A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

A child went missing during play. The body was recovered from the hut of the accused. The prosecution relied on three decisive circumstances. First, recovery of the corpse from the accused’s dwelling. Second, last‑seen evidence from two child cousins and an adult relative who placed the child with the accused moments before the occurrence. Third, DNA results linking exhibits from the scene and the accused, including a match from the accused’s underwear with both the victim and the accused. The Trial Court convicted the accused of offences under ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 IPC and s. 6 of the POCSO Act, and imposed death. The High Court affirmed the conviction and confirmed the death sentence on reference under s. 366 CrPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction, holding that identity, cause of death, last‑seen, recovery, and DNA formed an unbroken chain that proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court found that the sentencing courts had focused only on brutality and failed to evaluate aggravating and mitigating circumstances, contrary to established capital sentencing jurisprudence, including Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, Gudda v. State of M.P., Manoj v. State of M.P., and Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police. Considering the appellant’s socioeconomic background and psychological reports, the Court commuted death to imprisonment for life without remission for the remainder of natural life.

Keywords: last‑seen theory; DNA evidence; child sexual assault; rarest of rare; mitigating circumstances; death sentence confirmation; life without remission.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The background discloses a prosecution anchored in three links and a sentencing question at the core. A ten‑year‑old child disappeared at midday from a labour settlement inside an under‑construction college campus. She was later found dead in the hut of the appellant, under empty cement bags. The father lodged the FIR at P.S. Sahaspur after the discovery, narrating how the appellant had earlier lured the children with a ten‑rupee note and kept the victim back. The investigating agency prepared the inquest, sent the body for autopsy, and gathered exhibits for FSL testing. Charges were framed under ss. 302, 201, 376, 377 IPC and s. 6 POCSO; conviction was returned under ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 IPC and ss. 5/6 POCSO. On reference under s. 366 CrPC, the High Court confirmed guilt and death. The Supreme Court framed the decisive issue: whether the findings on conviction and sentence were sustainable. The Court catalogued the prosecution’s pillars: recovery from the hut, last‑seen evidence, and DNA linkages. It also recorded that the child’s identity and age stood established through school records, and cause of death was manual strangulation following sexual assault. The report also notes compliance with anonymity in line with Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, which requires redaction of the victim’s identity. The appeal turned on whether these circumstances excluded every hypothesis of innocence and whether the capital sentence met the constitutional and doctrinal safeguards under the rarest‑of‑rare rubric as explained in Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur, Gudda, Manoj, and Sundar @ Sundarrajan.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The record shows that on 28 July 2018, around 12:30 p.m., the victim, aged ten, was playing outside with cousins and friends in the labourers’ quarters. The appellant took the group to his hut and distributed ₹10 to each child to fetch sweets, retaining the victim alone. When the father enquired about her, the appellant replied that she had taken the money and left. After frantic searches failed, the contractor asked a co‑worker to check the appellant’s hut. The body was found concealed under empty cement bags, inside a corner of that hut. The FIR was lodged at once. Post‑mortem was conducted by PW‑4 Dr. Chirag Bahuguna, who opined that all injuries were ante‑mortem, the body bore marks indicative of sexual assault, and the cause of death was manual throttling causing asphyxia, post rape. The school’s head verified the date of birth as 20 October 2008, fixing age as ten on the date of occurrence. The investigation recovered and sealed several exhibits, including the accused’s underwear and hair from the deceased, and sent them for FSL analysis. PW‑17 Dr. Manoj Kumar Aggarwal proved the DNA report, including matches tying (i) hair recovered from the deceased and the accused’s underwear to the accused’s blood sample, and (ii) DNA from Exhibit 9 to both the victim and the accused. The Trial Court accepted witness testimonies on recovery and last‑seen, the High Court confirmed, and the Supreme Court found no infirmity in the chain establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i. Whether the circumstantial evidence—recovery, last‑seen, and DNA—proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed offences under ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 IPC and s. 6 POCSO.
