A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in Nagarajan & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 1390 of 2025) dealt with a significant question concerning the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in prosecutions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PoFA), specifically during the period between the insertion of Section 20AA in 1976 and the repeal of PoFA in 2006 by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act). The appeals stemmed from convictions relating to offences of food adulteration committed in 2001 and 1985. The appellants sought either the benefit of probation or the mollification of sentences under the new FSS Act framework.

The Court, through Justice Dipankar Datta, held that Section 20AA expressly excluded the application of probation for food adulteration offences, thereby rendering the Probation Act inapplicable. It also held that the savings clause in Section 97 of the FSS Act prevented retrospective application of reduced penalties. However, applying precedents such as C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala and A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of West Bengal, the Court exercised judicial discretion to convert custodial sentences into fines, noting discrepancies in analytical reports and the long passage of time since the offences. This judgment harmonises principles of statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and judicial equity, underscoring that while food adulteration is a grave offence against public health, justice demands proportionality in sentencing.

Keywords: Food adulteration; Probation of Offenders Act; Section 20AA PoFA; Repeal and savings clause; Sentencing principles; Consumer safety; Judicial comity; Statutory interpretation; Ex post facto laws; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeals in this case arose from two different convictions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, one relating to adulterated curd seized in Tamil Nadu in 2001 and the other relating to obstruction of a Food Inspector in Uttar Pradesh in 1985. Both appellants had exhausted their remedies before the trial, appellate, and revisional courts, which had upheld their sentences of imprisonment and fine. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellants could claim the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, or alternatively, whether their sentences could be mollified in light of the enactment of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which replaced the PoFA and prescribed lesser penalties.

The controversy primarily centered around Section 20AA of the PoFA, introduced in 1976, which categorically excluded the applicability of probation to offenders under the Act unless they were under 18 years of age. The appellants argued that this provision violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and was contrary to the reformative approach of criminal justice. They also contended that since the FSS Act omitted any analogous provision, it indicated a shift towards reformative sentencing, thereby entitling them to reduced punishment. Reliance was placed on Article 20(1) of the Constitution and Article 15 of the ICCPR, which recognise that offenders should benefit from lighter penalties under subsequent laws.

On the other hand, the respondent-State argued that the legislature had deliberately excluded probation in food adulteration cases, treating such offences as crimes against public health. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1976 amendment highlighted the increasing menace of adulteration and the inadequacy of existing laws. The State contended that judicial intervention could not override this legislative mandate, particularly when Section 97 of the FSS Act specifically preserved penalties incurred under the PoFA.

The Supreme Court examined a catena of precedents including Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1972), Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange (1974), Prem Ballab v. State (1977), T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983), Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987), Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004), and A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. (2024). The Court held that probation was clearly barred by Section 20AA, and reduced sentencing under the FSS Act could not override the savings clause. Yet, balancing justice and equity, it converted imprisonment into fines, drawing from precedents where discrepancies in evidence or protracted litigation justified such relief.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appeals arose from two different factual backgrounds but revolved around the same question of law.

In the lead appeal from Tamil Nadu, the prosecution case was that on 26 June 2001, at about 2:30 pm, the Food Inspector collected a sample of curd from the shop of the appellants Nagarajan and Selvaraj. The sample was sent for analysis under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PoFA) and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. The report of the Public Analyst revealed that the curd did not conform to the prescribed standard for buffalo milk, as it contained 4.6% fat instead of the required minimum of 5%. A complaint was filed, and the appellants were tried under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA. By judgment dated 18 June 2006, the Trial Court convicted them and sentenced each to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000, with a default sentence of two months’ imprisonment. Their appeal before the Appellate Court was dismissed on 18 December 2009, and their revision before the Madras High Court was rejected on 4 June 2019.

In the connected appeal from Uttar Pradesh, the prosecution alleged that on 20 March 1985 at 10:45 am in Karkala Bazaar, the appellant Naresh Chandra was found selling spice, chilli powder, flour, cooking oil, salt, and other items. On suspicion of adulteration, the Food Inspector attempted to take samples but the appellant refused to accept Form VI and intimidated the officer, thereby preventing him from discharging his statutory duty. The complaint led to a trial in which Naresh Chandra was convicted under Sections 7/10(1) read with Section 16(1)(c)(d) of the PoFA. He was sentenced to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. His appeal was dismissed on 16 November 1988, and his revision before the Allahabad High Court was rejected on 4 July 2019.

