A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.2 of 2024; judgment dated 03 March 2025) addressed whether visually impaired persons may be excluded from recruitment to judicial services by rule or medical opinion, and whether procedural requirements and cut-offs that operate equally on able-bodied and disabled candidates amount to indirect discrimination contrary to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the constitutional equality guarantee.

The Court held that visually impaired candidates who possess the requisite educational qualifications cannot be declared per se “not suitable” for judicial office; the exclusion in *r.*6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 1994 (as amended 2023) to the extent it excludes blind/low-vision persons was struck down. The Court emphasised the principle of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act and international instruments (UNCRPD), rejected reliance on non-speaking medical opinions to deny opportunity, and recognised that PWd/PwBD are to be treated as a distinct class deserving meaningful procedural adjustments (including relaxation of qualifying marks and a separate cut-off/merit list) so as to ensure substantive equality.

The Court also struck down parts of *r.*7 (three years’ practice or 70% in first attempt) insofar as applied to PwD candidates, permitted relaxation of minimum marks where statutory/administrative power to relax exists, and directed declaration/maintenance of separate cut-offs and merit lists for PwD at every stage. Remedies were ordered for specific appellants and broader directions given to High Courts to adjust selection processes in light of the judgment.

Keywords: visually impaired candidates; reasonable accommodation; RPwD Act, 2016; indirect discrimination; separate cut-off; relaxation of minimum marks; judicial services recruitment.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

This matter arose on the Court’s suo motu cognisance of letter petitions alleging that amendments to recruitment rules (notably *r.*6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 and related notifications) excluded visually impaired and low vision candidates from reservation/appointment to judicial service.

The petitions questioned:

(a) whether a category-wide exclusion could be based on medical opinion;

(b) whether procedural additions (such as *r.*7’s three-year practice requirement or 70% first-attempt threshold) indirectly discriminated against PwD;

(c) whether reservation rules and horizontal/vertical reservation practice required separate cut-offs and merit lists for PwD at each stage.

The Registry impleaded stakeholders (High Courts, State, Union) and allowed interventions, including by a visually-impaired law professor and amicus. The Court framed discrete issues and placed the debate in the broader context of the RPwD Act, 2016, India’s international obligations (UNCRPD) and evolving domestic jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation and substantive equality. The case therefore tested the interplay of statutory reservation, constitutional equality, administrative discretion under *s.*34 RPwD (exemptions) and the scope of reasonable accommodations in competitive selection for judicial office.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The genesis was a letter (15.01.2024) alleging that the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s amendment to *r.*6A (23.06.2023) removed reservation for blind/low-vision persons from judicial recruitment, despite earlier practices and rules granting such reservation and despite the RPwD statutory framework and central notifications listing subordinate judiciary posts as suitable for persons with disabilities.

The Madhya Pradesh authorities defended the amendment on the basis of a medical opinion (Dean, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Medical College) stating that certain disabilities (including blindness/low vision) rendered a candidate unable to discharge judicial duties; and by reliance on *s.*34(2) RPwD (state exemption procedure) and a State exemption previously obtained. Parallel petitions arose from Rajasthan where PwBD candidates claimed non-publication of separate cut-offs and non-observance of reservation; and from individual appellants (e.g., Ayush Yardi, Alok Singh) who alleged denial of relaxations resulting in non-selection despite eligibility and higher aggregate marks.

Interim orders allowed visually impaired candidates to sit mains; the Court later framed wider guidelines applicable nationwide and ultimately heard submissions on classification, accommodation, indirect discrimination, relaxation and remedial reliefs.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Can visually impaired candidates be declared not suitable for judicial service solely on medical/clinical opinion?
ii. Does the amendment to *r.*6A (MP Rules 1994, 2023) excluding blind/low-vision persons violate Articles 14/16/21 and the RPwD Act, 2016?
iii. Does proviso to *r.*7 (three years’ practice or 70% first attempt) impermissibly discriminate indirectly against PwD?
iv. Is relaxation of minimum qualifying marks and suitability standards permissible for PwD and in what manner?
v. Must separate cut-offs and merit lists be maintained for PwD at each stage of judicial recruitment?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioners (including intervenor Dr. Sanjay S. Jain) argued that *r.*6A’s exclusion of blind/low-vision persons rests on stereotype and the medical model of disability and therefore violates *s.*3 and *s.*20 RPwD, Articles 14/16/21 and India’s obligations under the UNCRPD. They emphasised that a law degree and practice qualify a candidate; reasonable accommodation (scribes, assistive technology, assistants, adjusted processes) enables proper discharge of duties; medical opinions without RA analysis are non-speaking and legally impermissible; PwD must be treated as a distinct class for reservation and procedural adjustments; and examples of judges/lawyers with visual impairments demonstrate practicability. They sought striking down of exclusionary rules, declaration of separate cut-offs and retrospective relief for appellants.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The High Court/State relied on the Dean’s medical opinion and the statutory exemption process under *s.*34 RPwD as justifying the amendment: submission was that certain functions (reading pleadings, observing witness demeanour, court conduct) require sight/hearing and that a reasonable nexus exists between rule and legitimate objective (efficacious administration of justice). It argued prior exemptions for District Judiciary, a valid rule-making process, and that interim reliefs already allowed limited participation. Regarding Rajasthan, the respondents relied on prior Supreme Court observations that horizontal reservation need not always translate into separate cut-offs (fact-specific).

