Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Landmark Cases
A topic-wise research guide to leading judgments on admissibility, proof, confessions, witnesses, presumptions and electronic records. Each decision includes its legal question, operative principle and a direct link to the judgment.

Legacy-law applicability after 1 July 2024
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was repealed with effect from 1 July 2024, when the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 commenced. Section 170(2) of the new law saves applications, trials, inquiries, investigations, proceedings and appeals already pending immediately before commencement. Those matters remain governed by the 1872 Act as then in force.
These judgments also inform interpretation of analogous provisions in newer legislation. However, counsel must verify statutory differences, later precedents and the procedural regime applicable to the particular proceeding. Read Section 170 in the official enacted text ↗
Editorial scope: 45 selected doctrinal authorities, including Privy Council decisions historically applied in India and Supreme Court judgments through April 2026. The year shown is the judgment year, while the reporter citation may have a different year.
How to use this case law collection
Start with the relevant statutory provision and identify its evidentiary question. Then check the controlling ratio, the facts on which that ratio depended and the current status of the authority. Use the judgment link to verify paragraphs before quoting any decision in pleadings, memorials or examinations.
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Relevancy, conduct and identification
Sukhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Key question: When is an immediate statement admissible under Section 6 as part of the same transaction?
A person injured by gunfire named the attacker to another person who reached the scene almost immediately.
Section 6 covers a spontaneous statement closely connected with the transaction; here the injured person’s immediate identification of the attacker was admissible. However, the Court ultimately acquitted the appellant because the particular witness was inimical, unsupported and unreliable.
A clear illustration that admissibility does not establish credibility. Courts must make both assessments separately.
Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Key question: What value does a test identification parade have under Section 9?
The prosecution relied on eyewitness identification of persons previously unknown to the witnesses following a shooting.
Identification in court is substantive evidence; a prior test identification parade serves principally as corroborative assurance of the witness’s ability to identify an unknown suspect. Fairness, absence of prior exposure, promptness and comparable parade participants affect its weight.
Exam relevance: test identification is an investigative aid, not an indispensable legal condition for conviction.
Dying declarations and statements of deceased persons
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra
Key question: Is a doctor’s contemporaneous certification of mental fitness indispensable?
A magistrate recorded a dying declaration after assessing the burn victim’s ability to answer.
A medical certificate is a useful safeguard, but not an inflexible prerequisite. A properly proved declaration may be relied upon where the recorder establishes that the declarant was fit, voluntary and truthful. Oral statements or communication through signs are not automatically excluded.
Five-judge decision resolving conflict about the formalities for recording dying declarations.
The recorder should satisfy themselves about the declarant’s condition; courts must examine reliability in the surrounding circumstances.
Paniben v. State of Gujarat
Key question: Can a dying declaration independently sustain a conviction?
A burns victim made several statements identifying her mother-in-law as the assailant.
A truthful, voluntary and reliable dying declaration can suffice without independent corroboration. Suspicious declarations require caution; multiple declarations must be compared for consistency and trustworthiness.
The judgment systematically restates the tests used when a conviction depends upon Section 32(1).
Ensure the declarant could identify the attacker, was mentally fit and was not tutored. Corroboration is a rule of prudence, not an absolute requirement.
Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor
Key question: What is the scope of statements concerning circumstances of a transaction resulting in death under Section 32(1)?
Before travelling to collect a debt, a man told his wife where he was going. His dismembered body was later found.
The Privy Council interpreted the circumstances-of-the-transaction limb broadly enough to include statements having a proximate relation to the eventual death; a statement need not describe the actual moment of death. Remoteness and connection remain central.
Foundational interpretation of Section 32(1); the authority is historical and persuasive, subsequently cited by the Supreme Court.
No exhaustive general directions were issued.
Confessions, discovery and self-incrimination
Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu
Key question: Are NDPS officers exercising Section 53 powers police officers for Section 25 of the Evidence Act?
