A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges concurrent convictions under Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 for an incident in Gujri Bazar, Village Hiwarkhed where the deceased Sukhdeo Mahadeorao Dhurve was stabbed to death allegedly by the appellant and co-accused on 19 April 2005.

The core factual matrix records a prior quarrel the previous night and an encounter next morning near a shop where the three accused approached the deceased; the appellant is described by multiple eyewitnesses as inflicting repeated knife-stabs causing instant death.

Trial and High Court convictions rested on consistent eyewitness testimony, post-mortem and seizure records, and the Investigating Officer’s account; delay of 2–3 days in recording statements under Section 161, CrPC was explained by communal disturbances/riots and police engagement in controlling law and order.

The appellant’s alternate plea of heat-of-the-moment culpable homicide was rejected because the knife was found to be with him, indicating prior intention to cause grievous bodily injury likely to cause death. On remission, this Court recalled principles from State of Haryana v. Jagdish and Union of India v. V Sriharan, held that remission policy ordinarily follows policy at conviction date (or more benevolent policy if applicable), and granted liberty to the appellant to make a fresh representation for premature release; the State to decide by reasoned order expeditiously.

Keywords: Murder; Section 302 IPC; Section 34 IPC; eyewitness testimony; delay in recording s.161 CrPC; remission policy; knife as weapon; concurrent conviction.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present appeal stems from a violent episode which culminated in the instantaneous death of Sukhdeo Mahadeorao Dhurve on 19 April 2005. The prosecution case, grounded in ocular accounts, the informant’s FIR and post-mortem findings, attributes the fatal knife-stabs to the appellant acting in concert with two co-accused. The Trial Court convicted two accused under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment; the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence.

The appellant’s core contentions were factual:

(a) false implication due to communal rivalry;

(b) unexplained delay of 2–3 days in recording witness statements under Section 161 CrPC;

(c) riotous context raising doubt whether injuries were sustained in communal disorder rather than by the appellant alone; and

(d) plea that at best the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304-I IPC because it arose in the heat of the moment.

The State relied on contemporaneous eyewitnesses, recovery of clothes with blood stains, the Investigating Officer’s panchnama and the post-mortem. A critical procedural question was the legal significance of delayed statements in a communal-disturbance environment and whether such delay fatally undermined credibility.

A secondary but equally important question concerned remedial executive action whether the appellant, having undergone substantial actual incarceration, was entitled to consideration under the remission policy applicable at the date of conviction or under a more beneficial policy.

The Court’s task was therefore twofold: evaluate the reliability of prosecution evidence in light of delay and disturbances; and clarify the State’s obligation to apply remission policy fairly and reasonably in accordance with settled precedents.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 18 April 2005 there occurred a quarrel between the deceased and certain persons including the accused, allegedly over interpersonal relations of the deceased’s sister. Next morning, on 19 April 2005 about 9:00 AM at Gujri Bazar, the deceased was near a hair saloon opposite PW3’s shop when the three accused arrived and a heated exchange ensued. Accused no.2 allegedly gripped the deceased’s collar; the appellant produced a knife and inflicted multiple stabs to the chest/abdomen while accused no.2 and accused no.3 allegedly assaulted by kicking.

Many persons gathered; blood was visible and the deceased died on the spot. Police reached the scene; unrest and rioting were reported in the locality, delaying formal recording of witness statements. FIR (Crime No. 61 of 2005) was lodged by the informant (sister) who later deposed in court as a defence witness but corroborated the FIR. PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6 gave ocular accounts identifying the appellant as the person who stabbed the deceased and stating the knife was already with him.

PW7 (Investigating Officer) prepared panchnama, seized clothes with blood stains and recorded arrests on 19–20 April 2005. Post-mortem by PW8 confirmed fatal injuries consistent with sharp object trauma. The Trial Court convicted accused nos.1 and 2 under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC; accused no.3 was acquitted. High Court affirmed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the concurrent conviction under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC is sustainable given the circumstances and eyewitness evidence?

2. Does the 2–3 day delay in recording statements under Section 161 CrPC fatally undermine the prosecution’s case?

3. Whether the incident falls within any exception to Section 300 IPC so as to attract Section 304-I IPC instead of Section 302 IPC?

4. What is the legal position on remission — which remission policy (date of conviction or date of consideration) governs the appellant’s right to be considered for premature release?

5. Whether examination of the informant as a defence witness (and not as prosecution witness) affects the probative value of her testimony?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the appellant was falsely implicated out of communal rivalry and that multiple eyewitnesses were tutored. It was urged that the police recorded statements only after 2–3 days, the explanation for which was inadequate, and that such delay suggested fabrication; hence credibility of ocular testimony stands vitiated.

Learned senior counsel further contended that the chaotic scene (hundreds present) made positive identification unreliable and that even if the appellant struck blows, the act was in the heat of the moment and not with the requisite premeditated intention to kill; therefore conviction under Section 302 IPC was excessive and should be converted to Section 304-I IPC.

On sentencing the appellant emphasised absence of prior criminal antecedents and urged consideration for remission under the favourable policy applicable at his time of conviction; relief by premature release was sought on humanitarian and legal grounds.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that ocular testimony was coherent across witnesses and corroborated by seizure of blood-stained clothes and the post-mortem report. The 2–3 day delay in recording statements was satisfactorily explained by the Investigating Officer who had been engaged in quelling riots; thus no adverse inference was warranted.

