A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, Criminal Appeal Nos. 966–971 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, 27 Feb. 2025) examines whether the Court’s direction in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287; [2015] 4 SCR 108, requiring that applications under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) be supported by an affidavit has retrospective effect so as to invalidate a complaint filed in 2010–2011 which led to registration of the second FIR against the appellants.

The appellants a husband and wife challenged the second FIR (FIR No. 298 of 2011) contending that the magistrate-ordered FIR emanated from a Section 156(3) complaint not accompanied by an affidavit and therefore ran afoul of the Priyanka Srivastava directive. The Calcutta High Court declined relief holding that the directions in Priyanka Srivastava operate prospectively; the appellants challenged that view before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court: while acknowledging the general rule that judicial decisions are retrospective unless expressly made prospective, the Court analysed the language and purpose of Priyanka Srivastava especially paragraph 30 (“a stage has come in this country“) and concluded that the affidavit requirement was intended as a forward-looking procedural safeguard against frivolous, harassing complaints.

Accordingly the Supreme Court held the direction to be prospective and dismissed the appeals. The judgment leaves open ordinary remedies (including discharge applications) available to the appellants in the criminal process.

Keywords: prospective operation; retrospective operation; Section 156(3) CrPC; affidavit requirement; Priyanka Srivastava; frivolous complaints.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeals arise from two FIRs registered at Bhowanipur Police Station: FIR No.179 of 2010 (27.04.2010) and FIR No.298 of 2011 (08.06.2011). The second FIR followed a complaint placed before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, whereupon the Magistrate directed registration of an FIR. The appellants maintained that the Section 156(3) complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit and therefore contravened this Court’s ruling in Priyanka Srivastava which, the appellants argued, requires such complaints to be supported by affidavits.

The High Court rejected the appellants’ revisions on the ground that the Priyanka Srivastava directions are prospective, not retrospective, and so could not invalidate a complaint filed in 2010–2011. The constitutional court was asked to determine the proper temporal operation of the Priyanka Srivastava directive and whether absence of an affidavit in the 2010–2011 complaint vitiated the magistrate’s order and the resulting FIR.

The Supreme Court examined the general rule on retrospective effect of judicial decisions vis-à-vis instances where a Court may expressly or implicitly make its directions prospective to avoid injustice or upheaval, and analysed the language and policy underlying Priyanka Srivastava to decide that the affidavit requirement was intended as a forward-looking procedural safeguard.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants are husband and wife who faced criminal accusation in two separate FIRs registered at Bhowanipur Police Station. FIR No.179 of 2010 (dated 27.04.2010) was registered on the complaint of Keyur Majumder alleging offences including 120B, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471 IPC and Section 66A IT Act; the allegations concerned forgery, cheating, deception, reputational harm and unlawful extraction of money.

FIR No.298 of 2011 (dated 08.06.2011) resulted from a complaint by Supriti Bandopadhyay moved under Section 156(3) CrPC, following which the Magistrate directed registration of the FIR for offences including 466, 469, 471 read with 120B(ii) IPC. The appellants challenged multiple interlocutory steps and the charge sheets before the Calcutta High Court via criminal revisions; a central ground was that the Section 156(3) complaint (which led to FIR No.298 of 2011) lacked the affidavit now required by Priyanka Srivastava and so the FIR was impermissible.

The High Court dismissed the revisions on 27.06.2024 on the view that Priyanka Srivastava should operate prospectively. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court arguing that judicial decisions ordinarily operate retrospectively and that absence of the affidavit rendered the magistrate’s direction and FIR void ab initio. The Supreme Court heard argument and considered the scope and objective of Priyanka Srivastava and the broader doctrine of temporal operation of judicial rulings.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the direction in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh that Section 156(3) CrPC complaints be supported by an affidavit operates retrospectively so as to invalidate a Section 156(3) complaint filed in 2010–2011 which lacked such affidavit?

2. Whether the absence of an affidavit in a Section 156(3) complaint vitiates the magistrate’s jurisdiction to direct registration of an FIR?

3. When and on what principles can this Court declare that its judicial directions will operate prospectively rather than retrospectively?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that judicial decisions ordinarily have retrospective effect and that Priyanka Srivastava did not explicitly state that the affidavit requirement would be prospective; therefore the affidavit rule should apply to complaints filed prior to the decision, including the 2010–2011 complaint leading to FIR No.298 of 2011.

