A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100, a two-judge decision delivered on 22 January 2025 addressing whether purpose-based interim bail may be granted to an undertrial accused to contest and physically canvass in elections. The case arises from multiple FIRs linked to the Delhi riots of February 2020, including a charge of murder of an Intelligence Bureau official, and a pending PMLA matter.

The Court split: Justice Pankaj Mithal (majority) held that interim bail for contesting or canvassing is impermissible because campaign activity is not a fundamental, constitutional, statutory or human right, and allowing such bail would produce systemic misuse and conflict with Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. He emphasized gravity of allegations, risk of witness tampering and the lack of legal footing for election-based interim release. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah dissented in part, stressing constitutional jurisdiction to protect Articles 14 and 21 where prolonged custody and pendency render continued detention oppressive; he granted limited interim bail subject to strict conditions while cautioning that the order is fact-specific.

The judgment reconciles competing values: electoral participation, statutory limits on prisoners’ voting, and constitutional protection of liberty where trials are unduly prolonged. This analysis follows the judgment in the provided file.

Keywords: Interim Bail; Purpose-based interim bail; Election campaigning; Delhi Riots 2020; Custodial parole.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The petitioner, an erstwhile councillor and candidate of AIMIM for the Mustafabad Assembly constituency, sought interim bail to campaign and contest the Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025. He faced multiple FIRs arising from the February 2020 riots, including an FIR alleging murder of an Intelligence Bureau official, and a prosecution under the PMLA. The Delhi High Court had refused substantive interim bail but allowed custodial parole narrowly to subscribe oath and file nomination papers. The petitioner challenged the High Court order before the Supreme Court, seeking broader interim bail for canvassing and physical campaigning.

At issue were two competing concerns: the accused’s liberty and participation in democratic process vis-à-vis serious criminal allegations, witness safety and statutory limitations on prisoners’ electoral participation. The two members of the Bench reached different conclusions on whether constitutional jurisdiction permits limited interim bail for election-related campaigning where trials are prolonged and the accused has endured extended custody. The majority prioritized prevention of misuse and statutory coherence with electoral law. The concurring/dissenting opinion emphasized constitutional protection of personal liberty and equitable relief where incarceration has been prolonged and most other cases against the accused had resulted in bail.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner was arrested in March 2020 and remained in custody since then. FIR No. 65 of 2020 (Police Station Dayalpur) charged him with rioting and with the murder of Ankit Sharma, an Intelligence Bureau official. Investigations recovered materials from the petitioner’s rooftop and premises (stones, bricks, petrol bombs, acid drums). Eleven FIRs implicated the petitioner in riot-related offences; one FIR was quashed, eight matters had resulted in bail, while at least two cases (including PMLA and another riot FIR) remained pending with bail applications unresolved.

The chargesheet in FIR 65 was submitted on 02.06/02.07.2020 and several material witnesses remained unexamined. The High Court granted custodial parole to enable filing of nomination but denied broader interim bail for canvassing. The petitioner applied to the Supreme Court contesting that custodial parole alone was hollow because effective representation to electorate requires physical canvassing. The State opposed, citing statutory constraints on prisoners’ right to vote, risk of witness tampering, gravity of charges, and potential for precedent allowing wider misuse of interim bail for elections.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether interim bail can be granted to an accused solely to contest elections or to physically canvass and campaign?
ii. Whether prolonged incarceration and pendency of trial can alone justify purpose-based interim bail to enable electoral campaigning?
iii. Whether constitutional jurisdiction (Articles 14 & 21) permits granting interim bail despite statutory restrictions on prisoner participation in elections (notably Section 62(5) RPA, 1951)?
iv. What conditions, if any, may be imposed to balance liberty and public interest when interim bail is granted for limited election purposes?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that prolonged detention since March 2020—without timely trial conclusion violated the accused’s rights under Articles 14 and 21. He argued that the right to seek public office and to meaningfully present oneself to the electorate is integral to democratic participation. Several matters had resulted in bail; the remaining cases had pendency and delay; the chargesheet witnesses largely examined, and systemic delay made trial conclusion unlikely soon. Interim bail for campaigning was a limited, equitable measure to avoid irreparable prejudice to electoral rights and to preserve presumption of innocence while subject to conditions.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State emphasized the gravity of allegations, including murder and organized riot logistics. It argued that campaign activity is not a constitutional or statutory right and that custodial parole for nomination preserved the statutory right to contest. The State relied on Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to show incongruence between interim release for campaigning and electoral law that bars prisoners from voting, hence a release would conflict with the scheme. The State cautioned against creating a precedent that would allow undertrials to repeatedly seek interim bail to enter electoral contests, leading to misuse, witness tampering, and disruption of prosecutions.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court bifurcated its conclusions. Justice Pankaj Mithal held interim bail to contest or canvass elections impermissible as a category. He reasoned that campaign or canvass is not a fundamental, constitutional, statutory or human right, and that interim bail is a judicial innovation to meet exceptional humanitarian or compelling circumstances; elections do not fall within such catalogue. Allowing election-based interim bail would create a Pandora’s box, invite flood of litigation, compromise witness safety where alleged offences arose within the same locality, and contravene the intent of Section 62(5) RPA, 1951 which bars prisoners from voting.

