Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 616 : 2025 INSC 484

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5098 of 2025, raises whether a High Court should have exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct restoration of possession of two flats originally handed over to the Police Department in 1940 on an oral/temporary basis. The High Court dismissed the writ petition because no written requisition or lease deed existed and because an alternative statutory remedy was available; it treated the Department’s occupation as permissive and relegated the claimants to pursue a suit or statutory remedy. The Supreme Court reversed. Emphasizing that exclusion of writ jurisdiction by existence of an alternative remedy is discretionary and not mandatory, the Court held that the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction cannot be fettered where continuing occupation since 1940 and non-payment of rent for many years resulted in injustice. The Court directed the State to hand over vacant, peaceful possession within four months and to pay arrears of rent. The judgment records the Court’s view that facts of 1940 (colonial context) and the prolonged 84-year occupation and 18-year non-payment of rent make judicial exercise of writ jurisdiction appropriate. This decision reaffirms that constitutional remedies are available where institutional delay or inequity would render statutory processes ineffectual or oppressive.

Keywords: Article 226; writ jurisdiction; alternative remedy; permissive occupation; requisition; possession; rent arrears; state occupation; Maharashtra Land Requisition Act, 1948; rule of law.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
ii) Case Number Civil Appeal No. 5098 of 2025
iii) Judgement Date 08 April 2025.
iv) Court Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan
vi) Author Judgment recorded by the Bench (reported as majority/bench judgment).
vii) Citation [2025] 5 S.C.R. 616 : 2025 INSC 484.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved Article 226, Constitution of India; Maharashtra Land Requisition Act, 1948; Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999; Right to Information Act, 2005.
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any) No direct overruling; distinguishes Chief Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra v. Anil Harish & Ors. (2007) on facts and the exercise of discretion.
x) Related Law Subjects Constitutional law; Property law; Administrative law; Land requisition and rent law.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute concerns two flats in Amar Bhavan, Opera House, Mumbai, put into Police Department occupation in 1940, without any written requisition or lease deed on record. The appellants, successors in title, sought restitution of possession under Article 226 on the ground that occupation was for temporary requisition to house police officers; the State denied requisition and characterized the occupation as permissive, pointing to payment of monthly amounts (till December 2007) and the absence of any written order. The High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, relying on the proposition that an alternative statutory remedy existed (notably under rent law) and pointing to Chief Secretary v. Anil Harish (2007) where the Supreme Court set aside a High Court order on similar facts because statutory remedy under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 should have been invoked. The appellants relied upon older authorities (e.g., H.D. Vora, Grahak Sanstha Manch, Roy Estate) to contend entitlement to possession where property was requisitioned, and argued the iniquity of an 84-year occupation with rent unpaid for approximately 18 years. The State relied on documentary lacunae, payments made till 2007, and precedent that counsels restraint in exercise of writ jurisdiction where specific statutory remedies exist. The Supreme Court, after hearing and court-directed settlement efforts, corrected the High Court’s refusal, stressing discretionary nature of the exclusionary rule and that continuing state occupation for decades with nonpayment and practical hardship warranted immediate constitutional relief.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Possession handed over in 1940: It is undisputed that the predecessor of appellants voluntarily handed over two flats to the Police Department in 1940 for housing police officers; no written requisition or lease deed is traceable in records supplied under RTI.

Payment history: Documentary material and RTI returns indicate monthly payments were made until December 2007 (last recorded rent then Rs.611/- per month) and thereafter payments ceased; no continuous written lease exists.

High Court proceedings: The appellants filed Writ Petition No.2135 of 2009; the High Court treated occupation as permissive and declined writ relief, directing appellants to pursue alternative remedies, citing the Supreme Court’s Anil Harish judgment.

Supreme Court intervention and settlement attempts: On appeal, the Supreme Court urged parties to negotiate and proposed three pragmatic remedies — market rent, purchase, or restitution. The State failed to finalize a settlement. Court noted the flats measure ~600 sq. ft. each and monthly rent historically paltry (around Rs.700/- per month current as per court-recorded enquiry). A Deputy Commissioner of Police attended and the Court required an affidavit undertaking to hand back possession within four months if relief not otherwise accorded.

Resulting grievance: Appellants asserted the injustice of being asked to litigate via ordinary suits after eight decades, and the Court found that relegation to suits would compound delay and injury.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court ought to have exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to restore possession where possession originated in 1940 without a written requisition?

ii. Whether availability of an alternative remedy (statutory remedy under rent/requisition laws) compels exclusion of writ jurisdiction as a matter of law?

iii. Whether prolonged state occupation with long non-payment of rent and practical hardship justifies invocation of constitutional jurisdiction?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellants contended that the Police Department’s occupation began as temporary requisition for housing officers in 1940 and that continued occupation for 84 years transforms the equities in favour of the owners. Possession having originally been for public exigency, restitution is due when exigency ceases.

ii. Reliance on precedents where possession taken for public purposes was held to be subject to return and where long occupation and non-payment warranted relief (citing H.D. Vora, Grahak Sanstha Manch, Roy Estate).

