A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India exercised its inherent power under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash two criminal proceedings, including one invoking Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860, on a fact‑sensitive appraisal that further prosecution would be an abuse of process and serve no meaningful purpose. The Court underscored that while quashing prosecutions involving grave offences like s.376 IPC on the basis of settlement is ordinarily discouraged, s.482 CrPC is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be applied to secure the ends of justice case‑by‑case. The sequence of a second FIR alleging sexual offences immediately after a first FIR by the opposing side, coupled with the prosecutrix’s categorical affidavit expressing her desire not to pursue proceedings after marriage and acknowledging an amicable resolution, weighed decisively. Setting aside the High Court’s refusal to quash, the Supreme Court terminated FIR No. 302 of 2023 and FIR No. 304 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings, including Sessions Case No. 29 of 2024. The ruling clarifies that exceptional facts, clear victim disinclination, and the prospect of purposeless trial may justify quashing even in serious, non‑compoundable offences, provided the Court is satisfied that justice is thereby advanced and process is not abused.

Keywords: Section 482 CrPC; Section 376 IPC; quashing; amicable settlement; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The controversy pivots on the scope of Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, where the High Court declined to quash prosecutions, including one under Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860, solely on the ground of a settlement. The Supreme Court was invited to consider whether the High Court’s approach was overly rigid given the peculiar facts. The record shows a first FIR (Crime No. 302 of 2023 dated 20.11.2023, Mehunbare Police Station, Jalgaon) alleging unlawful assembly, house‑trespass, hurt and intimidation under ss.324, 141, 143, 147, 149, 452, 323, 504, 506 IPC. The next day, a second FIR (Crime No. 304 of 2023 dated 21.11.2023) at the same station alleged s.376, s.354‑A, s.354‑D, s.509, and s.506 IPC against another accused. The prosecutrix later swore an affidavit in March 2024 stating that she did not wish to prosecute, that she was married and settled, that continued prosecution would disrupt her personal life, and that the dispute had been amicably resolved with ₹5,00,000 towards marriage expenses. The High Court, by order dated 07.03.2025, rejected Section 482 CrPC quashing petitions, reasoning that s.376 IPC is a serious, non‑compoundable offence not amenable to quashing on compromise. The appeals to the Supreme Court ensued, inviting a principled recalibration between the gravity of the allegations and the Court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and secure justice.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

A first FIR, Crime No. 302 of 2023 (20.11.2023) at Mehunbare Police Station, District Jalgaon named the appellants and alleged that on 19.11.2023 they formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the complainant and her family. The narrative mentioned her father Prabhakar as being assaulted and linked the incident to his alleged role in causing a divorce of one appellant, bringing in ss.324, 141, 143, 147, 149, 452, 323, 504, 506 IPC. A second FIR, Crime No. 304 of 2023 (21.11.2023), at the same station accused Prabhakar of sexual assault, criminal intimidation, sexual exploitation, and stalking‑related offences, invoking s.376, s.354‑A, s.354‑D, s.509, s.506 IPC, culminating in Sessions Case No. 29 of 2024. Subsequently, the prosecutrix tendered an affidavit in March 2024 before the High Court expressing a clear desire not to pursue the prosecution, voicing that she was now married and settled, and requesting that continuation halt to avoid disturbance in her personal life, while recording that the parties had amicably resolved the matter, including receipt of ₹5,00,000 towards marriage‑related expenses. The appellants then moved Criminal Applications Nos. 2561 and 2185 of 2024 under s.482 CrPC seeking quashing of both FIRs; however, the High Court, by 07.03.2025, declined, stressing that a s.376 IPC prosecution could not be quashed merely on settlement or compensation. Appeals followed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether, in the peculiar facts, proceedings involving Section 376 IPC may be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of settlement and the prosecutrix’s categorical unwillingness to prosecute?

