A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The present judgment in Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another addresses whether the directions given by this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh that applications under Section 156(3), CrPC be accompanied by a sworn affidavit operate retrospectively or only prospectively. The appellants, accused in two FIRs of falsification and associated offences, challenged the second FIR because the complaint presented to the Magistrate under Section 156(3), CrPC lacked the affidavit which Priyanka Srivastava later mandated.

The Calcutta High Court held that the direction in Priyanka Srivastava would apply prospectively and therefore could not invalidate complaints filed in 2010–2011. Before the Supreme Court the appellants argued that judicial pronouncements are ordinarily retrospective unless expressly made prospective. The Court affirmed the High Court’s approach: although judicial decisions generally operate retrospectively, a judicial direction that is procedural and intended to curb future misuse (here, harassment by frivolous Section 156(3) petitions) may be given prospective effect to avoid unsettling past actions and to prevent undue hardship.

The Court relied on the language and purpose of the Priyanka Srivastava directions, observing the phrase “a stage has come” and related measures (circulation to Chief Justices and Magistrates) as indicating an intent to regulate future conduct. The appeals were dismissed and the appellants were left free to seek discharge if charges were not yet framed.

Keywords: Section 156(3) CrPC, retrospective operation, prospective operation, affidavit requirement, Priyanka Srivastava, frivolous complaints.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal arises from the Calcutta High Court’s dismissal (27.06.2024) of criminal revision petitions by the appellants who were arraigned in two FIRs registered at Bhowanipur Police Station in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The first FIR dated 27.04.2010 alleged a series of offences including forgery, cheating, criminal conspiracy and offences under the IT Act. The second FIR (08.06.2011) initially originated as a complaint under Section 156(3), CrPC before a Magistrate who directed registration of the FIR.

The appellants’ core complaint in the revisions was procedural: the complaint presented to the Magistrate had not been accompanied by an affidavit, and therefore it contravened the requirement that per Priyanka Srivastava (2015) such complaints must be supported by an affidavit to prevent frivolous invocation of Section 156(3). The High Court held that the direction in Priyanka Srivastava operated only prospectively and could not impugn a complaint filed in 2010–2011. On special leave, the appellants contended before the Supreme Court that judicial pronouncements ordinarily operate retrospectively and absent an express prospective clause, the Priyanka Srivastava mandate should invalidate the earlier complaint that lacked an affidavit.

The narrow legal question therefore reduced to whether the affidavit requirement established in Priyanka Srivastava could be applied to complaints already filed and acted upon prior to the 2015 pronouncement, or whether that judgment was intended to govern future conduct only. The Court’s task was to interpret both the normative rule (how judicial decisions operate) and the intent and language of Priyanka Srivastava to determine whether application to past complaints would cause injustice or was required by principle.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants are husband and wife and face allegations of document forgery, fraud, reputation-damage and criminal conspiracy traceable to interactions with two complainants. The first FIR (No.179/2010) was lodged by Keyur Majumder on 27.04.2010 alleging offences under various sections of the IPC and Section 66A of the IT Act. The second FIR (No.298/2011) dated 08.06.2011 proceeded after a complaint by Supriti Bandopadhyay which was presented before the Magistrate under Section 156(3), CrPC; the Magistrate, invoking powers under Section 190 read with 156(3), directed the registration of that FIR.

The appellants filed multiple criminal revisions contesting filing of the charge-sheet and interlocutory orders; in particular they argued the second FIR was vitiated because the underlying complaint lacked an affidavit as later required by this Court in Priyanka Srivastava (2015). The High Court dismissed the revisions on the ground that the Priyanka Srivastava directions were prospective and therefore could not be applied retrospectively to 2010–2011 complaints. On appeal, the appellants argued before this Court that judicial decisions normally have retrospective operation and in the absence of explicit prospective declaration, the requirement should apply to prior complaints as well.

