A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025, addresses when the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Article 119(b), First Schedule, Limitation Act, 1963 begins to run whether from formal service of notice of filing of the award or from the date the party becomes aware that the award has been made and is available.
The dispute arose after an award dated 31.05.2022 in favour of the appellant was not immediately furnished because respondents had not paid the arbitrator’s balance fees. A District Court order dated 21.09.2022 directed respondents to pay the balance fee and stated that thereafter the award would be furnished; the appellant received a copy on 22.09.2022.
Respondents, however, deposited the fee and received formal notice only on 18.11.2022 and filed objections on 22.11.2022. The appellant filed an application under Section 17, Arbitration Act, 1940 on 10.11.2022 to have judgment pronounced in terms of the award; the trial and High Courts deemed the application premature because they treated 18.11.2022 as the commencement of the 30-day limitation for objections.
The Supreme Court, relying on precedents including Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K. Ahuja, held that Section 14(2), Arbitration Act, 1940 requires that the parties become aware of the award’s filing and that formal service is not a prerequisite; substantive awareness suffices to start the limitation.
The Court found respondents were aware by 21.09.2022, held limitation expired on 20.10.2022, declared the Section 17 application valid, set aside the High Court order and remitted for expeditious disposal.
Keywords: Section 17, Arbitration Act, 1940; Section 14(2); Article 119(b), Limitation Act, 1963; notice vs awareness; award filing; limitation commencement.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgment Cause Title: Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering Construction v. Union of India & Ors..
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025.
iii) Judgment Date: 03 January 2025.
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India.
v) Quorum: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.
vi) Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
vii) Citation: [2025] 1 S.C.R. 81 : 2025 INSC 24.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 14(1) & (2), Section 17, Arbitration Act, 1940; Article 119(b), First Schedule, Limitation Act, 1963; Section 381 (sic — Section 38) Arbitration Act; CPC, 1908 referenced.
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None overruled; Court followed and applied precedent.
x) Related Law Subjects: Arbitration law; Civil procedure; Limitation law; Administrative orders relating to court practice.
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The appeal tests the interface between the procedural obligation placed on courts to give notice of filing an arbitral award under Section 14(2), Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Limitation Act’s trigger for challenge under Article 119(b). Arbitration under the 1940 Act is structured to be expeditious; the statutory scheme contemplates that once arbitrators sign and the award is ready, the parties must be informed so that rights of challenge may be exercised within the prescribed thirty days.
Practical impediments here, respondents’ failure to pay the arbitrator’s balance fees delayed formal publication. The District Court’s direction on 21.09.2022 that payment be made and the award furnished raised the question whether such direction constituted sufficient notice such that the award-debtor’s time to file objections would start then, or whether formal service (actual receipt of court notice and copy on 18.11.2022) was the necessary trigger.
The trial and High Courts adopted the latter, treating the appellant’s Section 17 application as premature. The Supreme Court saw in earlier decisions a clear line favouring a substantive approach: when a party knows the award exists and is accessible, the limitation ought to run to prevent parties from manufacturing delay by demanding formalities. The judgment thus clarifies that notice in Section 14(2) is fulfilled by awareness of availability and not rigid formal service, aligning statutory interpretation with the arbitration statute’s speedy-objective and prior authority.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant’s husband, sole proprietor of M/s S.R. Engineering Construction, obtained a government work order (CA No. CWE/TEZ/8) in 1987–88 for construction work at Tezpur governed by contract terms containing Clause 70 arbitration. Work completed, payment withheld; arbitration invoked after protracted attempts and forum challenges. An arbitrator was appointed by District Judge, Sonitpur on 26.08.2019. The arbitrator made an award dated 31.05.2022 in favour of the appellant awarding Rs. 1,33,47,268.92 plus 9% interest. Publication was stalled because respondents had not paid an outstanding share of arbitrator’s fees.
The appellant moved under the Act (Section 38/38(1) procedure) and the District Judge on 21.09.2022 directed respondents to clear Rs. 47,212.33 and stated that upon clearance a copy of the award would be furnished. The appellant received a copy on 22.09.2022; respondents deposited a cheque only on 18.11.2022, and the court issued formal notice of filing the award on the same date.