ii. Whether the timing of a second FIR immediately following an earlier FIR by the opposing side may legitimately inform the Court’s s.482 CrPC discretion, including a finding that continuation would be an abuse of process?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the second FIR (Crime No. 304 of 2023 dated 21.11.2023) arose the day after the first FIR (Crime No. 302 of 2023 dated 20.11.2023) lodged by the opposite side, and that this sequence should temper the Court’s assessment of the complaint’s genesis. The appellants emphasized the prosecutrix’s unequivocal affidavit stating she does not wish to pursue and is now married and settled, and that continuation would disturb her life and serve no useful end. Counsel urged that the Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC aim to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process, and therefore warranted quashing the proceedings in both FIRs. They argued that, on these facts, a trial would be purposeless and oppressive, especially when the victim expresses no support for prosecution and the parties have amicably resolved their differences, including the acknowledged ₹5,00,000 marriage‑related expense payment recorded in the affidavit. The High Court’s categoric refusal based on the seriousness of s.376 IPC was portrayed as overbroad, failing to account for the exceptional circumstances and the Court’s flexible s.482 CrPC jurisdiction that is not constrained by a rigid formula.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that s.376 IPC is a grave and heinous offence, non‑compoundable in nature, and that quashing on the basis of compromise or monetary settlement would set an undesirable precedent. Reliance was placed on the High Court’s reasoning that such prosecutions cannot be quashed merely on settlement or compensation, insisting that the gravity of the charge commands a public law interest in adjudication. The State also pointed to the detailed allegations in the second FIR, including sexual assault, criminal intimidation, sexual exploitation, and interference with matrimonial alliances, resisting the suggestion that the case is purely private. It was highlighted that Section 482 CrPC must be used sparingly and not to bypass trial in serious offences. The State thus defended the High Court’s order dated 07.03.2025 as a correct application of principle that the nature of the offence—rather than the private settlement—should guide the outcome in s.376 matters.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—inherent power of the High Court to make orders to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. Applied here to assess whether continuation of prosecution would be purposeless or oppressive in the peculiar facts.

ii. Sections 324, 141, 143, 147, 149, 452, 323, 504, 506, IPC—offences alleged in the first FIR (Crime No. 302 of 2023, 20.11.2023).

