A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The decision in Dhanya M v. State of Kerala & Ors., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 354 : 2025 INSC 809, scrutinises the reach of preventive detention under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA). The District Magistrate, Palakkad detained the appellant’s husband under s.3(1) KAAPA as a purported “notorious goonda” on the basis of four predicate cases touching Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012, Indian Penal Code, 1860, and SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Supreme Court reiterates that preventive detention is an extraordinary and draconian curtailment of liberty tolerated only as a narrow exception under Art. 22(3)(b) read with Art. 21; therefore, any invocation must disclose a public order nexus rather than a mere law-and-order concern. Applying the statutory definitions in s.2(j) (goonda—acts “harmful to maintenance of public order”) and s.2(o) (known goonda), and the scheme of ss.3, 7, 12 KAAPA, the Court finds that the detention order fails to articulate how the alleged conduct disturbed the even tempo of the community; it neither supplies reasons nor proves breach of bail conditions, and it bypasses the ordinary remedy of bail cancellation. Guided by Rekha, Icchhu Devi, Banka Sneha Sheela, SK. Nazneen, Nenavath Bujji, Ameena Begum, and Mortuza Hussain Choudhary, the Court sets aside both the detention order dated 20 June 2024 and the Kerala High Court’s affirming judgment dated 4 September 2024, while clarifying that the State remains free to seek cancellation of bail before the competent courts.

Keywords: preventive detention; public order versus law and order; KAAPA s.2(j), s.2(o), s.3, s.7, s.12; Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b); cancellation of bail v. detention.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from an order dated 20 June 2024 by the District Magistrate, Palakkad, detaining the appellant’s husband Rajesh under s.3(1) KAAPA as a “notorious goonda” on the recommendation of the Palakkad District Police Head bearing Recommendation No. 54/Camp/2024-P-KAA(P)A dated 29 May 2024. The detenu had been running a registered lending business in the name of “Rithika Finance”. The detention order catalogued four cases: Crime No.17/2020 under s.17 Kerala Money Lenders Act and s.3, s.9(1)(a) of the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act at Kasaba Police Station; Crime No.220/2022 under s.3 r/w s.17 Kerala Money Lenders Act and s.9(a)(b) r/w s.3 of the 2012 Act at Town South Police Station; Crime No.221/2022 under s.294(b), s.506(I) IPC, the same lending statutes; and Crime No.401/2024 alleging s.341, s.323, s.324, s.326 IPC, s.17 Kerala Money Lenders Act, s.4 of the 2012 Act, and s.3(2), (va), s.3(1)(r), s.3(1)(s) SC/ST Act. The Kerala High Court, by judgment dated 4 September 2024 in WP(CRL) No. 874/2024, refused relief, holding that the detaining authority need not decide prospects of acquittal, that judicial review under Art. 226 is limited, and that procedural safeguards were met. The Supreme Court, noting that the maximum period of detention under s.12 KAAPA is six months and that an interim order dated 10 December 2024 had released the detenu on completion of maximum period, addressed the core question: whether the detention was lawful under the Constitution and KAAPA’s scheme.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The factual matrix is anchored in the administrative decision to detain a moneylender labelled as a “notorious goonda” to prevent alleged anti-social activities. The record discloses that the detaining authority invoked s.3 KAAPA grounded on s.2(j) and s.2(o)—the latter defining a “known goonda” by prior findings of guilt or findings in two separate instances not part of the same transaction. Four FIRs were enumerated. First, Crime No.17/2020 (Kasaba PS) invoked s.17 Kerala Money Lenders Act and s.3, s.9(1)(a) of the 2012 Act, reflecting alleged usurious lending. Second, Crime No.220/2022 (Town South PS) invoked s.3 r/w s.17 of the 1958 Act and s.9(a)(b) r/w s.3 of the 2012 Act. Third, Crime No.221/2022 added s.294(b), s.506(I) IPC besides the lending statutes. Fourth, the most serious, Crime No.401/2024, alleged wrongful restraint, hurt, causing grievous hurt with dangerous weapons under s.341, s.323, s.324, s.326 IPC, s.17 Kerala Money Lenders Act, s.4 of the 2012 Act, and offences under the SC/ST Act—s.3(2), (va), s.3(1)(r), s.3(1)(s). The detenu was on bail in these prosecutions and, according to the appellant, was complying with conditions. The High Court dismissed the habeas petition, reasoning that predictive assessments of guilt are irrelevant to preventive detention, that judicial review is not an appeal, and that procedural safeguards were complied with. The Supreme Court recorded that the detenu had been released on 10 December 2024 on completion of the statutory maximum detention period under s.12 KAAPA, but proceeded to determine the legality of the original detention order and the High Court’s affirmance.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the preventive detention under s.3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 was justified when the alleged activities, even if true, concern law-and-order infractions rather than “harmful to maintenance of public order” within s.2(j)?