The State maintained that the weapon (knife) was with appellant from the outset indicating prior intention; the facts do not fit exceptions to Section 300 IPC. On remission the State placed reliance on its order refusing early release subject to policy conditions and stressed its discretion, urging the Court not to direct grant but to permit administrative reconsideration.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Punishment for murder).

2. Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention).

3. Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Examination of witnesses by police).

4. Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Recording of confessions and statements before Magistrate).

5. Section 432, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Remission of sentence by appropriate government).

6. Principles from State of Haryana v. Jagdish, Union of India v. V Sriharan, Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India on remission policy.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court affirmed concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the prosecution proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The majority reasoning rests on the consistent ocular identifications of the appellant as the person who inflicted repeated fatal stabs; corroboration by the Investigating Officer’s seizure and post-mortem further fortifies the narrative.

The Court addressed the asserted 2–3 day delay in recording statements and distinguished authorities where delay was fatal; here the delay was satisfactorily explained by communal riots and the police’s deployment for maintaining public order. The Court emphasized that delay per se is not fatal; each case must be examined on its facts.

The appellant’s alternate plea for reduction of conviction to Section 304-I was rejected because multiple eyewitnesses stated that the appellant had the knife already an indicium of prior intention and a weapon sufficient to cause death.

On remission the Court applied precedent: the convict has a legal right to be considered under the remission policy prevailing at conviction date but may also obtain benefit of a more benevolent later policy; the executive must exercise discretion reasonably and give a reasoned order. The Court granted liberty to the appellant to file a fresh representation and directed the State to pass a reasoned order within a fixed timeframe.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold. First, reliable and consistent eyewitness testimony corroborated by material evidence (seizure of blood-stained clothes, panchnama, post-mortem) can sustain a conviction for murder even if minor discrepancies or short, explained delays in recording statements exist.

The Court reiterated the established principle that minor discrepancies do not vitiate ocular testimony where core facts remain unshaken, citing Lekh Raj and similar precedents. Second, where there is credible evidence that the accused possessed a deadly weapon at the outset and inflicted multiple stabs causing instantaneous death, the conclusion of murder under Section 302 IPC follows; a heat-of-the-moment plea cannot be accepted where evidence points to prior intention. The ratio also fixes the administrative approach to remission: the convict has a legitimate expectation to be considered under the remission policy at conviction or a more advantageous subsequent policy; the executive must reason and decide promptly.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed obiter that Ganesh Bhavan Patel does not lay down a per se rule that delay in recording statements is invariably fatal; rather each case must be judged contextually.

The bench noted jurisprudential emphasis on humane objectives of remission policy rehabilitation and reintegration and underscored that the power of remission is discretionary but must be exercised in a non-arbitrary manner consonant with Articles 14 and 21.

The Court also commented that production of the informant as a defence witness does not dilute the evidentiary value of her testimony if given the opportunity to cross-examine and the testimony aligns with other evidence.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Delay in statement recording: Courts must examine explanation for delay; if law-and-order exigencies or other credible reasons exist, delay alone cannot defeat prosecution.

2. Assessment of ocular testimony: Minor discrepancies and human variations of memory are to be weighed; material contradictions alone may be fatal.

3. Weapon and intention: Possession of a deadly weapon at the scene and repeated infliction of wounds point to prior intention and preclude easy conversion of conviction from Section 302 to Section 304-I.

4. Remission policy: The appropriate Government must consider representations of life convicts under the remission policy prevailing at conviction date; if a more liberal policy exists at time of consideration, the convict may benefit. The authority must pass a reasoned order and not apply arbitrary conditions.

5. Procedure on remission representations: Where Court directs reconsideration, State to provide a reasoned order within an expeditious but specified timeframe (in this case, a prompt decision).

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The adjudicative balance in this judgment is anchored on careful appraisal of evidentiary reliability and administrative fairness. The courts below and this Court gave primacy to coherent ocular testimony fortified by material corroboration; this approach aligns with settled law that truth often survives minor variances in witness accounts.

The judgment prudently distinguishes between unexplained, inordinate delays and short, explicable delays occasioned by communal unrest thereby avoiding a rigid technicality that could thwart justice. The rejection of the heat-of-the-moment plea is fact-sensitive and respectful of principle: where a deadly weapon is brought to the scene and multiple fatal wounds follow, it is reasonable to infer prior intention.

On remission the Court’s direction is salutary: it preserves executive discretion while insisting on reasoned, non-arbitrary exercise consistent with constitutional guarantees. Permitting the appellant to make a fresh representation and mandating a reasoned decision within a fixed timeframe reconciles rehabilitative policy with public interest and rule-of-law norms.

Practitioners should note the twofold lesson: litigators must press material corroboration to buttress ocular accounts; and administrative authorities must frame remission decisions transparently to survive judicial scrutiny.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 933 : 2025 INSC 387.

2. Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371.

3. Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 689.

4. State of A.P. v. S Swarnalatha, (2009) 8 SCC 383.

5. Lal Bahadur v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 4 SCC 557.

6. Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 473.

7. Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 9 SCC 283.

8. V K Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588.

9. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC 247.

10. Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457.

11. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786.

12. Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253.

13. Rameshji Amarsingh Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1321.

14. State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216.

15. Union of India v. V Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1.

16. Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481.

17. Mafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2982.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 304-I, 34.

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 161, 164, 432, 433-A.