A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s order in Gopal Govind Lakade & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2483 of 2025), focusing on the High Court’s summary dismissal of a criminal application seeking quashing of a complaint without issuing notice to the opposite party. The Supreme Court found the impugned order to be procedurally impermissible because the Division Bench of the High Court recorded that it was “not inclined even to issue notice in this matter” without assigning reasons or permitting the respondents an opportunity to be heard.

The Supreme Court emphasised foundational tenets of natural justice and the appropriate exercise of a High Court’s powers when called upon to quash criminal proceedings: either reasons must be recorded for not issuing notice, or notice must be issued and the matter decided after hearing both sides on merits.

Finding neither step taken, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and remanded the criminal application for fresh disposal on merits. This decision reaffirms the duty of higher courts to ensure procedural fairness, particularly in applications under the High Court’s supervisory/quashing powers, and highlights that summary dismissals that preclude adversarial participation require clear, recorded justification.

Keywords: quashing of complaint; notice; natural justice; High Court; summary dismissal; remand.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal challenges a terse Division Bench order of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, which, after brief hearing, recorded that it was “not inclined even to issue notice in this matter” and dismissed the application seeking quashing of an FIR. The appellants had approached the High Court to quash the criminal complaint contending that the dispute was essentially civil in character and had been given a criminal colour by lodging the FIR against them.

The High Court’s summarily expressed unwillingness to issue notice or consider the matter on its merits prompted the appellants to seek redress before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave and heard arguments. The bench noted that there was no representation for respondent no.2 at the Supreme Court hearing, but permitted counsel for the appellants and the State to be heard.

The core background is procedural — not a contested factual recording of guilt or innocence — and concerns the correct exercise of judicial process when a High Court is asked to use its supervisory or quashing jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s order insists that where a High Court declines even to issue notice, it must either provide reasons for such refusal or issue notice and dispose of the matter after hearing both sides.

Absent either course being followed, the decision offends the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court’s order and remanded the criminal application for fresh adjudication on merits with direction to dispose it in accordance with law.

This intervention underscores the supervisory obligation of appellate courts to ensure that the administrative short-circuiting of adjudicative process is guarded against, particularly where the defendant’s right to be heard and a reasoned decision are at stake.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The factual matrix, as recorded in the short operative order, is that the appellants filed a criminal application seeking quashing of an FIR lodged in a dispute which the appellants say is civil in nature. The High Court Division Bench heard the applicants’ advocate “for sometime” and then recorded it was “not inclined even to issue notice in this matter” before dismissing the petition.

No reasons were supplied in the High Court order for declining to issue notice to the respondents, nor was there any finding on the merits of whether the criminal complaint should be quashed. The appellants challenged this approach before the Supreme Court, submitting that the High Court did not consider their case on merits and declined even to issue notice to the respondent(s), thereby depriving the parties of an opportunity to be heard.

Learned counsel for the State conceded that the tenor of the impugned order required appropriate corrective action. On the Supreme Court hearing, respondent no.2 had been served but had no representation; however the Court proceeded after hearing the appellants’ counsel and the State’s counsel. The Supreme Court recorded that the High Court had been required either to assign reasons for refusing notice or to issue notice and decide the quashing application after hearing both sides.

Given neither option was exercised, the order of the High Court violated the norms of natural justice and had to be set aside. The Supreme Court therefore remanded the matter for fresh disposal on merits by the High Court. The facts are largely procedural and confined to the sequence of orders and the High Court’s refusal to permit adversarial participation; there is no contested exposition of the underlying civil facts in the operative order.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

1. Whether a High Court can summarily dismiss an application seeking quashing of a criminal complaint by recording that it is “not inclined even to issue notice” without assigning reasons?

2. Whether the denial of notice to the respondent in a criminal quashing application constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice?

3. What is the appropriate procedure a Division Bench should follow when it decides not to issue notice in a criminal quashing application — is an order recording reasons necessary or must notice be issued and matter decided on merits?

