A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Hansraj Moolji v. The State of Bombay, [1957] SCR 634, confronted a constitutional question of the legal validity and continued enforceability of an ordinance promulgated under emergency powers during British rule in India. The case revolved around whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, enacted by the Governor-General of India during a proclaimed emergency, remained in force even after the official termination of the emergency on April 1, 1946, and whether its provisions could apply to acts committed years later—in this case, on July 11, 1953. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance had the force of law similar to an Act of Legislature and remained in effect until repealed, despite the end of the emergency. This case highlighted intricate issues of statutory interpretation, retrospective application, and continuity of colonial-era legislation under the framework of Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that emergency ordinances promulgated under the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, continued as perpetual legislation unless repealed, and not merely as temporary enactments tied to the duration of the emergency.

Keywords: Demonetisation Ordinance 1946, Emergency Powers, Ordinance Continuity, Government of India Act 1935, Hansraj Moolji

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Hansraj Moolji v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date
February 12, 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justices Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas, Imam, Govinda Menon, J.L. Kapur

vi) Author
Justice N.H. Bhagwati

vii) Citation
Hansraj Moolji v. The State of Bombay, [1957] SCR 634

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 72, Schedule 9, Government of India Act, 1935

• India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, Sections 1(3), 3

• High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, Sections 4, 7

• Section 109, Indian Penal Code, 1860

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None specifically overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects

• Constitutional Law

• Criminal Law

• Administrative Law

• Banking and Finance Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case surfaced within the constitutional matrix left behind by colonial governance, raising significant questions about the extent and durability of ordinances promulgated during the colonial emergency regime. The case pertained to the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, issued under Section 72 of Schedule 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as amended by the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940. The Ordinance, intended to demonetise currency of high denominations, was questioned for its continued enforceability post-April 1, 1946—the date on which the colonial emergency was officially declared terminated. The petitioner, Hansraj Moolji, was prosecuted in 1953, well after the end of the emergency, prompting the constitutional challenge on the enforceability of the said ordinance. The Court was invited to determine whether the Ordinance lapsed automatically with the end of the emergency or whether it had a perpetual operation, akin to a legislative act. The legal question thus centred on statutory interpretation—whether the emergency context restricted the Ordinance’s temporal reach or allowed it to subsist until explicitly repealed. The answer, as formulated by the apex Court, reaffirmed the constitutional continuity of laws framed under the emergency regime.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On July 11, 1953, the appellant Hansraj Moolji, along with other accused, was alleged to have sold ten Rs. 1,000 High Denomination Bank Notes to one Velji Lakhamshi Joshi for a total of Rs. 1,800—a practice explicitly prohibited under Section 4 of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946. This Ordinance had been promulgated by the Governor-General of India on January 12, 1946, during an officially proclaimed emergency. However, on April 1, 1946, His Majesty’s Government declared an end to the emergency by publishing the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946. The appellant argued that due to this declaration, the Ordinance ceased to have effect from April 1, 1946, and therefore could not be invoked for acts done in 1953. The Presidency Magistrate convicted the appellant and imposed a fine of Rs. 8,000, with six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default. On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the conviction. The matter was escalated to the Supreme Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, was still in force on July 11, 1953, despite the termination of the emergency on April 1, 1946.

ii) Whether Ordinances promulgated under emergency powers ceased automatically with the end of the emergency.

iii) Whether Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as modified by the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, allowed ordinances to continue perpetually unless repealed.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the Ordinance in question had been enacted specifically under emergency powers. With the termination of the emergency on April 1, 1946, the legal basis of the Ordinance vanished, rendering it non-operative post-emergency[1].

They further argued that Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as it stood originally, permitted the Governor-General to promulgate ordinances only for six months. The temporary nature of emergency ordinances meant that such enactments could not remain indefinitely valid without legislative backing[2].

The petitioner relied on observations in King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma, [1943] F.C.R. 96, and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, [1944] F.C.R. 1, to argue that emergency ordinances are by nature transitory, and lapse either on the cessation of the emergency or on the expiration of their temporary validity period[3].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondent submitted that the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, specifically amended Section 72 of the Government of India Act, to remove the six-month limitation. Thus, any Ordinance made during the emergency period had the same status as a full Act of Legislature, not bound by any time limit unless otherwise specified[4].

They further argued that unless repealed, the Ordinance would continue to operate with full legislative authority, irrespective of the cessation of the emergency. This was supported by the decision in J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. King Emperor, [1947] F.C.R. 141, where it was held that ordinances enacted under the amended Section 72 had perpetual effect[5].

The State also relied upon the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, under the Indian Constitution, which treated such ordinances as continuing laws, unless repealed or amended by competent legislative authority[6].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 72 of Schedule 9, Government of India Act, 1935

ii) Section 1(3), 3, India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940

iii) High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, Sections 4, 7

iv) Section 109, Indian Penal Code, 1860

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The Court held that Ordinances promulgated during the emergency under the amended Section 72 must be treated as perpetual legislation unless a specific time limitation was imposed within the ordinance or it was repealed by competent authority. The emergency declaration merely provided the jurisdictional basis for the Governor-General to act, and not a time restriction on the duration of such ordinances[7]. Therefore, the 1946 Ordinance remained valid and applicable in 1953.

b. OBITER DICTA 
Justice Bhagwati stated that even though the emergency had ended, retrospective reinstatement of the original Section 72 (which contained the six-month limit) could not be presumed, as there was no legislative indication allowing such operation[8].

c. GUIDELINES 

• Emergency ordinances must be read with the law in force at the time of their promulgation, not with subsequent legal amendments.

• Emergency cessation does not nullify past valid ordinances that had become perpetual by operation of the law.

• Laws not expressly limited in time continue until repealed, even if enacted under emergency provisions.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision in Hansraj Moolji v. The State of Bombay is a landmark precedent on the temporal continuity of colonial emergency ordinances under Indian law. The Supreme Court clarified that even pre-Constitutional laws passed under the colonial emergency regime can survive and remain valid post-independence, unless explicitly repealed. The judgment reinforces the continuity doctrine enshrined in Article 372 of the Constitution, preserving laws that were in force prior to January 26, 1950, and not inconsistent with the Constitution. The verdict also draws from colonial jurisprudence, such as J.K. Gas Plant and Benoari Lal Sharma, while affirming the validity of transitional laws in a newly independent constitutional state. The ruling remains significant in understanding legislative intent, retrospective effect, and the status of emergency legislation under both colonial and independent India’s legal regimes.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma, [1943] F.C.R. 96
[2] King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, [1944] F.C.R. 1
[3] J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. King Emperor, [1947] F.C.R. 141

b. Important Statutes Referred

[4] Government of India Act, 1935, Section 72, Schedule 9
[5] India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, Sections 1(3), 3
[6] High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, Sections 4, 7
[7] Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 109
[8] Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 under Article 372 of the Constitution of India