A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

In Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr., the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s order summoning respondent no. 2 under s. 319 CrPC to face trial with co-accused for abetment of suicide under s. 306 read with s. 34 IPC, reversing the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s interference under s. 482 CrPC. The Court emphasised that alibi is a defence whose burden lies on the accused; unproved parking slips, OPD cards, chemist bills, CCTV grabs cannot defeat sworn ocular evidence at the summoning stage.

The Court read s. 319 CrPC purposively, following Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, and clarified that once live evidence stronger than mere suspicion surfaces during trial, the court “must act”. On facts, the alleged 08:30 a.m. taunt on 10.05.2016—that the victim and his family “should die of shame” following a grievous acid attack on 13.03.2016—could, if proven, constitute the psychological build-up punishable as abetment to suicide; the 90-km Jagowal–Chandigarh travel window did not, on its face, neutralise involvement.

The decision preserves the Trial Court’s ability to evaluate alibi and mens rea at trial, cautions against elevating investigative opinions over court-tested evidence, and prevents a truncated trial where a seemingly complicit participant is excluded. The Court distinguished the limited function of s. 319 from a merits determination and expressly kept all observations confined to that question, while referring to Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh for guidance on s. 306 IPC.

Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; Section 306 IPC; plea of alibi; prima facie evidence; summoning threshold; psychological abetment; High Court’s s. 482 jurisdiction; Hardeep Singh doctrine; court’s independent assessment; truncated trial.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers a criminal court to proceed against any person who, though not originally an accused, appears from evidence during inquiry or trial to have committed an offence for which they could be tried with the accused.

The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 construed this power as exceptional yet real, designed to prevent true offenders from slipping through procedural gaps and to advance a fair trial for society and victims alongside the accused.

The present decision applies that construction to a stark social context. The victim, Dharminder Singh, a physically challenged man, had suffered a grievous acid attack on 13.03.2016. On 10.05.2016, he was allegedly confronted and taunted by respondent no. 2 and others, told that he and his family “should die of shame” for not retaliating.

He returned home distressed, isolated himself, left at 04:00 p.m., and his body was recovered from a canal on 13.05.2016; FIR No. 51/2016 was registered for s. 306/34 IPC. Investigation accepted respondent no. 2’s alibi on the basis of a parking slip, OPD card, chemist bill, and CCTV footage from PGI Chandigarh, and filed s. 173(2) CrPC report classifying him “innocent.”

During trial, on PW-1’s oath testimony narrating the 08:30 a.m. confrontation, the Public Prosecutor invoked s. 319 CrPC; the Trial Court (04.07.2022) allowed summoning. The High Court (21.11.2023), under s. 482 CrPC, set that order aside at the threshold, privileging the alibi dossier.

The Supreme Court now reinstates the Trial Court’s order, holding that the live testimonial evidence met the s. 319 threshold; that alibi, being a defence, must be tested at trial; and that investigative opinions cannot ossify the array of accused once trial commences.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The record discloses two distinct occurrences.

First, an acid attack on 13.03.2016 against Dharminder Singh, recorded as FIR No. 30/2016 under ss. 323, 324, 341, 506, 148, 149 and 326-A IPC, in which respondent no. 2 was not named.

Second, the episode central to this appeal: on 10.05.2016 at about 08:30 a.m., respondent no. 2 with others allegedly stopped a white car on Jagowal Road near the victim’s abadi land, confronted him, and taunted that he and his family “should die of shame” for not taking action against the acid-attack assailants. The victim returned home visibly disturbed, locked himself in a room, and around 04:00 p.m. left alone.

That evening, a search located his bicycle, clothing, and footwear near Hussainpur canal; his body surfaced at canal head, village Salar, on 13.05.2016. The complainant father lodged a complaint; FIR No. 51/2016 ensued under s. 306/34 IPC, naming, inter alia, respondent no. 2.

Investigation accepted the alibi of respondent no. 2—anchored to PGI Chandigarh through parking-lot slip timed 06:30 a.m., OPD records, a medicine bill, CCTV stills at 12:09 p.m., and statements of parking attendant and chemist; the s. 173(2) CrPC report marked him “innocent” and committed the remaining accused to trial.

At trial, PW-1 (the appellant/complainant) narrated the 10.05.2016 confrontation on oath; the Prosecutor moved under s. 319 CrPC, also relying on Jagdev Singh’s s. 161 CrPC statement. The Trial Court (04.07.2022) summoned respondent no. 2 for s. 306 IPC, terming alibi a matter for proof at trial.

