A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The dispute concerns a title suit for recovery of possession where the defendant (son of the deceased regular tenant) in his written statement made admissions that materially conceded the plaintiff’s essential factual case. The plaintiff sought relief under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for a decree on admissions. The trial court allowed the application and decreed eviction; the High Court affirmed; this Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court examined scope, object and exercise of discretion under Order XII, Rule 6(1) & (2) CPC, the significance of the words “in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing” after the 1976 amendment, and the interplay with Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The Court reiterated that Rule 6 is enabling, discretionary and permissive use of “may” confers a broad, case-sensitive power to enter judgment on admissions without waiting for adjudication of other issues but that a court may nevertheless refuse to decide on admissions if the circumstances make it unsafe to do so. Given the defendant’s clear and unequivocal admissions namely that Ranjan Ghosh was sole tenant, that he died on 13.07.2016, that the plaintiff is the owner and rent was paid until May 2021 the Court held that the defendant fell within Section 2(g) and the trial court/High Court did not err in decreeing possession under Order XII, Rule 6. Remedies to vacate were afforded with a limited time period.

Keywords: Order XII Rule 6 CPC; Admission in written statement; Judgment on admissions; West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 — Section 2(g); Decree on admissions.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal.
ii) Case Number: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025.
iii) Judgment Date: 07 April 2025.
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India.
v) Quorum: Hon’ble J.J. J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan.
vi) Author: Bench judgment (per available file).
vii) Citation: [2025] 5 S.C.R. 458 : 2025 INSC 467.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Order XII, Rule 6 CPC; Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976; West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 — Section 2(g).
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None indicated.
x) Related Law Subjects: Civil Procedure; Property / Tenancy law; Execution and Relief on admissions.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The plaintiff-owner brought Title Suit No.1068 of 2021 for recovery of possession and mesne profits against the defendant who claimed tenancy through his father, the original tenant Ranjan Ghosh (deceased 13.07.2016). Plaintiff served statutory notice (20.07.2018) asserting that the heir’s statutory tenancy under Section 2(g) would survive only up to five years from the date of death and that the defendant could not be regarded as tenant under the 1997 Act beyond that period. The defendant’s written statement expressly admitted key factual components: that Ranjan Ghosh was the sole tenant, that he died on 13.07.2016, that the defendant was his heir and legal representative, and that rent was paid up to May 2021. Taking these admissions as foundation, plaintiff applied under Order XII Rule 6 CPC for judgment on admissions and decree; the trial court allowed the application and decreed eviction. On appeal, the High Court affirmed: it treated the pleaded admissions as satisfying Section 2(g)’s ingredients so that the defendant’s statutory tenancy had expired and the defendant stood relegated to trespasser, entitling the plaintiff to decree upon admission. The defendant sought special leave. The Supreme Court condensed the legal question to whether the High Court was right in decreeing the suit applying Order XII, Rule 6 CPC in view of the unequivocal pleadings. The Court reviewed legislative history (1976 Amendment), Law Commission commentary, and precedent on the ambit of “or otherwise” and discretion under Rule 6.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff is the registered owner of the suit premises. Ranjan Ghosh was a regular tenant at Rs.1,700 per month (including municipal charges) and died on 13.07.2016. The defendant (son) lived in the premises until his father’s death and thereafter claimed a right to continue as tenant by inheritance. The plaintiff served a notice dated 20.07.2018 drawing attention to Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 that confers tenancy status on specified dependants for a period not exceeding five years from tenant’s death. The defendant received notice on 21.07.2018 and did not give a satisfactory reply. The plaintiff instituted the title suit in 2021. In his written statement the defendant admitted that Ranjan Ghosh was sole tenant, that he died on 13.07.2016, that the defendant is heir/representative, that plaintiff is owner, and that rent was paid until May 2021. Relying on these admissions, plaintiff moved under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC for decree on admission. The defendant opposed, arguing Rule 6 is discretionary, admissions must sometimes be proved and the suit contained triable issues requiring full trial; he also filed applications under Sections 7(1) & 7(2) of the W.B.P.T. Act for payment of current/arrears rent, indicating ongoing contested pleadings. The trial court decreed possession on admissions; the High Court dismissed FAT No.7 of 2024 upholding that the admitted facts satisfy Section 2(g) and that Rule 6 empowered decree. The Supreme Court reviewed and dismissed the petition.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Order XII, Rule 6 CPC permits a court to pronounce judgment and draw a decree upon admissions made in the written statement without waiting for trial of other issues?
ii. Whether the words “in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing” in Rule 6 broaden its scope to admissions dehors pleadings?
iii. Whether the defendant’s pleaded admissions satisfy the ingredients of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 such that his statutory tenancy expired and the plaintiff is entitled to decree?
iv. Whether a court must nevertheless decline judgment on admissions when triable and complex questions remain or when it is unsafe to act on admissions alone?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for petitioner contended that Order XII, Rule 6 is discretionary and the court should exercise restraint where material issues remain; that admissions must be read with Order VIII, Rule 5 and the proviso to Section 23 Evidence Act permitting court to require proof even of admitted facts; that factual complexity (e.g., claim of fresh tenancy or pending applications under the W.B.P.T. Act) required full trial and evidence; and lastly that the petitioner might not be governed by Section 2(g), a point not argued below but advanced before this Court to contend that the statutory tenancy issue was erroneously resolved on admissions.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for respondent argued that the defendant’s admissions in the written statement were clear, unequivocal and unconditional specifically admission of the original tenant’s identity, date of death, heirship and payment of rent only up to May 2021 and that these constituted factual ingredients under Section 2(g). Therefore, no triable dispute remained on the admitted portions and the plaintiff was entitled to immediate judgment under Order XII, Rule 6; discretion to refuse judgment arises only where it is unsafe to act on admissions, which was not the case here. The respondent relied upon precedents including Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India and ITDC Ltd. v. Chander Pal Sood & Son to show wide scope of Rule 6.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court and trial court. It reviewed the legislative amendments effected by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, noting that Rule 6 was recast to permit judgment either on application or suo motu and to require a decree to be drawn where judgment is pronounced on admission. The Court emphasized the object: to enable speedy judgment at least to the extent of admitted relief. The Court held that Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce judgment upon admissions without waiting for determination of other questions. It stressed that Rule 6 is enabling and discretionary use of “may” imports judicial flexibility. However, the Court clarified that discretion operates to refuse to act on admissions when unsafe or when matters cannot conveniently be disposed at interlocutory stage. The Court interpreted the phrase “or otherwise” as sufficiently wide to include admissions in pleadings and dehors pleadings, oral or written, and reiterated that admissions may be express, implied, oral or constructive.

