A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The decision in Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand constitutes a significant judicial exposition on the contours of consent, misconception of fact, and promise of marriage under Sections 375 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while simultaneously reinforcing the procedural sanctity of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prosecution narrative alleging rape on the pretext of marriage spanning over four years, initiated by a complaint lodged shortly before the accused’s marriage to another woman. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of evidentiary inconsistencies, particularly relating to the age of the prosecutrix, the delay in lodging the FIR, and the nature of the interpersonal relationship between the parties.

A central feature of the judgment lies in the Court’s rejection of the prosecution’s claim that consent was vitiated either by fear or by misconception of fact. The Court emphasised that misconception under Section 90 IPC must be proximate to the act and cannot be inferred from a prolonged consensual relationship marked by emotional intimacy, voluntary cohabitation, and mutual correspondence. The judgment also censures the casual manner in which the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., reiterating that incriminating circumstances not put to the accused cannot be relied upon.

By setting aside the conviction under Sections 376, 323, and 341 IPC, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that criminal law cannot be employed to retrospectively penalise failed relationships where consent was conscious, deliberate, and sustained over time.

Keywords: Consent, Misconception of Fact, Promise of Marriage, Section 90 IPC, Section 313 Cr.P.C., Delay in FIR

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from the affirmation of conviction by the High Court of Jharkhand against the appellant for offences under Sections 376, 323, and 341 IPC. The prosecution case was founded on an allegation that the appellant had initially raped the prosecutrix at knifepoint when she was allegedly fourteen years old and thereafter continued to establish physical relations under the false promise of marriage for four years. The FIR was lodged in April 1999, shortly before the appellant’s impending marriage with another woman.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant primarily on the basis of the testimony of the prosecutrix, concluding that she was a minor at the time of the first alleged incident. The High Court affirmed the conviction, relying heavily on letters, photographs, and the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. without subjecting the evidentiary record to rigorous scrutiny.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant assailed the conviction on multiple grounds including inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, absence of reliable proof of age, consensual nature of the relationship, and serious procedural lapses in the Section 313 examination. The case thus presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify the legal threshold for vitiated consent and to reiterate the procedural safeguards intrinsic to a fair criminal trial.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecutrix lodged FIR No. 25 of 1999 alleging that four years prior, the appellant had forcibly raped her at knifepoint while she was on her way to school. She further alleged that the appellant promised to marry her and, on that pretext, continued to have sexual relations with her over several years, including a period when she stayed at his residence for fifteen days.

The FIR was lodged on 13 April 1999, merely seven days before the appellant’s scheduled marriage to another woman. During trial, the prosecutrix’s testimony revealed significant inconsistencies regarding her age. She initially stated she was sixteen at the time of the incident and later corrected herself to thirteen. No documentary proof such as school records was produced. Medical evidence assessed her age to be approximately twenty-five years. A cousin testified that she was six years younger than him, further compounding the uncertainty.

The evidence also disclosed a prolonged romantic relationship characterised by mutual correspondence, photographs, and an engagement ceremony. The prosecutrix admitted awareness of religious differences and societal obstacles to marriage. She further conceded in cross-examination that no incident had occurred on 9 April 1999, undermining the prosecution narrative.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged offence?
ii. Whether consent was vitiated by fear or misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC?
iii. Whether a promise of marriage over a prolonged period can invalidate consent?
iv. Whether delay in lodging the FIR affected the credibility of the prosecution case?
v. Whether defects in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. vitiated the conviction?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the FIR lodged after four years was an afterthought and coincided suspiciously with the appellant’s impending marriage. It was contended that the relationship was consensual, arising out of mutual love, as evidenced by letters and photographs. The medical opinion estimating the prosecutrix’s age at twenty-five years demolished the prosecution’s claim of minority.

It was further argued that the Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination was perfunctory, denying the appellant a fair opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances, in violation of settled principles of natural justice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State contended that the testimony of the prosecutrix was reliable and that delay in lodging the FIR was explained by failed compromise efforts. It was argued that the prosecutrix was a minor and that consent obtained on a false promise of marriage is no consent in law.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 375 IPC
ii. Section 90 IPC
iii. Section 313 Cr.P.C.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. The Court found wide variations in evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix and held that in the absence of positive proof, the benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused. The Court strongly criticised the cursory Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination, reiterating that circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him.

The Court further held that consent obtained over a prolonged relationship marked by emotional intimacy cannot be said to be under misconception of fact. The delay of four years in lodging the FIR, coupled with admissions undermining the prosecution story, rendered the conviction unsustainable.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

Consent arising out of a deep-seated romantic relationship, sustained over time with conscious participation, does not become invalid merely because marriage ultimately fails. Misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC must be immediate and proximate to the act.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that criminal law should not be invoked to retrospectively punish failed relationships driven by youthful passion and societal constraints.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Courts must insist on strict proof of age in sexual offence cases.
ii. Examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. must be comprehensive and meaningful.
iii. Delay in FIR must be examined with heightened scrutiny in consensual relationship cases.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on consent and underscores procedural fairness as the backbone of criminal adjudication. It acts as a safeguard against misuse of rape provisions in cases of failed consensual relationships, while preserving the sanctity of genuine prosecutions.

K) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

1. Uday v. State of Karnataka
2. Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala
3. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra

b) Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973