iii. Filing a suit would be futile and oppressive given the chronic delay, the paltry historical rent, and the State’s conduct in withholding possession and failing to maintain records.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The State argued absence of any written requisition or lease deed; documentary records show monthly payments (indicating permissive occupation under license/tenancy) till 2007, and thus the nature of occupation is disputed and fact-heavy requiring trial.

ii. Reliance on Chief Secretary v. Anil Harish to submit that where statutory remedies (e.g., Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999) are available, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction and parties should invoke statutory remedies.

iii. That the writ remedy is extraordinary and should not supplant dedicated statutory frameworks for landlord-tenant disputes.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment and directed the State to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the two flats within four months and to pay arrears of rent accrued till the date of handing over. The Court analysed facts and law: (a) it acknowledged absence of written requisition and existence of some historical payments; (b) it underscored that the exclusionary rule (avoidance of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedy) is not absolute but discretionary; (c) it placed weight on the extraordinary factual matrix — possession since 1940, dearth of records, state occupation for 84 years, and non-payment of rent for at least 18 years — and held that forcing appellants to pursue statutory or civil remedies would compound injustice and delay; (d) it distinguished Chief Secretary v. Anil Harish on facts: that case required restraint where remedy under the Rent Control Act was adequate, but the present case involved long state occupation and institutional conduct that justified immediate constitutional intervention. The Court also recorded interlocutory settlement efforts and gave the State the option to either pay market rent, purchase the property, or hand it back; when no settlement materialised, the court fixed a timeline and required an affidavit undertaking from a senior police officer. The Court reiterated constitutional primacy: constitutional powers vested in High Courts and the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by mechanical application of exclusionary rules where injustice persists. The Court awarded possession and directed computation and payment of arrears.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold. First, the High Court’s discretion to decline writ relief because an alternative statutory remedy exists is not absolute; where alternative remedies would be inadequate, oppressive, or futile, constitutional courts must exercise Article 226 powers to prevent injustice. Second, prolonged state occupation beginning in 1940 coupled with long non-payment of rent and absence of cogent records justified immediate relief by writ rather than relegation to statutory or civil proceedings that would risk further delay. Thus, when state conduct causes ongoing infringement of property rights and statutory remedies cannot yield timely or effective relief, the writ jurisdiction may and should be exercised.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed (obiter) that historical context matters — the year 1940 (colonial era exigencies) may explain how occupation arose — and that contemporaneous realities must inform equitable remedies. The Court also suggested practical approaches (market rent, purchase, restitution) as equitable solutions for state occupation of private property. It reiterated that consent settlements in other cases could not bind or be treated as precedent where facts differ. The Court emphasized that constitutional remedy is a shield against protracted injustice and delay.

c. GUIDELINES 

  1. The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not mechanically preclude exercise of Article 226; courts must assess adequacy, efficacy and fairness in the particular facts.

  2. Where the State is in long-standing occupation of private property and records are missing or incomplete, courts should scrutinize conduct and consider whether statutory remedies will provide timely redress.

  3. Courts may propose practical settlement options (market rent, purchase, or restitution) and afford a reasonable timeline for state compliance before passing coercive orders.

  4. In matters involving public authorities’ use of private property for administrative exigencies, historic context and equity ought to inform discretionary use of writ jurisdiction.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces constitutional courts’ role as guardians against entrenched injustice where formal statutory mechanisms are ill-suited to deliver effective relief. By refusing a categorical bar on writ jurisdiction merely because statutory remedies exist, the Court preserves the remedial flexibility necessary in property disputes involving long state occupation, missing records and institutional inertia. Practically, the decision signals to public authorities that prolonged permissive use of private property without clear legal foundation or fair compensation will attract judicial correction. For practitioners, the case is a careful template: plead both the statutory route and the exceptional character of the facts to invite discretion under Article 226; emphasize delay, non-payment, and state conduct. The Court’s direction to propose settlement options before coercive relief is pragmatic and balances state needs against private rights. Finally, the decision is a reminder that access to constitutional justice is vital where formal remedies are likely to be illusory, and that courts must weigh remedy adequacy rather than apply exclusionary rules mechanically.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., (Supreme Court of India) Civil Appeal No. 5098 of 2025, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 616 : 2025 INSC 484.
ii. H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 2 S.C.C. 337. (cited in judgment)
iii. Grahak Sanstha Manch & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 S.C.C. 192. (cited in judgment)
iv. Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2009) 12 S.C.C. 194. (cited in judgment)
v. Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra v. Anil Harish & Ors., Civil Appeal — (Judgment dated 15 Nov 2007). (relied upon and distinguished).
vi. Geeta Mangesh Laud & Ors. v. Appellate Authority & Principal Secretary, General Administration Deptt., 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1004. (cited in writ petition material).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India, Article 226.
ii. Maharashtra Land Requisition Act, 1948.
iii. Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
iv. Right to Information Act, 2005.

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