A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment addresses the contours of judicial review in contractual and tender matters, particularly emphasising the doctrine of judicial restraint in the interpretation of tender conditions by constitutional courts. The Supreme Court examined the legality of interference by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir with the decision of a tendering authority relating to technical eligibility under an e-tender issued by the Inspector General of Police, Kashmir Zone, for the supply of commercial vehicles for troop movement. The dispute revolved around the interpretation of Condition No. 31 of the Notice Inviting Tender, which required ownership of “30 vehicles both HMV/LMV”, and Condition No. 27, which prescribed five years of work experience with a minimum valuation of Rs. 2 crores.

The Court reaffirmed that the author of the tender document is the best judge of its requirements, and unless the interpretation adopted by the authority is perverse, arbitrary, or mala fide, courts must not substitute their own construction. The Division Bench was found to have exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating technical criteria and substituting the expert opinion of the Tender Opening Committee with its own assessment. The Supreme Court restored the judgment of the Single Judge, reinforcing the settled position that judicial review does not extend to technical evaluation of bids. The ruling strengthens predictability in public procurement and safeguards administrative discretion from unwarranted judicial interference.

Keywords:
Judicial Review; Public Tenders; Tender Interpretation; Administrative Discretion; Technical Evaluation

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arises from a challenge to the award of a public contract pursuant to an e-tender issued by the Inspector General of Police, Kashmir Zone, for the supply of commercial vehicles to facilitate troop movement during the financial year 2020–2021. Public tenders of this nature involve substantial administrative discretion, technical scrutiny, and expert evaluation, particularly in sensitive sectors involving security logistics.

The tender process was structured with technical and financial bids, and the evaluation was entrusted to a Tender Opening Committee, an expert body constituted for this purpose. Out of four bidders, only two were found technically qualified, including the appellant. The appellant emerged as the lowest financial bidder and was awarded the contract.

The respondent, having been declared technically ineligible, invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. While the Single Judge declined interference and upheld the tender authority’s decision, the Division Bench reversed the findings, re-interpreted essential tender conditions, and ordered fresh tenders.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether such judicial intervention was permissible, particularly when the tendering authority had applied its mind and no mala fides or arbitrariness were established. The background situates the judgment within a long line of precedents cautioning courts against transgressing into the administrative domain of tender evaluation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Pursuant to e-NIT No. 01 of 2020 dated 18.02.2020, the Zonal Police Headquarters, Kashmir, invited bids from registered transport firms for the supply of commercial vehicles without fuel. Four entities participated. The tender stipulated mandatory compliance with technical eligibility conditions, including ownership of 30 vehicles both HMV/LMV and five years of work experience valued at not less than Rs. 2 crores.

Upon scrutiny, the Tender Opening Committee found the respondent firm technically disqualified for non-compliance with the vehicle ownership condition. The appellant, having satisfied all requirements, was declared technically qualified. Its financial bid was the lowest, leading to allotment of the contract on 30.03.2020.

The respondent challenged the allotment before the High Court, contending that the appellant lacked a valid service licence, did not own the requisite number of vehicles, and failed to meet the experience criteria. The Single Judge, after examining documentary evidence and the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, rejected all contentions.

On appeal, the Division Bench re-interpreted Condition No. 31, holding that “HMV/LMV” permitted submission of either category, and further reassessed the appellant’s experience, concluding it was insufficient. Consequently, the contract was quashed and fresh tenders were directed.

The appellant approached the Supreme Court, leading to an interim stay and continuation of contract execution pending final adjudication.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court Division Bench was justified in re-interpreting Condition No. 31 of the N.I.T. contrary to the tendering authority’s interpretation?
ii. Whether courts can substitute their assessment for that of an expert Tender Opening Committee in technical evaluation?
iii. Whether interference under Article 226 was warranted in absence of arbitrariness or mala fide?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that Condition No. 31 expressly used the word “both”, mandating ownership of HMV and LMV vehicles. The respondent’s failure to furnish both categories rendered it technically ineligible.

It was argued that the Tender Opening Committee, an expert body, had duly scrutinised experience certificates spanning 2014–2019, satisfying Condition No. 27. Reliance was placed on Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. to assert that the tendering authority’s interpretation deserved deference.

The appellant further contended that issues relating to service licence validity had already been settled by the Single Judge and were not pressed before the Division Bench, thereby attaining finality.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent submitted that the expression “HMV/LMV” denoted an option and not a conjunctive requirement. It was argued that the tendering authority adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation.

The respondent further contended that the appellant’s work experience was fragmented and insufficient to meet the five-year threshold, and that some certificates were issued in the name of a different entity.

It was also urged that fairness and equality in distribution of State largesse necessitated judicial correction of arbitrary disqualification.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored that of the Single Judge. The Court held that a plain reading of Condition No. 31 clearly required ownership of both HMV and LMV vehicles, and the tendering authority’s interpretation was neither arbitrary nor perverse.

Relying on Afcons Infrastructure Ltd., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. AMR Dev Prabha, and Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that judicial review does not permit substitution of administrative discretion with judicial opinion.

On Condition No. 27, the Court found that the Tender Opening Committee, comprising four members, had assessed and accepted the appellant’s experience. The Division Bench erred in reassessing documents and arriving at its own conclusion.

The Court emphasised that commercial and technical decisions lie within the exclusive domain of expert bodies, and courts must intervene only when decisions are vitiated by mala fide or manifest arbitrariness.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The binding ratio is that courts must defer to the interpretation of tender conditions adopted by the authority which authored the tender, unless such interpretation is demonstrably perverse, arbitrary, or mala fide. Judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the decision-making process, not the decision itself.

The judgment crystallises the principle that technical eligibility assessment by expert committees cannot be re-evaluated by constitutional courts, reinforcing administrative autonomy in public procurement.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that tender disputes driven by business rivalry often attempt to cloak private interest as public interest. Such attempts must be discouraged, as they delay public projects and burden the exchequer.

It was also noted that issues not pressed before appellate courts cannot be resurrected at later stages, underscoring procedural discipline in litigation.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Courts must exercise restraint in tender matters.
ii. Interpretation by tender authors deserves primacy.
iii. Expert technical evaluation is not subject to re-assessment.
iv. Judicial review is limited to illegality, arbitrariness, mala fide, or perversity.
v. Public interest prevails over individual commercial grievances.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment consolidates and reaffirms settled principles governing judicial review in tender and contractual matters. It underscores the constitutional balance between administrative discretion and judicial oversight. By restoring the Single Judge’s decision, the Supreme Court prevented an unwarranted disruption of an ongoing public contract critical to security logistics.

The ruling strengthens certainty in public procurement, protects expert evaluation from judicial second-guessing, and discourages speculative litigation by unsuccessful bidders. It serves as a vital precedent for administrative authorities and courts alike, reinforcing that judicial intervention is an exception, not the rule, in matters of technical and commercial assessment.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., [2016] 3 SCR 551
Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517
Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd., [2016] 8 SCR 224
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. AMR Dev Prabha, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 335
Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1133

b) Important Statutes Referred

Constitution of India, Article 226