A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment examines the constitutional and statutory legitimacy of extending the age of superannuation for persons with disabilities and the permissibility of withdrawing such benefit through executive instructions. The appellant, a locomotor-disabled employee with 60% permanent disability, challenged his retirement at the age of 58 years, contending that the Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013, which extended retirement age to 60 years, though expressly limited to visually impaired employees, ought to apply to all persons suffering from disabilities recognised under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled position that persons suffering from benchmark disabilities constitute a homogeneous class for the purpose of service benefits once employed. Confining retirement age extension only to visually impaired employees was held discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, relying decisively on Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab.

However, the Court upheld the withdrawal of the benefit by OM dated 04.11.2019, applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, holding that executive authority competent to issue an office memorandum retains the power to rescind it. The Court clarified that no employee has a fundamental right to continue in service till a particular age, and superannuation does not amount to removal under Article 311(2).

The appellant was held entitled to the benefit of age extension only till the date the OM remained operative, i.e., 04.11.2019, and not beyond. Consequently, partial relief was granted with back wages and pensionary benefits.

Keywords:
Disability rights, Retirement age extension, Superannuation, Article 14, Office Memorandum, Executive power, Section 21 General Clauses Act

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose within the broader constitutional mandate of equality, dignity, and substantive non-discrimination accorded to persons with disabilities in public employment. The appellant had been appointed as an Electrician in 1985 and suffered from permanent locomotor disability assessed at 60%. Under prevailing service conditions, the age of superannuation was 58 years.

In 2013, the State of Himachal Pradesh issued an Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013 extending the retirement age from 58 to 60 years but restricted its benefit solely to visually impaired employees. This selective extension created differential treatment among employees suffering from disabilities recognised under statutory law.

The appellant consistently represented for extension prior to retirement, asserting parity under the 1995 Act and later the 2016 Act, both of which recognise locomotor disability as a benchmark disability. His claim was rejected, and he was compulsorily retired on 30.09.2018.

The legal landscape was already informed by authoritative precedent in Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, where similar exclusion had been declared unconstitutional. Despite this, the appellant was denied relief. Subsequently, the State withdrew the OM altogether by OM dated 04.11.2019, further complicating the appellant’s claim.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition and review, prompting the appeal. The Supreme Court thus examined both substantive equality under disability law and the limits of executive power to confer and withdraw service benefits.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant joined service in 1985 and was governed by service rules prescribing 58 years as the retirement age. His disability was permanent and undisputed.

The OM dated 29.03.2013 extended superannuation to 60 years for visually impaired employees alone. Before attaining retirement age, the appellant submitted representations asserting that such benefit must extend to all employees suffering from disabilities specified under the 1995 Act.

The respondent rejected the claim and issued a retirement notice on 22.09.2018. The appellant retired on 30.09.2018.

He approached the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, which was later abolished, leading to transfer of proceedings to the High Court. During pendency, the State issued OM dated 04.11.2019 withdrawing the 2013 OM with immediate effect.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition and review, holding that the appellant had no vested right. The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged both the discriminatory exclusion and the legality of withdrawal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the benefit of extension of retirement age could be confined only to visually impaired employees?
ii. Whether such exclusion violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
iii. Whether the State was competent to withdraw the Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013?
iv. Whether the appellant acquired a vested right to continue in service till 60 years?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that all benchmark disabilities recognised under the 1995 and 2016 Acts form a single homogeneous class. Restricting benefits only to visually impaired employees was arbitrary.

Reliance was placed on Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, where identical discrimination was struck down. It was argued that Devendra Kumar Pant was distinguishable as it related to promotion, not continuation in service.

It was further argued that withdrawal of the OM could not retrospectively deprive accrued rights and that once entitlement stood crystallised under constitutional interpretation, executive rescission could not defeat it.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents contended that on the date of retirement, the OM limited benefits only to visually impaired employees and was never declared unconstitutional. Hence, no vested right accrued.

It was argued that executive instructions are inherently mutable, and withdrawal was valid. The appellant could not claim continuation beyond the withdrawal date.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court held that the first issue stood conclusively settled by Bhupinder Singh, which categorically affirmed that denial of equal service benefits to similarly situated disabled employees violates Article 14. The Court reiterated that once employment is secured, discrimination among benchmark disabilities lacks rational nexus.

On withdrawal, the Court applied Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, affirming that power to issue includes power to rescind. Since no statutory rule fixed retirement age, withdrawal by executive instruction was valid.

The Court clarified that no fundamental right exists regarding age of retirement and cited K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh. Superannuation does not amount to removal under Article 311(2).

However, the appellant was held entitled to benefit till 04.11.2019, the date of withdrawal, with wages and pensionary benefits.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The benefit of extension of retirement age cannot be selectively granted among benchmark disabilities recognised under statutory disability law, as such classification violates Article 14. However, executive instructions granting service benefits may be validly withdrawn unless crystallised into statutory rights, and employees possess no vested right to retire at a particular age.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that disability jurisprudence must be informed by functional equality rather than medical categorisation, particularly once suitability for employment is established.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Service benefits extended to one benchmark disability must extend to all similarly situated disabilities.
ii. Executive instructions can be rescinded unless incorporated into statutory rules.
iii. No continuation beyond withdrawal date unless vested rights exist.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment harmonises disability rights with administrative autonomy. It strengthens substantive equality while respecting executive competence. It reinforces that constitutional equality cannot be selectively diluted by executive policy, yet preserves flexibility in service regulation.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1988] 3 SCR 409
ii. State of Punjab v. Bhupinder Singh, [2004] 3 SCR 718
iii. Union of India v. Devendra Kumar Pant, [2009] 11 SCR 1
iv. K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1985] 2 SCR 579

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995
ii. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016
iii. General Clauses Act, 1897
iv. Constitution of India