4. Whether, in the absence of reasons or hearing, the impugned High Court order is fit to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh disposal on merits?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the High Court did not genuinely consider the case on its merits and there was a complete absence of adjudicative reasoning when the Division Bench recorded that it was “not inclined even to issue notice in this matter.”

They argued that the appellants had sought to quash an FIR which allegedly converted an essentially civil dispute into a criminal one, and therefore the High Court’s duty was to either issue notice to the respondents and decide the matter after hearing, or, if it declined to issue notice, to record cogent reasons for such refusal.

The appellants’ counsel emphasized the fundamental right to a fair hearing and pointed out the procedural unfairness in denying the respondents an opportunity to contest the quashing petition. They urged that summary dismissal without reasons cuts at the root of judicial accountability and prevents appellate scrutiny of whether the High Court applied correct legal principles in declining to exercise jurisdiction.

The counsel further submitted that such an order could not be sustained in law because it rendered the decision non-reviewable on substance and prevented the development of an authoritative reasoning trail. On these contentions, the appellants sought setting aside of the impugned order and a remand for fresh adjudication in which both sides would be heard and the High Court would record reasons for its decision on the quashing application.

These arguments were founded on the twin pillars of procedural fairness and the necessity of reasoned judicial orders when rights and liberties are at stake.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that having regard to the nature and tenor of the impugned order, the Supreme Court may make appropriate orders in the appeal. At the Supreme Court hearing, respondent no.2 had been served but there was no representation for that party.

The State’s counsel did not press any positive justification for the High Court’s refusal to issue notice; rather the State accepted that the impropriety of a summary dismissal without reasons might attract corrective directions. Implicitly, the respondents’ position before the Supreme Court did not advance any specific factual or legal basis to sustain the Division Bench’s tersely worded refusal to issue notice. Rather than attempting to justify the High Court’s course, the respondents (through State counsel) left the correction to the judgment of the Supreme Court, effectively conceding that an order that precluded hearing of the other party required scrutiny.

The respondent’s limited engagement at the apex court hearing, and the absence of counter-argument defending non-issuance of notice, reinforced the appellate court’s conclusion that the High Court’s order lacked the procedural foundation necessary to withstand review. The State accordingly did not contest the remand for de novo consideration by the High Court.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

1. Principles of natural justice — right to be heard.

2. High Court supervisory/quashing jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (inherent judicial power to prevent abuse of process).

3. Requirement of reasoned orders when a court declines to exercise jurisdiction or deprives a party of an opportunity to be heard.

4. Doctrine that summary dismissal without notice or reasons may vitiate judicial action and necessitate remedial intervention by a higher court.
   (These principles are derived from the operative reasoning and focus of the Supreme Court order under review; the short order itself frames the matter around the duty to issue notice or to record reasons when notice is declined).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned High Court order and remanded Criminal Application No. 2439/2023 to the Bombay High Court for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law. The Court observed that the High Court Division Bench had not only refused to issue notice but had also failed to assign any reasons for such refusal.

The Supreme Court held that where a quashing application is filed, the High Court must either assign reasons for not issuing notice or issue notice to allow both sides to be heard and then decide the matter on merits. The court reasoned that the absence of either course of action renders the impugned order violative of the principles of natural justice because there is no intelligible basis available to understand why notice was declined and the grievance disposed of without adversarial input.

The Supreme Court therefore remitted the matter to the High Court with a request to decide the quashing petition afresh, applying the correct procedure and ensuring fair opportunity to both parties. The order succinctly encapsulates the remedial step: set aside the non-reasoned summary dismissal and restore the application for adjudication; the Supreme Court’s direction is remedial rather than final on merits, leaving substantive resolution to the High Court after fair hearing.