Respondent no. 2 invoked s. 482 CrPC; the High Court (21.11.2023) set aside the summoning, treating the dossier as decisive and the PW-1 account as insufficient for s. 319. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reviving summons and requiring respondent no. 2 to appear within four weeks, while clarifying that all observations are confined to the s. 319 question.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i. Whether evidence led during trial—particularly the sworn deposition of PW-1 narrating the 10.05.2016 08:30 a.m. confrontation—satisfied the threshold under s. 319 CrPC to summon respondent no. 2 for s. 306 read with s. 34 IPC.

ii. Whether the High Court, in exercise of s. 482 CrPC, correctly set aside the Trial Court’s s. 319 order at the threshold by privileging investigation-stage alibi materials over live courtroom evidence.

iii. Whether an alibi, unproved and documentary, can eclipse prima facie ocular evidence at the s. 319 stage, given that alibi is a defence whose burden lies on the accused.

iv. Whether s. 319 is defeated if the Investigating Officer’s s. 173(2) report has earlier opined the proposed accused to be “innocent.”

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that s. 319 CrPC is triggered by evidence emerging during trial, and PW-1’s sworn testimony directly attributes the taunt and confrontation on 10.05.2016 to respondent no. 2, which suffices to summon, consonant with Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92.

They stressed that the police conflated distinct events: the acid attack of 13.03.2016 and the 10.05.2016 confrontation, and that respondent no. 2’s alibi materials were never proved in court, remaining untested papers; alibi is a defence whose onus rests on the accused and must be determined only at trial.

The travel window—with parking at 06:30 a.m., alleged confrontation at 08:30 a.m., CCTV at 12:09 p.m., and a 90-km road link from Jagowal to Chandigarh—did not negate presence. They contended that abetment under s. 306 IPC may occur as a build-up of psychological pressure, and that telling a physically challenged victim and his family to “die of shame” after a grievous acid attack carries a serious, contextual sting; calling it mere teasing trivialises harm.

They urged that the High Court’s intervention under s. 482 CrPC amounts to a pre-trial acquittal on disputed facts, contrary to Hardeep Singh’s direction that s. 319 be exercised to avoid a truncated trial when live evidence reveals apparent complicity. They maintained that only the Trial Court can test the alibi, confront witnesses, and assess mens rea; investigative opinions cannot fossilise the accused array once the court is seized of evidence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the investigation comprehensively validated an alibi through parking slip timed 06:30 a.m., PGI OPD documentation, chemist bill, CCTV images at 12:09 p.m., mobile tower records, and corroborative statements; the s. 173(2) CrPC report recorded innocence and was never challenged, thus warranting respect at the s. 319 stage.

They argued that s. 319 demands evidence stronger than that required to frame a charge; PW-1 merely echoed the FIR narrative, while Jagdev Singh’s s. 161 CrPC statement is not substantive evidence until he testifies. They emphasised the time–distance matrix—~90 km Jagowal–Chandigarh and the PGI presence at 12:09 p.m.—as rendering the alleged 08:30 a.m. confrontation improbable.

They faulted the Trial Court for brushing aside “scientific and documentary proof” and for reversing the investigative conclusion without stronger counter-material. They supported the High Court’s s. 482 CrPC order as a restraint on extraordinary power under s. 319, to be used sparingly, especially where no new or compelling material emerged since the earlier quashing of a s. 193 CrPC summons.

They further warned that conflating the acid-attack FIR (13.03.2016) with the present FIR (10.05.2016) risks harassment rather than justice.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. s. 319 CrPC (power to proceed against other persons appearing guilty during inquiry or trial) as the fulcrum of summoning. s. 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) with s. 34 IPC (common intention) as the substantive charge. s. 482 CrPC (High Court’s inherent powers) as the vehicle of interference. s. 173(2) CrPC (police report/final report) as the investigative opinion classifying respondent no. 2 “innocent.” s. 161 CrPC (statements to police) and s. 193 CrPC (cognizance of offences by Courts of Session) as the earlier procedural backdrop. The Court relies on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 for the threshold of evidence and refers to Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 107 regarding evaluation under s. 306 IPC at trial.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court crystallised the s. 319 inquiry around three axes: what constitutes “evidence”, who bears the alibi burden, and how far an investigating opinion can constrain a trial court.

First, evidence under s. 319 means live, sworn material emerging in court, not conjecture; PW-1’s deposition mapping the 10.05.2016 08:30 a.m. confrontation is substantive evidence and goes beyond mere FIR recital.

Second, alibi is a defence; its burden rests squarely on the accused. The parking slip, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV images had not been proved and therefore remained untested pieces of paper; even if proved, their timestamps—06:30 a.m. and 12:09 p.m.—do not by themselves eclipse the possibility of an 08:30 a.m. incident given the 90-km private-vehicle window.

Third, the s. 173(2) CrPC opinion cannot ossify the accused array once trial begins; s. 319 would be rendered otiose if an Investigating Officer’s view could freeze participation despite trial-emergent evidence.

The Court rejected the High Court’s characterisation of the incident as mere “teasing”, underscoring context: a physically challenged victim in the immediate aftermath of a grievous acid attack and the gravity of words urging that he and his family “should die”.

The Bench held that the Trial Court acted within jurisdiction and correctly treated alibi as a matter for trial, reinstating the summons dated 04.07.2022 and directing appearance within four weeks, while confining all observations to the s. 319 sphere and leaving s. 306 IPC merits to the Trial Court, with reference to Mahendra Awase.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio anchors on a purposive reading of s. 319 CrPC, as affirmed in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92: where evidence arising in court discloses participation stronger than suspicion, the court must act to summon the person for joint trial.