Confessional statements were recorded by officers empowered to investigate offences under the NDPS Act.
The majority held such empowered officers to be police officers for Section 25. A statement under Section 67 NDPS Act cannot be relied upon as a confessional statement to convict.
Essential specialist application of the exclusion of police confessions.
Majority holding; consult the judgment for the separate dissenting view and its reasoning.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka
Key question: Can narcoanalysis, polygraph tests and brain-mapping be administered involuntarily?
The Court considered investigative demands for compulsory scientific interrogation techniques.
Involuntary administration of these techniques violates constitutional protection against self-incrimination and personal liberty. Even voluntary tests are subject to safeguards, and the test results themselves do not automatically become admissible confessions.
Landmark joining the Evidence Act with Articles 20(3) and 21.
The Court required genuine consent and procedural protections, including the safeguards discussed from the NHRC guidelines.
Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani
Key question: How far does the protection against self-incrimination extend during police questioning?
A former Chief Minister was prosecuted after declining to answer parts of a police questionnaire.
Article 20(3) protects against compelled answers with a real tendency to incriminate, including during investigation; remote or fanciful fears do not excuse all answers. The Court stressed safeguards against coercion and the requested presence of counsel.
Use with Article 20(3) and procedural provisions protecting against compelled self-incriminating answers.
Police should warn suspects about self-incrimination and not deny reasonable access to requested counsel during questioning.
Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra
Key question: How narrowly must a disclosure statement be edited before using Section 27?
An accused led investigators to stolen chemical drums at a location accessible to others.
The admissible statement was confined to identifying the place of deposit. The claim that the accused stole the drums was not the direct cause of discovery. Knowledge of an object’s location did not itself prove the accused was its thief.
Practical authority for separating the admissible discovery portion from barred confessional detail.
Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar
Key question: Can the prosecution isolate inculpatory parts of a confessional FIR made by the accused to police?
An accused reported a killing to the police in a narrative substantially confessing the offence.
Section 25 excludes a confession made to a police officer. The prosecution cannot ordinarily evade the bar by dividing the confessional narrative into isolated incriminating segments; legally severable non-confessional facts and Section 27 discovery have separate treatment.
Distinguish an accused’s confessional FIR from a first information report given by an eyewitness.
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad
Key question: Does compelling fingerprints or specimen handwriting amount to testimonial self-incrimination?
Several appeals raised the constitutional limits of obtaining physical identification material from accused persons.
The eleven-judge Bench distinguished compelled communication of personal knowledge from supplying physical characteristics. Specimen handwriting, impressions and similar identifying materials are not, merely by their collection, testimonial compulsion within Article 20(3).
A constitutional foundation for distinguishing physical evidence from forced testimony; later forensic jurisprudence must also be considered.
Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor
Key question: Which portion of information supplied in police custody is admissible under Section 27?
Accused persons supplied information leading investigators to objects connected with a village-faction murder.
Only the portion of the information distinctly related to the fact discovered is admissible. A discovery includes the place, object and accused’s knowledge, but does not license admission of a wider confession about the offence.
The classic narrow construction of Section 27 continues to inform Supreme Court decisions.
Historical Privy Council precedent, followed in Indian courts.
Circumstantial evidence and special knowledge
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra
Key question: What evidentiary significance attaches to a death inside the matrimonial home?
A woman was killed within her marital home; a snakebite explanation conflicted with medical evidence of strangulation.
Once the prosecution establishes foundational circumstances, a resident with special knowledge may be expected to explain what happened. A false or missing explanation can strengthen an otherwise established chain, not create the prosecution case from nothing.
Often read with Shambu Nath Mehra to avoid treating Section 106 as an automatic presumption of guilt.
Bodh Raj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
Key question: When can the last-seen-together circumstance support an inference of guilt?
The Court assessed several appeals involving last-seen evidence and other incriminating circumstances.
