e., 82 is a jurisdictional precondition to start 174A proceedings);

(ii) once started, 174A proceedings are independent and subsist even if the original section 82 status is later nullified;

(iii) despite statutory independence, courts retain discretion to close 174A proceedings where acquittal or settlement of the underlying dispute renders further prosecution pointless or unjust.

The Court cited and approved Delhi High Court decisions (Mukesh Bhatia; Divya Verma; Sameena) adopting the same view that s.174A is standalone. Applying law to facts, the Court noted acquittal in the main s.138 NI Act proceedings, existence of settlement/partial payments recorded in the bail order, and the antiquity of the original offence (2010). Exercising discretion consonant with fairness and absence of need to secure presence, the Court quashed the High Court order, set aside the PO Order, and ordered closure of all proceedings including FIR under s.174A IPC.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold:

(1) section 174A IPC is a substantive, stand-alone offence which may be prosecuted after a section 82 Cr.P.C. proclamation is published; initiation of 174A requires prior 82 proclamation but continuation of 174A does not require the perpetuation of 82 status;

(2) notwithstanding the statutory independence, courts may, in the exercise of judicial discretion and on appreciating subsequent developments (notably acquittal of the accused in the main offence and satisfaction/settlement of claim), find it appropriate to close 174A proceedings and quash extant proclamations as being bereft of purpose.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court recorded obiter observations about the evidentiary weight of absconding (drawing on Raghubir Singh, Rahman, Matru) absconding is a weak link by itself and must be weighed contextually. The Court also observed that provisions permitting attachment or sale of property linked to securing appearance must yield once the accused surrenders or is no longer an absconder (Vimlaben Patel), reinforcing that procedural devices should not produce unjust enrichment to complainants.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Section 174A prosecutions must be predicated on a valid section 82 proclamation—the latter is a jurisdictional trigger for commencement.
ii. Once 174A proceedings are launched they may continue even if the 82 proclamation is later nullified.
iii. Courts must exercise discretion to close 174A proceedings where the principal offence has been finally disposed of in favour of the accused, or where compromise/payment has made further prosecution futile.
iv. Complainants should not be permitted to derive collateral advantage from s.82 attachments once the purpose (compelling attendance) is satisfied or becomes moot.
v. Challenges to the validity of a proclamation may ordinarily be raised before the issuing court but principled relief may be granted by higher courts under s.482 in appropriate cases.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment clarifies statutory interaction between a procedural compulsion mechanism (section 82 Cr.P.C.) and the penal consequence (section 174A IPC). The Court’s construction preserves 174A’s independent penal character while avoiding mechanistic injustice: prosecution for non-appearance remains available to vindicate the process, but courts retain the power to close such prosecutions where the underlying need for compulsion has evaporated particularly following acquittal or settlement. Practically, the judgment prevents complainants from weaponising section 82 indefinitely once the controversy is resolved.

For practitioners, the decision signals that while a proclamation is the gateway to 174A, defense strategy can include drawing judicial attention to subsequent acquittal/compromise to seek closure of collateral 174A proceedings. The ruling also tidily aligns with precedent treating absconding as a contextual fact and restrains automatic penal consequences where overall justice disfavors continuation. Finally, the Court’s order to quash the PO Order and close the FIR is a fact-sensitive exercise of discretion that should not be read to preclude prosecution in markedly different circumstances where public interest compels continuity of 174A proceedings.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4359 of 2024, decided 2 Jan. 2025, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 117 : 2025 INSC 21.
ii. Kartarey v. State of U.P., (1976) 1 SCC 172.
iii. Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 7 SCC 104.
iv. Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, (2008) 4 SCC 649.
v. Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P., (1972) 3 SCC 79.
vi. Rahman v. State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 110.
vii. Matru v. State of U.P., (1971) 2 SCC 75.
viii. State v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, (2000) 10 SCC 438.
ix. Sureshchandra Ramanlal v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 7 SCC 591.
x. State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) 2 SCC 171.
xi. Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 14 SCC 516.
xii. Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282.
xiii. Mukesh Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023.
xiv. Divya Verma v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619.
xv. Sameena & Anr. v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr., Crl. M.C. No. 1470 of 2021 (17 May 2022).

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 174A.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, sections 82–90; section 482.
iii. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, section 138.