A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

JSW Steel Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 701 : 2025 INSC 257 examines whether a High Court correctly treated a long-pending writ as infructuous and permitted the Port Trust to encash security deposited by the petitioner to meet costs of raising a capsized barge (Satyam). The central legal question is narrow and legal: under Section 14(1) of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, on whom does the statutory liability to raise or remove a wreck fall the owner of the wrecked vessel or some other party (here, the appellant owner of the mother ship)?

The appellant had deposited Rs.70,00,000 under compulsion and challenged the demand by writ under Article 226, contending that the actual owner of the barge (respondent no.3) alone bore statutory liability. The High Court allowed the Port Trust to withdraw the deposit and dismissed the writ as infructuous on account of elapsed time. The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsound because the dispute raised a pure question of law not a factual minefield and systemic delay could not extinguish the lis or preclude adjudication where legal rights remained unresolved.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court order, revived the writ, and remitted the matter for disposal on merits, while noting that monetary withdrawal by the Port Trust could be compensated if the appellant succeeds. The judgment applies principles on exercise of Article 226 where no substantial factual controversy exists and restates that efflux of time/systemic delay is not a ground to deny adjudication of legal questions.

Keywords: Wreck of barge; Section 14(1) Indian Ports Act, 1908; Efflux of time; Pure question of law; Article 226.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The matter arises from a dispute over statutory liability to remove a wreck within port limits. A barge named Satyam capsized during transshipment operations from the appellant’s mother ship to the Dharamtar jetty. The Deputy Conservator of the Mumbai Port Trust invoked Section 14(1) of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 and directed deposit of Rs.70,00,000 as security to ensure removal of the wreck within thirty days. The appellant (then Nippon Denro Ispat Ltd.) contested the demand by filing a writ under Article 226, claiming statutory liability lay on the owner of the wrecked barge (respondent no.3, M/s Shivam Engineers), not on the appellant.

Although the appellant deposited the demanded sum in court, years elapsed and the High Court ultimately held the petition infructuous, permitting the Port Trust to withdraw the deposited amount and advising the appellant to seek remedy by civil suit for recovery. The appellant challenged this disposal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court framed the controversy as a pure legal question whether the statutory language and scheme of Section 14 fasten liability on the owner of the vessel which is wrecked and whether systemic delay justified declining to adjudicate that question in a writ petition.

The Court examined precedent on the scope of Article 226 and the impact of delay on judicial relief, and concluded that the High Court ought to have decided the legal issue rather than treating the petition as dead by efflux of time. Accordingly, the writ was revived and remitted.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant operated ocean carriage and engaged in transshipment to shore by barges. During such an operation one barge, Satyam (owned by respondent no.3), capsized while conveying iron ore from appellant’s ship to the Dharamtar jetty. The Deputy Conservator of the Port issued a communication dated 19.04.1995 exercising power under Section 14(1) and calling upon the appellant to deposit Rs.70 lakhs as security to ensure the wreck would be raised or removed within thirty days.

The appellant, though disputing liability, deposited the sum in court and filed Writ Petition No.2127/1996 challenging the requirement, seeking prohibition against the Port Trust’s insistence and injunction to protect its right to use port waters. Over years the wreck was removed and administrative acts occurred; the High Court, observing passage of time and that the petition had been rendered infructuous, allowed the Port Trust to withdraw the deposit and dismissed the writ, leaving open civil remedies.

The appellant contended the High Court failed to address the dispositive legal question of statutory liability whether the owner of the wrecked vessel alone bears the cost under Section 14(1) and that the disposal was legally unsustainable. Respondent Port Trust relied on the passage of time, the fact that the wreck had been cleared, and availability of alternate civil remedy.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Section 14(1) of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 imposes liability to raise or remove a wreck on the owner of the wrecked vessel alone, and accordingly whether the appellant (owner of the mother ship) could be compelled to deposit security;
ii. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 should be dismissed as infructuous and the deposit released merely because of efflux of time when the challenge raises a pure question of law;
iii. Whether systemic delay and lapse of time constitute sufficient grounds to deny adjudication of legal rights where no disputed factual matrix exists.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant contended the statutory scheme of Section 14(1) places onus to raise or remove a wreck on the owner of the vessel which is wrecked; the barge owner (respondent no.3) was responsible and not the appellant;
ii. The appellant deposited Rs.70 lakhs under protest and sought judicial determination of the legal question; permitting the Port Trust to encash the deposit without deciding the legal claim would unjustly saddle appellant with costs for which it was not liable;
iii. The appellant asserted that the High Court erred in treating the petition as infructuous: the dispute remained live as a legal controversy and required adjudication under Article 226; systemic delay did not extinguish the right to relief.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Respondent No.1 (Mumbai Port Trust) argued that substantial time had elapsed and the wreck had been cleared; the Port Trust’s right to withdraw deposits stood preserved;
ii. The High Court’s direction left open civil remedy and recovery actions, thereby protecting appellant’s rights to seek refund;
iii. Respondent emphasized that practicalities of port administration and public interest justified the conservator’s actions and the High Court’s pragmatic disposal.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Indian Ports Act, 1908, Section 14(1) — Conservator’s power to require owner of wrecked vessel to raise/remove and to furnish adequate security;
ii. Indian Ports Act, 1908, Section 14(3) — Provision for sale proceeds and payment of expenses;
iii. Constitution of India, Article 226 — High Courts’ writ jurisdiction; judicial precedents on exercise of Article 226 despite delay.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding the High Court’s disposal unsustainable. The Court emphasized that the lis raised a pure question of law on whose shoulder Section 14(1) casts liability and that no contested factual determination was essential to resolve that question. Because the appellant had deposited the demanded sum in court while contesting liability, the High Court was duty-bound to decide the legal issue rather than dismissing the petition as infructuous.

