A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 2025, concerns the appropriate forum of conviction and quantum of sentence where the same set of acts attract offences both under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The appellant, father of a minor girl, was convicted by the trial court under ss. 376(2)(f) & 376(2)(i), IPC and ss. 3/4, POCSO Act and sentenced to life imprisonment; the High Court affirmed conviction but interpreted the life term under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.

This appeal raised two discrete legal questions:

(i) whether the special statute (POCSO) ousts or overrides conviction under the general penal provisions when there is an overlap; 

(ii) whether the High Court was empowered in an appeal filed by the appellant to increase the rigour of sentence from a discretionary life term to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.

The Supreme Court held that s. 42, POCSO Act governs choice of punishment where an act attracts punishment under both statutes the court must apply the law prescribing the greater punishment and that s. 42A (non-derogation/overriding clause) cannot be read to nullify s. 42. Consequently convictions under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC alongside ss. 3/4, POCSO Act were justified. However the Court found the High Court’s enhancement (life till natural life) unwarranted in appeal by the convicted accused and accordingly restored the trial court’s life sentence for ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) without the caveat of remainder of natural life while reviving the trial court’s life sentence under ss. 3/4, POCSO Act.

Keywords: s.42 POCSO, s.42A POCSO, ss.376(2)(f) & (i) IPC, overlapping offences, life imprisonment, sentencing discretion.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from an FIR lodged by the mother of the child accusing the father, the appellant, of committing penetrative sexual assault on his daughter aged about nine. The trial court convicted the appellant under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC and ss. 3/4, POCSO Act and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine. The High Court, on appeal, dismissed the convict’s jail appeal but clarified that where the trial court had imposed life sentence under ss. 376(2)(f) and (i) such life term would mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life thereby intensifying the rigour of the sentence.

The Supreme Court granted leave limited to the sentencing question and the interplay between the general penal code and the special child protection statute. The dispute presented a focused statutory-interpretative conflict: whether the non-derogation clause of s. 42A, POCSO Act could be invoked to limit or supplant the exercise contemplated by s. 42 (alternate punishment) and, separately, whether the High Court could expand the severity of sentence in an appeal where the convicted appellant alone had challenged conviction/sentence. The judgment required parsing legislative intent, the statutory scheme that directs choice of punishment, and established sentencing principles including precedents that permit fixing finite terms to life sentences in appropriate cases. The Court navigated sentencing doctrine developed in Swamy Shraddananda and subsequent decisions while preserving the trial court’s discretion subject to appellate correctness.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was father of the victim (PW-2) who was around nine years old at the time. On 22 October 2015, the appellant allegedly enticed the child to the rooftop and committed penetrative sexual assault, detaining her by threats. The child descended the following morning and narrated the incident to her grandfather (PW-3); the mother (PW-1) subsequently lodged the FIR on 28 October 2015 requesting medical examination. Medical examination (PW-4) revealed internal redness in the labia minora and intact hymen; forensic swabs were collected and DNA samples sent for testing. The victim made an emphatic statement under s.164, CrPC.

The appellant absconded briefly and was arrested during investigation by the I.O. (PW-7). Charge sheet alleged offences under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC and ss. 3/4/5, POCSO Act. Trial recorded prosecution evidence (9 witnesses; 8 documents) including the child’s testimony and medical report; defence led no evidence and denied allegations in s.313 questioning. The trial court convicted and imposed life imprisonment plus fine; the High Court affirmed conviction but clarified life term under IPC provisions would extend to natural life; appellant challenged the sentencing escalation before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether, when the same act constitutes offences under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, the POCSO Act’s s.42 or s.42A requires exclusive application of the POCSO punishment, thereby precluding conviction or sentence under ss.376(2)(f) & (i), IPC?
ii. Whether the High Court was competent, in an appeal preferred by the convicted appellant, to increase the rigour of sentence by directing that a life sentence under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life?
iii. What is the correct approach to concurrent or alternate sentences where special and general penal statutes overlap and prescribe different maximum punishments?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Counsel for the appellant contended that s.42A, POCSO Act (non-derogation/overriding effect) means the POCSO scheme must prevail where inconsistency exists; therefore conviction under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC ought not to have been sustained.
ii. It was further argued that the High Court — on appeal filed by the appellant — erred in increasing the severity of sentence (interpreting life as remainder of natural life) since no enhancement appeal was before the Court and appellate interference in favour of increased rigour contravenes settled sentencing principles.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. State counsel urged that the appellant committed a grave offence warranting maximum punitive response; s.42, POCSO Act permits election to apply the law prescribing greater punishment and trial court correctly applied penal provisions with higher maximum.
ii. The State defended the High Court’s direction as appropriate to give effect to statutory language of ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) which permit life to mean remainder of natural life when life is imposed.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. s. 42, POCSO Act — Alternate punishment: where an act is punishable under both POCSO and specified IPC provisions, offender shall be liable to punishment only under the POCSO Act or under the IPC as provides for punishment of greater degree.
ii. s. 42A, POCSO Act — Non-derogation: POCSO provisions are in addition and, in case of inconsistency, have overriding effect to the extent of inconsistency.
iii. s. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC — Prescribes minimum 10 years and may extend to imprisonment for life which “shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life.”
iv. s.164, CrPC — Recording of statements by a Magistrate (relevant evidentiary anchor for the victim’s testimony).

