A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1309 : 2025 INSC 410 The Supreme Court examined whether the recitation (in Urdu) of a poem that appeared as background audio in a 46-second video posted by a Rajya Sabha member attracted offences under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

The informant alleged that the poem promoted communal enmity, hurt religious feelings and threatened national unity. On close textual and contextual analysis the Court held that the poem did not refer to any religion, caste, community, language or region; its tenor was protest and sacrifice against rulers and a call to suffer injustice with love rather than incite inter-communal violence.

Applying the statutory text, constitutional guarantees under Article 19(1)(a) read with its exception in Article 19(2), and established judicial standards for speech-related offences (reasonable, strong-minded person test), the Court found no prima facie case under the cited BNS provisions.

The Court additionally underlined the duty of police under Article 51-A(a) to respect constitutional freedoms and explained the scope of Section 173(3), BNSS (preliminary inquiry for offences punishable between three and seven years).

Because mens rea is an essential ingredient where speech offences are alleged, and because the police did not exercise the s.173(3) option (or, on a plain reading, receive information disclosing a cognizable offence), the FIR was mechanically registered and constituted an abuse of process; the High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR was set aside and the FIR quashed.

Keywords: Freedom of speech, Article 19(1)(a), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita s.196, mens rea in speech offences, s.173(3) BNSS — preliminary enquiry.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from an FIR lodged after a verified social-media post by the appellant, a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha), which carried a short video with a background recitation of an Urdu poem. The informant alleged that the words incited communal hatred and hurt religious sentiments, hence offences under ss.196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) BNS were invoked.

The High Court refused to quash the FIR at the nascent investigation stage. The Supreme Court confronted two linked concerns:

(i) the correct legal approach to alleged speech offences under the BNS in light of constitutional free-speech protections; and

(ii) the investigatory duty and discretion of police under s.173(3) BNSS where certain speech-based offences carry punishment between three and seven years.

The Court re-examined statutory text, precedent (including Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. on FIR duties), and established tests for judging the effect of words (reasonable, strong-minded person standard), and emphasized that the police, as State organs, must respect Article 19(1)(a). The judgment therefore assesses whether the poem, on its face and in context, meets the ingredients of the charged offences and whether registration of the FIR without using the BNSS preliminary inquiry option constituted an abuse of process.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

A mass wedding event at Jamnagar was video-recorded on 29 December 2024. The appellant uploaded a 46-second clip from his verified X account in which, in the background, an Urdu poem was recited. The informant alleged the poem used provocative language targeting Hindus, Muslims and other castes, promoted enmity and threatened national unity; the FIR claimed the post intended to hurt religious feelings and to incite people to criminality.

The appellant swore an affidavit before the High Court stating the poem’s message was of love and non-violence and disclaimed authorship, also noting public disputes about whether the poem was by Faiz Ahmed Faiz or Habib Jalib. The police registered the FIR for multiple BNS offences without first obtaining prior permission to conduct a preliminary inquiry under s.173(3).

The single Judge refused quashing because investigation was at a nascent stage. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the poem’s text and translation, its symbolic reference to the throne (rulers), and found no explicit or implicit reference to any class defined by religion, race, language, caste or region. The court also observed that, even if part of public reaction followed the post, social media responses for/against a video do not equate to creation of enmity contemplated by s.196.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the recitation in the background of a social-media video constitutes a cognizable offence under s.196 BNS (promoting enmity between groups).

2. Whether the poem’s words amount to imputations prejudicial to national integration under s.197(1) BNS.

3. Whether ss.299 and 302 BNS (outraging/wounding religious feelings) are attracted on facts.

4. Whether s.57 BNS (abetting by the public or more than ten persons) is made out.

5. Whether the police were obliged to register an FIR under s.173(1) or ought to have used the discretion under s.173(3) BNSS to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

6. Whether the High Court erred in refusing quashing the FIR at the nascent stage.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant contended that a plain reading of the poem shows no reference to religion, caste or community; rather it preaches non-violence and sacrifice against injustice by rulers. He argued that registration of the FIR violated his Article 19(1)(a) freedom and that the police acted with insensitivity and mechanical regularity. Counsel also emphasized that mens rea necessary for speech offences was absent and that social-media reactions cannot convert a non-criminal protest poem into a crime.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State (through Solicitor General) adopted a restrained stance — while defending the police’s duty to register FIRs where cognizable offences are alleged, it criticized the appellant’s affidavit claim about authorship and emphasized the police’s obligation to act on complaints alleging promotion of enmity and injury to national unity.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s.196, s.197(1), s.299, s.302, s.57, s.3(5).
ii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s.173(1), s.173(3), s.528.
iii. Constitution of India — Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(2), Article 51-A(a).
iv. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.154 (comparative jurisprudence).
v. Judicial precedents: Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court performed a close textual reading of the Urdu original and its English translation, concluding the poem speaks to injustice by rulers, encourages facing injustice with love, and contemplates sacrifice. Applying s.196’s elements, the Court held the provision targets words promoting disharmony between defined groups (religion, race, language, region, caste, etc.).