The Court applied precedents: Uttam Singh (2000) and ITDC (2000 DLT DB) endorsing broad exercise of Rule 6; older authorities (e.g., Throp v. Holdsworth, Brown v. Pearson, Sher Bahadur) were surveyed for doctrinal lineage. Turning to facts, the Court observed that admitted facts satisfied Section 2(g): the defendant’s status as son and heir, date of tenant’s death (13.07.2016), and cessation of rent acceptance by plaintiff after May 2021, showed the statutory five-year period had expired before suit.

The Court therefore concluded that the defendant was relegated to a trespasser vis-à-vis the plaintiff and that decree on admissions was justified. The submission that the Act did not apply was not raised below and inconsistent with the defendant’s own pleadings (he had invoked Sections 7(1) & 7(2) W.B.P.T. Act before the trial court). Given these factors, the petition failed and dismissal followed with an incidental three-month period to vacate.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is two-fold. First, Order XII, Rule 6 CPC, as amended, permits a court to pronounce judgment and draw a decree on admissions made in pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing, and such power is discretionary and to be exercised in light of facts and circumstances to secure speedy determination of the admitted relief. Second, where pleaded admissions clearly satisfy statutory ingredients of a substantive provision (here Section 2(g) W.B.P.T. Act, 1997), no further trial is required on those admitted facts and judgment on admission is appropriate. The combination of clear admissions and statutory effect (expiration of five-year dependent tenancy) justified immediate decree for eviction.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court reiterated that discretion under Rule 6 is not fettered by rigid formulation; it may be declined where it is unsafe or inconvenient to decide on admissions alone. The Court also observed procedural propriety: points not raised below (e.g., non-applicability of the Act) should not be first advanced at SLP stage. The Court emphasized interplay between Rule 6 and provisions like Order VIII, Rule 5 and the Evidence Act proviso, signalling that courts retain power to require proof where necessary.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Order XII, Rule 6 may be invoked when admissions are clear, unequivocal and cover the essential ingredients of claimed relief.
ii. Court must exercise discretion in light of safety and convenience; decline Rule 6 where triable questions remain that cannot be resolved on admissions alone.
iii. Admissions outside pleadings (oral, documentary, record statements) fall within Rule 6’s scope post-1976 amendment.
iv. When judgment on admissions is pronounced, a decree must be drawn immediately under sub-rule (2).
v. Parties should raise all material legal contentions at earliest forum; novel points at appellate/SLP stage may be rejected on procedural grounds.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces the salutary policy of speedy relief on admissions while preserving judicial discretion when full adjudication is necessary. Practitioners should be alert that unequivocal admissions in a written statement can be fatal to a defence and may permit interlocutory decree under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC. Conversely, defendants must avoid inadvertent admissions and should explicitly plead and preserve contentions (for example, non-applicability of a statute) at the trial stage. The decision faithfully tracks earlier precedents (notably Uttam Singh and ITDC) and the law reform impulse behind the 1976 amendment — to prevent unnecessary trial where the core factual contest has been admitted. Finally, courts retain a cautionary duty: the convenience of disposing admitted parts must not trump fairness where admissible facts require corroboration or when complex issues remain that cannot be justly resolved at motion stage.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120; [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 187.
ii. Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India, AIR 1971 SC 1081; [1971] SCR 2171.
iii. Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396; [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 258.
iv. ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood & Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB); (2000 AIHC 1990).
v. Sivalinga v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151.
vi. Sher Bahadur v. Mohd. Amin, AIR 1929 Lah 569.
vii. Throp v. Holdsworth, (1876) 3 Ch D 637.
viii. Brown v. Pearson, (1882) 21 Ch D 716.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Order XII, Rule 6).
ii. Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (amending O. XII R.6).
iii. West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (Section 2(g)).

c. Primary Source
i. Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025, Supreme Court of India, Judgment dated 07 April 2025.