ii. Whether the detaining authority satisfied the constitutional burden under Art. 21 and Art. 22(3)(b) by supplying cogent reasons and relevant documents under s.7 KAAPA to justify the extraordinary curtailment of liberty?
iii. Whether, in the face of subsisting bail orders and alleged violations, the appropriate course was cancellation of bail rather than resort to preventive detention?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the invocation of s.3 KAAPA rests on a misapprehension of public order. The predicate prosecutions, read fairly, depict private disputes and financial offences tethered to lending transactions with episodic allegations of assault, not a disruption of the even tempo of community life. The statutory text of s.2(j) demands that a person “indulges in activities harmful to maintenance of public order”; the detention order neither explains this threshold nor furnishes reasons linking the detenu’s conduct to a community-wide disturbance. The appellant relied on the constitutional characterization of preventive detention as a draconian measure under Art. 22(3)(b) that must be strictly policed by procedural safeguards under Art. 21; the Court’s own statements in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244 and Icchhu Devi v. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 531 confirm that such detention is an exception and the State bears the burden to justify the procedure established by law. They emphasized that the detenu was on bail in all four cases and no application for cancellation of bail had been filed—rendering preventive detention a disproportionate shortcut condemned by Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana (2021) 9 SCC 415, SK. Nazneen v. State of Telangana (2023) 9 SCC 633, and Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana (2023) 9 SCC 587, all insisting that where ordinary criminal law remedies suffice, preventive detention should not be deployed. The appellant urged that the High Court erred in treating compliance with procedural minima as sufficient; under s.7 KAAPA, the grounds and documents must be furnished within five days, and the reasons must meet constitutional rigor. The detenu’s release on 10 December 2024 upon reaching the six-month cap in s.12 only underscores that the order lacked enduring justification and that the State’s true remedy lay in bail cancellation.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the detenu fits the statutory description of a “known goonda” under s.2(o) KAAPA, given multiple cases across different years and police stations that show a pattern of usurious lending, intimidation, and violence. They maintained that preventive detention aims to forestall future harm, not to adjudicate guilt, and therefore the detaining authority rightly refrained from evaluating prospects of conviction—an approach the High Court endorsed when it observed that writ courts do not sit in appeal over subjective satisfaction. They argued that the statutory scheme—s.3 (power to detain), s.7 (communication of grounds), s.12 (maximum period)—was duly followed; the order relied on a police recommendation dated 29 May 2024 and disclosed the grounds and the predicate offences. They contended that the mix of financial offences and violent conduct, including allegations under s.341, s.323, s.324, s.326 IPC combined with SC/ST Act provisions, sufficiently implicates public order because the activities target vulnerable borrowers and risk community-level fear. In their view, bail status is not dispositive; preventive detention operates on a different plane. They supported the High Court’s findings that procedural safeguards were met and that the court’s role is limited. Even so, they stressed that given the completion of maximum detention and the detenu’s release, any interference would be academic except to clarify the law; the State sought affirmance of the subjective satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate within the statutory contours.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Art. 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India—authorises preventive detention but subjects it to stringent procedural safeguards, read with Art. 21’s procedure established by law.