He noted the seriousness of the charges, recoveries from petitioner’s premises and unfinished witness testimony. The High Court’s limited custodial parole to file nomination was adequate to protect the statutory entitlement to contest. He distinguished Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement on facts as Kejriwal was President of a national party and an indispensable campaigner. Concluding, Mithal, J. dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah disagreed in part. He reiterated settled bail principles from precedents such as K A Najeeb and subsequent authority that constitutional courts can grant bail despite restrictive statutory schemes if Articles 14/21 demand protection where trial delay and prolonged incarceration cause infringement of liberty. While acknowledging gravity of allegations, he underscored the presumption of innocence and the distinctive fact matrix: petitioner had been in custody since March 2020, had obtained bail in a majority of related cases, and the High Court had allowed nomination filing.

Weighing these factors, Amanullah, J. allowed limited interim bail up to noon of 04.02.2025 on stringent conditions: territorial confinement to the constituency, prohibition on referencing pending cases or riots, passport deposit, and other statutory bail conditions under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 480(3)(b) and 482(2)(ii)). He cautioned that the order is fact-specific and not a precedent for general release to contest or campaign.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold. First, as held by Mithal, J., purpose-based interim bail for campaigning is not a recognized right and, as a rule, must not be granted because it creates systemic risks, conflicts with statutory electoral provisions and imperils witness safety where allegations involve local violence. Second, as refined by Amanullah, J., constitutional courts retain power to grant bail even against statutory restrictions where individual liberty under Articles 14/21 is threatened by prolonged custody and delay; in exceptional and fact-specific cases limited interim bail may be justified subject to strict conditions to prevent prejudice to trial or public interest. Thus, the ratio balances a presumption against election-based interim bail with a residual constitutional discretion to grant narrowly tailored relief where prolonged detention and other factors so require.

b. OBITER DICTA 

Both opinions record dicta that canvassing may be achieved through non-physical media (pamphlets, social media, agents), that many candidates have historically contested while incarcerated, and that any broader rule would be subject to statutory constraints and the specifics of each case. Mithal, J. observed the public interest in “clean politics” and disfavoring persons with tainted images participating while in custody. Amanullah, J. cautioned against treating statutory restrictions as ousting constitutional jurisdiction, citing Union of India v. K A Najeeb and later cases clarifying the protective role of Article 21. Both judges warned that future courts must assess whether these reasons apply on a case-by-case basis.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Interim bail for the purpose of physical campaigning should not be considered a general ground for release; exceptional, fact-specific justification required.

2. Courts may permit limited custodial parole for filing nomination and formal steps; that suffices to protect statutory right to contest.

3. Where prolonged custody and trial delay produce substantial prejudice, constitutional courts can grant limited interim bail subject to strict conditions to prevent interference with witnesses and investigation.

4. Any such bail must include territorial restriction, prohibition on commenting about pending cases, deposit of travel documents, and other conditions safeguarding trial integrity.

5. Orders granting interim bail for elections are to be expressed as fact-specific and not broad precedent.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is careful and pragmatic. It refuses to create a categorical right to election-based interim bail while preserving constitutional supervisory power to protect personal liberty where extraordinary delay or harsh incarceration threatens Articles 14/21. The majority guardrails against misuse, witness tampering and tension with the electoral code. The concurring/dissenting view underscores constitutionalism: statutory prohibitions cannot mechanistically extinguish judicial review against deprivation of liberty.

Practically, litigants will find the message twofold: custodial parole for nominations remains available; a narrow, conditional window for limited interim bail may be obtained only in exceptional cases where delay and custody tilt the balance towards liberty. Trial courts and High Courts must apply precedents circumspectly; appellate courts must scrutinize fact matrices rather than invoke categorical rules. The decision reconciles competing public goods—fair prosecution and democratic access—by privileging restraint and fact-specific constitutional relief.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577.
ii. Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 1.
iii. Athar Pervez v. State (Delhi High Court), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6662.
iv. Union of India v. K A Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713.
v. Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813.
vi. State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085.
vii. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565.
viii. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694.
ix. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, [2024] 7 SCR 97.
x. Sanity of other cases as cited in the judgment text.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 62(5).
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (bail framework, including Section 436-A cited).
iii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 480(3)(b) and 482(2)(ii).