The last-seen theory gains force where the interval between the accused and deceased being seen together and death is sufficiently short to make third-party intervention unlikely. It rarely replaces the need for other corroborating circumstances.
Useful for testing whether a circumstantial chain remains complete.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
Key question: What must the prosecution establish where the case rests entirely upon circumstances?
The appellant’s wife died from poisoning and the prosecution relied on a chain of circumstantial evidence.
The Court articulated five golden principles: fully proved circumstances; consistency only with guilt; conclusive tendencies; exclusion of every reasonable innocent hypothesis; and a complete, unbroken chain. The prosecution must first prove its case independently of any false defence.
Core authority under Section 3 on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The five stated conditions are legal principles for evaluation, not a substitute for evaluating each proved circumstance.
Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
Key question: Does Section 106 reverse the prosecution’s normal burden?
An employee accused of obtaining railway travel allowances was asked to account for ticket-related facts.
Section 106 applies to facts especially, not merely generally, within a person’s knowledge. It cannot relieve the prosecution of proving the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
Leading interpretation of Section 106 and its relationship with Section 101.
Burden of proof, presumptions and paternity
Nikhat Parveen alias Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique alias Shillu
Key question: How is an already-completed, accepted DNA test treated in a child-maintenance dispute?
A DNA test had already been conducted with consent and had become final; it excluded the respondent’s biological paternity.
The Court applied the fact-specific reasoning in Nandlal Badwaik, rather than ordering a new DNA inquiry. It reaffirmed strong judicial hesitation about directing tests and distinguished the situation from cases without an existing conclusive report.
Recent clarification of how DNA results, the Section 112 presumption and maintenance interact.
Read with Ivan Rathinam and Aparna Ajinkya Firodia; the case does not create a routine entitlement to DNA testing.
Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph
Key question: Can paternity be investigated where a person was born during a valid marriage?
A man sought to establish the biological paternity of a person other than his mother’s husband, though spouses had access to each other.
Section 112 strongly presumes legitimacy and legal paternity absent proof of non-access. Before ordering DNA testing, courts must find existing evidence insufficient and assess whether the benefits justify privacy, dignity and welfare harms.
Important 2025 analysis of “non-access”, multiple access and the need for evidence before scientific testing.
The Court articulated two barriers: insufficiency of existing evidence and a positive balancing of interests.
Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia
Key question: When may a child be directed to undergo a DNA test in a marital dispute?
A husband sought DNA testing of a child born during marriage, relying on allegations of infidelity.
The Section 112 presumption cannot ordinarily be displaced merely by allegations of adultery or a DNA result, without establishing non-access. A child’s privacy, dignity and legitimate status impose serious limits on invasive testing.
Significant modern clarification and necessary context for Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik.
Do not order DNA testing as a routine fact-finding exercise; insist on a strong prima facie foundation and address the child’s interests.
Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana
Key question: How should courts interpret “soon before” and apply Section 113B in dowry-death trials?
The Supreme Court assessed dowry-related cruelty, the death of a married woman and the trial court’s approach.
The phrase “soon before” requires a live and proximate link, not necessarily an event immediately preceding death. Once foundational elements are proved, the presumption operates. The Court also distinguished the ingredients of Section 306 IPC.
Includes trial-management and evidentiary directions relevant to dowry-death prosecutions.
The Court gave structured directions on careful questioning, proper recording of accused statements, judicial neutrality, avoidance of unnecessary delays and responsible sentencing.
Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Key question: When does the dowry-death presumption under Section 113B arise?
The Court reviewed convictions involving allegations of cruelty in connection with a woman’s unnatural death.
The prosecution must establish foundational facts, including cruelty or harassment for dowry sufficiently proximate to death. Section 113B cannot repair a failure to prove those prerequisites.
Protects against treating the statutory presumption as automatic merely upon an unnatural death.
Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik
Key question: What happens where a DNA report conflicts with the Section 112 presumption?
Court-ordered DNA tests established that the husband was not the child’s biological father in a maintenance dispute.