The Court defines “evidence” to include sworn testimony in court; a first information report is not evidence, but its narrative—when testified on oath—becomes substantive material. The ratio further clarifies the allocation of burdens: an alibi is a special defence, and until formally proved through admissible evidence and cross-examination, documentary tokens remain unproved and cannot trump ocular testimony at the s. 319 threshold.

The Court delineates the temporal and spatial plausibility in assessing whether defence materials even on their face neutralise the prosecution’s case; here, timestamps did not foreclose the 08:30 a.m. episode given the Jagowal–Chandigarh window. Critically, the ratio decouples investigative conclusions under s. 173(2) CrPC from the trial court’s duty; once trial commences, the court’s independent assessment prevails, and it cannot be handcuffed by the Investigating Officer’s opinion.

The High Court’s s. 482 intervention was impermissible because it inverted the order of proof by adjudicating an unproved defence before the prosecution was allowed to lead its case, thereby risking a truncated trial. The ratio, thus, restores the Trial Court’s discretion and circumspection consistent with Hardeep Singh’s framework.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court’s observations on social context and psychological abetment assume an obiter hue, guiding trial assessment under s. 306 IPC. It notes that abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment; it may comprise a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs.

In this backdrop, language urging that a physically challenged victim and his family “should die” in the immediate aftermath of a grievous acid attack is not banter and cannot be trivialised as teasing; sensitivity to honour/shame dynamics within the relevant social milieu is necessary.

The Court’s time–distance reflection is also instructive: even if alibi materials are ultimately proved, timestamps at 06:30 a.m. and 12:09 p.m. do not ipso facto negate an 08:30 a.m. occurrence in a 90-km corridor when private travel is feasible; such matters are quintessentially for trial.

Finally, the Court reaffirms that all observations are confined to s. 319 CrPC and must not prejudice final appreciation of evidence at trial, particularly the delineation of mens rea and the application of Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 107 on s. 306 IPC. These reflections, while not dispositive, illuminate the Trial Court’s evaluative lens and caution against premature exoneration on investigation-stage dossiers.

c. GUIDELINES

The decision, read with Hardeep Singh, yields working principles for s. 319 CrPC. First, trigger and standard: s. 319 activates upon evidence adduced during inquiry or trial that is stronger than mere suspicion but stops short of trial-level proof; sworn courtroom testimony can, by itself, cross this line.

Second, alibi posture: alibi is a defence; unproved alibi documents cannot be tallied as determinative at the s. 319 stage; they must be proved and tested at trial, where the burden lies on the accused.

Third, investigative opinion’s place: a s. 173(2) CrPC report exonerating a person cannot sterilise s. 319; once trial begins, the Court’s independent assessment controls.

Fourth, contextual harm in s. 306 IPC: courts must acknowledge that abetment can be cumulative and psychological; words and conduct acquire gravitas from timing, vulnerability of the victim, and cultural milieu.

Fifth, appellate restraint under s. 482 CrPC: High Courts should avoid prematurely weighing unproved defences to quash a s. 319 summons; the extraordinary power should not invert the order of criminal proof.

Sixth, case-management: where new participant complicity appears during trial, summon to avoid a truncated trial, but insulate remarks to the s. 319 question so as not to prejudice final adjudication.

These principles guide trial courts to act, yet act with circumspection, ensuring both inclusion of true offenders and fairness to the accused.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The ruling preserves the trial court’s gatekeeping remit under s. 319 CrPC and de-emphasises investigation-stage determinations when court-tested evidence points to apparent complicity. It avoids the jurisprudential hazard of allowing unproved alibi papers to override ocular testimony at the summoning threshold and keeps faith with Hardeep Singh’s constitutional calculus that fair trial shields both the accused and society.

On facts, the Court neither pronounces guilt nor weakens s. 306 IPC’s doctrinal rigor; it instead clarifies that psychological abetment can be diffuse and contextual, and that mens rea must be determined only after due proof, including testing of alibi through cross-examination and formal exhibition of documents.

The insistence that the High Court’s s. 482 jurisdiction not be used to adjudicate defences prematurely is salutary; it aligns with systemic economy and accuracy by ensuring that the Trial Court hears all necessary parties together.

The directive that respondent no. 2 appear within four weeks restores procedural completeness without foreclosing any bail or merits contentions. The judgment thus steers between over-inclusion and under-inclusion, centring evidence adduced in court as the lodestar for s. 319, and entrusts the Trial Court with the calibrated task of fact-finding on s. 306 IPC, with due regard to Mahendra Awase and allied jurisprudence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; [2014] 2 SCR 1 — followed for scope and threshold under s. 319 CrPC.
ii. Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 107; [2025] 2 SCR 80 — referred for guidance on s. 306 IPC assessment at trial.
iii. Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 168; 2025 INSC 634 — primary judgment analysed.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 306, s. 34.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 319, s. 482, s. 173(2), s. 161, s. 193.