I) JUDGMENT 

The Court accepted that the conviction itself was well-founded on the record of oral testimony, medical evidence and forensic steps; the narrow legal controversy was statutory interaction and sentencing. The Bench parsed s.42 and s.42A and concluded they operate in different spheres: s.42 is an enabling rule directing selection of the penal provision prescribing greater punishment where overlap exists; s.42A is a general non-derogation clause to preserve POCSO’s procedural and substantive constructs against inconsistent enactments. The Court rejected the appellant’s submission that s.42A should be deployed to negate the operation of s.42.

The reasoning emphasised textual harmony: s.42 expressly prescribes that where an act is punishable under both, the offender shall be liable to punishment under the enactment which provides greater punishment; thus the trial court’s election to sentence under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC as these carry higher maximums was lawful. The Court relied on the legislative scheme and prior precedents that recognise the primacy of the more onerous statutory punishment in overlap situations.

Regarding sentencing severity, the Court noted that ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) confer discretion: courts may award a term not less than ten years or imprisonment for life; where life is awarded the statutory gloss equates it to remainder of natural life. But the Court recognised the constitutional and jurisprudential controls established in Swamy Shraddananda and its progeny, allowing courts to fix finite terms as a calibrated response where appropriate.

The High Court’s unilateral direction converting the trial court’s life sentence into imprisonment for remainder of natural life in an appeal by the appellant was viewed as impermissible enlargement of rigour. The Supreme Court therefore restored the trial court’s sentencing approach: revive the trial court’s life sentence under ss. 3/4, POCSO Act and maintain the life sentence under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC as awarded, but without the stipulation that the life term would enure till natural life. The Court further ordered a concurrent run of sentences and imposed an enhanced fine for the IPC counts (Rs. 5,00,000) to be paid to the victim.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold. First, where the same act constitutes offences under both POCSO and the IPC, s.42, POCSO Act requires application of the law that prescribes punishment of greater degree; s.42A does not supplant this choice but functions as a non-derogation clause confined to inconsistency in procedural or substantive provisions. Consequently convicting under IPC provisions that carry higher maximum punishment is permissible. Second, an appellate court hearing an appeal by a convicted appellant cannot, by way of clarification, increase the severity of sentence so as to convert a discretionary life term into imprisonment for the remainder of natural life; sentencing must respect the trial court’s considered exercise and the appellate function does not permit enhancement in favour of greater rigour where only the convicted party has appealed. These holdings balance statutory interpretation with sentencing jurisprudence set out in Swamy Shraddananda, Veerendra and Navas.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Bench reiterated that constitutional courts retain power to fix finite terms for life sentences in appropriate cases and cited the trajectory of jurisprudence (including Shiva Kumar, Navas, Veerendra, and Swamy Shraddananda) which permits courts to expand sentencing options between 14 years and death to avoid disproportionate outcomes. The Court observed that while ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) allow life to mean remainder of natural life, judicial discretion remains paramount and such extreme rigour must be imposed only in truly exceptional circumstances. The Court also noted the desirability of victim-compensation and affirmed the direction that fines be paid to the victim. These pronouncements underscore proportionality, individualized sentencing and victim-oriented remediation.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Where an act constitutes offences under both POCSO Act and IPC, apply s.42, POCSO Act to select the statute prescribing greater punishment; do not invoke s.42A to negate s.42.
ii. Trial courts must record reasons when choosing the penal provision under which greater punishment is awarded, demonstrating consideration of statutory aims and facts.
iii. Appellate courts should not enhance the rigour of sentence in favour of increased harshness when the appeal is by the convicted appellant alone; any modification to increase severity must ordinarily await a prosecution/State appeal or be founded on errors in sentencing principle.
iv. Where life sentence is imposed, courts retain jurisdiction (consistent with Swamy Shraddananda line) to fix a finite term in appropriate cases to avoid disproportionate punishment; reasons must be contemporaneously recorded.
v. Victim-compensation by way of fine ordered to be paid to victim should be attempted as part of sentencing to secure reparative justice.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision reconciles textual statutory interpretation with sentencing jurisprudence. It clarifies that s.42 is the specific mechanism for resolving overlap between POCSO and IPC and that the broader non-derogation clause in s.42A does not nullify that mechanism. This preserves legislative intent: child-protection law operates robustly, but where general law prescribes higher punishment the penal code may still be invoked for sentencing severity. The Court’s corrective on the High Court’s enhancement is salutary: appellate courts must guard against inadvertent augmentation of punishment in appeals filed solely by accused persons.

Practically, the judgment instructs trial courts to exercise and record sentencing choices carefully and signals that life sentences remain subject to reasoned judicial calibration rather than mechanical conversion to natural-life imprisonment. For practitioners, the case is a useful precedent on statutory interplay, sentencing limits of appellate interference, and victim compensation orders in sexual offences involving minors.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 2025, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335.

2. Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817.

3. Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online SC 315.

4. Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 4 S.C.R. 225.

5. Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — ss. 3, 4, 42, 42A.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — ss. 376, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(i).

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.164 (relevant for statement recording).