On its particular facts, the Court preferred the reliable scientific result over the otherwise applicable statutory presumption. Later decisions have tightly limited when DNA testing is justified and how legitimacy must be protected.
Must be read with Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, Ivan Rathinam and Nikhat Parveen rather than cited as unrestricted DNA-testing authority.
Rangammal v. Kuppuswami
Key question: Who bears the burden of proving a disputed sale deed and legal necessity?
In a property dispute, one party relied on a transfer allegedly executed during the opposing party’s minority.
Under Section 101 the party asserting a fact must prove it. The burden of establishing the transaction’s genuineness and asserted legal necessity could not be transferred to the person denying the transaction.
A useful civil-law illustration of the burden of proof and pleadings.
Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif
Key question: Can adverse inference be drawn where a party withholds the best documentary evidence?
Material records held by a party were withheld in litigation over land and trust property.
The court may draw an adverse inference under Section 114 illustration (g) if a party withholds evidence in their possession, even when that party argues the technical burden falls on someone else.
Explains how evidentiary non-production differs from formal allocation of the burden of proof.
Testimony, cross-examination and hostile witnesses
Ramesh Harijan v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Key question: Can dependable parts of hostile witness testimony be accepted?
A criminal appeal involved material witnesses turning hostile and other corroborative evidence.
Hostility does not efface sworn testimony altogether. Courts may rely on portions found dependable after careful comparison with the remaining record.
Useful modern application of Sat Paul to the assessment of hostile prosecution witnesses.
Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra
Key question: Can a child witness provide adequate evidence under Section 118?
The prosecution relied substantially on a ten-year-old eyewitness to a murder.
A child who can understand questions and answer rationally is competent. Corroboration may be prudent but is not mandatory in all cases; the judge must examine the risk of tutoring and testimonial reliability.
Explains competency, credibility and prudential corroboration without imposing arbitrary age limits.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh
Key question: Is corroboration invariably required for the credible testimony of a sexual-assault survivor?
The Court examined a rape prosecution and how the victim’s testimony had been appreciated.
A trustworthy prosecutrix’s testimony does not require corroboration as an inflexible rule. Courts must avoid stereotypes and undue suspicion, while assessing the whole evidence with judicial care.
Read in context of current substantive criminal law and the law governing sensitive witness examination.
Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration
Key question: Does permission to cross-examine one’s own witness erase that witness’s testimony?
The credibility of participants in a corruption trap was contested, and the court examined the use of prior statements.
The testimony of a witness cross-examined by the calling party does not vanish automatically. Reliable portions may remain usable after careful scrutiny. Prior police statements cannot be used as substantive proof or corroboration contrary to procedural limits.
The principal Section 154 authority for evaluating hostile witness evidence.
Tahsildar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Key question: When does an omission in a previous police statement become a contradiction?
Eyewitnesses were confronted with differences between statements made to investigators and their testimony at trial.
The Court explained the method required by Section 145 and the limits imposed by criminal procedure on use of police statements. An omission becomes a contradiction when it is significant enough, in context, to be inconsistent with later testimony.
Foundational procedural rule for precise impeachment during cross-examination.
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras
Key question: Does Section 134 require multiple witnesses to prove a criminal charge?
A murder conviction rested heavily upon testimony from one witness.
Evidence is weighed, not counted. A wholly reliable solitary witness can sustain a conviction, while testimony requiring caution may need corroboration depending on its character and circumstances.
Exam favourite for Section 134 and the distinction between quality and quantity of evidence.
Documents, wills and written transactions
Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani
Key question: How do Sections 91 and 92 restrict oral evidence about written agreements?
A dispute concerning contractual rights and possession raised attempts to vary a written arrangement orally.
Section 91 governs proof of the terms of documents; Section 92 generally bars parties from contradicting or varying proved written terms through oral statements, subject to statutory provisos. Their scopes overlap but differ.
Classic explanation of the best-evidence and parol-evidence rules.
Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam
Key question: What must an attesting witness prove under Section 68?
A contested will was tendered without adequate proof of statutory attestation.
Merely examining an attesting witness is insufficient if their evidence does not prove the legally necessary execution and attestation. Proof must satisfy the Evidence Act and Succession Act requirements.
Clarifies that calling a witness is not the same as proving an attested instrument.
Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat
Key question: Should trials stop for separate decisions on every evidentiary objection?
A long-running criminal trial was delayed by disputes over the admissibility of material.
Ordinarily, trial judges may record objections, tentatively mark the evidence and decide admissibility at final judgment, excluding material if objection succeeds. Stamp-duty objections are a specific exception requiring immediate decision.
Provides practical trial management directions to reduce interruptions.
Preserve the stated stamp-duty exception; this is a procedural direction, not blanket permission to admit every document.
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit
Key question: Does a school register entry conclusively establish a person’s date of birth?
Election nomination eligibility depended on age shown in school records.
A register entry may be admissible under Section 35 yet lack probative weight unless the underlying source of the information is proved. Admissibility and reliability are distinct questions.
Useful for age disputes involving school records and other official entries.
Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam
Key question: Does marking a document as an exhibit automatically prove its contents?
Books of account were produced in a dispute concerning payments on a mortgage.
The mere assignment of an exhibit number does not dispense with legal proof of a document. Contents and entries must be established through admissible evidence where genuinely disputed.
Essential for documentary evidence objections and trial strategy.
H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma
Key question: How is due execution of a will proved where suspicious circumstances exist?
Beneficiaries relied on a testament whose execution and surrounding circumstances were challenged.
The propounder must prove due execution and testamentary capacity. Suspicious circumstances create a further obligation to remove legitimate doubt through satisfactory evidence, read with Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act.
Foundational test for civil probate disputes.
The Court identified suspicious features as matters requiring judicial satisfaction; no exhaustive checklist replaces the factual inquiry.
Experts, scientific proof and handwriting
Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Key question: Does a handwriting expert’s opinion always require independent corroboration?
The Court considered whether expert handwriting analysis could be used in a serious criminal trial.
There is no universal rule forbidding reliance on uncorroborated handwriting expertise. Courts must evaluate the expert’s reasons, competence and consistency with the whole record.
Important interpretation of Section 45 as opinion evidence rather than automatic proof.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram
Key question: May a court obtain specimen handwriting for comparison under Section 73?
Authorship of a disputed writing was in issue in criminal proceedings.
The Evidence Act recognises proof by the writer’s admission, direct observation, knowledgeable witnesses, experts and judicial comparison. A court may use statutory comparison powers, exercising caution about expertise and accuracy.
Useful for Sections 45, 47 and 73 and the distinct modes of proving handwriting.
Spousal communications and estoppel
Vibhor Garg v. Neha
Key question: Can covertly recorded conversations between spouses be tendered in a matrimonial dispute?
A husband relied upon recorded telephonic conversations, memory cards and transcripts in divorce proceedings.
The Section 122 exception for proceedings between married persons permits relevant inter-spousal communications to be introduced in such litigation. The Court restored the Family Court’s order admitting the materials for consideration according to law.
Major 2025 clarification, read with family-court evidentiary rules and separate proof requirements for electronic records.
Admission remains subject to proof and other applicable safeguards; the case does not declare every recording authentic.
B. L. Sreedhar v. K. M. Munireddy
Key question: When does conduct or acquiescence create estoppel under Section 115?
Property purchasers relied on the conduct of persons who later contested earlier transactions.
A person whose representation, conduct or acquiescence induces another to act on an apparent state of affairs may be prevented from contradicting it, subject to statutory and other legal limits.
Leading example of estoppel by representation and conduct.
M. C. Verghese v. T. J. Ponnan
Key question: What protection applies to communications made during marriage under Section 122?
Letters written by a husband to his wife became relevant to allegations of defamation involving a third person.
