A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark case of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and Others, examined the scope and interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The case revolved around whether a widow, who was in constructive possession of her deceased husband’s estate despite a disputed adoption, could be regarded as the full owner of the property under the Act. The appellant, being a reversioner, challenged the widow’s right to absolute ownership, claiming that the possession was with the adopted son at the time of the Act’s enforcement. The Court expansively interpreted Section 14(1), ruling that “possession” included both actual and constructive possession. Thus, the widow, Veeravva, even if not physically possessing the property, retained ownership rights as recognized under law, thereby transforming her limited estate into an absolute estate. The decision decisively clarified the retrospective and remedial nature of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, significantly altering the legal status of Hindu women concerning inherited properties.

Keywords: Hindu Succession Act, Section 14, Constructive Possession, Widow’s Rights, Reversionary Rights, Adoption Validity, Supreme Court of India, Limited Estate, Absolute Estate, Property Succession.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and Others

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date
December 19, 1958

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS, and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice JAFER IMAM

vii) Citation
[1959] Supp. SCR 968

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (link)

• Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now 1963) (link)

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case
The earlier Patna High Court decisions in Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir and Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad were overruled.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Hindu Personal Law, Succession Law, Property Law, Adoption Law, Civil Procedure

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The matter pertains to the inheritance and succession rights of a Hindu widow under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Kari Veerappa, having no issue, authorized his wife, Setra Veeravva, to adopt a son as per his will dated October 10, 1920. The will imposed certain conditions requiring the consent of trustees before any adoption. After Veerappa’s death on October 23, 1920, Veeravva made two adoption attempts. The second adoption, involving Sesalvada Kotra Basayya on October 11, 1942, was disputed by the appellant Kotturuswami, who claimed himself to be the nearest reversioner. The controversy arose primarily due to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which fundamentally transformed Hindu women’s property rights, leading to the question of whether Veeravva’s possession under the Act converted her limited estate into an absolute one, rendering any reversionary claim redundant.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Kari Veerappa executed a will authorizing his wife Veeravva to adopt a son with trustee approval. Veerappa passed away in 1920, and Veeravva first adopted a boy in 1939, who died prematurely. Subsequently, she adopted Sesalvada Kotra Basayya in 1942. This adoption was accompanied by two documents: a registered agreement to adopt dated September 18, 1942 (Exbt. D-25), and a registered adoption deed dated June 23, 1943.

Kotturuswami, as a reversioner, filed a suit to declare the adoption invalid, contending that the required trustee consents were not obtained. The suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Bellary. The Madras High Court upheld the dismissal, recognizing Kotturuswami as a reversioner but stating he need not establish that he was the nearest reversioner unless seeking possession post-Veeravva’s death.

During appeal before the Supreme Court, the respondents raised a preliminary objection relying on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They argued that even if the adoption were invalid, Veeravva became the absolute owner by virtue of the Act, nullifying the reversioner’s claim.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the adoption of the second defendant Sesalvada Kotra Basayya was valid under Kari Veerappa’s will.

ii) Whether Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applied to transform Veeravva’s limited estate into an absolute estate.

iii) Whether the possession of property by the widow, for purposes of Section 14, included constructive possession.

iv) Whether the appellant, as a reversioner, retained any legal standing to challenge the adoption post-Act.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The appellant contended that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 did not apply since Veeravva was not in actual possession of the property when the Act came into force. The appellant argued that possession was with the adopted son and, hence, the widow could not claim full ownership under the Act.

The appellant further asserted that under Section 14(2), Veeravva held only a restricted estate since the will and adoption agreement restricted her rights. The will (Exbt. P-2(a)) imposed specific conditions upon the adoption. As the adoption did not comply with these conditions, the adopted son’s title was void, and thus, reversioners like the appellant had a valid claim.

The appellant relied on the principle that adoption by a Hindu widow does not depend on her ownership but on her authority, either through express consent of the husband or agnates. The Act did not expand this authority nor validate an otherwise invalid adoption.

Relying on Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the appellant asserted that he, as a reversioner, could seek declaratory relief challenging the adoption during the widow’s lifetime since the act of adoption attempted to induct a stranger, thereby affecting the reversionary rights.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The respondents argued that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applied retrospectively. Veeravva possessed her husband’s estate since his death and maintained constructive possession even after adopting the second defendant.

They emphasized that possession under Section 14 included not only actual possession but also constructive or legal possession. Even if the adopted son held physical possession, it was permissive, with Veeravva retaining legal ownership.

The respondents cited Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, AIR 1957 Cal. 557, where the Calcutta High Court had expansively interpreted possession to include constructive possession.

They further argued that the conditions in the will and agreement did not create a restricted estate under Section 14(2) since the will envisaged full ownership if adoption failed. As adoption was invalid, Veeravva inherited the estate absolutely.

Relying on Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri [1940] FCR 84, respondents contended that appellate courts could apply changes in law occurring after the trial court’s decision.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i)

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(1): Converts a female Hindu’s limited estate into full ownership if she possessed the property when the Act came into force.

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(2): Excludes from full ownership property acquired under specific instruments prescribing restricted estates.

• Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now 1963), Section 42: Grants declaratory relief to persons claiming legal character or right as against adverse claimants.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that “possession” under Section 14 includes actual and constructive possession. Even if the adopted son had physical possession, it was permissive. Veeravva, being the widow, was legally in possession through him. Therefore, Section 14(1) applied and transformed her limited estate into an absolute estate.

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that actual possession was necessary, adopting a broad interpretation as held in Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, AIR 1957 Cal. 557. The Court also referred to Gaddam Venkayamma v. Gaddam Veerayya, AIR 1957 AP 280, which defined possession to include legal possession through licensees or agents.

The Court concluded that Section 14(2) did not apply since the will and adoption agreement did not prescribe a restricted estate.

The Court also overruled the earlier decisions of the Patna High Court in Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir, AIR 1957 Pat 480 and Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad, AIR 1957 Pat 674, aligning instead with the reasoning adopted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mt. Lukai v. Niranjan, AIR 1958 MP 160 and later reaffirmed in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court noted that the purpose of Section 14 was to enhance the legal status of Hindu women by converting limited estates into absolute ones. This beneficent object would be frustrated if the interpretation of “possession” were narrowly confined.

The Court also observed that the reversioner’s right, as traditionally understood, ceased upon the application of Section 14, since the widow became full owner, leaving no estate to revert.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Possession under Section 14(1) includes constructive possession.

• Widow’s estate converts into absolute ownership if in possession at the commencement of the Act.

• Restrictions under Section 14(2) apply only if the instrument explicitly prescribes a limited estate.

• Reversioners have no locus to challenge the adoption if the widow holds an absolute estate.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, [1940] F.C.R 84.
ii) Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, AIR 1957 Cal. 557.
iii) Gaddam Venkayamma v. Gaddam Veerayya, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 280.
iv) Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad, AIR 1957 Pat. 674.
v) Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir, AIR 1957 Pat. 480.
vi) Mt. Lukai v. Niranjan, AIR 1958 Madhya Pradesh 160.
vii) Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat. 581.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Sections 14(1), 14(2).
ii) Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 42.