ii. Whether the confirmation of death sentence adhered to the rarest‑of‑rare doctrine, mandating a balanced consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and evaluation of the possibility of reformation, as explicated in Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur, Gudda, Manoj, and Sundar @ Sundarrajan.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the case rested on circumstances and demanded strict proof of each link. They would invite scrutiny of last‑seen testimony by minors and an interested relative, the timing of discovery of the body, and the chain of custody for forensic exhibits. They would emphasise that capital sentencing must satisfy the two‑step framework: the case must fall within the rarest‑of‑rare, and the alternative of life imprisonment must be unquestionably foreclosed through evidence showing the impossibility of reformation. Here, the courts below, in affirming death, relied mainly on the brutality of the crime, overlooking other statutory and constitutional imperatives. They would cite Manoj v. State of M.P. to assert that a court must identify and weigh both aggravating and mitigating factors and, at the second stage, examine whether life imprisonment would not suffice, with the State furnishing materials. They would rely on Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra to stress a prudential preference for life imprisonment where the case is based solely on circumstantial evidence. They would draw support from Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police to say that without a structured inquiry into reformation potential, death cannot stand. Finally, they would place before the Court the probation and psychological reports pointing to pervasive poverty, early child labour, and absence of psychiatric disturbance, as mitigating factors that must be accounted for before invoking the death penalty. In such circumstances, the proper sentence, even if conviction is maintained, is life imprisonment without remission.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the prosecution established a cogent, complete, and inter‑locking chain. The child was last seen in the exclusive company of the accused inside his hut; the adult relative and both minor cousins described the accused handing money and retaining the victim. The dead body surfaced just hours later, hidden under cement bags in the very hut of the accused. These links exclude any hypothesis other than guilt. The FSL report carries decisive weight: hair recovered from the deceased and the accused’s underwear matched the accused’s DNA; DNA from Exhibit 9 matched both the victim and the accused. The medical evidence proved sexual assault and manual throttling by hand as the cause of death, post‑rape. The High Court rightly rejected the suggestion of tutoring of child witnesses because their testimony was natural and independent and was corroborated by other evidence. On sentence, the State would justify death by pointing to the age of the victim, the manner of sexual exploitation, and the attempt to conceal the body inside the accused’s room—factors it would label as placing the case within the rarest‑of‑rare category. The confirmatory court, it would say, is entitled to treat the brutality and vulnerability of the victim as aggravants outweighing any mitigation. Thus, both conviction and death deserved affirmation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 376(AB) IPC; Section 377 IPC; Section 302 IPC (offences charged and proved as recorded by the courts below).
ii. Section 5/6 POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative sexual assault; punishment).
iii. Section 366 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (reference to the High Court for confirmation of death sentence).
iv. Article 14 of the Constitution (invoked in Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur while cautioning against subjective disparity in death sentencing and insisting on objective criteria).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It held that identity of the deceased and cause of death were undisputed; PW‑4’s post‑mortem confirmed sexual assault and manual strangulation as the cause of death, with all injuries being ante‑mortem. The age was established through the school record proving a birth date of 20 October 2008. On recovery, PW‑3 discovered the body concealed under cement bags in the appellant’s hut; PWs 1 and 2 corroborated and identified signatures on panchnamas and recovery memos; PW‑10 supported the presence of the body in the hut. On the last‑seen circumstance, PW‑13 Somwati and the two cousins narrated how the accused took the children to his hut, gave money, and retained the victim; both children’s testimony inspired confidence and there was no evidence of tutoring, especially since their accounts were corroborated. On DNA, the Court relied on PW‑17’s report: hair from the body and the accused’s underwear matched the accused’s DNA, and Exhibit 9 matched both the victim and the accused. Cumulatively, the chain was complete and excluded innocence. Turning to sentence, the Court faulted both the Trial Court and the High Court for relying predominantly on the brutality and for not undertaking a thorough inquiry into aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Relying on Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur, the Court reiterated that, as a matter of prudence, life imprisonment is to be preferred where the case rests on circumstances and where disparity risks breach of Article 14. Building on Gudda and Manoj, it emphasised the two‑stage analysis and the need for an evidence‑based finding that reformation is foreclosed—something absent here. Citing Sundar @ Sundarrajan, it noted there was no structured inquiry into rehabilitation. The Court therefore commuted death to life imprisonment without remission extending to natural life, considering the probation report’s account of very pathetic family conditions, early child labour, and absence of psychiatric disturbance.