H) JUDGMENT 

The Court analysed constitutional doctrine, RPwD scheme, UNCRPD obligations and prior jurisprudence (notably Vikash Kumar, Jeeja Ghosh, Indra Sawhney). It held that exclusion of visually impaired persons by administrative rule or non-speaking medical opinion contravenes the rights-based model of disability and substantive equality under RPwD and Articles 14/21. The Court reaffirmed that reasonable accommodation is a right (not discretionary) and must precede any assessment of suitability; clinical assessment alone cannot determine workplace capability.

Applying the test for indirect discrimination, the Court struck down *r.*6A to the extent it excluded visually impaired candidates who are educationally qualified. *R.*7’s additional requirements (three years’ practice or 70% in first attempt) were struck down insofar as applied to PwD; however general educational thresholds and minimum marks may remain with appropriate relaxation (similar to SC/ST concessions). The Court permitted relaxation of qualifying marks and suitability standards where statutory power exists and found such relaxations compatible with administrative efficiency (citing Indra Sawhney and DOPT OM permitting relaxation).

On cut-offs, the Court directed that separate cut-offs and merit lists for PwD at every stage are mandatory where reservation creates a distinct class to ensure representation and transparency; non-publication of separate cut-offs frustrates the object of reservation. Specific reliefs were granted to appellants (e.g., Ayush Yardi, Alok Singh), notifications set aside insofar as they prejudiced PwD, and High Courts were directed to proceed with selection applying relaxations and separate lists. The Court also called for institutional measures, training and administrative accommodations to enable full participation of PwD in judiciary.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative legal principle: reasonable accommodation is integral to assessing eligibility and forms part of the constitutional right to equality and dignity; administrative exclusions based solely on clinical/medical opinion are impermissible; indirect discrimination must be tested where neutral rules impose unequal burdens on PwD. Therefore, rules or practices that exclude or impose additional procedural hurdles (e.g., immediate 70% first attempt/three years’ practice) without accounting for accommodation, or without separate cut-offs for a reserved class, are constitutionally defective. Relaxation of qualifying marks and procedural adjustment is permissible and legally necessary to realize substantive equality.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court recorded persuasive international jurisprudence and emphasised the evolving disability jurisprudence: the RPwD Act is a super-statute and its anti-discrimination commitments should be read with quasi-constitutional force. The judgment contained extended observations on administrative reforms, assistive technologies, use of trained assistants/scribes, and institutional responsibilities—urging High Courts to go the extra mile in providing accommodations. The Court lamented entrenched stereotypes and recommended affirmative steps to improve representational diversity on bench and bar.

c. GUIDELINES 

• *r.*6A struck down to the extent it excludes blind/low-vision persons who are educationally qualified.

• *r.*7’s additional requirements struck down insofar as applied to PwD; educational thresholds remain but without first-attempt/three-year practice requirement for PwD.

• Authorities must publish separate cut-offs and merit lists for PwD at each stage (Prelim, Main, Interview, Final).

• Relaxation of minimum marks/suitability may be applied to PwD where rule/OM permits; appointing authorities should exercise relaxation powers to avoid vacancy carry-forward.

• Any medical assessment must be speaking, consider RA, and not be conclusive sans accommodations.

• High Courts to implement administrative measures (assistive tech, trained scribes, confidentiality protocols) and report compliance.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reaffirms a rights-based, substantive equality approach: disability cannot be treated as a ground for categorical exclusion from public office where statutory and constitutional frameworks require inclusion and reasonable accommodation. The Court’s insistence on separate cut-offs, permissible relaxation and case-by-case RA assessment balances administrative efficacy with the duty to ensure representation and dignity. Practically, this judgment compels rule-makers and High Courts to revisit rule drafts, selection processes and infrastructure (training, assistive devices, confidentiality safeguards). It also clarifies that *s.*34 RPwD exemptions cannot be a backdoor for stereotype-driven exclusion; exemptions must be reasoned, transparent and accommodate RA analysis.

For litigators and administrators, the judgment is a blueprint:

(i) rules imposing neutral but unequally burdensome requirements must be tested for indirect discrimination;

(ii) RA must be considered and operationalised before unsuitability findings;

(iii) transparent publication of category-wise cut-offs is mandatory to vindicate reservation’s objective. The decision aligns domestic law with international obligations under UNCRPD and strengthens the RPwD Act’s protective promise.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred 

1. Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission and Others, (2021) 5 SCC 370.

2. Jeeja Ghosh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 761.

3. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217.

4. V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu (Madras High Court / affirmed earlier), discussed and corrected by Vikash Kumar.

b. Important Statutes / Instruments Referred

1. The Constitution of India — Articles 14, 15, 16, 21.

2. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (ss.3, 20, 32, 34).

3. Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 (rr.6A, 7, 19) — 2023 amendment.

4. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.

5. UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), 2007; International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities, 2019.