A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1060 : 2025 INSC 212, examines whether prolonged officiating service rendered by employees appointed temporarily as Assistant Executive Engineers (AEEs) between 1990–1992 must be counted for cadre seniority vis-à-vis candidates regularly selected through the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) in 1997. The State regularised the services of temporary AEEs by G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005) but placed them below the last regularly selected AEE; on representations the State issued G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006) entitling the 1990–1992 batch to seniority from their date of initial induction.

Aggrieved regular appointees challenged G.O.M. No. 262 and the High Court quashed it. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court. Applying the twofold test distilled in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra

(A) where initial appointment is ad-hoc/stop-gap officiation does not count;

(B) where initial appointment was not under rules but incumbents served uninterruptedly until lawful regularisation officiation counts the Court held the appellants fall under Proposition (B).

The judgment emphasises:

(i) the factual matrix of project-based sanctioned posts under G.O.M. No. 540 (30.08.1990) and G.O.M. No. 391 (30.06.1994),

(ii) absence of selection rules at the time of appointment,

(iii) long uninterrupted service until regularisation in 2005, and

(iv) that functus officio and requirement of individual hearings do not fetter the executive’s rule-making/policy power.

The Court therefore upheld counting officiating service (1990–2005) for seniority, set aside the High Court order and validated G.O.M. No. 262.

Keywords: Seniority; Officiating service; Regularisation; Functus officio; Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments) Act, 1994; G.O.M. No. 234; G.O.M. No. 262; Direct Recruit (1990) 2 SCC 715.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arises from a project-driven recruitment during the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project (CERP): engineers already in service as Work Inspectors were appointed temporarily as AEEs in 1992 under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the State & Subordinate Service Rules to meet urgent public exigencies. The Act of 1994 (retroactive to 25.11.1993) introduced a statutory recruitment architecture administered by APPSC. Between 1993–1997 regular selections occurred and candidates appointed through APPSC (1997 batch) claimed seniority over the earlier temporary incumbents. Long-running representations and tribunal proceedings culminated in G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005) regularising 1990–1995 temporary AEEs but placing them below the last regular appointee; subsequent representations led to G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006) which differentiated the 1990–1992 batch and granted them seniority from initial induction.

Litigation ensued: APAT decisions, High Court quashing G.O.M. No. 262 (finding functus officio and audi-alteram lacuna), and finally the Supreme Court’s analysis on the character of the initial appointment, precedential tests from Direct Recruit (1990) and allied authorities, and administrative law limits on functus officio and pre-promulgation hearings. The case thus engages doctrine (A vs B propositions) on counting officiating service, executive policy flexibility, and the interplay between statutory rule-making and principles of natural justice.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants were appointed as Work Inspectors on 1 Jan 1990 and possessed engineering degrees. G.O.M. No. 540 (30.08.1990) sanctioned 386 AEE posts under CERP; due to manpower exigency the Department appointed several Work Inspectors as temporary AEEs on 5 Dec 1992 under Rule 10(a)(i)(1). The appointment orders expressly described these as temporary and noted the project basis and that the posts could be terminated. The Act of 1994 and later APPSC notifications produced regular recruitments, with the 1997 batch selected through APPSC after Notification No. 8/1995.

Temporary AEEs served uninterruptedly for long periods; representations for regularisation began in 1995 and protracted tribunal litigation followed. G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005) regularised temporary AEEs (1990–1995) but placed them below the last regular APPSC selectee. Aggrieved, the 1990–1992 cohort sought classification based on pre-1994 appointment; the State issued G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006) granting seniority from initial induction to 1990–1992 appointees. Regular appointees (1997 batch) challenged G.O.M. No. 262; High Court quashed it citing functus officio and absence of hearing.

Supreme Court reversed: found absence of selection rules at appointment time, continuous service till regularisation, and therefore application of Proposition (B); further held functus officio and requirement of hearings were inapplicable to this rule-making exercise.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the period of officiating service (1990–2005) of temporarily appointed AEEs in the 1990–1992 batch must be counted for the purpose of cadre seniority vis-à-vis candidates regularly selected in 1997?

2. Whether the initial appointments (1990–1992) were ad-hoc/stop-gap de hors the rules or lawful temporary appointments under the Service Rules?

3. Whether the State Government, after issuing G.O.M. No. 234 (regularisation), became functus officio and lost competence to modify seniority by G.O.M. No. 262?

4. Whether affected regular recruits were entitled to prior individual hearing before issuance of a policy G.O.M. altering seniority?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner/Appellants submitted that the appellants were lawfully appointed as temporary AEEs under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) to meet project exigency in 1992 and not by backdoor or de hors procedures. They emphasised that no selection rules existed in the Panchayat Raj Department when appointments occurred, the incumbents served uninterruptedly till regularisation by G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005), and therefore their case squarely falls under Proposition (B) of Direct Recruit (1990) entitling them to seniority from initial induction. Counsel argued the delay in regularisation was attributable to the need to frame/amend rules and that appellants cannot be penalised for executive delay.