They argued that absence of the requisite affidavit meant the Section 156(3) petition did not meet the procedural standard laid down by this Court and that the magistrate’s direction founded on that non-compliant petition was vitiated. The appellants maintained the result was prejudice to their fundamental rights and urged quashing of the second FIR as a necessary consequence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that Priyanka Srivastava was remedial and intended to curb frivolous harassment by future complainants; its language notably that “a stage has come in this country” manifests an intent for prospective application. They contended that applying the affidavit requirement retrospectively would unsettle long-standing actions, impose hardship and disturb settled expectations.

The State further submitted that ordinary remedies under the criminal process (including discharge applications) remain available to appellants to raise the merits of the allegations and that retrospective invalidation was neither necessary nor appropriate.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed the twin principles governing temporal operation of laws and judicial decisions: statutes are ordinarily prospective unless the legislature directs otherwise; judicial pronouncements are ordinarily retrospective unless the Court specifies prospective effect to avoid injustice or undue hardship.

The Court emphasised that prospective operation is a tool used sparingly to prevent upheaval, protect bona fide conduct and avoid imposing new obligations or burdens retroactively. Turning to Priyanka Srivastava, the Court inspected paragraph 30 where the Bench stated that “a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit“.

The Supreme Court reasoned that such diction coupled with the remedial policy aim to curb harassment by frivolous complaints shows the direction was meant as a forward-looking procedural prescription. Applying that purposive reading, the Court held that the affidavit requirement did not invalidate complaints lodged before Priyanka Srivastava; consequently the High Court correctly dismissed the revisions.

The Court observed that the appellants retain usual procedural remedies: where charges remain unframed, they may apply for discharge and have those applications decided according to law. The appeals were dismissed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that while judicial decisions are presumptively retrospective, the Court may direct prospective operation when necessary to prevent injustice, disruption or hardship; where the language and purpose of the earlier decision indicate such intent as in Priyanka Srivastava (paragraph 30: “a stage has come in this country“) the affidavit requirement for Section 156(3) complaints operates prospectively and does not affect complaints filed prior to that decision. Thus the absence of an affidavit in a 2010–2011 complaint does not by itself vitiate the resulting Magistrate order or subsequent FIR.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court’s observations on the general doctrine of temporal effect reiterating that statutes are prospective by default and judicial rulings retrospective unless otherwise stated serve as instructive dicta. Additionally, the Court remarked on the policy rationale for requiring affidavits (discouraging harassment and incentivising responsibility) and on procedural safeguards available to accused persons (e.g., discharge applications), indicating the continued importance of procedural fairness and the availability of ordinary remedies to test the merits of allegations.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. When issuing procedural directions with wide consequence, Courts should use clear language if they intend retrospective application; otherwise a remedial procedural direction may be read as prospective where the language or context supports that reading.

2. Section 156(3) CrPC applications henceforth must be supported by affidavits, and Chief Justices / Magistrates should be informed and vigilant in applying the requirement (as foreshadowed in Priyanka Srivastava).

3. Where a direction is prospective, pending or antecedent cases are to be determined by existing law at the time of filing, subject to ordinary remedies like discharge or quashing if facts justify.

4. Courts should balance the twin concerns of preventing frivolous litigation and protecting those who relied on previous law; prospective operation may be necessary where retroactivity causes undue hardship or unsettles settled conduct.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision underscores judicial restraint in applying new procedural safeguards retroactively; it affirms that a court-crafted procedural reform intended primarily to curb a present social ill (frivolous harassment via Section 156(3) petitions) may be given prospective effect to avoid injustice. Practically, the ruling preserves stability in pre-existing criminal proceedings while enforcing a higher standard for complaints going forward.

For accused persons, the judgment does not foreclose contesting the merits of earlier complaints discharge and quashing remedies remain available. The case also reiterates the correct approach for Courts: examine the language, object and consequences of earlier pronouncements before declaring them retrospective. This calibrated approach protects both the integrity of judicial process and reliance interests of litigants.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287; [2015] 4 SCR 108.
ii. Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, Criminal Appeal Nos. 966–971 of 2025, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1405 : 2025 INSC 278.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Sections 156(3), 190).
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 120B, 420, 466, 467, 468, 469, 471 as relevant).
iii. Information Technology Act, 2000 (Section 66A referenced in FIR No.179 of 2010).