ii. Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007: s.2(j) defines “goonda” as one indulging in activities harmful to maintenance of public order; s.2(o) defines “known goonda” by prior findings or two separate instances; s.3 empowers the District Magistrate/Government to detain a known goonda to prevent commission of anti-social activities; s.7 requires disclosure of grounds and documents within five days; s.12 caps detention at six months.
iii. Predicate statutes relied on for “anti-social activities”: Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958 (s.17), Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012 (s.3, s.4, s.9(1)(a), s.9(a)(b)), Indian Penal Code, 1860 (s.294(b), s.506(I), s.341, s.323, s.324, s.326), and SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (s.3(2), (va), s.3(1)(r), s.3(1)(s)).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the preventive detention order and the High Court’s affirmance. The Court began by reiterating that preventive detention is a draconian measure to be used sparingly, as it deprives liberty before trial and conviction, and thus is an exception to Art. 21 filtered through Art. 22(3)(b). The Court referenced Rekha to emphasise the exceptional nature of such power and cited Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland for the proposition that strict constitutional and statutory safeguards must be observed in preventive detention regimes. Turning to KAAPA, the Bench undertook a textual reading of s.2(j), s.2(o), s.3, s.7, s.12, stressing that the Act targets those harmful to the maintenance of public order. The Court contrasted public order with law and order, invoking SK. Nazneen and Nenavath Bujji, to hold that the materials relied upon by the District Magistrate did not disclose community-level disturbance or an impact on the even tempo of societal life. The detention order, the Court noted, lacked reasons explaining the public order nexus. On the State’s assertion that the detenu breached bail conditions, the Court recorded that no application for cancellation of bail had been filed and the alleged violations were not even specified. Citing Ameena Begum and the classic caution in Vijay Narain Singh, the Court held that preventive detention may not be used to clip the wings of an accused when ordinary criminal law provides adequate remedies, including cancellation of bail. It therefore concluded that the exercise of s.3 KAAPA was not justified in law, clarifying that any future bail-cancellation applications must be decided uninfluenced by the present observations.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio decidendi rests on three integrated propositions. First, preventive detention is constitutionally exceptional—an exception to Art. 21 via Art. 22(3)(b)—and can be sustained only upon strict compliance with procedural safeguards and a demonstrable necessity grounded in public order. The Court draws on Rekha and Icchhu Devi to place the burden on the detaining authority to prove conformity with lawful procedure and to justify that the measure is truly preventive, not punitive. Second, KAAPA’s definitional and operative provisions—s.2(j) and s.3—require that the detenu’s activities be “harmful to maintenance of public order,” a term understood, per SK. Nazneen and Nenavath Bujji, to signify community-level disturbance and an impact on the even tempo of life. Mere violations affecting a few individuals or private-law lending disputes with episodic violence do not meet this threshold; they are law-and-order concerns. As the impugned order did not assign reasons showing how the detenu’s conduct threatened public order, it fails on the statutory and constitutional touchstones. Third, where the detenu is on bail and the State suspects breach of conditions, the proper remedy is to seek cancellation of bail, not to invoke preventive detention. The absence of any cancellation applications, coupled with non-specificity about alleged breaches, reinforces the conclusion that the detention was a misuse of an extraordinary power. On these planks, the Court set aside the detention and the High Court’s affirmance.

