A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., Civil Appeals Nos. 3640–3642 of 2025 (J. J.B. Pardiwala and Pankaj Mithal) examines the scope of Section 47 CPC read with Order XXI, Rules 35, 97–103 CPC when a decree-holder’s attempt to obtain possession is resisted by third-party occupants who claim to be cultivating tenants protected under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955.

The core questions were:

(i) whether the executing court and High Court erred in upholding objections by respondent-occupants who claimed possessory rights as cultivating tenants,

(ii) whether those occupants could claim protection under the 1955 Act such that the decree would be a nullity for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court analysed the special code in Order XXI (esp. Rr.97 & 101) which empowers the executing court to determine, in execution proceedings themselves, all questions relevant to adjudication of resistance or dispossession including questions of right, title or interest and contrasted that procedural competence with the general provision in s.47 CPC.

The Court found that the occupants (respondent Nos.1 & 2) had remained passive through the main suit and subsequent appeals, failed to produce cogent documentary proof of bona fide status as cultivating tenants, and that there was material to infer collusion between the vendors and these occupants to frustrate execution. The High Court’s refusal to permit amendments to the execution petition and its acceptance of the occupants’ objections were held to be erroneous; the appeals were allowed and directions were given for possession to be delivered to decree-holders within two months.

Keywords: Section 47 CPC; Order XXI Rr.97–103 CPC; Execution petition; Cultivating tenants; Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955; Obstruction/resistance in execution; Collusion; Amendment of execution pleadings; Decree-holder’s right to possession.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeals sprung from a long-running suit for specific performance (O.S. No.514/1983) in which a decree for specific performance with possession was ultimately confirmed in favour of the purchasers (appellants). After culmination of appellate remedies, the executing court recorded difficulties in giving possession because two persons (respondent Nos.1 & 2) physically obstructed delivery and claimed independent possessory rights as cultivating tenants. They were impleaded in the original suit but did not contest it; later they filed an application under s.47 CPC (in substance an Order XXI r.97 application) asserting possession and seeking protection.

The executing court accepted their application; the High Court affirmed. Appellants challenged those orders in revision and this Court heard whether the executing court could decide such questions in execution proceedings, and whether the respondents could claim protection under the 1955 Act so as to render the decree unenforceable. The Constitutional bench emphasised that Order XXI forms a complete code for adjudicating resistance/obstruction and that executing courts possess jurisdiction to determine relevant right, title and interest questions arising in that limited execution context but only to the extent those issues are germane to execution (i.e., subsequent or contemporaneous facts relevant to the execution).

The Court also scrutinised the conduct of the respondents, their failure to contest earlier proceedings, the timing and quality of revenue records relied upon, and the spectre of collusion. On facts, the Court found respondents’ claims weak and the High Court’s reliance on them unsustainable; it therefore allowed the appeals and directed immediate possession to be given to decree-holders.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The original agreement of sale dated 30.06.1980 required balance payment and execution of sale deed; plaintiffs sued for specific performance when vendors failed to execute the deed. Respondent Nos.1 & 2 were nephews inducted into the land and impleaded as defendants though they chose not to contest; decree for specific performance was passed on 02.04.1986. Subsequent appeals by vendors were dismissed and SLPs were rejected; decree confirmed and appellants deposited consideration as directed. Execution proceeded and a sale deed was executed by the court in favour of appellants (names of respondents 1 & 2 were earlier included but later removed by rectification at vendors’ insistence).

When the executing court attempted physical delivery (12.02.2008), respondent No.1 violently obstructed it (even threatened self-immolation) and later filed s.47 application claiming long possession and entitlement as cultivating tenants; tehsildar/RDO actions recorded possession in 2008 but refused retrospective entries from 1974. The executing court (and later High Court) accepted respondents’ application and held appellants must obtain possession only by separate legal proceedings; appellants challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. The record showed respondents had not participated in original suit appeals and produced no independent documentary proof of tenant status for the relevant antecedent periods; revenue entries were limited and came after the decree.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether an executing court can adjudicate objections by a third-party occupant under Order XXI, r.97 and s.47 CPC to determine right, title or interest relevant to execution?
ii. Whether respondent Nos.1 & 2, claiming to be cultivating tenants, are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 so as to divest the civil court of jurisdiction to evict them in execution?
iii. Whether the executing court and High Court were justified in upholding respondents’ s.47 objections given their non-participation in earlier proceedings and the documentary record?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants submitted that:

(i) s.47 CPC and Order XXI permit the executing court to decide execution-related questions but the respondents had to raise substantive defences earlier; their belated objections were tactical;

(ii) Order XXI R.22 shows notice to debtors is not mandatory when execution follows within two years; appellants had moved promptly;

(iii) respondents had been parties but remained passive through trial and appeals, so they cannot now collaterally attack the decree;

(iv) revenue entries relied upon were belated (2008) and produced only after the decree indicia of collusion;

(v) amendment to execution petition to seek possession against respondents should have been permitted to avoid defeat of decree by technicality.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Respondents contended that:

(i) the decree travelled beyond the judgment and lacked clear operative effect against their independent possession;

(ii) appellants did not pursue effective proceedings against them specifically for possession;

(iii) they had been in uninterrupted possession since 1967 and enjoyed revenue recognition (certificates/cultivation accounts);

(iv) civil courts lacked jurisdiction to evict bona fide cultivating tenants protected by the 1955 Act;

(v) Sunder Dass and similar authorities permit challenge to decrees that are nullities for want of jurisdiction even at execution stage.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court addressed three interlinked strands: (A) statutory scope of s.47 CPC vis-à-vis Order XXI Rr.97 & 101; (B) the nature and quality of respondents’ possessory claim and tenant protection; and (C) the procedural fairness and conduct of parties.

