A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9289 of 2019 (29 January 2025) addresses whether a State/UT may lawfully reserve postgraduate (PG) medical seats on the basis of domicile/residence within the State quota. The Supreme Court, following the trajectory of Jagadish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain, and the Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri, reaffirmed that while institutional preference may constitute a permissible, reasonable classification under Article 14, domicile/residence-based reservation for PG medical courses is constitutionally impermissible. The Court explained the legal meaning of domicile a national, not regional, concept in India and cautioned against the loose popular use of the term when States intend to denote residence or permanent residence.

The judgment preserved limited institutional preference seats (valid to a reasonable extent) but struck down the remaining seats reserved on residential criteria; those seats must be filled strictly on merit derived from the all-India NEET ranking. The Court also protected the interest of students already admitted under the impugned residential quota in equity. The decision reiterates that reservations may be tailored for local needs at the MBBS/UG level to a limited degree, but at higher, specialised levels (PG/MD/MS) merit predominates because of national interest in selecting the best talent.

Keywords: PG Medical Admissions; Domicile; Residence-based Reservation; Institutional Preference; Article 14; NEET; MBBS v. PG distinction.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose from the Government Medical College & Hospital, Chandigarh prospectus which divided 64 State-quota PG seats into two pools: an Institutional Preference Pool (candidates who did MBBS from the same college) and a UT Chandigarh Pool (candidates satisfying broad residence criteria such as five years’ study, parental residence, or immovable property ownership). Petitioners challenged the UT-pool clause as violative of equality and national citizenship principles because it effectively excluded non-residents from a share of State-quota PG seats and privileged parochial residency ties over nationwide merit.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court struck down the residential clauses as unconstitutional and directed filling those seats by NEET merit; the Medical College and affected students appealed. Before the Supreme Court the central question was whether domicile/residence-based reservation for PG medical admissions within the State quota passes constitutional muster, and if not, how such State-quota seats must be filled thereafter. The Court was required to reconcile prior trilogy jurisprudence Jagadish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain, and Saurabh Chaudri and to clarify domicile versus residence in Indian constitutional law.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Medical College initiated admissions for the 2019 PG academic year and allocated its 64 State-quota seats into 32 Institutional Preference seats and 32 UT Chandigarh Pool seats. The UT pool eligibility criteria included:

(i) five years’ study in Chandigarh at any time,

(ii) parents’ five-year residence in Chandigarh, or

(iii) parental/candidate immovable property in Chandigarh for five years. These criteria were expansive and recognized certificates from school principals, Deputy Commissioner, or Tehsildar.

Petitions were filed contending that the UT pool imposed a residential preference incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity nationwide and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedents. The High Court agreed and set aside the residential clauses, ordering re-filling based on NEET merit. Students admitted under the residence category and those pursuing courses sought protection; the State and college appealed. The Supreme Court received interim orders and the matter was referred to a larger Bench to authoritatively decide whether residence/domicile criteria in PG admissions are constitutionally permissible.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether providing domicile/residence-based reservation in admission to PG medical courses within the State quota is constitutionally invalid?

ii. If permissible, what is the permissible extent and manner of domicile/residence-based reservation for PG seats within a State/UT?

iii. If impermissible, how should State-quota seats (other than permissible institutional preference seats) be filled?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioners contended that the UT-pool created an arbitrary classification privileging residents over other citizens and thereby frustrated the constitutional promise of equal opportunity. Reliance was placed on precedents that treated domicile in India as a national concept and that condemned provincial domiciliary tests when used to deny access to higher learning. Petitioners argued that PG courses require the highest merit standard and that regional or residential reservations would dilute quality and violate Article 14. They urged the Court to declare residence-based reservation for PG seats impermissible and to direct re-filling of seats by NEET merit.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Respondents (State/Medical College) defended the prospectus, asserting that residence-based preferences address local needs, reflect State investment in infrastructure, and are justifiable classifications under Article 14 or Article 15. Some argued that Article 15 does not explicitly prohibit residence as a criterion for educational reservations and that limited domicile/residence preference is defensible particularly where States bear the cost of running institutions. They also relied on distinctions between institutional preference and broader residential preferences, and urged preservation of the admissions already completed.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court answered issue:

(i) decisively: domicile/residence-based reservation for PG medical courses is constitutionally impermissible. The judgment surveyed the trilogy of Jagadish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain, and the Constitution Bench Saurabh Chaudri, concluding that institutional preference is a reasonable classification but residence-based quotas at the PG level violate Article 14. The Court explained the legal meaning of domicile it denotes national domicile in India (per Article 5 and jurisprudence) and not a provincial domicile and condemned the colloquial misuse of “domicile” to mean local residence.