Both sets of appellants approached the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petitions, limited to the question of sentence. The principal legal issues that arose were: (i) whether probation could be granted under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 notwithstanding Section 20AA of PoFA, and (ii) whether the reduced sentencing provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act) could apply retrospectively to their benefit, given that the PoFA was repealed by the FSS Act.

The peculiar facts also included a discrepancy in the analysis reports in the lead appeal. While the Public Analyst reported deficiency in fat content (4.6% against 5% standard), the Central Food Laboratory reported 8.3% fat, which was well above the minimum required. This inconsistency raised doubt as to whether adulteration had in fact occurred, creating scope for judicial relief.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be extended to persons convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, notwithstanding the express exclusion in Section 20AA of PoFA?

ii) Whether the repeal of PoFA by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which prescribes lighter penalties, entitles the appellants to mollification of their sentences under the principle of beneficial construction and Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India?

iii) Whether discrepancies in laboratory reports on food samples can be grounds for conversion of custodial sentences into fines in the interest of justice and equity?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The learned counsels for the appellants advanced a series of constitutional and statutory arguments.

Firstly, it was argued that Section 20AA of PoFA—which excludes probationary relief—was unconstitutional as it violated Article 14 by treating food adulteration offenders as a separate class without rational justification. It was submitted that probation is a reformative measure under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, aimed at rehabilitating first-time offenders and reducing prison overcrowding. By denying such a measure, Section 20AA discriminates between offenders under different statutes.

Secondly, it was urged that the exclusion violated Article 21 of the Constitution, as it deprived individuals of liberty without fair consideration of their personal circumstances. The appellants argued that the Probation Act and Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 reflect India’s commitment to rehabilitative justice, and food adulteration cases should not be excluded categorically. Reliance was placed on Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab (1964), where this Court held that beneficial amendments could be applied retrospectively to aid reformation.

Thirdly, the appellants contended that since the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which repealed PoFA, does not contain an equivalent to Section 20AA, this demonstrates a legislative shift towards leniency. They relied on T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983), where the Court applied a subsequent statute prescribing lesser punishment to offences committed earlier, holding that beneficial construction required extending the advantage to accused persons. Similarly, they referred to Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004), which acknowledged that mollification of sentence is consistent with constitutional guarantees.

Fourthly, the appellants invoked Article 20(1) of the Constitution and Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), which prohibit retrospective harsher punishment but allow retrospective application of lighter penalties. Since India ratified the ICCPR in 1979, it was argued that its principle of retroactive leniency binds domestic courts.

Finally, in the lead appeal, the appellants highlighted discrepancies in the laboratory reports: while the Public Analyst found fat deficiency in curd, the Central Food Laboratory’s report indicated higher-than-required fat content. Relying on C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala (2006), where imprisonment was converted to fine due to inconsistencies in adulteration tests, the appellants sought relief on similar grounds.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu opposed the appeals and strongly defended the legislative exclusion of probation.

It was submitted that Section 20AA of PoFA was introduced in 1976 precisely because of the rampant menace of food adulteration, which posed a grave threat to public health. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment emphasized the need for deterrent punishment. Thus, the exclusion of probation was a conscious policy decision treating food adulteration as an economic offence and a crime against society.

The State argued that probation is intended for petty, personal crimes, whereas food adulteration impacts the lives of countless consumers. Reliance was placed on Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1972), Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange (1974), and Prem Ballab v. State (1977), where the Court had cautioned against applying probation to economic offences. In Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987), the Supreme Court had already held that Section 20AA overrides the Probation Act, making probation inapplicable.

Further, the State pointed to Section 97 of the FSS Act, 2006, which contains a repeal and savings clause. It specifically preserves penalties incurred under the repealed PoFA, making it clear that lighter penalties under the new Act cannot retrospectively apply. The reliance placed by the appellants on T. Barai (1983) was distinguished on the ground that it involved a conflict between State and Central enactments, and not a repeal-and-savings situation.

The State emphasized that judicial discretion cannot override clear statutory command. To grant probation or apply reduced penalties contrary to Section 20AA PoFA and Section 97 FSS Act would amount to rewriting legislation. Public health offences must be dealt with strictly to deter future violations.