The poem, devoid of any group-targeted imputation, did not satisfy s.196’s mens rea or objective elements. The Court reiterated the standard from Bhagwati Charan Shukla and later decisions: evaluate effect of words by the standard of a reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous person, not by weak or alarmist minds.

On s.197(1), the poem made no assertion or imputation about any class’s inability to uphold the Constitution or being unfit as citizens. Ss.299 and 302 require deliberate and malicious intent to outrage or wound religious feelings; those mental elements were absent. s.57 (abetting by public) was inapplicable since no material showed the appellant instigated a public offence by more than ten persons.

Procedurally, the Court contrasted CrPC s.154 jurisprudence (Lalita Kumari) with BNSS s.173(3) which expressly allows a preliminary inquiry (with prior permission) where alleged offences attract 3–7 years’ imprisonment; here police did not exercise that option.

The Court emphasized police constitutional duty under Article 51-A(a) to protect Article 19(1)(a); had the option under s.173(3) been used, frivolous FIRs could have been avoided. Since no cognizable offence was made out even on plain reading, registration was mechanical, abusive and the High Court should have quashed the FIR despite the nascent stage of investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal proposition is twofold:

(i) for speech-based offences under s.196 (and its counterparts), both textual content and context must demonstrate promotion of enmity between identified groups; effect must be judged by the reasonable, strong-minded standard; mens rea is an essential ingredient; and

(ii) where s.173(3) BNSS applies, police should normally use the preliminary inquiry mechanism to avoid needless FIRs that chill constitutionally protected speech.

When, on literal and contextual analysis, the words do not target protected classes or lack requisite malicious intent, no prima facie cognizable offence exists and the FIR can be quashed to prevent abuse of process.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court richly admonished police institutions to be sensitized regarding constitutional freedoms and suggested systematic training; it observed that Article 19(2) must remain a reasonable exception, not an instrument for oppression. The Court also clarified that reading or hearing alleged words to decide whether a cognizable offence is made out (for registering FIR) does not amount to an impermissible preliminary inquiry under s.173(1).

c. GUIDELINES

1. Where alleged offences arise from spoken/written words, the officer-in-charge must read/hear the words and decide if a cognizable offence is prima facie made out; this act is not a prohibited preliminary inquiry.

2. If s.173(3) is applicable (punishment 3–7 years), the higher officer should normally permit a preliminary inquiry to ascertain a prima facie case.

3. Police must respect Article 19(1)(a) and the reasonable-restriction standard of Article 19(2) when deciding registration.

4. The test for effect of words is objective — judged by reasonable, strong-minded persons — not alarmist standards.

5. High Courts can, in appropriate cases, quash FIRs even at nascent stages where no offence is made out on the face of the complaint to prevent abuse of process.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision is a careful reaffirmation of constitutional primacy over criminalisation of speech. It preserves a protective approach to political protest and poetic expressions that do not single out protected groups. Procedurally, it balances mandatory FIR registration duties with a statutory, pragmatic safeguard (s.173(3) BNSS) to prevent frivolous prosecutions for speech-related acts.

For practitioners, the case is a template: when defending speech-based FIRs, focus on textual/contextual analysis, absence of group-targeted imputations, and absence of mens rea; procedurally invoke s.173(3) and Article 19 doctrine.

For police, the judgment is a corrective: ensure constitutional duties are embedded in training; use the preliminary inquiry power when intended by statute; and avoid mechanical FIR registration that chills legitimate expression.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1309 : 2025 INSC 410.

2. Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1.

3. Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156.

4. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1.

5. Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, (2021) 15 SCC 35.

6. Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5.

7. Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668.

8. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (ss.196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57).

2. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (ss.173(1), 173(3), 528).

3. Constitution of India (Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 51-A(a)).

4. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (s.154 — comparative principles).