A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 262 ; 2025 INSC 152, focusing on two interlinked constitutional-administrative questions: (i) the validity of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (which repealed the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976), and (ii) whether the State Transport Authority/Regional Transport Authority may delegate permit-granting powers under s.68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with r.56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989.

The Court upheld the 2003 repeal as a legitimate exercise of legislative power, emphasising that the power to repeal equals the power to enact and that subsequent policy changes may justify repeal even where prior judicial decisions upheld the repealed statute. The Court rejected the argument that fresh Presidential assent was required for repeal. On delegation, the Court held that s.68(5) together with r.56(1)(d) authorises the STA/RTA to delegate non-stage carriage permit functions to officers such as the Secretary; delegation of routine/quasi-administrative permit work promotes administrative efficiency and does not nullify statutory oversight.

The High Court’s contrary view on non-delegability was set aside. The judgment balances legislative supremacy in policy choices with administrative law principles permitting delegated exercise of certain quasi-judicial/administrative powers, subject to statutory safeguards.

Keywords: repeal; delegation; contract carriage permits; s.68(5) Motor Vehicles Act; r.56 KMV Rules; presidential assent; quasi-judicial functions.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose from a long-running policy about control of passenger transport in Karnataka. The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was enacted to acquire private contract carriages and vest vehicles, permits and registrations in the State, transferring them to State Corporations (notably KSRTC). That acquisitionist approach was judicially sustained in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy and Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, where the 1976 Act was held constitutionally valid and consistent with Directive Principles (Art. 39). Over subsequent decades the transport environment changed: urbanisation, rising demand, and perceived shortages (particularly in rural/semi-urban areas) prompted legislative re-assessment.

The Karnataka Legislature enacted the 2003 Amendment (Act No. 9 of 2003) which, inter alia, repealed the 1976 Act to liberalise contract carriage operations and encourage private participation. Parallelly, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 created a statutory scheme for STA/RTA powers and expressly permitted delegation under rules framed u/s 96. Litigation followed: KSRTC and unions attacked the 2003 repeal and the practice of Secretaries granting permits; High Court views diverged one bench struck down delegation, another upheld repeal.

The Supreme Court consolidated appeals to determine:

(i) whether the repeal was constitutional and required fresh Presidential assent, and

(ii) whether permit-granting (non-stage carriage) may be delegated to the Secretary under s.68(5) and r.56.

The decision reconciles legislative competence over repeal with administrative law principles permitting delegated exercise of certain powers where statute and rules clearly authorise it.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The KCCA Act, 1976 was enacted to acquire privately operated contract carriages purportedly operating contrary to public interest; upon acquisition vehicles, permits and registrations vested in the State and were transferred to KSRTC. This acquisitionist policy remained operative for decades. Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Karnataka framed KMV Rules, 1989; these provided the modern framework for permits, STA/RTA composition and expressly contemplated rule-based delegation of powers. The State observed shortages of passenger services; committees and reforms recommended liberalisation.

The Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act No. 9 of 2003) repealed the 1976 Act with stated objects to liberalise and increase services. Following repeal, private bus operators applied for contract carriage permits; Secretaries of STA/RTA granted some permits relying on r.56. KSRTC and worker federations challenged (a) constitutionality of repeal (arguing prior presidential assent and Entry 42 implications) and (b) legality of delegation (contending permit-granting is quasi-judicial and non-delegable).

Single Judge rulings struck down delegation and invalidated repeal on grounds requiring presidential assent. Division Bench upheld repeal but struck down delegation. Multiple SLPs to the Supreme Court ensued, involving private operators, STA and KSRTC—the consolidated appeals questioned both legislative repeal procedure and whether s.68(5) and r.56(1)(d) permit delegation of non-stage carriage permits to the Secretary.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 which repeals the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 is constitutionally valid?
ii. Whether repeal of a State Act, previously enacted under Entry 42 (List III) and earlier upheld by the Supreme Court, requires fresh Presidential assent or otherwise exceeds State legislative competence?
iii. Whether the State Transport Authority/Regional Transport Authority can delegate its power to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist and temporary permits) to its Secretary under s.68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act read with r.56 of KMV Rules?
iv. Whether the quasi-judicial character of permit-granting precludes delegation to a single officer despite statutory provision for delegation?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The Appellants (private operators and STA) argued that s.68(5) and r.56(1)(d) expressly empower delegation; the statutory scheme differentiates stage and non-stage permits and envisages administrative delegation to meet practical service demands. They contended legislative intent favours efficient routine processing and that delegation to competent officers (Secretary/RTO-rank officers) is common administrative practice. Reliance was placed on Newtech Promoters & Developers v. State of U.P. to show quasi-judicial functions may be delegated where statute so permits.