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio on conviction is that recovery from the accused’s hut, last‑seen inside the hut immediately prior to the incident, and DNA matches linking key exhibits to both the accused and victim constitute a complete, cogent chain that proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt in offences under ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 IPC and s. 6 POCSO. The Court expressly found no infirmity in the chain of seizure and forensic handling. The ratio on sentencing is that rarest‑of‑rare must be applied through a two‑step, objective framework. First, the court must identify, weigh, and record aggravating and mitigating circumstances with equal emphasis. Second, it must ask whether life imprisonment would be clearly inadequate and whether the aim of reformation is foreclosed, with the State producing material to that effect. When a case is based on circumstantial evidence, prudence favours life over death, and disparity concerns under Article 14 demand objectivity and consistency as explained in Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur. The records in this case lacked a deep inquiry into mitigation and reformation; reports showed poverty, early labour, and no psychiatric disturbance; therefore, death was not justified though the crime was brutal. Life imprisonment without remission to natural life satisfies penological goals while aligning with precedent in Gudda, Manoj, and Sundar @ Sundarrajan.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court underscored broader concerns with capital sentencing culture. It quoted Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur to remind courts that capital punishment is not a “normal penalty” and demands procedural justice that flows not only from black‑letter law but also from conventions. It warned that rarest‑of‑rare cannot be what a particular judge deems rare in a personal sense; an objective, consensus‑driven approach must anchor the doctrine to avoid violation of Article 14 through disparate outcomes. This broader guidance, though not essential to the final commutation, shapes sentencing practice in future cases by requiring trial and appellate courts to document their balancing exercise and to avoid reliance on brutality alone. The Court’s references to Gudda and Sundar @ Sundarrajan reiterate that a “tooth‑for‑a‑tooth” reaction has no place in a civilised system, and that a structured inquiry into reformation is indispensable. These observations, while not the immediate ratio determining guilt, serve as authoritative counsel to lower courts on how to structure death penalty review, especially when evidence is circumstantial. The case thus contributes to the corpus insisting on individualized sentencing, on reasoned proportionality, and on documentary support for conclusions that the possibility of rehabilitation is foreclosed.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Aggravation–Mitigation Matrix Mandatory: Sentencing courts must explicitly catalogue and weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances; reliance on brutality alone is impermissible. Absence of such analysis is an error warranting appellate correction.
ii. Two‑Step Rarest‑of‑Rare Test: First, ascertain objectively that the case falls within rarest‑of‑rare; second, record why life imprisonment would not suffice and why reformation is impossible, with the State providing material.
iii. Circumstantial Evidence Prudence: Where conviction rests solely on circumstances, courts should—in line with Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur—prefer life over death as a rule of prudence, mindful of Article 14 concerns about disparity.
iv. Structured Inquiry into Reformation: Before imposing death, courts must conduct and document an inquiry into the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation, drawing on probation, jail, and psychological assessments. Failure vitiates the death sentence confirmation.
v. Use of Mitigation Material: Socio‑economic deprivation, educational deprivation, and absence of psychiatric illness are relevant mitigation inputs; such material must be called for and considered.
vi. Victim Identity Protection: Courts must ensure continued adherence to anonymity norms in sexual offences, in line with Nipun Saxena v. Union of India.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s approach draws a firm line between proof and penalty. On proof, it accepted the triad recovery, last‑seen, DNA as a seamless chain. The medical opinion and age determination fortified the prosecution case. The Court’s articulation makes clear that circumstantial evidence, when consistent and corroborated across independent strands, suffices to uphold conviction for rape, unnatural offences, and murder under ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 IPC and s. 6 POCSO. On penalty, the judgment is a careful reaffirmation that rarest‑of‑rare is not an emotive response to heinousness but an objective test calibrated by constitutional values. By insisting on a documented aggravation mitigation analysis, the Court corrects the lower courts’ focus on brutality alone. The reliance on Manoj, Farooq, Gudda, and Sundar @ Sundarrajan re‑centres reformation as a statutory aim and stresses the State’s burden to bring material excluding that possibility. The probation and psychological reports poverty, early labour, no psychiatric illness were rightly treated as mitigation. The final sentence life without remission to natural life signals that proportionality can be achieved without extinguishing life, especially when the record does not foreclose rehabilitation. The ruling thus strengthens sentencing discipline while retaining strong condemnation of the offence. It also offers a template for future capital references: build the matrix, gather mitigation, interrogate reformation, and pronounce sentence by reason, not by revulsion.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 SCC 641 — quoted on prudence favouring life over death and the need for objective rarest‑of‑rare standards under Article 14.
ii. Gudda v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC 596 — relied on to reject brutality‑alone as the basis for death sentence.
iii. Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353 — reiterated the two‑step framework and State’s burden to show reformation is foreclosed.
iv. Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 310 — commuted death for want of inquiry into reformation.
v. Ram Naresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 — referred in the High Court for aggravation–mitigation lists.
vi. Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 — referenced for anonymity of sexual‑offence victims.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — ss. 376(AB), 377, 302 (charges/conviction).
ii. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — s. 6; ss. 5/6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault and punishment).
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 366 (death sentence reference).