The State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent in the connected appeal, did not advance detailed arguments before the Court.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 20AA, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – exclusion of the Probation of Offenders Act and Section 360 CrPC, except for offenders under 18 years of age.

ii) Section 97, Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – repeal and savings, preserving penalties and liabilities incurred under the repealed enactment.

iii) Sections 7, 10, and 16 of the PoFA – prohibition, offences, and penalties relating to adulterated food and obstruction of Food Inspectors.

iv) Section 360, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – power of courts to release offenders on probation.

v) Sections 6 and 26, General Clauses Act, 1897 – effect of repeal and prohibition of double punishment.

vi) Article 20 of the Constitution of India – protection against ex post facto penal laws.

vii) Article 14 of the Constitution – equality before law.

viii) Article 21 of the Constitution – right to life and personal liberty.

ix) Article 15 of the ICCPR, 1966 – prohibition of retrospective harsher punishment; recognition of retroactive leniency.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta, delivered a common judgment for both appeals. The Court commenced by acknowledging the gravity of food adulteration offences, describing them as “crimes against public health”. It emphasised that Parliament’s legislative intent in introducing Section 20AA of PoFA was to ensure that offenders do not escape with lenient treatment through probationary provisions.

On the first issue, the Court applied the rule of literal interpretation. It held that Section 20AA was unambiguous and expressly excluded the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 CrPC. Hence, courts could not extend probation to food adulteration convicts, as doing so would violate the legislative mandate. The Court drew support from Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987), which had already ruled that Section 20AA overrides the Probation Act. Earlier decisions like Ishar Das (1972) and Prem Ballab (1977) were revisited, and it was observed that even before the amendment, courts were cautious in granting probation due to the social impact of adulteration.

On the second issue, regarding retrospective application of reduced penalties under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the Court rejected the appellants’ plea. It reasoned that Section 97 of the FSS Act contains a savings clause which expressly preserves penalties incurred under PoFA. Therefore, mollification of sentence could not be granted by judicial interpretation. The Court clarified that while T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983) laid down the principle of beneficial construction, it was distinguishable because that case involved conflict between a Central and a State law and did not concern a repeal-and-savings situation. Relying on Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004), the Court stressed that when Parliament deliberately excludes certain cases from benefiting from retrospective leniency, courts must respect legislative wisdom.

Nonetheless, the Court exercised its powers to mould relief in the interests of justice. It noted that in the lead appeal, there was a discrepancy between the Public Analyst’s report (4.6% fat) and the Central Food Laboratory’s report (8.3% fat). Following C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala (2006), where conflicting reports led to conversion of imprisonment into fine, the Court held that such discrepancies must be interpreted in favour of the accused.

In the connected appeal, although there was no evidentiary inconsistency, the Court was guided by the precedent of A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of West Bengal (2024), which had converted imprisonment into fine despite repeal-and-savings provisions. While expressing reservations about that reasoning, the Bench chose to follow it in the interest of judicial comity and to avoid prolonging litigation that had already spanned nearly four decades.

Ultimately, the Court partly allowed both appeals. The sentences of six months’ imprisonment were converted to fines of Rs. 30,000 each for Nagarajan and Selvaraj and Rs. 20,000 for Naresh Chandra. The appellants were given time till June 2025 to deposit the fines, failing which the custodial sentences would revive.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court’s ratio rests on two primary legal conclusions:

Firstly, the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is inapplicable to offences committed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 during the period from 1976 (introduction of Section 20AA) to 2006 (repeal by FSS Act). The rationale is that Section 20AA constitutes a special statutory bar overriding general probationary provisions. Reliance was placed on Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987), where the same interpretation was given. The Court distinguished reform-oriented precedents such as Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab (1964) by highlighting that those decisions preceded the statutory exclusion. Thus, literal construction of Section 20AA leaves no room for probationary benefit.

Secondly, the repeal and savings clause (Section 97 FSS Act) prevents the retrospective application of reduced penalties under the new law. The Court held that repeal-and-savings clauses are not surplusage and must be given full effect. Since Section 97 expressly saved punishments incurred under PoFA, courts could not override it by invoking beneficial construction. This principle echoes Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004), where exclusion of pending appeals from retrospective benefit was upheld as constitutionally valid.

Thus, the ratio decidendi firmly establishes that (i) probation is barred under PoFA for offences between 1976–2006, and (ii) reduced penalties under the FSS Act cannot be retrospectively applied due to the savings clause.

b) OBITER DICTA

While rejecting the appellants’ main contentions, the Court made significant observations amounting to obiter dicta.

