A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This appeal concerns an owner-occupier, Kishore Chhabra, whose land at Sultanpur, Sonipat was included in a Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award stating possession had been taken and the land vested in the Government. The appellant repeatedly sought release of his land; earlier writ proceedings failed. Primary legal questions were whether:

(a) the appellant possesses a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) for running a factory said to exist since 1970;

(b) the appellant was discriminated against compared to other landowners whose lands were released;

(c) delay, laches or res judicata barred relief. The State relied on absence of CLU, deemed possession, and planning exigencies including expenditure on sector infrastructure and an earmarked green belt.

The Court held that the area fell within a controlled area under the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 and a CLU was a statutory prerequisite to validate a factory; no CLU had been produced. Discrimination claims failed on materials showing differing facts and prior CLU-grant timelines in other releases. Delay and res judicata were rejected on the facts. However, on the peculiar factual matrix the appellant’s asserted continuous physical possession and operation of a factory which the State did not satisfactorily controvert — the Court, exercising powers under Article 142, directed that compensation be calculated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as of its commencement date. This remedy was granted as a case-specific equitable disposition and not as precedent.

Keywords: Acquisition; Release of land; Possession; Change of Land Use (CLU); Discrimination; Article 142; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appellant purchased constructed and open land at Sultanpur, Sonipat in 1986. The State issued a Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 09.11.1992 for planned residential and commercial development and a Section 6 notification followed. The Collector awarded acquisition and recorded that possession had been taken (Rapat Rozanamcha No. 229 dated 05/15.11.1995). The appellant mounted multiple writ petitions: one dismissed on merits earlier, a second withdrawn while representations were pending, and the present petition challenging the State’s rejection (order dated 17.08.2010) of his representation for release.

The appellant pressed that his land had an existing industrial use (a factory said to be operating since 1970), that the State’s own policies (notably 26.06.1991 and 26.10.2007) permitted release of pre-existing factories, and that other similarly-situated lands had been released, producing an arguable discrimination. The State countered that the land lay within a controlled area declared under the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Act, 1963 requiring a CLU before development could be validated; no CLU was produced. The State also relied on the deemed taking of possession, significant public expenditure on sector development, green-belt and road planning, delay/laches, and res judicata.

The High Court dismissed the writ primarily on the ground that deemed possession prevented a release claim based on physical possession. The matter reached this Court for final adjudication of legal entitlement, factual contest over CLU and possession, and whether exceptional relief should be given.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant is recorded as owner in possession of 386 sq. yards (constructed area) and 3,078 sq. yards of land purchased by sale deed dated 04.08.1986. The State issued Section 4 notification on 09.11.1992 and Section 6 notification on 06.11.1993 including appellant’s land in a 329.70-acre acquisition. The Collector’s Award No. 10 dated 05.11.1995 recorded that possession had been taken and vested in Government; a Rapat Rozanamcha was prepared.

The appellant claims a factory on the land since 1970—i.e., before the Section 4 notification and alleges he had continuously operated it. He filed objections under Section 5-A (claimed), later sought release relying on State policies dated 26.06.1991 and 26.10.2007, which allow release of pre-existing factories under specified conditions. The appellant contended that other owners (e.g., Devraj Dewan; Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd.) obtained release, indicating discriminatory treatment. The State produced counter-material showing the area was declared controlled under Notification No. 2366-2TCP-64/24048 dated 23.09.1964 and required CLU for development; the appellant produced no CLU for the land or his predecessor.

The State further demonstrated large public expenditure (Rs. 2661.88 lakhs) on infrastructure and that the subject plot abutted institutional plots, an 18m road and a 30m green belt, integral to sector planning. Procedural history shows two earlier writs; the second was withdrawn while representation was pending. The present challenge attacked the administrative rejection dated 17.08.2010. The State argued delay, res judicata, and that prior releases were distinguishable factually and temporally. The Court found delay and res judicata arguments unpersuasive on these facts but centralised the CLU issue as determinative.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the absence of a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) precludes release of land included in an acquisition notification when the land lies within a controlled area declared under the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Act, 1963?

2. Whether deemed/physical possession recorded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 precludes the relief of release where an owner claims continuous physical possession and existing industrial use?