The Court examined the bar on disclosure of communications made during marriage, its statutory exceptions and the implications of how communications come before a court.
A foundation for spousal communication privilege, now to be read alongside Vibhor Garg.
Electronic records and Section 65B
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
Key question: Is a Section 65B(4) certificate mandatory, and what if the original device is produced?
Election litigation led a three-judge Bench to resolve conflicting interpretations of electronic-evidence certification.
For electronic computer outputs, certification remains mandatory, subject to the Court’s explained procedural mechanisms for obtaining it. Producing the original electronic device through a competent witness is different; no separate certificate is required for that primary record.
Controlling leading authority for legacy Section 65B, affirming Anvar and overruling the contrary Shafhi Mohammad relaxation.
Courts may summon persons in control of systems and secure certificates; certificates may be produced later where lawfully permitted and fairness is preserved.
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh
Key question: Could a court dispense with a Section 65B certificate where a party lacks the device?
The Court considered crime-scene videography and practical barriers to obtaining electronic certificates.
A two-judge Bench proposed relaxation of certificate requirements for a party not controlling the device. This legal position was expressly overruled by Arjun Panditrao Khotkar in 2020.
Included as a jurisprudential milestone and warning against reliance on superseded law.
Not good law on dispensing with Section 65B(4) certification; Arjun Panditrao controls.
Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana
Key question: When must an objection concerning the mode of proving electronic records be raised?
Call-detail records were used in a kidnapping and murder prosecution; certification objections arose on appeal.
Objections to a curable mode of proof should ordinarily be made when evidence is tendered. Failure to raise the objection at trial can preclude a belated challenge, depending on its character.
Read with Anvar and Arjun; distinguish objections to admissibility from objections to the method of proof.
Anvar P. V. v. P. K. Basheer
Key question: How must a secondary electronic record be proved under Sections 65A and 65B?
An election dispute involved allegedly recorded and copied electronic materials.
Section 65B is the special route for proving electronic computer outputs, with statutory certification where required. The Court rejected the contrary route allowing such copies to bypass Section 65B through general secondary evidence rules.
Three-judge decision later affirmed and clarified by Arjun Panditrao Khotkar.
The certificate requirement concerns computer outputs, not production and proof of the original electronic record by an appropriate witness.
Research standards and citation guidance
Case summaries are paraphrases of the judgments, not verbatim judicial quotations. Hyperlinks open complete judgments hosted on the Supreme Court website, court repositories, judicial academies or Indian Kanoon. Reported citations and spelling variants should be checked against the cause title and authorised report before formal filing. Do not rely on superseded propositions, especially the Section 65B relaxation in Shafhi Mohammad.
This compilation is for legal education and research. It is selective rather than an exhaustive list of every important evidence-law judgment.
Frequently asked questions
Is the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 still applicable?
The Act was repealed when the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 came into force on 1 July 2024. Section 170(2) preserves application of the old Act to proceedings, applications, investigations, inquiries, trials and appeals already pending immediately before commencement.
Is a Section 65B certificate necessary for electronic evidence?
For computer outputs tendered under the legacy Evidence Act, the certificate is ordinarily mandatory under Anvar P. V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. A properly proved original electronic device is treated differently. The Shafhi Mohammad relaxation was overruled.
Can a dying declaration alone support conviction?
Yes. Paniben and Laxman recognise that a voluntary, truthful and reliable dying declaration may suffice. Courts examine the declarant’s fitness, recording circumstances and signs of tutoring; corroboration is not compulsory in every case.
Does Section 106 shift the entire burden of proof to an accused?
No. Shambu Nath Mehra establishes that facts especially within the accused’s knowledge may require explanation, but the prosecution must first establish the essential elements of the charge.
Are old Evidence Act judgments relevant under the new evidence law?
Many principles remain valuable wherever equivalent language has been retained, but practitioners must check the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, its changed provisions and subsequent judicial interpretations before applying older rulings.