The appellant filed Section 17 application on 10.11.2022 to pronounce judgment per award. District Court dismissed as premature (23.11.2022) holding limitation for objections began on 18.11.2022; High Court dismissed revision (27.03.2024). Respondents filed objections under Section 30 on 22.11.2022. The Supreme Court noted these sequence-of-events and the conflicting dates of awareness vs formal notice.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Does the 30-day limitation under Article 119(b), Limitation Act, 1963 start from formal service of notice of filing of an award or from the date a party becomes aware that the award has been made and is available?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The appellant submitted that the 21.09.2022 District Court order directing payment and stating the award would be furnished constituted effective notice of filing because it conveyed that the award existed and had been made; therefore the 30-day period began then and expired 20.10.2022. The appellant emphasized precedents where informal intimation or pleader’s knowledge was treated as compliance with Section 14(2) and argued that requiring formal notice would permit tactical delay by award-debtors. It was further pointed out respondents never pleaded absence of notice but only non-receipt of copy — a distinction supporting substantive notice sufficiency.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Respondents contended that Section 14(2) contemplates that the court give notice in a formal manner and that Article 119(b) requires service of notice before limitation runs. They relied on the formal act of issuing notice on 18.11.2022, arguing only from that date could objections be fairly filed because that was when they could access the award’s contents. Respondents warned that accepting informal acts or orders as starting the clock would lead to variable and uncertain triggers and undermine the procedural clarity intended by the statute.
H) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Analysing Section 14(2) and Article 119(b) together, the Court held that the statutory purpose is to ensure parties are apprised of the award’s filing; the law does not insist on a document-formalism if the parties in practical terms are aware that the award is filed and available. The Court surveyed precedent: Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti endorsed informal notice; Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan accepted pleader’s knowledge; Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K. Ahuja emphasised substantive awareness not mere receipt of copy.
Applying those authorities, the Court found the 21.09.2022 order constituted clear intimation that the award had been made and would be furnished upon payment; respondents were thus aware and had constructive ability to take steps. Consequently limitation expired on 20.10.2022. The Section 17 application of 10.11.2022 was therefore not premature; trial and High Court orders were set aside and District Judge directed to dispose Misc. (J) No. 61/2022 expeditiously. No costs were imposed. The Court emphasized arbitration’s object of expedition and warned against technicalities enabling delay.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The essential ratio is that notice under Section 14(2), Arbitration Act, 1940 is satisfied when the award-debtor is made aware that the award has been filed and is available; formal service of a copy is not a precondition. The Limitation Act’s trigger in Article 119(b) service of notice is met by substantive awareness. Precedent supports that informal communication, orders or counsel’s knowledge that fairly inform a party of the award’s existence start the limitation clock. This interpretation vindicates the arbitration scheme’s object of speedy dispute resolution and prevents deliberate procedural stalling by parties aware of an award’s existence.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed obiter that treating the receipt of a copy as the only trigger would permit award-debtors to benefit from their own inaction and use form over substance to delay finality. The Court noted that where a pleader or authorised agent is aware, that awareness binds the litigant. The judgment cautioned lower courts to give effect to substantive compliance and not to allow technicalities to frustrate arbitration’s expeditious mandate. The Court reiterated that Section 14(2)’s requirement of court notice is not synonymous with an exclusive, narrowly defined mode of communication.
c. GUIDELINES
The Court effectively provided practical guidance:
(i) where a court order or unequivocal communication conveys that the award has been made and will be furnished, that event may be treated as notice for limitation purposes;
(ii) parties who become aware must act within thirty days from that awareness;
(iii) lower courts should guard against allowing parties to rely on mere procedural formalities to extend limitation;
(iv) when dispute arises about the date of notice, courts must examine contemporaneous orders, communications and whether the party or its pleader had knowledge;
(v) judgments applying Section 14(2) must prioritise arbitration’s speedy-objective and avoid rigid formalism that facilitates delay.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The decision reinforces a substance-over-form approach in arbitration procedure. By aligning Section 14(2) with Article 119(b) through the lens of practical awareness, the Court curtails opportunities for tactical stalling and protects the statute’s objective of swift dispute resolution. The ruling coherently follows and synthesises precedent, emphasising that courts must look to actual knowledge and the surrounding circumstances rather than insist upon mechanical formalities.
Practitioners should note the importance of contemporaneous records and communications: an order directing steps that make an award accessible may start the limitation clock. Award-creditors should therefore be vigilant to secure pronouncement quickly when no objection is filed. Award-debtors must act promptly upon becoming aware, and cannot rely on absence of formal service to extend challenge periods. The judgment provides useful doctrinal clarity and practical predictability for post-award litigation under the 1940 Act and Limitation Act.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, [1962] 2 SCR 551 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 75.
ii. Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer, [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 266 : (1999) 9 SCC 610.
iii. Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan, [1993] 3 SCR 1028 : (1993) 3 SCC 445.
iv. Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd., [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 231 : (1988) 4 SCC 31.
v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K. Ahuja, [1995] 2 SCR 65 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC 744.
vi. Deo Narain Choudhury v. Shree Narain Choudhury, [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 307 : (2000) 8 SCC 626.
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Arbitration Act, 1940 (Sections 14(1), 14(2), 17, 38).
ii. Limitation Act, 1963 (First Schedule, Article 119(b)).