(A) Statutory Interpretation. The Court reaffirmed that s.47 is a general provision requiring courts executing decrees to determine questions that relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree; Order XXI, Rr.97–101 apply specifically to execution for possession where resistance arises. A harmonious construction shows that executing courts can decide questions of right, title or interest that are relevant to adjudication under r.101, but such determinations must be confined to matters arising subsequent to or germane to execution and must not permit undermining of the decree itself. The statutory scheme was described as a complete code — an executing court can, on an r.97 application, hold a full-fledged inquiry and its order shall have the force of a decree (r.103). The Court reiterated precedents (e.g., Shreenath, Brahmdeo Chaudhary, NSS Narayan Sarma) which construed “any person” in r.97 to include strangers asserting independent rights and that the executing court need not be helpless when faced with obstruction.

(B) On Tenant Protection and Jurisdiction. The Court examined the respondents’ revenue records and conduct. It held that mere inclusion of names in cultivation accounts in 2008, or a certificate, does not ipso facto create an independent possessory right that can defeat a prior decree, especially where the occupants had not been registered as tenants for the period they asserted and where the certifying acts post-dated the decree. The Court found strong indicators of collusion: respondents were nephews of vendors; names were deleted from the execution sale deed at vendors’ instance; respondents had not contested the main suit or appeals; and key documentary proof was lacking. On this factual matrix, respondents could not be regarded as bona fide cultivating tenants whose eviction would be barred by the 1955 Act for the relevant period. Thus the claim that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to evict them failed.

(C) Procedural Relief and Amendment. The Supreme Court found the High Court erred in rejecting the appellants’ amendment application to include possession relief against respondents: allowing the amendment was necessary to effectuate the decree and avoid frustration by technicalities. The Court therefore set aside the impugned orders, allowed the appeals, and directed the executing court to deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the appellants within two months, using police assistance if necessary. It also issued administrative directions to High Courts to collect execution-pendency data and ensure execution petitions are disposed of within six months in accordance with guidance in Rahul S. Shah.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

(1) Order XXI R.97 read with R.101 empowers executing courts to adjudicate objections by any person (including strangers) who resists execution and to decide questions of right, title or interest relevant to that adjudication; such orders have the force of decrees (R.103).

(2) s.47 CPC must be read harmoniously with Order XXI: only questions germane to execution (arising subsequent to or relevant to execution) fall within the executing court’s competence; matters which were open and could/should have been raised in the original suit cannot generally be allowed to be re-litigated in execution if that would undermine the decree.

(3) A claimant to tenant protection under special tenancy legislation must prove status and continuity; belated or collusive documentary entries will not automatically displace a decretal right.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court emphasised procedural maxims: rules are vehicles of justice not traps; amendment to execution pleadings to effectuate a decree should be permitted where justice so requires. The Court warned against collusive conduct that thwarts decrees and reiterated administrative concern over delay in execution ordering High Courts to collect data and ensure execution petitions are completed within six months as per earlier guidance.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Executing courts must adjudicate r.97 applications fully and may decide questions of right, title or interest relevant to execution; such orders will be treated as decrees (Order XXI, Rr.97–103).

2. s.47 and Order XXI should be read harmoniously: executing courts decide execution-connected questions only.

3. Courts should be alert to collusion and assess the timing/quality of revenue records and retrospective entries.

4. High Courts must collate execution pendency data and direct district judiciary to dispose execution petitions within six months; non-compliance to be administratively reviewed.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision preserves the dual objectives of finality of decrees and procedural fairness to third-party occupants: executing courts have the instrumentality to adjudicate resistance in execution proceedings, but factual and documentary proof remains critical. The Court resisted any expansion of tenant-protection claims based on belated revenue entries and emphasised that passive party conduct in earlier suits cannot be rehabilitated by tactical, late objections to execution.

Practically, the judgment reaffirms that execution is not a hollow formality; courts must ensure decrees are not nullified through collusion or procedural lacunae while also guaranteeing that genuine third-party possessory claims get a fair, full adjudication within the execution framework. The administrative directions target chronic execution delay and seek systemic improvement. The reasoning is consistent with prior precedents interpreting Order XXI as a complete code while upholding the need for documentary proof where statutory tenancy protections are claimed.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Shreenath & Anr. v. Rajesh & Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 543.

2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694.

3. NSS Narayan Sarma & Ors. v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 662.

4. Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662.

5. Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, (2014) 15 SCC 529.

6. Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418 (guidelines on execution).

7. Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 9 (possession and better title principles).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 47; Order XXI Rr. 35, 97–103.

2. Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955.