A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd., [1952 SCR 391], categorically held that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution of India protect citizens’ rights to property only against State action, not violations by private individuals. The Court dismissed a petition filed under Article 32 by the petitioner seeking enforcement of fundamental rights alleging wrongful deprivation of property by a private banking company. The Court emphasized that remedies for such private wrongs must lie in ordinary civil law and not under constitutional writ jurisdiction. This ruling established a crucial constitutional boundary distinguishing between private wrongs and State-inflicted violations of fundamental rights.

This judgment set a precedent reinforcing the concept that writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is available only when a breach of fundamental rights is caused by “State” action, not otherwise. The Court’s reliance on constitutional interpretation, legislative history, and doctrinal understanding of private vs public action deepened jurisprudence on constitutional remedies.

Keywords: Article 32, Fundamental Rights, Article 19(1)(f), Article 31(1), Private Wrong, Property Rights, Constitutional Remedies, Writ Petition, State Action, Supreme Court.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd.

ii) Case Number: Petition No. 328 of 1951

iii) Judgement Date: 21st December, 1951

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mehr Chand Mahajan J., B.K. Mukherjea J., S.R. Das J., N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.

vi) Author: Patanjali Sastri, C.J.

vii) Citation: [1952] SCR 391

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Article 32, Article 19(1)(f), Article 31(1) of the Constitution of India, Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any): None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Property Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The constitutional remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution is extraordinary and restricted to the enforcement of fundamental rights against State infringement. In P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd., the petitioner approached the Supreme Court alleging that his rights under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1) had been infringed by a private bank through unauthorized sale of his shares. The matter revolved around the interpretation and applicability of constitutional protections of property rights when the impugned acts were committed by non-State actors. This case arose in the early days of Indian constitutional jurisprudence, testing the scope of the newly established fundamental rights and the corresponding remedies.

The judgment examined whether a private wrong could be redressed under the garb of a fundamental rights violation. In doing so, it delineated the contours of judicial review and the scope of Article 32, a central feature of India’s constitutional framework. The Court reinforced the idea that constitutional safeguards are against actions by “State” or “instrumentality of State” and not against private entities. This provided an important doctrinal foundation for future interpretations of fundamental rights enforcement.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, P.D. Shamdasani, held five shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882. The bank purportedly exercised its lien rights over those shares to recover a debt allegedly owed by Shamdasani and sold the shares to a third party. The transfer was duly recorded in the bank’s books in 1937.

Dissatisfied with the sale, the petitioner initiated several legal proceedings in the Bombay High Court challenging the legitimacy of the bank’s actions. The final case was dismissed in 1951 on the ground of limitation under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rather than appeal the decision, the petitioner moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking enforcement of his fundamental rights, alleging that the bank’s actions infringed upon his property rights under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1). The petitioner also requested writs directing the High Court to rehear the suit and deliver judgment against the bank. However, the petitioner admitted he did not appeal as he believed the High Court judges were biased.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a private individual’s action can violate fundamental rights protected under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution.

ii) Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable against a private entity for deprivation of property rights.

iii) Whether the judiciary can enforce private rights violations through public constitutional remedies.

F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The petitioner contended that the Central Bank, by exercising a lien and selling his shares, violated his fundamental right to property. He asserted that Article 19(1)(f) protected his right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and the bank’s action directly infringed that right.

He further argued that Article 31(1) provided a safeguard against deprivation of property “save by authority of law,” and since no lawful process was followed in selling his shares, his rights were breached. The petitioner also emphasized the omission of the word “State” in Article 31(1) as compared to Article 31(2) to argue that private violations could also fall within its ambit.

Additionally, he cited legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule—Entry 33 (Union List), Entry 36 (State List), and Entry 42 (Concurrent List)—to suggest that no specific provision authorized State action for depriving property, hence the protection under Article 31(1) must apply even to private conduct.

Relying on observations in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, [1950 SCR 869], the petitioner maintained that Article 31(1) enshrined a general principle distinct from acquisition under clause (2), and that it extended to all forms of deprivation, not merely those executed by the State.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The Solicitor-General, appearing for the Central Bank, challenged the maintainability of the petition under Article 32. He contended that fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) were enforceable only against State action. The bank, being a private corporate entity, could not be equated with the “State” or its instrumentalities as defined under Article 12.

He argued that Article 19(1)(f)—like other sub-clauses of Article 19(1)—was designed to protect individuals from encroachments by the State, not private wrongs. The respondent emphasized that the Constitution offers no remedy under Article 32 against private persons or companies. The petitioner had, in fact, wrongly chosen a constitutional remedy where civil litigation was the appropriate course.

The Solicitor-General also stressed that Article 31(1), despite not mentioning “State” explicitly, must be interpreted in light of its structure and context within Part III. Only State-initiated deprivation of property without lawful authority would invoke the article.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 32: Provides the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights.
ii) Article 19(1)(f) (now repealed): Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
iii) Article 31(1) (now repealed): No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
iv) Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC: Court can reject plaint if barred by law.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court held that both Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1) are applicable only against State action. These provisions do not cover violations by private individuals or private entities. It ruled that wrongful actions by private persons must be challenged under ordinary civil or criminal law, not by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 32. The Court reasoned that the omission of the term “State” in Article 31(1) did not imply coverage of private wrongs. The phrase “save by authority of law” inherently connotes State action, not private conduct. The Court also dismissed the argument that legislative entries suggest a broader reading of Article 31(1).

b. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)

The Court observed that Article 21, despite lacking the term “State”, clearly applies only to State violations, as evident from the requirement of “procedure established by law”. Similarly, Article 31(1) implicitly presumes State involvement in deprivation of property.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Writ under Article 32 cannot lie against private individuals or companies.

• Property rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) are not enforceable against private wrongs.

• Ordinary legal remedies must be pursued for private disputes involving property.

• “Authority of law” in Article 31(1) indicates governmental action, not private actions.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision in P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. laid down a foundational principle distinguishing private and State action in the context of fundamental rights. It closed the door on any confusion regarding the enforceability of constitutional rights against private parties. It also reinforced the importance of judicial discipline in adhering to the scheme of Part III of the Constitution. The Court rightly emphasized the necessity of using the appropriate legal forum, i.e., civil courts for private wrongs. This case remains a landmark for understanding the scope and limitations of constitutional remedies under Article 32.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Constitution of India, Articles 19(1)(f), 31(1), 32, 12, 21
ii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 7 Rule 11(d)
iii) Indian Companies Act, 1882
iv) Government of India Act, 1935, Section 299(1)