3. Whether the appellant has been discriminatorily treated compared to other landowners whose lands were released?

4. Whether delay, laches or principles of res judicata bar the appellant’s claim for release?

5. Whether the Court may, in exercise of Article 142, order compensation under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 as on its commencement where statutory preconditions for release (like CLU) are not satisfied but continuous physical possession is claimed?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that:
i. The appellant’s factory pre-dated the Section 4 notification (since 1970), hence release is warranted under State policy dated 26.06.1991 and 26.10.2007 which favour existing factories.
ii. Other landowners in the same village received release; thus the appellant suffered discriminatory treatment contrary to principles of equal treatment.
iii. The rejection order dated 17.08.2010 provided no reasons and therefore was unsustainable.
iv. Delay and res judicata cannot defeat a legitimate claim especially when representations were pending and State itself considered release requests as late as 2020–21.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
i. The writ petition suffers from delay and laches; possession had been legally taken and release is barred.
ii. The appellant did not obtain a CLU which is a statutory requirement within the controlled area; absence of CLU renders the factory claim invalid and precludes release.
iii. Other release orders are factually distinguishable — some had CLU processed earlier or were not part of the same notification or road/green-belt; therefore no discrimination.
iv. Substantial public expenditure and integrated planning (roads, green belt, public utilities) would be prejudiced by release.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court focused first on the statutory planning constraint: the Department of Town & Country Planning had declared the area a controlled area under its 1964 notification, bringing it within the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Act, 1963, thereby making CLU a statutory precondition for validating any development. The appellant failed to produce any CLU in the record for himself or predecessor. On that basis the Court held that running a factory without CLU could not be legalized so as to bring the appellant within the State’s release policies. The absence of CLU was thus determinative on merits.

On discrimination, the Court examined the factual matrix of the other released plots. It found releases like that in favour of Devraj Dewan involved earlier CLU processing and different timelines; Northern India Carbonates holdings had separate factual positions; some releases did not even relate to the same notification. Therefore material distinctions existed and the discrimination plea failed. The Court noted that the award and Rapat recorded possession but that mere physical possession alone would not validate use contrary to statutory controls.

Regarding delay, laches and res judicata, the Court observed that the State itself continued to process release/CLU requests much later (into 2020–21) and that earlier writ petitions had not finally adjudicated release on merits; accordingly, delay/res judicata defenses could not foreclose consideration. However, even without these bars, the substantive requirement of CLU remained unmet.

Finally, taking into account the appellant’s claim of continuous possession and the State’s inadequate refutation of that assertion, the Court exercised extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Article 142 to direct that compensation payable be calculated under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 as on its commencement date. The Court emphasized this remedy was case-specific and not to be treated as precedent. The appeal was disposed of accordingly; no costs.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal ratio is twofold:

(i) where land is situated within a statutory controlled area the requirement of CLU is a statutory prerequisite to validate development and to attract benefit under State release policies; absence of CLU therefore precludes release;

(ii) factual distinction in release orders defeats generalized discrimination claims. On the exceptional facts where continuous physical possession was plausibly asserted and not satisfactorily controverted, equitable relief in the form of compensation computed under RFCTLARR Act, 2013 was appropriate in exercise of Article 142.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed obiter that physical possession, while relevant, cannot override statutory planning controls. It also noted the State’s responsibility to justify differential treatment when releases are ordered, yet stressed that factual heterogeneity among release decisions is a legitimate basis to deny discrimination claims. The Court cautioned that its grant of relief under Article 142 was exceptional and not to be cited as precedent.

c. GUIDELINES

1. In controlled areas declared under planning statutes, acquisition-release determinations must consider compliance with statutory prerequisites such as CLU.

2. Administrative orders releasing lands should record reasons and the factual basis (including CLU status) to prevent allegations of arbitrariness or discrimination.

3. When multiple releases occur, comparators must be factually similar across key axes (notification inclusion, CLU status, timing) to sustain discrimination claims.

4. Courts may, in appropriate and specific factual matrices where statutory prerequisites remain unsatisfied but equitable considerations obtain, fashion relief under Article 142, including direction on the statutory basis for compensation under later laws, but such relief must be expressly confined to the peculiar facts of the case.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision carefully balances statutory planning controls, administrative policy, equitable jurisdiction and the protection of landowners’ expectations. Its central insistence on CLU as a statutory gateway reinforces that administrative regularity and urban planning law cannot be circumvented by retrospective reliance on physical possession. The Court’s refusal to find discrimination reflects careful factual analysis rather than a rule denying remedy where differential treatment is shown highlighting that legal parity requires factual parity.

The use of Article 142 to direct compensation under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is a measured exercise of equitable power that provides a monetary remedy where specific statutory preconditions block release but possession and operations of the land are credibly asserted; however, the Court prudently confined this to the peculiar facts, limiting its precedential effect. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of maintaining documentary municipal/CLU compliance and the need for prompt, reasoned administrative orders when considering release so as to avoid protracted litigation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred 

1. Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 7 SCC 545.

2. Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 621; [2010] 2 SCR 756.

3. Sham Lal v. State of Punjab, (2013) 14 SCC 393.

4. Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation v. Shakuntla, (2010) 12 SCC 448; [2009] 15 SCR 413.

5. Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792; [2011] 14 SCR 1113.

6. Patasi Devi v. State of Haryana, (2012) 9 SCC 503; [2012] 7 SCR 387.

7. Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2013) 4 SCC 210; [2013] 5 SCR 645.

8. Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99.

9. Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981; Supp. 1 SCR 489.

10. State of Punjab v. Bandeep Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 724; [2015] 10 SCR 496.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development Act, 1963.

3. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.