A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad upholding the trial court’s summoning order against the appellant for offences under Sections 376, 323, 504, 506, IPC and under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter SC/ST Act). The core dispute concerns whether the complainant’s consenting intimate relations with the appellant were procured by a false promise of marriage such that consent was vitiated, and whether caste-based abuse sufficient to attract offences under the SC/ST Act was made out. The Supreme Court analysed the prosecutrix’s Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and held that the early intimate encounters were consensual and not shown to be induced by a pre-existing dishonest promise to marry. Applying established precedents Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar the Court emphasised the distinction between mere breach of promise and a bona fide false promise made to obtain sexual intercourse.

The prosecution failed to establish mala fide intention or caste-based vilification in the complainant’s own recorded statement. Consequently, the Court concluded that continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process and quashed the summoning order qua the appellant. This analysis rests on the criminal standard proof beyond reasonable doubt of each ingredient and the best evidence available on record, namely the complainant’s sworn statement.

Keywords: consent, false promise of marriage, breach of promise, SC/ST Act, Section 164 CrPC, rape vs consensual sex.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal interrogates the boundary between criminal liability for sexual offences and private relational breakdowns that assume criminal colour. The complainant met the appellant via Instagram in January 2022; their liaison developed into an intimate relationship with repeated in-person meetings across locations (Gazipur, Varanasi, Prayagraj). The prosecution alleged that the appellant procured sexual relations by promising marriage, that a resulting pregnancy was terminated by the appellant’s coercion, and that later the appellant abused the complainant using caste-epithets and refused marriage.

A First Information Report dated 5 August 2023 and subsequent charge-sheet framed offences including rape and multiple counts under the SC/ST Act. The trial court summoned the appellant and his father; the High Court partially quashed proceedings only against the father but left the appellant to stand trial. The appellant sought special leave in this Court challenging the sufficiency of materials to sustain charges and contending abuse of process. The Supreme Court’s task was to examine whether, on the available best evidence specifically the complainant’s Section 164 statement the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were made out prima facie, or whether the facts indicated a consensual relationship that soured and thus fell outside penal culpability.

The Court applied long-standing principles distinguishing mere breach of promise from deception vitiating consent and considered whether allegations of caste-based verbal assault were borne out by primary evidence. The judgment underscores the prosecutorial burden to establish mens rea or mala fide inducement where consent is disputed and cautions against criminalising ordinary relationship disputes absent cogent corroboration.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant, a major and employee at a diagnostic centre in Varanasi, met the appellant on Instagram (Jan 2022). Their friendship matured into romance. The complainant stated under oath (Sec. 164 CrPC, dated 09.08.2023) that she trusted the appellant, had feelings for him and, despite initial reservations, engaged in intimate relations. Encounters continued after she moved to Varanasi and he to Prayagraj; he visited and physical relations followed. She discovered pregnancy in December 2022 and alleged that the appellant made her take medication for termination; the charge under Section 313 IPC was later dropped from the charge-sheet.

Tension arose when the complainant observed the appellant with her cousin; she retaliated by befriending another person to make him jealous. The appellant allegedly thereafter refused marriage, questioned her character and demanded a large sum as condition for marriage. The complainant claims the appellant suggested elopement but she insisted on waiting till he secured a job. The FIR alleged repeated sexual assault, caste-based slurs and abandonment; the prosecution relied principally on the Section 164 statement. The trial court summoned accused persons; the High Court quashed proceedings only against the appellant’s father and maintained summoning of the appellant, prompting the present appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether intimate relations obtained on a promise to marry necessarily vitiate consent so as to constitute rape under Section 376 IPC?

2. Whether the prosecution has established at the prima facie stage that a deliberate false promise to marry was made with mala fide intention from the inception?

3. Whether the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement corroborates allegations of caste-based humiliation necessary to invoke the SC/ST Act?

4. Whether continuation of criminal proceedings, on the facts disclosed, would amount to an abuse of the process of law?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that: the Section 164 statement demonstrates consensual relations borne of mutual attraction and trust; there is no material to infer that at the inception the appellant had no intention to marry; absence of contemporaneous evidence of caste-based abuse negates SC/ST Act offences; the prosecution’s case amounts to a civil wrong (breach of promise) disguised as criminality; summoning was unjustified and perpetuates harassment through criminal process.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that: the complainant was induced to physical relations by promise of marriage; later conduct of the accused coercion to terminate pregnancy, repeated physical assaults and caste-based insults form a composite criminal offence under IPC and SC/ST Act; the Section 164 statement contains allegations of force and abuse which must be tested in trial and cannot be summarily rejected at the stage of summon.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

1. Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (rape).

