A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The judgment in Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. considers the scope and limits of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when the police investigation has named a person in the FIR but the investigating agency files a closure report / omits that person from the chargesheet. The Supreme Court affirms the High Court and trial court in holding that the power under Section 319 CrPC is an independent judicial power to summon any person not being the accused if, on the evidence led at trial, there emerges strong and cogent material that such person should be tried with the accused already before the court.
The Court reiterates that materials in the chargesheet or case diary are not evidence; therefore the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer cannot be determinative of the court’s exercise of power under Section 319. The decision applies the test in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (constitutional bench standard) and follows S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak to confirm that a person named in the FIR but later dropped by police may still be summoned where trial evidence, including untested examination-in-chief of a complainant, furnishes cogent grounds. The Court also observes procedural propriety: closure reports must be promptly considered by the court and not left pending unduly. Primary record relied upon is the judgment and connected trial material as reproduced in the uploaded judgment file.
Keywords: Section 319 CrPC, closure report, summoning non-charge-sheeted person, trial evidence, Hardeep Singh, FIR naming vs. chargesheet omission.
B) CASE DETAILS (IN TABLE FORM)
i) Judgment Cause Title: Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr..
ii) Case Number: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 17781 of 2024.
iii) Judgment Date: 03 January 2025.
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India (Bench of J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan).
v) Quorum: Two Judges.
vi) Author: Judgment delivered per bench (reproduced in the uploaded file).
vii) Citation: [2025] 1 S.C.R. 266 : 2025 INSC 27.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal provisions under Indian Penal Code, 1860 (ss. 302, 307, 147, 148, 149).
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None indicated.
x) Related Law Subjects: Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence Law; Procedural safeguards in trial.
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The dispute arises from an incident on 20.02.2018 where an FIR (Crime No.96/18) recorded names of seven persons, including the present petitioners. During investigation the police filed a closure report qua the petitioners while proceeding to charge-sheet other accused for offences including murder (s.302 IPC). Trial commenced and PW-3 (the first informant) in his examination-in-chief narrated the occurrence and specifically attributed overt acts to the petitioners, identifying them among those who allegedly fired upon the deceased. Reliance upon this deposition prompted the prosecution / complainant (or co-parties) to move under Section 319 CrPC for summoning the petitioners as accused to face trial with the others.
The Trial Court allowed the application and summoned the petitioners; the High Court, in Criminal Revision, upheld that order. Before the Supreme Court the core contention advanced by the petitioners was that the trial court and High Court erred by ignoring the closure report and acting despite the Investigating Officer’s opinion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute them. The Supreme Court examined settled principles governing Section 319, most notably the constitutional bench guidance in Hardeep Singh about the standard required to invoke s.319, and considered whether the evidence adduced at trial (even if not yet tested by cross-examination) sufficed to constitute the requisite strong and cogent material. The Court also inspected the content and status of the closure report and stressed the need for judicial examination of such reports without undue delay.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
On 20 February 2018, while returning from District Court, Abhishek was allegedly surrounded near LIC office at Tansen Nagar Road by a group of persons travelling in two vehicles. PW-3 Raghvendra Tomar deposed that shots were fired at Abhishek, multiple persons acted with a common intention to kill, and that the petitioners were among those who fired. The FIR recorded names of seven individuals including the petitioners.
After investigation the police prepared charge-sheets against several accused but filed a closure report in respect of the petitioners stating that sufficient evidence to prosecute them was not found; the closure report details bank CCTV checks, witnesses’ statements and call detail records said to displace the petitioners from the scene. Trial proceeded; PW-3’s examination-in-chief repeated the FIR narrative and specifically identified the petitioners and attributed overt acts. On the basis of this trial-evidence an application under Section 319 CrPC was moved to summon the petitioners; the Trial Court allowed it and the High Court affirmed. The closure report remained on record but was not accepted and had not been disposed of at the time of the s.319 order.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether a trial court may summon as accused persons who were named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted, when a closure report has been filed by the police exonerating them?
ii. What is the correct standard of satisfaction to invoke Section 319 CrPC — can untested examination-in-chief suffice?
iii. Whether the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer (manifested by a closure report) is binding on the Court at the stage of summoning under Section 319?
iv. What procedural obligation does a court have when a closure report is placed on record but not disposed of?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Petitioners / Appellants submitted that the Trial Court erred in summoning the petitioners ignoring the closure report prepared by the Investigating Officer which categorically recorded lack of evidence against them. They argued that the police, being the primary fact-finder, had investigated CCTV and CDR material and witness statements which exculpated the petitioners; therefore judicial interference to add persons as accused would imperil the investigation’s findings and violate principles of fairness and procedural propriety. It was urged that allowing Section 319 to be triggered on the basis of untested or mere narrative deposition would displace the statutory balance between police investigation and judicial process.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Respondent submitted that Section 319 confers an independent judicial power and the court must act where strong and cogent evidence emerges at trial. Reliance was placed upon PW-3’s examination-in-chief which identified the petitioners and attributed overt acts; the respondent argued that materials in the chargesheet or closure report do not constitute evidence and cannot bind the court where trial testimony furnishes grounds to summon a person. It was also argued that the closure report had not been accepted by the trial court and therefore could not thwart invocation of Section 319 when trial evidence establishes a case more than mere probability.
H) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the High Court and trial court orders summoning the petitioners under Section 319 CrPC. The Court applied the constitutional bench standard in Hardeep Singh that the power under s.319 is discretionary and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly but where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court. The Court clarified that the standard for s.319 is more than a prima facie case yet short of the satisfaction necessary for conviction at trial; untested deposition can be relied upon where it furnishes robust material pointing to the proposed accused.
The Court held that materials in the chargesheet and case diary do not amount to evidence; therefore the Investigating Officer’s satisfaction (or inverse, a closure report) is not determinative and cannot preclude the Court from invoking s.319 when evidence arises at trial. Citing S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak the Court reiterated that when a person is named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted, the court is not powerless; s.319 may be triggered during trial if evidence surfaces implicating that person.
The Court observed that the closure report in the record had not been accepted and stressed that courts should promptly consider closure reports rather than leave them pending. The Court concluded there was no error of law in the appellate courts’ approach and allowed the prosecution of the petitioners to proceed subject to all defenses available to them, including placing reliance upon the closure report before the trial court.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The operative ratio is that Section 319 CrPC empowers a trial court to summon any person not being the accused to face trial if, from the evidence adduced before the court, the court is satisfied there are strong and cogent grounds to include that person. This jurisdiction is not curtailed by the Investigating Officer’s decision to omit the person from the chargesheet or by the presence of a closure report; the court must base its exercise on evidence produced at trial (not on case diary or chargesheet materials).
The appropriate threshold is higher than a mere prima facie suspicion but lower than the quantum required for conviction the evidence, if unrebutted, should be capable of leading to conviction. The Court thereby protects the prosecutorial function of the court to pursue persons shown by trial evidence to be culpable, preventing immunity by virtue of investigative omissions.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed obiter that while s.319 remains potent, it must be exercised sparingly and judicially. The Court recommended procedural discipline: when a closure report is filed, the court should promptly consider it and pass an appropriate order after hearing the defacto-complainant rather than allow prolonged pendency. The judgment also signals that reliability of complainant testimony will be relevant; where such testimony is cogent, the Investigating Officer’s contrary satisfaction is of minimal consequence.
c. GUIDELINES
The Court articulated practical guidance:
(i) the threshold for s.319 is “more than prima facie” but less than conviction standard;
(ii) evidence before the trial court not chargesheet/case diary is the proper basis to invoke s.319;
(iii) naming in FIR does not impose a bar if police dropped the person, provided trial evidence surfaces implicating them;
(iv) courts should promptly decide closure reports and afford the complainant opportunity to file protest petitions;
(v) accused have full liberty to deploy defenses at trial, including reliance on closure reports and investigative materials. These guideposts balance judicial responsibility to include implicated persons with procedural safeguards against casual additions.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment reaffirms a pragmatic separation between investigative conclusions and judicial fact-finding at trial. It preserves the court’s supervisory and accusatorial function under Section 319 CrPC to ensure that persons implicated by credible trial evidence cannot escape trial by virtue of investigative omissions. Simultaneously, the Court’s insistence on strong and cogent evidence and admonition to exercise s.319 sparingly supply a necessary check against arbitrary additions.
The direction to dispose of closure reports promptly advances procedural fairness for both complainant and accused. Practically, the ruling signals to trial courts to scrutinize live evidence including untested examination-in-chief with care, and to weigh it against investigative materials only as admissible evidence. The verdict strengthens prosecutorial completeness without obliterating rights of the accused to challenge evidence and to rely on closure reports.
For practitioners, the decision underscores that applications under s.319 must be supported by trial evidence capable of meeting the heightened prima facie standard described in Hardeep Singh, and that investigative exoneration is not an absolute bar to judicial action.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 S.C.C. 92.
ii. Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2021) 12 S.C.C. 608.
iii. S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak, (2017) 16 S.C.C. 226.
iv. Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 17781 of 2024, Supreme Court of India, Judgment dated 03 January 2025.
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.319.
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss.302, 307, 147, 148, 149.