b. OBITER DICTA 

In the course of reasoning, the Court restated broader constitutional guardrails, which function as obiter clarifications. It underscored that preventive detention—described in Mortuza Hussain Choudhary as a draconian measure—must be invoked rarely because it deprives an individual of liberty without trial, and therefore the safeguards in Art. 22 must be read strictly. It reiterated the jurisprudential difference between public order and law and order by drawing upon the “even tempo of life” test. It highlighted that similar acts may present different legal consequences depending on their reach and impact, and that the degree and extent of societal impact is determinative—a restatement that flows from the Court’s quotation in Nenavath Bujji. The Court’s suggestion that the State should move for cancellation of bail rather than preventive detention—echoing SK. Nazneen and Ameena Begum—operates as a practical, systemic direction, nudging executive authorities to prefer ordinary criminal process over extraordinary detention statutes. Finally, while setting aside the detention, the Court clarified that any prospective bail-cancellation proceedings must be adjudicated uninfluenced by this judgment’s observations—a caution intended to preserve the neutrality of trial and bail courts while still vindicating constitutional discipline in the use of detention statutes.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Assess public order, not merely law and order: Detaining authorities invoking KAAPA s.3 must explicitly connect the detenu’s conduct to public order under s.2(j) using reasons that demonstrate an impact on the even tempo of community life. Bare recitals or catalogues of FIRs are insufficient.
ii. Record and supply reasons and materials: Under s.7 KAAPA, the grounds and relevant documents must be communicated within five days; qualitative sufficiency matters. The burden lies on the State to prove conformity with Art. 21 and Art. 22.
iii. Prefer ordinary process where available: If the detenu is on bail and the State alleges breach of conditions, the appropriate remedy is cancellation of bail; preventive detention cannot be used to circumvent criminal procedure.
iv. Temporal and proportional scrutiny: Given s.12 KAAPA’s six-month cap, detention must be strictly necessary and proportionate, revisited if circumstances change; completion of the cap, as here, signals the finite and exceptional nature of the measure.
v. Subjective satisfaction must be objective in method: While subjective satisfaction is recognised, it must rest on objective materials showing public order harm; the High Court’s limited review does not immunise non-speaking or reason-deficient orders. These guideposts synthesize the Court’s reliance on Rekha, Icchhu Devi, Banka Sneha Sheela, SK. Nazneen, Nenavath Bujji, Ameena Begum, and Mortuza Hussain Choudhary.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment fortifies constitutional discipline in the use of preventive detention in financial-offence contexts. It does not trivialize the seriousness of usurious lending or associated violence; it insists that KAAPA be used only where public order is demonstrably at stake. By anchoring the analysis in s.2(j), s.2(o), s.3, s.7, s.12 KAAPA and in Art. 21/Art. 22(3)(b), the Court prevents the migration of ordinary criminal allegations into the extraordinary realm of detention without trial. The insistence on reasons that map facts to public order avoids the vice of non-application of mind. The pointed reminder that bail cancellation is the proper route where conditions are allegedly breached creates an administrable check against executive overreach, echoing Ameena Begum and Vijay Narain Singh. The case also restates the classic distinction between law and order and public order, drawing on the even tempo doctrine in SK. Nazneen and Nenavath Bujji, and it situates Mortuza Hussain Choudhary’s articulation of draconian character within State-level detention statutes. For Kerala and similarly placed jurisdictions, the ruling serves as a template: articulate the public order harm, respect procedural time lines, and reserve preventive detention for cases where community life is palpably threatened. It thus strengthens liberty without immunising wrongdoing; it channels State action into the ordinary criminal process unless the strict statutory public order threshold is crossed.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2011] 4 SCR 740 : (2011) 5 SCC 244.
ii. Icchhu Devi v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCR 640 : (1980) 4 SCC 531.
iii. Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, [2021] 8 SCR 978 : (2021) 9 SCC 415.
iv. SK. Nazneen v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 633.
v. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 367.
vi. Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, [2023] 11 SCR 958 : (2023) 9 SCC 587.
vii. Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361.
viii. Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 502.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Constitution of India, Art. 21; Art. 22(3)(b).
ii. Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, s.2(j); s.2(o); s.3; s.7; s.12.
iii. Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, s.17.
iv. Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012, s.3; s.4; s.9(1)(a); s.9(a)(b).
v. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.294(b); s.506(I); s.341; s.323; s.324; s.326.
vi. SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, s.3(2); (va); s.3(1)(r); s.3(1)(s).