2. Section 323, IPC (voluntarily causing hurt).

3. Section 504, IPC (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach).

4. Section 506, IPC (criminal intimidation).

5. Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act, 1989 (atrocities & caste-based insults).

6. Section 164, Cr.P.C. (statement recorded before Magistrate).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed the Section 164 statement as the best contemporaneous evidence. The statement showed initial encounters were consensual; the complainant repeatedly acknowledged trust, feelings and voluntary engagement despite initial hesitation. The Court emphasised judicial precedents which instruct that a mere promise of marriage, or subsequent breach, does not automatically convert consensual intercourse into rape. The Court relied on Uday v. State of Karnataka and Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana for the doctrinal distinction between breach and fraudulent promise intended from inception.

Applying Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, the Court observed that absence of evidence showing the accused’s mala fide intention at the start negates the theory of deception. On the SC/ST Act counts, the Court noted that the complainant’s sworn statement lacked any explicit account of caste-based slurs or humiliation; mere later refusal to marry or questioning of character did not, without more, satisfy statutory ingredients. The Court found that the prosecution’s narrative relied heavily on inference and conjecture rather than concrete corroboration. Given these findings, continuing prosecution would be disproportionate and an abuse of process when the best evidence negates essential ingredients.

Consequently, the Court quashed the summoning order against the appellant for the specified offences. The appeal was allowed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that where the prosecutrix’s own contemporaneous statement indicates consensual sexual relations entered into voluntarily and there is no credible material to infer from the inception a dishonest promise to marry, consent is not vitiated by later breach and the elements of rape under Section 376 IPC are not prima facie made out. Further, without explicit evidence of caste-based abuse in the complainant’s best evidence, the ingredients of SC/ST Act offences cannot be said to be established. The Court therefore applied precedents that require proof of mala fide intent at the outset to convert a promise into criminal deception.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that courts must be cautious in converting private interpersonal disputes into criminal trials absent strong corroboration. It reiterated that Section 164 statements carry high evidentiary value and that criminal process must not be permitted to become a weapon of harassment. The Court warned against treating every failed relationship as a criminal matter and stressed prosecutorial responsibility to ensure prima facie culpability before invoking protective statutes which carry serious stigma. These observations, while persuasive, were framed as guidance on prosecutorial prudence and judicial restraint.

c. GUIDELINES

1. At the summoning stage, the trial court must test whether the best available evidence (e.g., Section 164 statement) discloses essential ingredients of offences.

2. Distinguish mere breach of promise from fraudulent promise made with mala fide intent at the inception; only the latter may vitiate consent.

3. For SC/ST Act charges, look for explicit allegations or contemporaneous evidence of caste-based humiliation; general statements of refusal or insult are insufficient.

4. Avoid misuse of protective statutes to litigate relationship grievances; ensure threshold prima facie material exists before summoning.

5. Prosecutors and magistrates should guard against treating subjective regret as criminal injury; the burden remains on prosecution to prove each ingredient beyond reasonable doubt at trial.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reinforces the careful line courts must walk between protecting victims and preventing misuse of criminal law for personal vendettas. The Court faithfully applied established tests from Uday, Deepak Gulati and Deelip Singh, insisting on demonstration of dishonest intention at the inception to convert consensual intercourse into rape. The judgment is fact-sensitive: where the complainant’s own sworn account negates coercion or caste-based vilification, continuation of criminal prosecution would be oppressive.

The case underlines two practical truths for practitioners: first, secure contemporaneous and corroborative material before framing serious offences; second, advocates should evaluate whether civil remedies rather than criminal prosecution more aptly address breaches of personal commitments. The decision does not dilute the protection available to vulnerable persons; it ensures the protective net is not stretched to penalise ordinary relational breach absent criminal intention or discriminatory conduct explicitly proved on record.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46.

2. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.

3. Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88.

4. Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1497 : 2025 INSC 151 (present judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376, 323, 504, 506, 313.

2. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v).

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 164.