A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in Pinky Meena v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur & Anr. addressed the legality of the discharge of a probationary Civil Judge from service for allegedly suppressing her previous government employment and pursuing simultaneous academic degrees. The appellant, a Scheduled Tribe woman, had been appointed as a Civil Judge after resigning from her earlier position as a Teacher Grade-II in the Education Department of Rajasthan. A complaint prompted disciplinary proceedings against her on grounds of suppression of prior service, simultaneous enrollment in LL.B. and B.Ed., and pursuing LL.M. while serving as a teacher without departmental permission. The Rajasthan High Court discharged her during probation. The Supreme Court held that the alleged misconduct pertained to her period as a government teacher, not her judicial service. Since she had resigned before her interview, non-disclosure of past service was not material suppression. The Court emphasized that probationers cannot be stigmatically discharged without inquiry and that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution safeguard against arbitrary termination. The Court reinstated her with all consequential benefits except back wages, underscoring principles of natural justice and highlighting the importance of women’s greater representation in the judiciary.

Keywords: Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, Probation, Termination, Suppression of service, Simultaneous degrees, Women in judiciary, Natural justice, Article 311, Termination simpliciter, Reinstatement.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case emerged from the discharge of a probationary Civil Judge, Pinky Meena, who belonged to a Scheduled Tribe community and had earlier served as a Teacher Grade-II in Rajasthan’s Education Department. Having acquired multiple academic qualifications, including B.A., B.Ed., LL.B., and LL.M., she successfully cleared the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination, resigned from her teaching post in October 2018, and was appointed as a Civil Judge in February 2019.

Her tenure was disrupted when complaints were filed against her, alleging concealment of prior government service, simultaneous pursuit of academic degrees, and undertaking LL.M. as a regular student while employed. Based on these allegations, the Rajasthan High Court discharged her from service during probation without granting confirmation. The High Court justified its decision under Rules 44–46 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 and Rule 14 which deals with employment by irregular means.

The matter raised critical issues of fairness in probationary termination, the extent of disclosure obligations regarding past employment, and whether academic irregularities prior to judicial service could disqualify a candidate post-selection. The Supreme Court was also called to deliberate upon constitutional protections under Articles 14 and 16, procedural fairness, and the broader imperative of ensuring women’s representation in the judiciary. This case thus became a confluence of service law principles, constitutional guarantees, and gender equality considerations within the judicial system.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, appointed as Teacher Grade-II in 2014, pursued legal education and applied for Rajasthan Judicial Service in 2017. She submitted her resignation on 25 October 2018, which was accepted on 28 December 2018, prior to her interview scheduled on 02 November 2018. She was declared successful and appointed as a trainee Civil Judge on 11 February 2019. She completed her judicial training on 07 March 2020 without any adverse remarks.

However, complaints were lodged against her, prompting issuance of a show cause notice dated 17 February 2020 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958. The allegations were: (i) simultaneous enrollment in LL.B. and B.Ed., contrary to University of Rajasthan Ordinance 168A, (ii) pursuing LL.M. as a regular student while in government service without departmental permission, (iii) suppression of government employment in interview checklist, (iv) failure to obtain No Objection Certificate (NOC) for appearing in RJS examination, and (v) concealment of resignation details.

An inquiry was conducted by the Registrar (Vigilance), but the appellant was not furnished with the report or given a proper opportunity of defense. Relying on the inquiry report, the Full Court resolved to discontinue her services, issuing a discharge order on 29 May 2020. Her writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court was dismissed in 2023.

Before the Supreme Court, her counsel argued that the alleged misconduct pertained to her tenure as a government teacher and not as a judicial officer, that resignation predated her interview, and that the inquiry was vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice. The respondents contended that suppression and irregular qualifications rendered her unfit for confirmation under Rules 44–46 of RJS Rules, and her failure to obtain NOC amounted to misconduct under Rule 14.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether non-disclosure of prior government service in the interview checklist amounted to suppression of material information justifying discharge from service?
ii. Whether pursuing LL.B. and B.Ed. simultaneously, and LL.M. as a regular student during government service without departmental permission, constituted misconduct affecting her judicial appointment?
iii. Whether termination of a probationary Civil Judge during probation without opportunity of hearing violates principles of natural justice and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution?
iv. Whether the discharge order amounted to termination simpliciter or was stigmatic and punitive in nature, attracting protection under Article 311?
v. Whether the High Court erred in treating past academic and service-related irregularities as grounds for judicial discharge after successful completion of training?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the appellant argued that the alleged misconducts related to the period of her service as a Teacher and not her probationary service as a Judge. The Education Department had not taken any action regarding simultaneous academic enrollment or LL.M. attendance; hence, those issues could not be grounds for her judicial discharge.

ii. They contended that on the date of submitting her checklist at the interview, she had already resigned from her government post. Thus, omission to mention past service was not suppression of material fact. The checklist contained no specific column for disclosure of past employment.

iii. It was argued that she had completed her probationary training without any adverse remark, showing efficiency and suitability for judicial office. The discharge was punitive, stigmatic, and violative of Article 311(2), as held in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831, which mandates inquiry before stigmatic termination.