The Court drew upon precedent reaffirming that efflux of time or systemic delay alone cannot defeat adjudication where legal rights require resolution. The decisions of B S Hari Commandant v. Union of India (2023) and Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (2023) were relied on to underline that Article 226 is not constrained by rigid timeliness rules and that High Courts may, and should, resolve pure legal controversies even if time has passed.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court order, revived WP No.2127/1996, and remitted the matter for expeditious disposal on merits. The Court observed that the Port Trust had already withdrawn the deposited monies; if appellant ultimately succeeds, appropriate compensation or refund would follow. The Court requested the High Court to prioritize the petition given its vintage and allowed parties to raise all law and fact issues afresh.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The central ratio is twofold:

(i) when a writ raises a pure legal question (no disputed factual matrix requiring extensive trial-like inquiry), the High Court must decide that legal issue notwithstanding passage of time; and

(ii) efflux of time caused by systemic delay does not automatically justify treating a writ as infructuous and refusing adjudication.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the Port Trust to encash the deposit without resolving whether Section 14(1) imposed liability on the appellant. The decision thus reinforces the High Court’s duty under Article 226 to resolve legal controversies and protects litigants from being penalized for systemic judicial delay.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed (obiter) that administrative expediencies and port safety are important, but they cannot override statutory interpretation or procedural fairness when a litigant has challenged the correctness of a demand and deposited the contested sum. The Court further indicated that parties are free to pursue civil remedies for recovery if appropriate, but such remedial availability does not absolve courts from deciding legal questions in writ jurisdiction. The observations reiterate that remedial multiplicity does not deprive Article 226 of its protective role.

c. GUIDELINES

i. High Courts should not decline to decide pure legal questions because of delay; where no disputed facts exist, legal adjudication must follow;
ii. Systemic delay is distinguishable from laches attributable to litigants; courts must guard against denying justice on account of institutional backlog;
iii. When respondents encash deposits withdrawn during pendency, courts should provide mechanisms (refund/compensation) if the petition succeeds;
iv. Writters of port and maritime administrative acts must ensure notices under Section 14 properly identify the statutory obligor (owner of the wreck) before enforcing monetary demands on third parties.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s order restores procedural justice by insisting that legal controversies be resolved on their merits even when litigation has become protracted by systemic delay. The case underscores an important protective principle of Article 226 it is a salutary safeguard not to be rendered illusory by passage of time. For maritime and port administration, the judgment signals caution: administrative officers exercising powers under Section 14 must correctly identify the statutory obligor, or risk litigation where depositors (third parties) contest liability.

Practically, port authorities should ensure that notices under Section 14(1) are addressed to the owner of the wrecked vessel or provide reasoned grounds for alternative imposition. For litigants, the ruling affirms that making a deposit under protest preserves the right to seek judicial review and that withdrawal of funds by an authority does not extinguish the claim if a litigant has challenged the demand. Finally, the Court’s direction for expeditious disposal is salutary; it balances administrative needs (clearing navigational hazards) with constitutional protections.

The case contributes to the jurisprudence on the interplay between administrative exigencies and constitutional writ remedies, and it reiterates that systemic judicial delay must not be weaponized to deny substantive legal adjudication.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. JSW Steel Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust, Civil Appeal No. 3169 of 2025, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 701 : 2025 INSC 257.

2. Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 1.

3. B S Hari Commandant v. Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 779.

4. Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140.

5. A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, (1962) 1 SCR 753.

6. U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41.

7. E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Ports Act, 1908 — Section 14(1) and Section 14(3).

2. Constitution of India — Article 226.