A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others examines the constitutional validity of appointments made to public service posts in deviation from the merit list prepared under statutory recruitment rules. The Supreme Court was confronted with a complex service law dispute arising from a prolonged recruitment process initiated in 1999 for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive) in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The litigation spanned over two decades and involved three distinct rounds of judicial scrutiny.

The core controversy centered on whether appointments granted to twenty-two candidates—who were admittedly lower in merit than the appellants—could be sustained when such appointments were made pursuant to a concession recorded by the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings, and not strictly in accordance with the redrawn State-wise merit list. The appellants invoked Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, contending that denial of appointment to more meritorious candidates amounted to arbitrariness and hostile discrimination.

The Court undertook an elaborate analysis of the doctrine of negative equality, reiterating that illegality or irregularity committed in favour of one candidate cannot be relied upon by others to claim similar relief. While holding that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were irregular and not in conformity with recruitment rules, the Court declined to disturb them on equitable considerations, including long years of service, bonafide state action, and the need to bring quietus to prolonged litigation. The judgment draws a critical distinction between illegal and irregular appointments and reinforces settled principles governing public employment, merit-based selection, and constitutional equality.

Keywords:
Service jurisprudence; Negative equality; Merit-based appointment; Irregular appointments; Article 14 of the Constitution

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arose out of a recruitment process initiated by the Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir through an advertisement dated 25 February 1999 for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive). The post formed part of the State cadre and was governed by the J&K Police (Executive) Rules. The recruitment process, instead of culminating in a final selection within a reasonable period, became embroiled in multiple rounds of litigation due to deviations from statutory procedure.

The foundational illegality stemmed from the preparation of province-wise merit lists for Jammu and Kashmir provinces, despite the absence of any statutory sanction for such bifurcation. This deviation triggered the first round of litigation, culminating in directions from the High Court to redraw a State-wise merit list. Subsequent compliance led to cancellation of appointments of forty-seven serving candidates, thereby initiating a second round of litigation.

In an attempt to resolve the escalating dispute, a concession was recorded before the Supreme Court in 2007, wherein the State undertook to accommodate not only the forty-seven ousted candidates but also twenty-two impleaded candidates. This concession later became the fulcrum of the third round of litigation, when candidates higher in merit challenged the appointment of the twenty-two candidates.

The present appeals questioned whether such appointments could be constitutionally sustained when they violated the settled principle that public employment must strictly adhere to merit. The case thus required reconciliation of constitutional equality with equitable considerations arising from prolonged service and administrative bonafides.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The recruitment process commenced with an advertisement issued on 25 February 1999, inviting applications for Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive). The Rules did not contemplate provincial segregation of merit. However, the selecting authority prepared separate merit lists for Jammu and Kashmir provinces. This resulted in differential cut-off marks, with the last selected candidate in Jammu securing 56 marks, while in Kashmir the cut-off was 50 marks.

Aggrieved candidates challenged this approach in SWP No. 567/2000. The Single Judge held that the post being a State cadre post, the selection ought to have been State-wide. The Division Bench modified the relief and directed preparation of a fresh State-wise merit list, protecting those candidates who fell within the merit zone.

Pursuant to these directions, a revised merit list dated 19 May 2004 was issued, resulting in appointment of 259 candidates and cancellation of appointments of 47 serving candidates. These candidates challenged their removal and obtained interim protection. Contempt proceedings followed, culminating in a High Court direction that those outside the merit zone could not continue.

When the matter reached the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4758 of 2006, a statement by the Advocate General was recorded that 47 ousted candidates and 22 impleaded candidates would be accommodated. No legal issue was adjudicated at that stage.

Subsequently, the State appointed the 22 candidates in 2008. This led to the third round of litigation, initiated by candidates who were higher in merit than the appointed twenty-two candidates. The Single Judge ruled in their favour, but the Division Bench reversed the decision, holding that the Supreme Court order operated under Article 142. This finding was challenged before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether appointments made contrary to the order of merit violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
ii. Whether the doctrine of negative equality permits extension of an irregular benefit to others?
iii. Whether the Supreme Court’s order dated 10 May 2007 amounted to an exercise of power under Article 142?
iv. Whether long years of service can validate otherwise irregular appointments?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that appointments to public posts must strictly follow the order of merit as mandated by statutory recruitment rules. It was argued that appointment of candidates lower in merit, while excluding the appellants, amounted to hostile discrimination under Article 14.

It was contended that the order dated 10 May 2007 merely recorded a concession by the Advocate General and did not adjudicate any legal issue. Therefore, the State could not rely upon it to justify appointments dehors the rules. The appellants emphasized that they were not seeking removal of the twenty-two candidates but sought fair consideration for appointment or adjustment against available vacancies.

The appellants further argued that denial of appointment caused continuing injustice and mental agony, particularly when vacancies were admittedly available.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents submitted that the appointments were made in exceptional circumstances to resolve prolonged litigation. It was highlighted that the forty-seven candidates had undergone extensive training and participated in anti-insurgency operations, and their removal would have adverse consequences.

It was argued that the twenty-two candidates had litigated for years and were accommodated bonafide. The respondents stressed that the appellants were not the next candidates in the merit queue and could not claim a vested right.

Reliance was placed on settled law that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality and that courts may mould relief to balance equity and legality.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court held that recruitment to public posts must ordinarily be made strictly in accordance with statutory rules and merit lists. Any deviation violates Articles 14 and 16. However, the Court emphasized that not every deviation renders an appointment illegal.

The Court clarified that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were irregular, as they were not made strictly in accordance with the redrawn merit list. Yet, they were not illegal, as they were made pursuant to a bonafide concession recorded by the Court during ongoing litigation.

The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the appointments were made under Article 142, holding that the order dated 10 May 2007 merely recorded a concession and did not invoke constitutional powers.

Relying on precedents such as State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, Arup Das v. State of Assam, and Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, the Court reiterated that an erroneous act cannot be the foundation for perpetuating further illegality.

Considering that the twenty-two candidates had completed over twelve years of service and had gained substantial experience, the Court declined to disturb their appointments. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that Article 14 embodies positive equality, not negative equality. An irregular appointment, even if constitutionally suspect, does not entitle others to claim similar relief. Public employment must be merit-based, yet courts may exercise equitable discretion where disturbing appointments would cause greater injustice than upholding them.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that prolonged recruitment processes undermine administrative efficiency and erode faith in public institutions. It expressed concern that a recruitment initiated in 1999 remained unresolved after twenty-one years, leaving candidates in perpetual uncertainty.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Recruitment authorities must strictly adhere to statutory recruitment rules.
ii. Merit lists must not be altered except in accordance with law.
iii. Courts may distinguish between illegal and irregular appointments.
iv. Negative equality cannot be claimed to perpetuate an error.
v. Equitable relief may be moulded considering long service and bonafide state action.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a careful balance between constitutional discipline and equitable justice. While reaffirming the sanctity of merit-based public employment, the Court pragmatically acknowledged the human and administrative costs of unsettling long-standing appointments. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on negative equality while cautioning the State against procedural deviations that give rise to avoidable litigation.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : [2006] 2 SCR 877
ii. Arup Das v. State of Assam, (2012) 5 SCC 559 : [2012] 1 SCR 445
iii. Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422 : [2010] 1 SCR 1099
iv. Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers’ Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) Supp 2 SCC 591
v. Buddhi Nath Chaudhary v. Abahi Kumar, (2001) 3 SCC 328

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India – Articles 14, 16, 226, 142