They further contended G.O.M. No. 262 was a policy decision within the State’s rule-making domain and not prevented by functus officio; absence of individual hearings did not invalidate the rule given the public-policy context and settled precedents allowing administrative flexibility.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondents submitted that the appellants’ initial appointments were ad-hoc/stop-gap and not made according to any selection rules; the APPSC provided opportunities for regular selection (Notifications 1990 & 1995) which appellants did not utilise. They argued that regular recruits appointed after due selection (1997) were entitled to seniority over temporary incumbents and that G.O.M. No. 234 was a final executive decision; the State having fixed seniority became functus officio and could not alter it by G.O.M. No. 262. Counsel urged that G.O.M. No. 262 affected vested expectations of regular recruits and was issued without affording them hearing, contravening audi alteram partem in the administrative context.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Rule 10(a)(i)(1), Andhra Pradesh State & Subordinate Service Rules (temporary appointments in public interest).

2. Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994 (recruitment via APPSC).

3. G.O.M. No. 540 (30.08.1990); G.O.M. No. 391 (30.06.1994); G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005); G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006).

4. Precedents: Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Ass’n v. State of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Santosh Kumar v. State of A.P. (2003) 5 SCC 511; Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa (2014) 4 SCC 583.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court conducted a fact-sensitive application of Direct Recruit (1990). It first held as fact that no selection rules for AEEs were in force in the Panchayat Raj Department at the time of the 1992 appointments and that those appointments were made pursuant to G.O.M. No. 540 for project needs under Rule 10(a)(i) hence not de hors the rules. The Court contrasted G.O.M. No. 540 (which lacked conditional reversion/selection-by-APPSC clause) with G.O.M. No. 1289 (10.08.1994) (which explicitly linked appointment continuation to APPSC selection), finding a different legal character between the two categories.

It relied on G.O.M. No. 391 (30.06.1994) to evidence executive intent to absorb project staff into regular divisions, supporting continuity, not mere stop-gap service. Given continuous, uninterrupted officiation until regularisation in 2005, the Court placed the appellants under Proposition (B): officiating service counts for seniority.

On functus officio, the Court emphasised the distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial finality and policy/rule-making flexibility of the executive under Art. 245. It held application of functus officio to rule-making would unduly cripple governance, following the reasoning in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. UOI (2023). Accordingly, G.O.M. No. 262 was a valid exercise of executive policy power and not ultra vires.

Regarding natural justice, the Court invoked Tulsiram Patel and Patel Engg. Ltd. to hold that audi may be excluded where prompt or policy action requires or where statute/structure so warrants; thus absence of individual hearing before a policy G.O.M. did not invalidate G.O.M. No. 262. The aggregate conclusion: G.O.M. No. 262 validly counted officiating service (1990–2005) for seniority; High Court’s quashing was unsustainable. Appeals allowed; High Court order set aside.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold:

(i) where initial appointment was not per selection rules but incumbents continued uninterruptedly until lawful regularisation, the period of officiation is to be counted for seniority (application of Proposition (B) from Direct Recruit (1990));

(ii) administrative/policy decisions involving seniority are within the executive’s rule-making domain and are not fettered by functus officio or a blanket pre-hearing entitlement when exigencies of governance and established precedents permit exclusion of prior hearing.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court commented obiter that categorisation based on date of appointment relative to statutory regimes (pre/post Act of 1994) may be legitimate if supported by rational executive considerations and that long executive inaction resulting from rule-making delays cannot be visited as a penalty on employees who performed duties in good faith. Also noted: policy choices affecting large classes do not ordinarily require individual notices to each affected person.

c. GUIDELINES

1. When initial appointment lacks prescribed selection procedure but incumbents serve uninterruptedly until regularisation, count officiating service for seniority.

2. Differentiate appointments by the terms of the sanctioning G.O.M.; conditional clauses linking retention to future APPSC selection alter legal character.

3. Executive rule-making modifying seniority is permissible; functus officio ordinarily does not bar later policy revision.

4. Audi may be excluded in class-based policy decisions where prior notice would frustrate administrative purpose; courts will examine proportionality and reasoned basis of executive action.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment reaffirms a pragmatic, fact-oriented approach to seniority disputes in public employment. It reiterates Direct Recruit (1990)’s pragmatic bifurcation and applies it to a long-running administrative reality where projects, absence of selection rules, and prolonged uninterrupted service produced legitimate expectations. The Court balanced employees’ legitimate career expectations against rule-of-law norms by focusing on the nature of the original appointment, continuity of service, and finality of executive regularisation.

Important administrative-law principles were clarified: functus officio does not straitjacket executive policy revision; procedural audi rights are not absolute in mass policy decisions; and G.O.s reflecting rational classification and remedial equity are sustainable. For practitioners, the case underscores meticulous factual pleading (documenting terms of the G.O.s, continuity of service, absence/presence of rule-based conditions) and highlights the continuing judicial deference to executive competence in cadre management provided decisions are reasoned and within statutory competence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1060 : 2025 INSC 212.

2. Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 (also reported at [1990] 2 SCR 900).

3. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 (Supp. 2 SCR 131).

4. Santosh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2003) 5 SCC 511 (Supp. 1 SCR 264).

5. Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2014) 4 SCC 583 ( [2014] 2 SCR 1031 ).

6. Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 257.

7. Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 309.

b. Important Statutes / Rules Referred

1. Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994.

2. Andhra Pradesh State & Subordinate Service Rules, (Rule 10(a)(i)(1) & Rule 25/47 references in judgment).

3. G.O.M. No. 540 (30.08.1990); G.O.M. No. 391 (30.06.1994); G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005); G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006).