The judgment thus enforces procedural minimums — issuance of notice or reasoned refusal — and reinforces judicial responsibility to produce reasoned decisions, especially when a party’s grievance is terminated without formal adversarial participation. The apex court’s order does not decide the underlying merits of whether the FIR should be quashed; it confines itself to correcting the procedural defect and ensuring the matter receives a fair adjudication in the High Court.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that a court vested with power to quash criminal proceedings cannot dismiss an application by declining even to issue notice without either recording cogent reasons for such refusal or issuing notice and disposing of the application after hearing both sides.

The Supreme Court held that the choice lies with the High Court but the exercise must be accompanied by either reasoned explanation or notice-based adjudication. An absence of both renders the order a breach of natural justice because it removes the opponent’s opportunity to be heard and leaves no basis for appellate or certiorari review of the High Court’s exercise of discretion.

In short, the ratio insists on procedural safeguards — reasons or hearing — as indispensable when a quashing application is dismissed without a contested adjudication. This legal principle forms the central binding part of the decision and governs future instances where courts attempt to summarily refuse issuance of notice in applications affecting substantive rights.

b. OBITER DICTA

Although the order is primarily peremptory and remedial, the Supreme Court’s observations function as guidance: the Court implies that adjudicative accountability requires either recorded reasons or the opportunity for adversarial hearing. The observation that the High Court could have either assigned reasons or issued notice, and that the absence of these options violates natural justice, operates as an obiter reinforcement of judicial practice standards.

The Supreme Court’s commentary underscores that terse dismissals that deprive parties of notice may be vulnerable to appellate correction, and courts should be mindful that absence of reasons deprives litigants and appellate courts of the ability to test whether discretion was exercised lawfully.

Although not expanded into fuller jurisprudential exposition, these remarks call upon courts at all levels to afford procedural fairness and to avoid administrative short-circuiting of judicial adjudication. These observations, while ancillary to the operative order, serve as a cautionary template for lower courts.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. If a High Court decides not to issue notice in a quashing application, it must record clear reasons for that refusal on the record.

2. Alternatively, the High Court should issue notice to the respondent(s) and decide the quashing application after hearing arguments on merits.

3. Summary dismissal without reasons or hearing may be set aside on appeal as violative of natural justice.

4. Order-writing should preferably reflect the rationale when procedural shortcuts are taken, to permit meaningful review and to preserve transparency in judicial decision-making.

5. Where a summary order precludes adversarial participation, the appellate court should consider remand to enable full adjudication on merits rather than decide the substantive controversy in absence of factual and legal contestation.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s short but principled order restores the foundational requirement that judicial discretion must be exercised transparently and in a manner consistent with natural justice. By directing the High Court to re-hear the quashing application or to record reasons if it declines to issue notice, the apex court preserved the litigants’ entitlement to adversarial process and reasoned decisions.

The ruling does not traverse into the merits of the underlying civil-dispute-turned-criminal matter; instead it confirms that procedural integrity is a precondition for adjudicative finality. Practically, the decision alerts High Courts that administrative terseness of the kind recorded in the impugned order is unsustainable where it extinguishes a party’s opportunity to contest relief.

For practitioners, the case underscores the tactical importance of insisting upon reasoned orders and objecting to disposals that cut off notice without explanation. Institutionally, the judgment strengthens judicial accountability: litigants and reviewing courts must be able to follow the trail of reasoning to evaluate whether discretion was properly exercised.

In that sense, the order contributes to procedural jurisprudence by emphasizing that how a court reaches a conclusion is as important as what the conclusion is, particularly in matters touching on liberty, reputation and the mischief of criminalisation of civil disputes. The remand respects hierarchical limits: factual and discretionary conclusions belong to the High Court after it affords both parties a fair hearing or records reasons for not doing so.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Case Referred

i. Gopal Govind Lakade & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 2483 of 2025, Supreme Court of India, Judgment dated 06 May 2025, reported as [2025] 6 S.C.R. 307.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Principles of natural justice and High Court’s inherent supervisory power (as discussed and applied in the operative order).