iii. Sections 376, 354‑A, 354‑D, 509, 506, IPC—offences alleged in the second FIR (Crime No. 304 of 2023, 21.11.2023) culminating in Sessions Case No. 29 of 2024.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s order dated 07.03.2025, and quashed FIR No. 302 of 2023 and FIR No. 304 of 2023, including Sessions Case No. 29 of 2024. The Court first acknowledged the gravity of Section 376 IPC, reiterating that quashing in such cases is ordinarily discouraged. Yet, it stressed that the power under Section 482 CrPC is not rigid and must respond to the specific context. The Court highlighted the unusual sequencing—the second FIR invoking s.376 IPC followed immediately upon the first FIR by the opposite side—which offered interpretive context and suggested a reactionary element. Most consequential was the prosecutrix’s unequivocal affidavit expressing that she is married and settled, has no wish to pursue prosecution, and would face disruption if proceedings continued. The Court found her stand neither tentative nor ambiguous. In the aggregate, these features persuaded the Bench that continued prosecution would serve no useful purpose, would prolong distress, especially for the prosecutrix, and would burden the courts without any productive outcome. On that evaluation, the Court concluded that further proceedings would be an abuse of process and invoked s.482 CrPC to terminate both matters. The result recorded: appeals allowed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling principle is that Section 482 CrPC confers inherent power to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process, and while quashing is ordinarily disfavoured in serious offences like Section 376 IPC, it is not foreclosed by a categorical bar. The Bench ruled that the exercise of discretion must be context‑sensitive and informed by the peculiar facts. Here, the immediate succession of the second s.376 IPC FIR after an earlier FIR by the opposite side provided contextual weight, suggesting the matter’s reactionary tenor. The prosecutrix’s categorical refusal to proceed—expressed through an affidavit that she is now married, settled, and that prosecution would disturb her peace and stability—was decisive. Where the victim declines to support the charges and the parties have amicably resolved differences, and where the Court is satisfied that a trial would serve no meaningful purpose, continuation becomes oppressive and futile. Therefore, to secure justice and avoid abuse, quashing is justified even in a non‑compoundable, grave offence, if the Court is convinced that the broader interests of justice are advanced and no useful outcome would likely emerge at trial. This is the binding ratio: no rigid rule, but a principled, fact‑driven application of s.482 CrPC capable of terminating even serious prosecutions in rare, exceptional circumstances.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court’s discourse contains instructive observations that, while not strictly necessary to the result, illuminate doctrine. The Bench observed that prosecutions under s.376 IPC are grave and heinous and that quashing on settlement should not be permitted lightly. This cautionary note emphasizes that public interest in prosecution remains a serious consideration even where private parties settle. Simultaneously, the Court reiterated that the reach of s.482 CrPC is not confined by rigid formulas, signalling that categorical prohibitions are inconsistent with the equitable character of inherent powers. The Court’s emphasis on victim‑centric impacts—recognizing that compulsion to prosecute against an articulate unwillingness may prolong distress and burden courts—foregrounds humane administration of criminal justice while guarding against perfunctory compromises. These statements guide lower courts to scrutinize the nature and genuineness of settlement, the clarity and voluntariness of the victim’s stand, and the utility of a full trial, ensuring that quashing remains exceptional but available where continuation serves no useful purpose and justice is better served by closure. These reflections, though ancillary, help structure discretion and preserve a coherent balance between deterrence, victim autonomy, and judicial economy.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. No rigid prohibition in serious offences: Courts should ordinarily discourage quashing in s.376 IPC matters but must not treat seriousness as an absolute bar; s.482 CrPC remains available to secure justice in exceptional fact matrices.

ii. Sequence and context of FIRs matter: Where a second FIR alleging grave offences follows immediately upon a first FIR by the opposing side, courts may weigh the reactionary context while assessing abuse of process.

iii. Victim’s categorical stand is pivotal: A clear, consistent, voluntary affidavit by the prosecutrix indicating unwillingness to pursue, especially after marriage and settlement, is a significant factor. Courts should examine whether continuation would disturb peace and stability and prolong distress.

iv. Ends of justice and utility test: If, on totality, the trial would serve no useful purpose, courts may quash to prevent abuse of process, acknowledging judicial resources and victim impact.

v. Holistic appraisal, not formulaic reasoning: The inherent power aims to secure the ends of justice; each case must be evaluated on its own facts, resisting one‑size‑fits‑all approaches, particularly where parties have amicably resolved differences.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision structures a careful middle path. It reaffirms that s.376 IPC prosecutions inhabit a zone of gravity where private settlements cannot ordinarily dictate quashing. Yet it also refuses to calcify s.482 CrPC into a blunt rule. The peculiar constellation—a second FIR filed the day after a first FIR by the other side; a clear, voluntary affidavit by the prosecutrix post‑marriage disclaiming further interest; and the court’s satisfaction that a trial would serve no useful purpose—justified intervention to avert abuse of process. The lesson for future cases is methodological rather than mechanical: probe the sequencing, test the genuineness of the settlement, center the victim’s unequivocal position, and apply an ends‑of‑justice lens. Where those inquiries converge on futility and oppression, quashing may be the legally prudent remedy even in serious, non‑compoundable allegations. Conversely, in the absence of such compelling features, courts should hew to trial. The present ruling thus refines the discretionary grammar of s.482 CrPC, cautioning against routine quashing in s.376 IPC cases while preserving an equitable safety‑valve for rare, exceptional fact patterns demonstrably unfit for prosecution.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Madhukar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 568; 2025 INSC 819 (Supreme Court of India, 14 July 2025).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.482.

ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss.324, 141, 143, 147, 149, 452, 323, 504, 506; ss.376, 354‑A, 354‑D, 509.