Appellants emphasised administrative reality: multi-member authorities are overburdened; prompt grant/renewal of permits for non-stage carriage is necessary to implement liberalisation objectives post-2003. They accepted the High Court’s acceptance of repeal but sought reversal of the non-delegation finding.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

KSRTC contended the 2003 repeal was constitutionally infirm because the 1976 Act had been enacted under Entry 42 with Presidential assent and created vested rights and operational structures; repeal under a taxation amending Act improperly circumvented constitutional procedure. KSRTC maintained repeal undermined prior judicial findings and public policy favouring state control. On delegation, KSRTC argued permit-granting is inherently quasi-judicial and was intended for the composite STA/RTA, not a single Secretary; delegation would erode collective deliberation, accountability and risk arbitrary grants converting contract carriages into stage services. KSRTC warned of operational and financial prejudice and misuse post-repeal.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court analysed legislative power to repeal and delegation doctrine. On repeal, the Court reiterated the principle that the power to repeal is coextensive with the power to enact: a legislature competent to enact may repeal, subject to constitutional limits. The Court found the 2003 Repeal Act was a considered policy choice grounded in the Statement of Objects and Reasons which identified inefficiencies and the need to liberalise transport services; repeal was not arbitrary.

The Court rejected the contention that prior judicial validation of the 1976 Act ousted legislative power to repeal and held fresh Presidential assent was unnecessary where repeal fell within State competence; a repeal extinguishes prior Act’s operation rather than recreating new law needing assent. The Court relied on precedents like Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha for the coextensiveness principle.

On delegation, the Court construed s.68(5) and r.56(1)(d) literally: the statute allows delegation by rules under s.96 and r.56 specifically authorises delegation of permits other than stage carriage permits to Chairman, Secretary or officer not below RTO rank. The exclusion of stage carriage permits showed legislative care to reserve complex adjudicatory functions to the composite authority while permitting delegation of routine permits.

The Court held quasi-judicial character alone does not prohibit delegation where statute expressly permits it; administrative efficiency and statutory safeguards justify Secretary-level decision-making for non-stage permits. The High Court’s contrary view on non-delegability was set aside and appeals by private operators and STA allowed, while KSRTC’s appeals on repeal dismissed. Directions were given to implement delegated regime consistent with limitations in rules.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio is twofold:

(1) a competent legislature may repeal an Act it previously enacted even if that Act had earlier judicial endorsement; repeal does not require fresh Presidential assent when the repeal is within State legislative competence and is not a covert attempt to alter constitutional distribution of powers;

(2) s.68(5) read with r.56(1)(d) permits delegation of non-stage carriage permit powers to the Secretary or appropriate officer; quasi-judicial character does not render such delegation per se non-delegable when statute and rules expressly provide for it. The Court balanced legislative supremacy in policy change with administrative law principles enabling delegation for efficiency while preserving oversight.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that administrative practice across States supports delegation for routine matters and that refusal to permit delegation would create impractical burdens on multi-member authorities. It emphasised that judicial review remains available if delegated exercise exceeds prescribed limits and that misuse of permits could be curbed through rule-based safeguards. The Court also commented that legislative choices to liberalise transport policy are responsive to socio-economic changes like urbanisation and passenger demand.

c. GUIDELINES

• Delegation confined to non-stage carriage permits as per* r.56(1)(d).*
• Delegation must conform to restrictions, limitations and conditions prescribed under rules framed u/s 96; authorities must record general/special resolutions when delegating.
• Secretary/officer exercising delegated power must follow statutory procedure; decisions subject to judicial review for excess, mala fides or non-application of mind.
• STA/RTA must retain oversight and ensure delegation does not become de facto abdication of duty; guidelines and administrative checks recommended for transparency.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reconciles competing values: legislative autonomy to respond to changed public policy and the administrative need for efficient decision-making. Upholding the 2003 repeal recognises that law is an instrument of policy subject to change, and prior judicial validation does not fetter legislative correction. Endorsing delegation under s.68(5)/r.56 affirms that statutory design can lawfully allocate routine quasi-administrative tasks to capable officers while preserving multi-member adjudication for constitutionally sensitive or complex matters (like stage carriage permits).

Practically, the decision encourages prompt permit processing, potentially expanding passenger services, but places the onus on rule-makers and authorities to frame rigorous safeguards against misuse. For practitioners, the case is a precedent on interplay between repeal power and procedural safeguards and a clear affirmation that explicit statutory delegation of quasi-judicial tasks is permissible subject to judicial oversight.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215.

2. Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 2072; (1990) 2 SCC 562.

3. Newtech Promoters & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 18 SCC 909.

4. Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha, AIR 1962 SC 1073.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (repealed).

2. Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003) — s.3 (repeal).

3. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — ss. 2, 66, 68(3), 68(5), 96.

4. Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 — rr. 54–56 (esp. r.56(1)(d)).