The State respondents defended the High Court’s retrospective limitation, pointing to the language and policy aim of Priyanka Srivastava to curb future misuse of Section 156(3) and to circulate directives to magistrates—indications, they argued, of a forward-looking measure designed to regulate future filings rather than to unsettle closed or ongoing proceedings commenced before 2015. The record shows charge-sheets were filed in both cases and the Court observed appellants’ liberty to move for discharge if charges were not framed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the directions in Priyanka Srivastava that Section 156(3), CrPC applications must be accompanied by an affidavit operate retrospectively so as to invalidate complaints filed before the pronouncement.
ii. Whether a judicially created procedural safeguard aimed at preventing harassment by frivolous Section 156(3) petitions can be given prospective operation notwithstanding the general rule that judicial decisions are retrospective.
iii. What is the proper test to determine when a judicial decision should be made prospective.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that judicial pronouncements ordinarily operate retrospectively and hence, absent an express prospective clause, the requirement in Priyanka Srivastava should apply to all complaints filed under Section 156(3) regardless of the date of filing. They contended that allowing complaints filed without affidavits to survive would undermine the protective purpose of the affidavit requirement and leave victims of harassment without remedy. Appellant no.1, appearing in person, emphasised that retroactivity is the normal rule of law for changes in legal standards and that exceptions must be explicitly stated by the Court; therefore the High Court erred in treating Priyanka Srivastava as inherently prospective.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents submitted that Priyanka Srivastava was a procedural directive targeted at curbing a contemporaneous and ongoing trend of frivolous petitions and was framed to regulate future conduct. They pointed to the language “a stage has come” and the administrative directions to circulate the judgment to Chief Justices and Magistrates as clear indicators that the Court intended prospective operation to avoid unsettling earlier proceedings and to prevent injustice to persons who had acted in reliance on the law as it stood at the time. Respondents argued equity and public interest counsel in favour of prospective application for such procedural safeguards.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court granted leave and examined the legal principle governing retrospective versus prospective operation of judicial decisions. It noted the general rule: judicial interpretations ordinarily operate retrospectively unless a judgment itself provides otherwise. However, the Court clarified that where a judicial direction is procedural, regulatory, aimed at preventing future misuse, or where retrospective application would produce hardship, it may legitimately be given prospective effect.

Turning to Priyanka Srivastava, the Bench reproduced paragraph 30 which stated that “a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit…” and observed the accompanying administrative directions (sending copies to Chief Justices for circulation to Magistrates) manifest an intent directed at future conduct. The Court reasoned that the affidavit requirement is preventive and institutional, designed to make applicants responsible and to equip Magistrates with a tool to scrutinize and deter abusive filings.

Retroactive application would unsettle public and private reliance interests and could impose unfair burdens on persons who had bona fide proceeded under the law before 2015. The Court therefore held the High Court was correct to treat the Priyanka Srivastava direction as prospective, and dismissed the appeals while leaving open the usual remedy: appellants may apply for discharge where charges were not framed. The Court emphasized the balance between rule-of-law principles (retrospectivity) and practical justice (avoiding unjust disruption), endorsing prospective operation where the language, purpose and consequences justify it. The judgment contains no overruling of precedent but clarifies the appropriate application of prospective effect to procedural safeguards.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that while judicial decisions typically have retrospective effect, a direction that is procedural in nature and clearly intended to curb future misuse—demonstrated by its language and ancillary administrative steps—may be given prospective application. The Court found that Priyanka Srivastava used language such as “a stage has come” and issued circulation directives, which together indicate the Court’s intention that the affidavit requirement apply from that point forward. Applying that requirement retrospectively would unsettle settled expectations and cause hardship; therefore prospective operation was justified.

b. OBITER DICTA

The judgment contains observations on the rationale for prospective application: it may be employed to avoid burdening persons who acted in bona fide reliance on prior law, to prevent injustice that would arise from upsetting long-settled matters, and to ensure that procedural safeguards aimed at preventing harassment do not themselves become instruments of inequity if applied retroactively. The Court reiterated that prospective operation should be sparingly used and only where the language and context of the antecedent judgment support such an approach.

c. GUIDELINES

• Where a judicial direction is regulatory/procedural and addresses a contemporaneous trend of misuse, courts may consider prospective application.

• The language of the antecedent judgment (phrases indicating a change “from now onward” or “a stage has come”) and administrative measures (circulation to magistracy) are strong indicia of intended prospectivity.

• Prospective operation should be employed to avoid undue hardship and to respect reliance interests of parties who acted before the new rule was announced.

• Even when a judgment is given prospective effect, persons aggrieved by earlier proceedings retain ordinary remedies (e.g., applications for discharge) to challenge charges on merits.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s decision reconciles doctrinal purity with practical justice: it acknowledges the default retrospective character of judicial rulings but permits prospective application when the rule is procedural, preventative and clearly aimed at future filings. The approach is legally defensible and pragmatic. It avoids penalizing persons for conduct that conformed to the legal landscape at the relevant time and prevents administrative disruption. For criminal practice, the judgment underscores that magistrates and litigants must be attentive to procedural directions issued after the fact yet also that earlier actions taken in good faith will not be lightly disturbed.

The ruling also signals caution: prospective operation is an exception, not the norm, and must be grounded in the antecedent judgment’s language, purpose and attendant administrative instructions. Practitioners should note two practical implications: first, complaints filed after Priyanka Srivastava must be supported by affidavit; second, where proceedings pre-date such directives, aggrieved accused retain orthodox remedies (discharge applications, quashing petitions) but cannot automatically rely on subsequent procedural mandates to invalidate prior filings. The judgment therefore balances prevention of harassment through frivolous Section 156(3) petitions with protection of settled reliance and fairness to litigants.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1405; 2025 INSC 278.
ii. Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
iii. Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).