Firstly, it lamented the absence of sentencing guidelines in India. The Court remarked that judicial discretion in sentencing often leads to inconsistency, and codified guidelines are needed to ensure uniformity. This observation reflects concerns raised in prior cases like State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar (2008), where sentencing reform was emphasised.

Secondly, the Court underscored the philosophy of probation, describing it as a reformatory measure intended for first-time offenders who can reintegrate into society. Citing Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas (1974), it acknowledged the importance of rehabilitation but reiterated that judicial sympathy cannot override express legislative exclusion.

Thirdly, the Court observed that while food adulteration is a crime against public health, there remains a distinction between mollification of sentence and release on probation. The former may be permissible in rare cases based on discrepancies or equity, while the latter is categorically barred under Section 20AA.

Finally, the Court hinted that cases involving long-pending litigation may warrant judicial intervention to prevent disproportionate hardship. It cited the 40-year delay in the connected appeal as a factor justifying conversion of imprisonment into fine.

c) GUIDELINES

The Court laid down guiding principles for future cases:

i) Probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is not available to persons convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for offences committed between 1976 and 2006, due to Section 20AA.

ii) Mollification of sentences by applying subsequent legislation (like the FSS Act, 2006) is impermissible when the repealing Act contains a savings clause preserving earlier penalties.

iii) Courts must distinguish between reduction of sentence and release on probation. While probation is expressly excluded, reduction of sentence may be granted in exceptional cases of evidentiary discrepancy or inordinate delay, following precedents like C. Mohammed (2006) and A.K. Sarkar & Co. (2024).

iv) Discrepancies in laboratory reports in food adulteration cases must be resolved in favour of the accused, as per principles of criminal jurisprudence.

v) Courts must respect judicial comity and precedent from coordinate Benches, unless there are compelling reasons to refer the issue to a larger Bench.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment exemplifies the Supreme Court’s balanced approach to criminal jurisprudence in economic offences. On one hand, the Court upheld the legislative intent behind Section 20AA of PoFA, reiterating that crimes against public health require deterrent treatment. By doing so, it reaffirmed the principle of parliamentary supremacy in sentencing policy. On the other hand, the Court also acknowledged the role of judicial discretion in mitigating hardship in exceptional cases, particularly where evidentiary doubts exist or where protracted litigation makes imprisonment disproportionate.

The decision harmonises constitutional principles with legislative intent. By refusing probation, the Court reinforced the deterrent purpose of food safety laws. By refusing retrospective application of reduced penalties, it respected the repeal-and-savings framework. Yet, by converting imprisonment into fines, it demonstrated the humanising role of judicial discretion.

From a comparative perspective, the Court’s reliance on Article 15 ICCPR aligns Indian law with international standards recognising retrospective application of lighter penalties. However, it carefully limited this principle to contexts where the legislature had not expressly excluded such benefit.

The ruling also highlights broader jurisprudential themes. It underlines that beneficial construction cannot be stretched to defeat explicit statutory language. It recognises that while reformative justice is desirable, it must yield to public interest in cases of serious economic crimes. At the same time, the judgment illustrates that justice, equity, and propriety remain guiding values, ensuring that rigid application of law does not result in undue hardship.

This case will serve as a benchmark in future prosecutions under repealed statutes, particularly in balancing statutory mandates against judicial equity. It also reinforces the principle that public health offences deserve strict treatment, yet courts retain a narrow window for relief where fairness demands it.

K) REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred

i) Ishar Das v. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 65
ii) Jai Narain v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1972) 2 SCC 637
iii) Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange, (1974) 1 SCC 167
iv) Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Administration), (1977) 1 SCC 173
v) T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177
vi) Babu Ram v. State of Haryana, (1987) Supp SCC 12
vii) Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2004) 3 SCC 609
viii) C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 290
ix) Nemi Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 17 SCC 448
x) A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of West Bengal, (2024) 10 SCC 727
xi) Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40
xii) Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas, (1974) 4 SCC 222

Important Statutes Referred

i) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (ss. 7, 10, 16, 20AA)
ii) Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (s. 97)
iii) Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
iv) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (s. 360)
v) General Clauses Act, 1897 (ss. 6, 26)
vi) Constitution of India (Arts. 14, 20, 21)
vii) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (Art. 15)