The Court recalled that Pradeep Jain permits limited residence-based preference for MBBS/UG seats because the State’s investment and local healthcare needs can justify modest institutional or regional balancing. However, the Court emphasized the paucity of justification for residency criteria in PG admissions where merit, specialised skill, and national interest demand selection on an all-India competitive basis. Drawing on the Medical Education Review Committee’s recommendations and prior dicta, the Court held that seats, other than a reasonable institutional preference pool, must be filled strictly by merit from the NEET/all-India ranking.

The Court upheld the High Court’s invalidation of the UT Chandigarh pool while protecting students already admitted under the residential category on equitable grounds. The Court further observed that Article 16(3) permits Parliament to prescribe residence requirements for employment under a State but that this exception does not authorize State-legislated residential preference in education; hence the uniformity concern lies with parliamentary competence if residence were to be made a valid qualification for State purposes.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative legal rule is that institutional preference may form a reasonable classification under Article 14 and may be sustained to a limited degree, but domicile/residence-based reservation for postgraduate medical education violates the core guarantee of equality because it arbitrarily restricts national citizens’ equal opportunity to compete for advanced specialised seats. The Court held that higher-level professional selections, crucial for national capacity, require unimpaired merit selection; residence-based classifications lack a sufficiently proximate nexus to the legitimate object (selecting the best specialists) and hence fail Article 14 scrutiny. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that domicile is a national legal concept and improper as a basis for provincial reservation.

b. OBITER DICTA

The judgment reiterated policy observations from prior authorities: that limited sons-of-the-soil considerations may be acceptable in UG admissions to assuage regional backwardness and to incentivize local medical service, but that such populist accommodations are narrowly circumscribed. The Court also observed that misuse of legal terms like domicile breeds fragmentation and urged State authorities to avoid terminological confusions. It recorded the Constituent Assembly’s rationale for reserving a parliamentary role (via Article 16(3)) where residence must be made an express qualification for State employment.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. State-quota PG seats — except for a reasonable number of institutional preference seats — must be filled on the basis of all-India merit (NEET rank).

2. Where an institution adopts institutional preference, the classification must be reasonable, limited, and demonstrably connected to legitimate objectives (e.g., local supply of practitioners).

3. Domicile should not be used loosely; administrative rules should employ precise terms such as residence or permanent residence and must respect constitutional constraints.

4. Existing admissions under impugned residential quotas may be protected on equity where students are already undergoing or have completed courses.

5. If residence-based employment qualifications are to be prescribed uniformly, Parliament not States must legislate under the exception in Article 16(3).

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment crystallises three enduring propositions:

(i) domicile in Indian constitutional law is a unitary national concept and cannot be equated with a provincial entitlement;

(ii) institutional preference is a permissible, limited classification but must not be a cloak for parochial exclusions at higher education levels; and

(iii) PG medical admissions implicate national interest and therefore demand meritocracy over residence-based parochialism.

Practically, the decision restrains States/UTs from adopting broad residential quotas for specialised education while allowing narrow institutional preference to address local service needs. It reinforces equality jurisprudence by balancing distributive social justice at the UG level with uncompromised merit selection where national specialised capacity is at stake. Administrations must now revise prospectuses that employ vague residency/domicile criteria and ensure alignment with NEET/all-India merit principles; future policy changes to permit residence-based allocations would require clear parliamentary action consistent with Article 16(3) and constitutional equality norms.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Jagadish Saran v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 768.
2. Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654.
3. Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 146.
4. Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 186.
5. Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 10 SCC 237.
6. Vishal Goyal v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 11 SCC 456.
7. Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India, (2022) 4 SCC 1.
8. The State v. Narayandas Mangilal Dayame, AIR 1958 Bombay 68 (FB).
9. D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 334.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15, 16.