iv. The appellant’s counsel emphasized violation of principles of natural justice, since the inquiry was conducted ex parte by the Registrar (Vigilance) without furnishing her the report or affording a proper defense.

v. It was also urged that termination would render her jobless despite merit and perseverance. Being a tribal woman who overcame socio-economic hurdles to qualify for judicial service, she deserved equitable consideration.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the respondents asserted that the appellant’s simultaneous pursuit of LL.B. and B.Ed. contravened Ordinance 168-A and 168-B of University of Rajasthan Handbook. This constituted misconduct and lack of integrity.

ii. They argued that she pursued LL.M. as a regular student while serving as a government teacher, without obtaining permission from the Education Department, thereby showing fraudulent attendance.

iii. It was contended that she suppressed material facts regarding her past government service in the checklist, thereby attracting Rule 14 of RJS Rules, 2010, which penalizes employment by irregular or improper means.

iv. The respondents relied heavily on Rules 44–46 of RJS Rules, 2010, stating that as a probationer, she had no vested right to confirmation, and the Full Court rightly assessed her as unfit for continuation.

v. They relied on Raj Kumar v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 857, Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. v. Anil Kanwariya (2021) 10 SCC 136, and H.F. Sangati v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka (2001) 3 SCC 117 to argue that probationers can be discharged without reasons if found unsuitable.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – rr. 14 (Employment by irregular means), 44 (Probation), 45 (Confirmation), 46 (Unsatisfactory progress during probation).
ii. Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16 (Show Cause Notice).
iii. Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution – Equality before law and equal opportunity in public employment.
iv. Article 311 of Constitution – Protection of civil servants from dismissal without inquiry.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court quashed the show cause notice and discharge order, holding that the appellant’s alleged irregularities pertained to her period as a teacher and not as a judicial officer. Since she had resigned prior to her interview, non-disclosure of past service was not material suppression. The Court held that she had successfully completed training without blemish and that termination based on past academic irregularities was disproportionate.

The Court emphasized that probationers cannot be terminated punitively without inquiry. Since the inquiry against her was ex parte and she was denied natural justice, the discharge was unconstitutional. The Court also stressed the importance of women’s participation in judiciary, acknowledging her perseverance as a tribal woman. Accordingly, the Court directed her reinstatement with consequential benefits, except back wages, treating her as confirmed in service.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the case lies in the principle that non-disclosure of past government service, if resignation was already tendered before interview, does not constitute suppression of material fact warranting discharge from judicial service. Further, alleged academic irregularities prior to judicial appointment cannot justify punitive discharge from probation. Termination of probationers must distinguish between termination simpliciter and stigmatic termination; when founded on misconduct, it is stigmatic and requires compliance with Article 311(2) and natural justice.

The Court relied on Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831 and Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation (2007) 10 SCC 71, holding that stigmatic discharge of probationers amounts to punitive removal. The case reaffirms constitutional protection under Articles 14 and 16 against arbitrary action.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that greater representation of women in the judiciary enhances diversity, improves judicial decision-making, and promotes gender equality. Women judges can dismantle stereotypes, inspire societal confidence, and increase women’s access to justice. The appellant’s perseverance in overcoming social barriers exemplified why diverse representation benefits the judiciary.

The Court highlighted that women judges, especially from marginalized communities, strengthen democratic legitimacy. Such participation should be encouraged rather than curtailed by disproportionate disciplinary actions.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Non-disclosure of past service, if resignation is tendered before interview, cannot be treated as suppression warranting discharge.
ii. Alleged irregularities in academic pursuits prior to appointment cannot be grounds for punitive discharge from judicial service.
iii. Termination of probationers must distinguish between termination simpliciter and stigmatic termination; punitive orders require inquiry and opportunity of hearing.
iv. Probationers completing training successfully without adverse remarks should ordinarily be confirmed unless objective grounds exist.
v. High Courts, while exercising administrative control, must ensure fairness, non-arbitrariness, and adherence to principles of natural justice.
vi. Women’s participation in judiciary should be safeguarded as a constitutional value promoting equality under Articles 14 and 16.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reaffirms critical principles of service law, namely that discharge of probationers cannot be punitive without adherence to Article 311(2) and natural justice. It underscores that past academic or service-related irregularities not connected to judicial conduct cannot retrospectively invalidate judicial appointment. By distinguishing between termination simpliciter and stigmatic termination, the Court prevents misuse of probationary termination powers.

The ruling also advances constitutional equality by contextualizing the appellant’s case within gender and tribal representation in judiciary. The Court’s recognition of women’s participation as vital to judicial legitimacy is a progressive step. By reinstating the appellant with benefits, the Court balanced justice with proportionality, denying back wages but protecting her service and dignity. This case will stand as a precedent on probationary termination, disclosure obligations, and diversity in judiciary.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831.
ii. Raj Kumar v. Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 857.
iii. State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, [1968] 3 SCR 234.
iv. Hari Singh Mann v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2263.
v. H.F. Sangati v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, (2001) 3 SCC 117.
vi. Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of Jammu & Kashmir, (2010) 12 SCC 783.
vii. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136.
viii. Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur v. Akashdeep Morya, 2021 INSC 485.
ix. Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007) 10 SCC 71.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 (rr. 14, 44–46).
ii. Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958.
iii. Constitution of India – Articles 14, 16, 311.