A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India restored criminal proceedings against respondent–nephews accused of engineering a property compensation windfall by deploying a forged family tree and a partition deed that excluded five daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy. The Court held that the record discloses a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy and cheating under ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, rejecting the High Court’s view that civil pendency should foreclose prosecution. The Bench criticised reliance on an untested Sub‑Registrar statement about thumb impressions on the 2005 deed and directed that the genuineness of both the partition deed and family tree be tested at trial, since they were instrumental in securing BMRCL/KIADB compensation from the acquired land. Reaffirming that civil and criminal remedies may co‑exist, the Court relied on K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, and Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B., to underscore that criminal law may proceed despite a parallel partition suit where ingredients of offences are disclosed. The impugned High Court order quashing prosecutions in C.C. No. 892/2021 and C.C. No. 897/2021 was set aside and trial was ordered to continue against respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Keywords: criminal conspiracy; cheating; forged family tree; partition deed; civil–criminal coexistence.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from quashing, by the High Court of Karnataka, of prosecutions in two complaint cases that charged respondent nephews with cheating and criminal conspiracy surrounding compensation for land acquired at Dodda Thogur, Bengaluru. The appellant is one of five daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy and Jayalakshmi; the family also included three sons. The land bearing Sy.No. 35 (extent 19 guntas) had been jointly purchased by the parents in 1986, using proceeds of ancestral property, and was later acquired by BMRCL, leading to an award of ₹33 crore. The appellant believed the proceeds would be equitably distributed among all eight children. Instead, she discovered that an incorrect family tree dated 18.01.2011—allegedly procured by bribing the village accountant—listed only the sons, omitting all daughters. Alongside, a partition deed dated 24.03.2005 seemingly divided the land into three parts among two grandsons (the present respondents) and two sons, and these documents were then used to obtain compensation disbursal. When confronted, threats were allegedly issued; FIRs followed, CCB froze multiple bank accounts under s. 102 CrPC; and successive challenges to the freezing failed up to the High Court, with SLPs dismissed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, charge-sheets under ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 IPC were filed and cognizance taken in C.C. No. 892/2021 and C.C. No. 897/2021. The High Court nonetheless quashed proceedings, leaning on a Sub‑Registrar’s statement validating the thumb impression on the partition deed and invoking the pendency of partition suits to prefer a civil route. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that civil proceedings do not bar criminal prosecution where offences are disclosed, and that the alleged fabrication/misrepresentation must be tried, not foreclosed at threshold.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The material facts form a linear chain. K.G. Yellappa Reddy and Jayalakshmi had eight children—three sons and five daughters, including the appellant, Kathyayini. The parents had purchased Sy.No. 35 (19 guntas) at Dodda Thogur by a registered sale deed dated 17.02.1986, drawing from sale of ancestral properties. Upon BMRCL acquisition, ₹33 crore compensation was awarded and disbursed. The appellant later discovered an alleged conspiracy by her elder brother Sudhanva Reddy and his sons, the present respondents, with assistance of a village accountant, to create a false family tree dated 18.01.2011 omitting all daughters, reflecting a lineage of only three sons. A partition deed dated 24.03.2005 appeared to divide the land into three equal shares for Sidharth P.S. Reddy, Vikram P.S. Reddy, Guruva Reddy, and Umedha Reddy. On that basis, compensation was claimed and paid, with at least ₹1.8 crore released at one stage despite a reference in the deed to the five daughters, and later ₹27 crore credited to accounts of the respondents and two uncles, until KIADB froze further payment and deposited about ₹5.59 crore in court after Sudhanva Reddy disclosed the alleged fabrication to the BMRCL Managing Director. On 06.10.2017, the appellant learnt of the disbursal, faced threats when she objected, and lodged a complaint on 14.11.2017; FIR No. 270/2017 followed under ss. 506, 34, 471, 420, 474, 120B, 468, 464 r/w s. 34 IPC. A second complaint with her sister yielded Cr.No. 145/2017. The CCB Bengaluru then seized the bank accounts of Ashok Reddy, Sidharth, Vikram, and Umedha under s. 102 CrPC; attempts to defreeze failed before the Trial Court and Sessions Court; the High Court upheld freezing on 07.04.2021; and SLPs were dismissed on 08.10.2021. Charge‑sheets under ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 IPC were filed on 12.01.2021; cognizance was taken on 13.01.2021 in C.C. No. 892/2021 and C.C. No. 897/2021. A 28.08.2021 MoU led to quashing against Umedha and Ashok. Parallel civil suits—O.S. No. 274/2018 for partition and allied reliefs and O.S. No. 124/2018 for injunction—remained pending.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the materials disclose a prima facie case of offences under ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 IPC against respondent Nos. 1 and 2?
ii. Whether the High Court erred in quashing prosecutions by relying on an untested Sub‑Registrar statement concerning the partition deed?
iii. Whether pendency of civil suits for partition/injunction bars or justifies quashing of criminal proceedings on the same subject matter?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the record demonstrates the classic anatomy of criminal conspiracy and cheating deployed to siphon public compensation funds by erasing the very existence of five daughters from a fabricated family tree and by pressing into service a 2005 partition deed of dubious provenance. The chain is consistent and probative: creation of a family tree dated 18.01.2011 omitting daughters; procurement of compensation on the faith of that tree and the partition deed dated 24.03.2005; distribution of large sums to the respondents and uncles; and threats upon exposure. The appellant emphasised that even the High Court conceded the duty to disclose daughters in the family tree, which shows misrepresentation going to the root of s. 415 IPC deception and s. 420 IPC cheating, aggravated by common intention under s. 34 IPC and agreement under s. 120B IPC. The reliance on a Sub‑Registrar’s statement to vouch for the deed’s thumb impression, without the safeguard of a cross‑examination, was assailed as antithetical to threshold quashing because questions of genuineness and execution are quintessentially trial issues. The appellant further relied on binding doctrine that civil pendency is no bar to criminal prosecution where ingredients are made out, drawing strength from K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, and Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B., each affirming the independence and co‑extensiveness of remedies, and specifically repudiating quashing merely because a civil suit is on foot. The plea was to restore prosecutions in C.C. No. 892/2021 and C.C. No. 897/2021 and remit all factual disputes—family tree, partition deed, compensation flow, and threats—for adjudication at trial.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the 2005 partition deed bore the thumb impression of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, as per the Sub‑Registrar’s statement that impressions were taken at the patriarch’s residence due to ill health, and that, accordingly, allegations of forgery under ss. 468/471 IPC were unsustainable. They portrayed the 2011 family tree as merely an administrative step to align revenue entries with the partition arrangement, not as a deceptive instrument intended to cheat. On that view, any failure to include daughters in the family tree would not, by itself, establish s. 420 IPC cheating absent wrongful inducement and delivery of property attributable to deceit. The respondents invoked the pendency of civil suits—including a comprehensive partition suit seeking shares, injunctions, and a declaration of invalidity of the partition deed—to contend that civil adjudication offers adequate, efficacious remedies, rendering criminal prosecution oppressive and duplicative. They further stressed that banking restraints had been judicially sustained only on pragmatic grounds to prevent dissipation, and that this should not be conflated with proof of criminality. The High Court, therefore, rightly exercised its inherent/extraordinary jurisdiction to quell abuse of process, especially when the Sub‑Registrar’s account undermined the central charge of fabrication. Accordingly, the quashing order was defended as a proper calibrating of criminal law to the background of a live civil dispute over title, shares, and apportionment of compensation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. s. 120B IPC (criminal conspiracy) read with s. 34 IPC (common intention).
ii. ss. 415, 420 IPC (cheating and dishonest inducement).
iii. s. 102(1) & (3) CrPC (police power to seize property/bank accounts; reporting to Magistrate).
iv. ss. 451 and 457 CrPC (custody/restoration of property and procedure on seizure).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s quashing order, and directed the Trial Court to proceed against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The Court held that the facts disclose a prima facie case for criminal conspiracy and cheating. The sequence—exclusion of daughters from the 2011 family tree, reliance on a 2005 partition deed to access and apportion compensation, and threats when confronted—forms a coherent narrative of deception aimed at bypassing sisters’ shares and appropriating the land award. The Bench rejected the High Court’s pivotal reliance on the Sub‑Registrar’s statement that the thumb impression on the deed was that of Yellappa Reddy, pointing out that the statement was untested by cross‑examination and, therefore, could not settle genuineness at the quash stage. The Court underscored that both documents—the family tree and the partition deed—were used to obtain monetary advantage and must be subjected to trial scrutiny. On the High Court’s premise that civil suits were pending, the Court reiterated settled law: civil pendency is not a bar where criminality is prima facie disclosed, and civil and criminal remedies may run concurrently. The Court relied on K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. and the earlier ratio in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, reaffirmed in Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B., to hold that quashing was unwarranted. The result: impugned order dated 23.11.2023 in W.P. No. 23106 of 2021 was set aside; proceedings in C.C. No. 892/2021 and C.C. No. 897/2021 shall continue to their logical end.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio is twofold. First, on threshold review under quash jurisdiction, courts must not foreclose prosecution where the complaint and charge‑sheet disclose ingredients of offences; contested factual matters—here, the genuineness of the partition deed and the accuracy of the family tree—are trial issues. The High Court’s reliance on an untested Sub‑Registrar statement to negate forgery/cheating was improper; such evidence must be subjected to cross‑examination and weighed with the full record. Second, the co‑extensiveness of civil and criminal remedies is doctrinally entrenched: the mere pendency of partition and injunction suits cannot, by itself, justify quashing of criminal proceedings if the facts disclose deception, wrongful gain, and common intention/conspiracy. The Court held that the narrative—creation and use of a family tree excluding daughters, deployment of a partition deed to channel compensation, distribution patterns favouring respondents and uncles, and alleged threats—provides prima facie support for ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 IPC. Therefore, trial must test mens rea, inducement, and participatory acts rather than disposing of the case at the threshold. This ratio harmonises procedural prudence at the quash stage with substantive protection of victims’ property interests when public compensation is at stake.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court’s extended observations on the civil–criminal interface function as persuasive dicta guiding lower courts. By quoting that “the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings,” the Bench reiterated that public justice objectives are not eclipsed by private civil remedies. It further cautioned that the genuineness of revenue‑oriented documents like family trees and partition deeds should not be presumed at the quash stage when these instruments have been used to procure monetary benefits from statutory acquisition; rather, trial is the proper forum to test authenticity. Additionally, the Court’s treatment of the Sub‑Registrar’s statement emphasises evidentiary discipline in criminal process—testimonial assertions by officials cannot be elevated to dispositive proof sans cross‑examination. The bank‑account freezing episode—sustained to prevent dissipation—was noted in the factual matrix and, while not determinative of guilt, reflects a judicially endorsed caution that aligns with safeguarding potential restitution/compensation interests pending trial. Collectively, these dicta refine how Section 482/Article 226 quash powers ought to be exercised where public compensation funds are diverted through allegedly fabricated lineage or conveyancing records.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Where documents like family trees and partition deeds are instrumental to obtain statutory compensation, their genuineness is a trial question; quashing should be avoided if the complaint and charge‑sheet disclose offences.
ii. Civil pendency—partition or injunction suits—does not bar criminal prosecution if ingredients of IPC offences are prima facie made out; courts should not prefer civil remedies to the exclusion of criminal law at threshold.
iii. Official statements (e.g., Sub‑Registrar on execution/thumb impression) that have not undergone cross‑examination cannot conclusively negate allegations at the quash stage; evidentiary disputes must proceed to trial.
iv. A chain of conduct—fabrication or misrepresentation in lineage documents, subsequent use to obtain disbursal, and threats/intimidation—may suffice to frame charges under ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 IPC.
v. Bank‑account restraints under s. 102 CrPC, sustained to prevent siphoning of funds, may continue pending trial where the monies are directly related to the alleged offence.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision restores the criminal process to its rightful terrain when confronted with allegations of engineered exclusion of heirs from acquisition spoils through documentary manipulation. The Court centre‑staged the principle that quash jurisdiction is not a mini‑trial, especially where documents have been used to procure significant public compensation. The High Court’s approach—privileging an untested Sub‑Registrar’s assertion to validate the deed and letting civil pendency eclipse criminality—was corrected by reinstating trial scrutiny over the family tree and partition deed. In doctrinal terms, the judgment consolidates the civil–criminal coexistence principle: victims of deceit need not forfeit punitive remedies merely because they pursue partition or injunctions. From a process perspective, the bank account freezing jurisprudence sustained earlier supplied a protective perimeter around suspected proceeds, signalling courts’ readiness to secure funds during investigation and trial to avoid futility of eventual restitution. Practically, for property and compensation disputes entangled in intra‑family dynamics, the ruling cautions against administrative complacency in revenue records and urges meticulous verification before disbursal. It also indicates that misrepresentation in genealogical documents can engage IPC offences beyond mere civil wrong. The path ahead lies in trial‑level testing of execution, intent, and participation, ensuring that due shares are not extinguished by creative paperwork.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. & Anr., (2020) 14 SCC 552 (quoted/relied); “the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings.”
ii. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & Anr., (1985) 2 SCC 370 (co‑extensiveness of civil and criminal remedies).
iii. Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 555 (pendency of civil action not a ground to quash criminal case).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 120B, 415, 420 r/w s. 34 (charges and ingredients).
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 102(1) & (3) (freezing of bank accounts; magistrate reporting); ss. 451, 457 (applications to de‑freeze/release property).